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ERRATA.

Page 555, line 21, for <i>enormous</i> ,	read <i>erroneous</i> .
558, 13, <i>God and inter gods,</i>	<i>God and gods interchangeably.</i>
558, 20, <i>stories,</i>	<i>stoics. (Note.)</i>
566, 18, <i>proposition,</i>	<i>power.</i>
569, 18, <i>Creator,</i>	<i>creation.</i>
574, 6, <i>faculties,</i>	<i>facilities.</i>

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NOTICE.—The *Essays on the Philosophy of the Mind, and on Christianity and Philosophy*, will be continued.

ERRATUM.—On page 56, last line, for *objection* read *obligation*.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. V.—MARCH, 1835.

ART. I. MEANS OF PROMOTING CHRISTIANITY.

By ELIAZAR LORD, Esq., New-York.

THE divine influence is the sole efficient cause of all the success of Christianity, whether with respect to individuals or communities.

No means or instrumentalities are to be employed but those which are divinely sanctioned, and which are therefore appropriate to the co-operation of that influence.

The degree of success will be proportioned to the right use of these means. It were inconsistent with the very nature and all the pretensions of Christianity to argue otherwise, and would imply that the truths and sanctions of the Gospel were less adapted, even with aid from on high, to affect men's minds, than the perversions of error.

There is in the divine purpose and constitution with respect to these means and the nature and affections of the human mind, a fitness and connexion, on the ground of which, by the concurrence of the divine agency, success may be expected to follow their use, and cannot be looked for without the appropriate instrumentality.

This connexion, fitness, and co-operation is analogous to that which occurs in other cases involving human agency, as in that of agriculture: insomuch that a departure from the scriptural method, and a reliance on other influences and grounds of success, will as certainly end in disappointment, as the calculations of a husbandman would, who, to produce wheat should sow tares, or who should look for a crop without sowing any seed.

But there have been in modern, as well as earlier times, wide departures from the simplicity of the Gospel, and reliance has been extensively placed, in the reformed churches, on other means of success.

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Instead of specifying at large in what instances and what respects in the history of Protestant Christendom there have been the most notable failures to employ evangelical means in simple dependence on the divine influence, it will be more to the present purpose to notice some of the substitutes and inferior causes on which reliance for success has been extensively reposed. The results anticipated and realized from these substitutes amount to little more than a kind of public worldly influence of Christianity, an outward respectability, a tolerated observance of its forms, a temporal support of its institutions, and certain secular benefits to society.

Among those inferior grounds of dependence for the success of the Gospel, *Learning* must be named as the first and most conspicuous. When the church emerged from the ignorance and corruption of the dark ages, and caught a glimpse of the light and glory of the Gospel in contrast with the reigning and universal superstition, imposture and wickedness, the minds of men were roused, and the transition gave to every species of knowledge a captivating power; and in relation to the first and main object, the conversion and salvation of men, assigned to human learning a mistaken office and an undue importance, which the invention of printing encouraged, and various causes have helped to perpetuate.

Let every one think as he pleases, but let no one's temper be disturbed, if it be urged that the reformers and their successors erred on this subject. Let it be candidly considered, whether instead of relying on the inculcation of those simple and essential truths of the Gospel which are adapted to the capacities and feelings of the common mind, however ignorant of other things, and on the divine influence, as the immediate and sole ground of confidence and hope, they did not too much exalt, and too much depend on, the efforts of reason, the arms of controversy, and the powers of learning? Instead of calculating on the boundless resources of moral influence and renovation which proceed from the simple inculcations of the Gospel, and addressing their efforts accordingly, did they not direct their zeal quite too much against the heretical doctrines, abominable customs, and tyrannical power of the hierarchy to which they were opposed?

Whatever may be alleged in its defence, whatever causes

may be assigned as leading to it, did not the course which they adopted at once place Christianity in a position to require defence, constant defence against the arrogance of puny mortals, and defence on other grounds and by other means than its own intrinsic elements, its divine verities, its spirit of love, purity, and humility, its claims on the conscience, its hopes, its sanctions, its alliance with the agency and glory of God?

Did not their view of the contest they were to prosecute, unavoidably lead to the use of weapons similar to those by which they were assailed, and to transfer the scene of action from the field of spiritual conquest, the hearts and consciences of the common people, to the intellects and passions of the learned and the great? Were not the acquisitions and efforts of ministers dictated by this view of the case? Did it not become necessary, that they should explore all those paths of learning in which their enemies were intrenched, and those newer ones which they opened, and which augmented their intellectual force, and gave them advantages of position? Did not this policy naturally require, that their learning should appear conspicuously in their sermons, as well as in their books; that in addition to their controversies with each other, they should fight the enemy at all points; that they should openly attack and oppose each and every thing which they deemed erroneous in theory and practice, every thing in the theological, ecclesiastical, and political world, every thing in the religious rites and established customs of society, every thing in the stupendous fabric of papal imposture, and in the dark workings of the whole mystery of iniquity which could be argued against, ridiculed or denounced?

The Reformers, whose praise needs not the tribute of any feeble tongue of the present day, had themselves, in common with all around them, been enveloped in the clouds of Romish ignorance and superstition. When they opened their eyes and discovered those effulgent truths of the Gospel which are quick and powerful, sharper than any two edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and discerning the thoughts and intents of the heart, it need not be wondered at, that in view of the abominations of Rome, and the degraded and hopeless condition of the people, they were impelled to extremes by the spirit of controversy; that seeing the reins of absolute power, ecclesiastical

and political, in the hands of a few of the trained and leading agents of the Pope, they were induced to turn the influence and the associated and public efforts of Christianity, and all the artillery of learning and wit, against them; that they deemed an intellectual and political victory, necessary as a preparation for the Gospel to have free course and be glorified.

To those who have leisure and curiosity, it will be worth the trouble to read the history of this prolonged battle with the powers of the air, and mark how the intellectual and political resources which were so much depended on, and so earnestly employed on the part of Christianity, were gradually expended, or engrossed by the enemy, and how naturally the present state of those parts of Europe which were the scene of these events, has resulted from the mistaken course adopted by the first Reformers.

In the light of that history, the tendency of their system is clearly to be seen, and there can be no hazard in saying, that like all the efforts of heated controversy and excited passion at the present day, their proceedings were calculated to divert attention from the spiritual and practical import of the Gospel, to the points in dispute, and to their connexion with the affairs of civil government, the rights of the people, and other secular and extraneous matters. Rulers and politicians seized the rising ferment as a means of securing their power and gaining strength for its defence; and the people, suffering under the iron rod of despotism and superstition, like the Jews on the earliest announcement of Christianity, were first and chiefly anxious to be delivered from the yoke of political tyranny.

It is therefore no matter of surprise, that the Scriptures should have received less attention, and been less read, less understood and less regarded, even by the learned, at least in Germany, a century after, than immediately before the dawn of the reformation. That such was the case may be rendered sufficiently evident by a single testimony, that of Spener, one of the founders of the school of Biblical Theology at Halle, near the close of the seventeenth century. He states, that it was usual for persons having an education for the ministry, to spend five or six years at the Universities without hearing, or caring to hear, a single book, chapter, or verse of the Bible explained. It is also stated by the Translator of Knapp's "Theology," from whom the above is

taken, "that in the few cases when exegetical lectures were commenced, by such teachers as Olearius and Carpzov, they were soon abandoned. The Bible was perhaps less used before the time of Spener, in Protestant Universities, than it had been, under penalty of excommunication, by pious Catholics before the reformation. In place of the Scriptures, the different symbols established by the Protestant church were taught and studied. The minutest distinctions established by them were contended for with the greatest zeal, and the least deviation from them, was pronounced heresy as decidedly as if they had been given by inspiration of God, and was punished accordingly with the greatest severity. The spirit of Protestantism seemed to have thrown off the hierarchal yoke, only to assume another and perhaps a more degrading form of bondage. In explaining and defending these symbols, the Aristotelian dialectics were employed, and in the use of them the students were thoroughly exercised. As to the practical effect which the doctrines of Christianity should have upon their own hearts, and the manner in which they should exhibit them for the benefit of others, nothing was said to them by their teachers. Thus disciplined they went forth, to repeat from the pulpit what they had learned from the University, and fought over their idle battles, in which their own learning and skill were carefully displayed, to the neglect of every thing which might arouse the careless, persuade the doubting, or satisfy the deep desires, and assuage the sorrows of the heart."

"This was a state of things which Spener deplored. Others before him, especially pious laymen, had noticed these evils; but had withdrawn, like the mystics of a former period, and sought in private contemplation that satisfaction of their spiritual wants, which they could not obtain from the learned jargon of the pulpit; or if, like Andreæ and Arndt, they had lifted a voice of remonstrance against the prevailing disorders, it had been drowned in the noise of angry polemics."

Behold a different example! On the appearance of our Saviour the state of the world, and especially of Judea, was, with respect to religion, very much like that of Europe at the date of the reformation. Pomp, ceremony, ritual forms, intolerance, pride, bigotry, and the whole list of iniquities, perversions, and heresies abounded on every side; religion had ceased to exert any practical influence on the hearts,

and lives of the Jewish people, generally, and the attention of the learned doctors and expounders of the law, both Jewish and Samaritan, was wholly absorbed by sectarian controversy and theoretic questions; while the Sadducees courted and obtained the favour of the great, and the Pharisees that of the ignorant and profligate multitude. Our Saviour beholding them in this condition, compares the people to sheep wandering without a shepherd, and their pretended guides to men smitten with blindness. Yet these leaders displayed great zeal for the law, and its outward rites and ceremonies. They were ready to suffer and die for their conflicting doctrines, theories, and traditions; but wholly neglected *that teaching of individuals and families*, in the house, and by the way-side, which Moses had expressly enjoined, as the means of perpetuating religion among them.

Did Christ and his disciples direct their efforts chiefly against these heads and leaders of the nation, or against their pretensions and errors, or any thing relating to them? Did they ever go after them, or seek them? When they came into our Saviour's presence did he invite a controversy, or argue with them except from premises which they admitted, and by which they were self-convicted? Is it not evident from their history, that the first teachers of Christianity, both to Jews and Gentiles, avoided all direct and systematic assaults on the customs of society, and the power and influence of rulers and leaders, however perverted and absurd, and devoted almost their whole attention to the common people, in the most inoffensive, humble, Christ-like manner possible? And is it not equally notorious, that while this simple, unpretending, despised instrumentality was continued, in perfect dependence on the Divine influence, though the wisdom of the wise was scandalized, and the passions of the contentious, and the curiosity of the vain and foolish, were disappointed, the progress of Christianity was rapid and irresistible? And what was the first indication of its decline, but the gorgon head of rabbinical, allegorical, philosophical, and political learning thrusting itself into the sanctuary, and essaying to engraft upon the Gospel a score of opposing theories and systems, and to smother the church in a cloud of pagan darkness and folly!

This misplaced dependence on learning continues to the present day. At this hour, in the most favoured nations,

Christianity is a disputed, controverted, unsettled question ; a question of criticism, of philosophy, of history ; a question involving politics and literature ; a question about which men differ as widely as at any former period, and which, though it be treated somewhat differently, is no nearer being settled than heretofore. The only demonstration which it owns, or will admit of, has been withheld. Its friends, instead of exemplifying its humility, benevolence, and heavenly spirit in their lives, and applying it to the young, the poor, the ignorant, the mass of the people, have regarded it as a difficult, abstruse, complicated subject, involving many uncertain and doubtful matters, and requiring to be defended by learning, art, and subtility. Instead of being considered as an affair of the heart, it is treated first, and chiefly, as an affair of the head. Instead of being within the capacity of a Hottentot, or Laplander, it is supposed to require deep study, intellectual effort, and subtility, on the part of its converts. The continual droppings of learned officiousness have worn away the plain and simple features of the original, and covered its emaciated form with such a load of glosses, explanations, queries, distinctions, doubts, and difficulties, as to put at defiance all pretence of harmony or consistency, and render it a matter of wonder, that any two persons should exactly agree, or be perfectly content to differ, on any one point. It is to a greater or less extent in every community supposed to be, with respect to its claims, its authority, and its bearing on the future destinies of men, on a level with other religions. It is judged of, not by any reference to its author, nor by its own pure light, but by its elevation or depression in the scale of human reason, the learning and prowess of its defenders, and the state of pending controversies.

The truth is, discouraging and humiliating as it may be, the great mass of the people in Protestant Christendom know little or nothing of the Gospel ; and perhaps as large a proportion of those who are instructed, and even learned, in other matters, have no idea of the spiritual nature and design of Christianity, as of those who are most ignorant of all other things. And there is but too much reason to apprehend, that the religion of Protestants in this country is in danger of a similar eclipse to that which long since obscured its light in Germany.

The people are not taught. The system is such, that it

requires an educated Protestant minister, alas, in how many instances ! six whole days of study and rest, to prepare himself to deliver two lectures, essays, or sermons, of thirty or forty minutes each, on the Lord's day, to such persons as may please to come to hear him. These generally must be carefully written, in learned and set terms, so as to be unintelligible to many of the auditory, lest in the infinite confusion of ideas in which the subject is involved, and the labyrinth of definitions, distinctions, doubts, and perplexities which crowd upon the question on every side, he should make some mistake, use some wrong words, cross somebody's track, or in some way get out of the *traces*. This habit on their part disqualifies them in every respect for that simple, familiar, colloquial teaching, by which alone the young, the uneducated, the common mind, can ever be instructed. Ministers are too often a class by themselves—a learned, recluse body, as far removed from the associations, capacities, and sympathies of the people generally, as were the priests of Egypt, and the philosophers of Greece, or as are the Babel tongues of their libraries. Is it any wonder that the most diligent of their hearers, when for the time they ought to be teachers themselves, have need that one teach them again and again, which be the first principles of the oracles of God ? Is it any wonder that the pure, demonstrative, resistless light of the Gospel, cannot be seen through such a confused mass of artificial net-work, such a compound of bewildering technicalities, abstractions, and mysteries !

This system seems unavoidably to require, what is so commonly, and with so much surprise observed, that the glow of love in the newly renovated heart, should be chilled, restrained, and compelled to give precedence to the theories, notions, and abstractions of the head. No sooner does a convert discern, with grateful and admiring transport, the divine beauty, loveliness, and glory of the objects which the Gospel presents to his new-born affections, than he is directly, or by just inference from the course of instruction, made to feel in danger if he yields to the power of that vision, to the absorbing emotions of the heart, to that transforming spiritual influence, the mode, or philosophy of which is one of the thousand things in controversy ; and he is painfully driven to turn his eye, and yield his attention, to the cold, cheerless, barren subjects of speculative theology, sectarian

distinctions, and the category of religious tactics. He is to obtain through these mediums whatever light he enjoys or reflects. His heart is confined and smothered, by the very instruments which are intended to excite its action ; it is, as it were, incased in the thick folds of theory, speculation, technicality, mode and form, as the Chinese glaze over their earthen images with an unyielding and durable compound. And now that the well-springs of life and action are sealed ; now that those powerful emotions and supreme affections of the heart, from which obedience in the outward conduct proceeds, are checked and repressed ; now that the native spiritual influence of Christianity, instead of being permitted to become the law of the mind, superceding all other influences, and ruling all the sources of action, is subjected to an artificial system of theory and speculation, is it any wonder, that the practical exhibitions of this religion, of its pure spirit, its humility, its benevolence, its forbearance, its amiableness, its universal and surpassing loveliness, should not be such as to put an end to all doubt of its genuineness and efficacy, all question of its reality and blessedness, all difficulty of distinguishing its radiance from false lights, and all pretence for depending for its support or defence on any thing but its own simple truths and the co-operation of the Holy Spirit?

Under this system, when the church is by its leaders thought to be in danger, not from vice and immorality, but from error in speculation, error touching the construction of something in the symbol of doctrine or the principles of ecclesiastical government, one of the first things to be done is—*what* ? To repent and do the first works, and return to the fountain and source of light ? Quite otherwise. It is to draw all possible attention to the written symbol or standard, as though a speculative conformity with that, as the respective parties construe it, were the main thing, and all variance of opinion, even respecting the latest and most subtle distinctions, were the highest offence, demanded an exclusion from all confidence, and merited condign punishment. Pride, selfishness and passion now have scope for their indulgence, under the cloak, and in the abused and insulted name of religion. Piety stands abashed. Love, humility, meekness, gentleness, forbearance, compassion, kindness, joy and peace disappear, while their place is occupied by the seven spirits of contention.

On the scheme of maintaining Christianity by intellectual efforts on the fields of ecclesiastical, philosophical and doctrinal controversy, the door of dissention is alway kept wide open, and the same pride, ambition and other passions are appealed to, and there is the same tendency to division and strife, as in politics and false systems of religion. Books, therefore, on all sides of every question which the wit of man has been able to suggest, have been and still are constantly increasing. At the same time it is apparent that the learned terms, and incredible masses of lumber which this method has accumulated, have no hold on the common mind, and neither directly nor indirectly exert any more influence on the mass of mankind, than the rolls of Pompeii, or the hieroglyphics of Egypt: and hence the facility and success with which infidelity, fanaticism and delusion have so long roamed over the vast field of human ignorance and depravity.

How on this scheme can it be accounted for, that Christianity has always flourished and triumphed most, when so administered and so circumstanced, as to appear contemptible to the learning, philosophy, wisdom and power of the world? and when utterly bereft of all hope of favour from them, subjected to their frowns, and driven to depend exclusively on God? Did the faith of miracles at the beginning stand in place of our shield of polemics and controversy? Did the resistless sword of Nero excuse the church from an intellectual war? Was the Apostolic church in the valleys of Piedmont preserved by miracle, or by the same humble instrumentality, and the same divine influence and protection, as in the primitive age?

Let the reader, with a full view of the nature of Christianity, its divinity, its proper sphere, and its complete adaptation to its object, refer to the history of events in the theological and ecclesiastical world of Protestantism; examine a list of what are called theological books, or such as are deemed desirable and necessary in a theological library; consider the systems of theological education especially in Europe, and the nature of ministerial labour; and to avoid uncharitable censures, let all the exceptions which any one may find reason to make, and all the good which has been done, be allowed, and the most ample folds of all charity be thrown over all those individuals who with honest hearts have wasted their lives in building up and defending the

mere scaffolding of their systems ; and let him candidly inquire what have been the results of this method of propagating and maintaining Christianity ; what is the actual state of religion and of the churches, in those countries where the experiment was commenced, and where it has been most fully tried ? What in short under this system is the type of a minister ? With respect to those countries at least, may it not be said, that a Protestant minister is a man specially educated and trained to defend the ecclesiastical and theological system of his sect, first against all other Protestant denominations, and then against all the errors of the rest of the world ?

Such a minister suggests the idea of a man who should undertake to construct a building for religious meetings, and in order to prepare himself for the work, should study the civil law, the theory of architecture, and the method of self-defence ; and as a practical mechanic should learn to use only the rule and the smoothing plane, and know nothing of the axe, the saw, the chisel, the hammer, or any other implement. He would thus be qualified to sketch a plan of the proposed building, and to explain and defend his theory and all his rights ; and supposing the necessary timber to be brought to the proper locality, he might in course of time make some impression on it with his smoothing plane, and probably fit some pieces for their place in his edifice ; but most of his materials would perish before he would effect his object. Should several different persons, similarly qualified, undertake to co-operate in constructing the same building, and should they disagree as to the architectural plan, and employ themselves in controversy, first about their own, and then with the world at large touching the plan of all other buildings, the illustration would perhaps be more complete.

There has been a shifting of scenes, a change of tactics, from time to time, but the great evils which have been assailed by this array of effort have not been subverted.— Would that it might be seen, that the means employed had no tendency to work success, and never even in appearance had any success, except as death cleared the field of particular enemies, and perseverance worried out others, or the taste and fashion of the times demanded new subjects, and new modes of contention. This partizan warfare and single combat of intellectual and moral gladiators may, with respect to the

mountains of error in question, be fitly compared to the case of a civil engineer, who should attempt to subvert a material mountain by the fulminations of his science and oratory, instead of engaging with the humble labour of the people to undermine it.

This system is every way at variance with the genius of the Gospel, and instead of working the effects which Christianity is designed to produce, it first of all leads the minds of men away from those simple truths by the instrumentality of which their sanctification is effected. It is essentially a speculative system, and demands attention to matters which are but remotely and circumstantially connected with the subject of religion. This is doubtless more especially the case when the storm of controversy rages with greatest violence. Then succeed all sorts of fanaticism, "all monstrous, all prodigious things," as the excitement spreads among the common people. In calmer times, the supercilious pride of learning takes a more stately and luxurious seat; while the plodding dullness of pedantry busies itself, like the artisans of a German toy shop, in giving new shapes and colours to old materials, serving up to the weary, fickle appetite of effeminate curiosity and pompous egotism, an endless assortment of criticisms, comments, conceits and quidities. Religion is now covered with heaps of rubbish, which even the initiated can penetrate only by lives of study, working their obscure and devious way through the confusion of dead and foreign tongues.

Need we look to the father-land of the Reformation exclusively, to justify what has now been said? Does not the system tend the same way everywhere? May we not see nearer home a growing tendency to follow in the same steps, cherish the same spirit, teach the same things, impart the same wares, and adopt the same fashions?

Besides the alleged dependence on human learning, much might be affirmed to the same purpose of the forms of religious worship, and the appendages and worldly alliances of Christianity. How much reliance, for example, has been placed in some countries on the secular and political advantages of a connexion of church and state? and, generally, what dependence has been felt on the style and accommodations of the buildings appropriated to public worship? The feeling is common that a tasteful and attractive style of architecture, and a show of comfort and elegance is neces-

sary to conciliate the favourable opinions of worldly persons, make Christianity respectable in the eyes of the world, and give it popular influence.

Rightly viewed, the Gospel, instead of being commended by these circumstantial appendages, which the magicians, astrologers and soothsayers of paganism can imitate and surpass, would better commend itself by its spirit, its works of love, and its outward tokens of the humility which it so prominently inculcates.

Should any one imagine that the preceding observations are intended to cast contempt upon learning, or to imply that ministers have no need of sound education, mental discipline, and habits of thought and reflection, he would be quite mistaken. With theological learning in its proper sphere and applied to its proper objects, there is no more occasion of controversy than with mechanics or agriculture ; but let it not usurp the place or office of Christianity ; let not the metaphysics or philosophy of religion be substituted for the Gospel. Scholastic learning has no business in the pulpit. And, judging from experience, even if employed on the external evidences, philosophy and polemics of religion, or in the *hermeneutics*, the *dialectics*, or any other of its numberless ramifications, it may as often obscure and mystify, as render more evident the light within. The facts, assumptions, testimonies, doctrines, precepts, and sanctions of the Gospel, in their adaption to the heart and conscience, their power to produce conviction, and their tendency to reform and purify, are as much superiour to any of the forms or applications of human learning, as heaven is to earth. Let ministers be educated, not in speculation or controversy, not to furnish them with artificial instruments for their work, but in order to the best use and exertion of their faculties as pastors and teachers ; let them attain a clear and comprehensive knowledge of Christianity, but in teaching it, leave all extraneous matters out of view, and adhere to the simple method of its founder. And as for learning, profound biblical and theological learning, let such and so many men be set apart, and by common consent devoted to it, in each country, as the interests of the church demand, or as those interests will permit, without a misapplication of any of the time or talents required for the practical application of Christianity. For ministers generally to devote themselves at pleasure to the pursuits of learning, can be no more right, than it

would be for them to apply themselves to other extraneous pursuits.

In the apostolic age all dependence on human learning was disavowed and rejected—all use of learned language, and imitation of the reigning fashion of oratory, and all pride, pomp and show in externals, was carefully avoided.

The facts, precepts and doctrines of the Gospel were revealed in the simplest language, and men ignorant of the learning and philosophy of the day, were peculiarly adapted to teach the Gospel to others,—1st, because they would deliver it in the same simple phrase and manner in which they received it; 2d, because from the state, the associations and sympathies of their own minds, they were qualified to fall in with, and avail themselves of the thoughts and feelings existing in the minds of the people; 3d, because the efficacy of the Gospel under their administration was in no hazard of being ascribed to any other than the divine influence.

Hence the method by which our Saviour taught them to instruct others. He went about through all the villages preaching, that is talking to, and conversing with, all who would attend. He joined individuals and companies in their journeys, in the fields, and on the water, engaged in their secular employments; and availing himself of the knowledge they possessed, and the course of thoughts to which they were accustomed, he engrafted his instructions on their cherished feelings and associations, and by narratives, parables, and similes, suggested by the objects immediately in their view, held up before their minds those strong and vivid pictures of the things of his kingdom, which are transmitted to us in the brief story of his mission.

Paul, whatever might have been the use of his previous learning, in his relation to the Jews and their economy, imitated this example in his preaching to the Gentiles. He says to the Greeks of Corinth, "Christ sent me to preach the Gospel, not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect; for the preaching of the cross is to them that perish, foolishness, but unto us which are saved it is the power of God.—God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty, and low things of the world, and things

which are despised, hath God chosen, and things which are not, to bring to naught things that are ; that no flesh should glory in his presence.—And I, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God ; for I determined not to know any thing among you save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness, and fear, and much trembling, and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the spirit and of power, that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men but in the power of God.—I have planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the increase. So then neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase.—We are labourers together with God. Ye are God's husbandry ; ye are God's building." Again : " I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some. And this I do for the Gospel's sake, that I may be partaker thereof with you.—I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection ; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-away."

The example of the apostles and first teachers of Christianity most clearly indicates as proper to a minister, besides a just knowledge of the Gospel, a spirit of supreme self-devotement to its service, and of self-denial with respect to all other objects ; an aptness to teach, comprising a practical knowledge of human nature, a knowledge of the susceptibilities, affections, passions, habits of thought, sentiments and prejudices of men, a capacity to gain their confidence, win their attention, conciliate their regard, and convey to their minds the simple, persuasive, and affecting truths of Christianity. And in the exercise of their office it is clearly indicated, that they should in their temper and conduct exemplify its spirituality, purity, humility, inoffensiveness, impartiality and universal benevolence ; that they should, at whatever personal sacrifice and self-denial, adapt themselves to the state of mind and the circumstances of the people, avoiding in their temper, manners and habits, every thing, even things in themselves indifferent, which might offend, alienate or prejudice the weakest mind, obscure their exhibitions of the Gospel or hinder its success, and that their engrossing and chief business from day to day should be that of teaching, warning and exhortation, in conformity

with the command of Christ, "go teach—disciple, all nations—every creature."

Perhaps some reader may be inclined to suppose, that because there were no books or means of instruction in general use in our Saviour's time, and no sufficient places for large assemblies to meet on the Sabbath day, to hear sermons, his method and that of the apostles, of outdoor, personal and family instruction, was very proper and very necessary; but not so in the present age of schools, books, and church edifices. Shallow as this view of the case is, it has probably satisfied many a one to waste his life in worse than monkish indolence, dreaming over the trash and gossip of the day, and being in earnest only on such themes as eating, drinking, sleeping, and being clothed, while nine out of ten of the human race, whatever their schools and books might teach, knew nothing, nay, never so much as heard of the Gospel, and not a small proportion of the most favoured communities, in the midst of the greatest abundance of Bibles and other books, had no idea of the method of salvation, nor any sense of its importance to themselves.

The method of our Saviour and his apostles is founded in the nature of man, in his susceptibilities, affections, and conscience; and while the race continue to bring the same nature and qualities into the world with them, as heretofore, it will be just as applicable and as necessary, as at any former period.

The absurdity of supposing that the knowledge and influence of the Gospel can be imparted to all the individuals of any community, without the diligent use of that method, may be illustrated by supposing that a schoolmaster, being engaged to instruct an hundred children of five years old and upwards, in the alphabet, spelling, reading, and the various branches of a common education, should attempt to accomplish his object, by delivering a course of weekly lectures, addressed indiscriminately to the whole school, instead of dividing them into proper classes, and devoting himself to the constant, laborious, daily task of teaching each individual and each class separately.

Surely, words need not be multiplied upon this subject. If ministers will occasionally drop their books and papers, and look out from their comfortable and pleasant libraries upon the condition of the people around them, they will discover where the difficulty lies. Let them consider how

small a number out of one or two thousand residing nearest to them, have been brought under the influence of the Gospel ; how small a proportion are regularly present at public worship ; how few even of the adults, to say nothing of the children, usually understand or give any earnest attention to the sermons which are addressed to them ; to what proportion of the hearers the sermons have no appropriateness ; how little influence of the public services extends beyond the hour or the place in which they are performed. Let them minutely survey the state of those who seldom or never hear preaching, the vagrant, uncatechised children, the reckless youth, and the various groups of poor, infirm, ignorant, misled, vicious, sick, without hope and without God in the world ; and then consider what is the nature of their labours ? what are their discouragements ? what is it that undermines their health and wears them out ?—and let them seriously bring it home to themselves to perceive and feel how very limited and meagre is the effect of their personal agency and influence in a course of years, even supposing them to be cheered once and again by a day of Pentecost ; and finally, let them lay it to heart how little three quarters of the people around them are much the better for their agency, talents, and sacred office.

Let them also contemplate the prospects of Christianity ; its prospects of perpetual and universal controversy on the present plan of promoting and maintaining it ; its prospects here and in other Protestant countries, in relation to Popery, and all the forms of error, fanaticism and delusion, without and within ; and its prospects in relation to the myriads of the heathen world, who have not in eighteen hundred years so much as heard of its existence.

And let them glance at the prospects of society in respect to social order and domestic quiet, virtue, security and happiness. All experience admonishes us that mankind in the enjoyment of liberty, in proportion as they are unblest and uncontrouled by the influence of moral causes, become impatient of all social and legal restraint, insensible to the value of their blessings and advantages, ungrateful, supremely selfish, and hardened in depravity. This downward course of licentiousness is accelerated by the growing and resistless force of numbers ; it quickly bursts the feeble barriers which oppose it, sets law at defiance, renders life, as well as property, insecure, and inevitably ends in despotism:

despotism with its iron rod, its intolerance, and all its known and dreadful evils, is welcomed by the wisest and best, at the hands of military heroes or aspiring demagogues, as a refuge from anarchy. There is no security for any community against this course of things, there are no adequate means of security, man's wisdom has devised none, experience furnishes none, God has provided none,—except the Gospel. Christianity, and that alone, furnishes the means, and is adequate to the end. No other religion, no system of philosophy or politics, no combination of reason, interest, imposture and superstition, ever has, or ever can reach the seat of the disease, much less cure it. The roots and germs of the disorder are in the heart, and all other remedies besides that which Christianity offers, do but increase the evil. But this remedy neither is, nor was designed, nor can in the nature of things be effectual, any more than a prescription of medicine to a community infected with the plague, except it be applied to individual cases.

But can ministers of the Gospel obviate the difficulty? Can they supply the needful instruction, and interpose the requisite instrumentality. As surely as Christianity is of God, and comprises the means of enlightening and saving the world. There is piety, knowledge, and talent enough in the ministry, and in the church, if employed as in the first age, to impart the essential truths of the Gospel to every family on earth within a short period. Nor is it necessary that ministers should, as men and Christians, be equal to apostles, to effect this; nor to such reformed doctors as Baxter, though a few such might sooner change the face of the world. But it is necessary, that, humbly depending on God alone for success, they should, as his servants, devote themselves to the labour of teaching the essential truths of the Gospel privately, and in the family, as well as from the pulpit, at the same time availing themselves of all possible aid from the prayers and co-operation of the church.

Were ministers, having acquired a suitable education, to devote themselves, the chief part of every day, to the instruction of individuals and families, and to the cultivation and exercise of those gifts and graces, and those habits of benevolence, self-denial, and labour, which the object requires, they surely might, by their own direct efforts, and the subordinate assistance of the laity, bring the light and influence of the Gospel to bear on the minds of several

thousand times as many people as they can on the plan generally pursued.

In this case, the whole life of a Christian pastor would not be required for the instruction, by weekly discourses, of a few persons, who could come at once within the sound of his voice. By his familiar intercourse with the people, and his knowledge of their religious wants, by his personal influence and example, by removing their prejudices, resolving their doubts, and gaining their confidence, by enlisting their sympathies, and awakening their hopes, by constantly plying the means of direct instruction and persuasion both privately and publicly, and by directing the efforts of all those who were capable of teaching in Sunday Schools, and assisting the common object in various ways, he might indefinitely widen the sphere of his influence. Nor would any disorders or difficulties result from such broad-cast efforts; for so certainly as he accomplished his object, and to whatever extent he gained the attention and confidence of the people, the softening, matchless influence of the Gospel itself would fall upon their minds. This instrumentality, brought into contact with men's minds, is provided, designed, and adapted, by the Divine wisdom, to supersede other influences, and to restrain, reform and sanctify. And why should it be doubted but that the same effect which is now so conspicuous in the case of the few upon whom this influence is constantly exerted, would be co-extensive with any enlarged application of the same means.

By thus bringing the truths and sanctions of the Gospel, and its testimonials of grace and love, directly to the minds of the people, fixing them in their associations and feelings, and enforcing them by example, they would exert a mighty and growing influence. Religion would be regarded as the one, chief, all-important concern, both for the life that now is, and that which is to come. Levity and vice would be checked. The people would feel that they have souls, and that their eternal destiny was at issue. Their attention would be fixed on those plain and unquestionable truths of Christianity, which concern each and every one personally, and not on the jargon of scholastic theology, the warfare of party zeal and passion, or the solemn trifling of the scribes and pharisees of any sect. A book of heresy or infidelity, under such circumstances, would be as harmless as a false system of arithmetic. Such association of religion with the

habitual thoughts, conversation, and employments of the people, renewed from day to day, and cemented by their mutual sympathies, affections, prayers and hopes, would bring their temporal and worldly concerns to a due subordination, and shield and fortify them against counteracting influences, against the efforts of heretics and fanatics, and the contagion of enthusiasm and delusion. This is what men need, and what the infinite bounty and love of God has provided for them, to engage, controul and purify their thoughts, to assuage their insupportable afflictions, to satisfy the deep and secret yearnings of their hearts, to deliver them from the yoke of sin and Satan, to raise their minds from earth to heaven, to fill them with love, joy, peace and hope, and to quench the terrours of death and the grave.

By such teaching and training, men come to feel their dependence, and to recognize the hand of God in his works, and in his providence; their pride, stupidity, and unthankfulness are rebuked; the all-pervading presence and agency of their constant preserver and benefactor, becomes familiar to their minds; and they are awakened to the claims of love, gratitude, and universal obedience. They become conscientious, principled, virtuous, orderly, useful, happy members of society, blest in their families, and in all their relations.

Among the numerous and unquestionable benefits to be expected from this method of Christian intercourse and instruction, those which respect the duties and privileges of the sacred day, claim to be particularly referred to. The use of this method would signally tend to prepare both ministers and people for the exercises of social and public worship, and to secure a general and regular attendance. If the daily routine of private teaching rendered the people less dependent on laboured discourses for their instruction, they would hear more simple and familiar ones with tenfold interest; and if the minister studied books somewhat less, he would learn more of the character, state, and spiritual wants of his flock, the operations of grace, the transcendent excellency and power of the Gospel, and the practical value and use of his gifts, talents, and personal influence. His speech and his preaching, would proceed from the fulness of his heart. There would be abroad, among the people, a common religious sentiment and feeling. The Lord's day would be hallowed in their associations and affections.

They would meet in the solemn assembly, not as a mere formal custom, not to see and be seen of each other, not to gratify an idle curiosity in hearing and criticising a literary essay, not to pass a weary, irksome, sleepy hour, not merely to be instructed and gratified ; but first, and chiefly, to worship, praise, and honour their God and Saviour, and mingle their hearts and voices in the offices of devotion ; and in connexion therewith to hear the gracious words of his own dictation and love, and to behold in the testimonies of his grace, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, that they might be changed into the same image.

The minister, in this state of things, would live in the affections of his people ; they would be his joy and crown ; his labours among them, and in the pulpit, would be an un-failing source of the highest interest and delight ; orthodoxy, instead of floating in the brains, or raging in the passions of men, would rest in the bosom, and be guarded by the law of love. The lion and the lamb would repose together ; the disorders of society would be hushed ; religion would reign in the actions and employments, as well as in the hearts and devotions of men, and display in the church, and all the relations of life, its serene and heaven-born excellence.

This method would likewise promote the unity of the household of faith, which it is vain and hopeless to expect from any speculative system. This method addresses itself to the heart. It aims to produce spiritual and practical religion. It is homogeneous wherever applied. With instruction it combines example and influence ; and with doctrine, mutual fellowship, prayers and good works ; and lays the foundation of union in the affections, sympathies, and hopes.

Will not ministers look into their commission ; and swayed by the love of Christ, rather than by the pride of learning and the canons of ecclesiastical fashion and prescription, will they not prefer the fellowship of the Great Shepherd in the humble service of teaching, watching over, and training the respective individuals and families of their flocks ? Will they not make it their object to reform and save all who are within their reach, and thus staunch the fountain of those evils which ruin the souls and bodies of men, and those outward exhibitions of depravity which alms houses, prisons, locks and bars, penal laws, the sword of magistracy, education, and all the devices of human wisdom, are so incompetent to cure.

It is for them to decide. Let them well consider the tendency and fruits of the present system, and soberly calculate when, under its influence, it is likely the mass of the people, here and throughout the world, will be converted.— Let them consider how it comes under this system, that they are so generally seized with indignation and alarm when the intellects of any of their own sect are infected with error, and get out of the traces of their theory, while they slumber over the ignorance, infidelity, and impiety of the undisciplined multitude around them. Let them consider where and how that multitude are ever to be reformed, unless some untitled and unpretending servant in the kingdom and patience of Christ shall go after them, instruct, persuade and gather them into his fold.

Let them ask, whether it is right for them to lay such stress on literary acquisitions, habits of study, and talents and furniture for public speaking, in those whom they introduce into the sacred office; and to overlook comparatively those gifts and endowments which are inwrought by the Spirit of Grace? whether more good is to be contemplated from a learned, studious, aspiring, eloquent, graceful youth, than from one like Brainard on the opposite extreme of humility, self-abasement and spiritual-mindedness?

Let them ponder, whether it requires a whole life of study, with a thousand extraneous aids and helps, to understand the essential truths of the Gospel, so as to impart the knowledge of them to others; whether it is, in very deed, the Gospel which they study, or any thing and every thing else; whether all the attainments of literature and science can supply the defect of habits of patient, familiar, colloquial intercourse, sympathy, and fellowship with those to whom the Gospel is to be imparted; and whether life is so enduring and so cheap, that they can afford to spend it otherwise than in the peculiar and laborious duties of their office?

Let them go into their libraries, and see what proportion of their books are of any use in respect to the true end of their ministerial office; how many do but serve to beguile their thoughts and waste their time; how many chill their religious affections, and engage their minds on questions foreign to their proper object; how many might as well be dispensed with here, as in heaven, and would be deemed worthless trash by a heart absorbed in the love and service of God; how few besides their Bibles are worthy of their

notice, or can share their time consistently with those solemn duties upon which depends the destiny of souls.

Let them consider, too, that if any reformation takes place, it must begin with them. If the present system is persisted in, every one may judge for himself, from the experience of the last three centuries, what is likely to be the course of events in this and other parts of Christendom. No one can be at a loss to judge what is to be expected from continued controversy between different Protestant denominations, and controversial opposition to Popery, infidelity, and other forms of external error. Even should some benefit result to a portion of those who read what is published, and hear what is said, the mass of the people are not enlightened or warned against delusion: not one in ten of them are reached, be the conflict ever so sharp; and if the partisans of error can but have an unoccupied field of such extent to work in, they will have scope enough: and if by art, industry, and the deceivableness of unrighteousness, they can turn the current of ignorance and wickedness against the truths and institutions of Christianity, the combined powers of darkness will, it is to be feared, extinguish the light of truth.

If any change takes place, by which the course of religious influence and effort shall be differently directed, any change by which the Gospel shall be applied, after the primitive manner, to the people generally, and the wide field of the world be thickly sown with the seed of the word,—any change by which a just exhibition of Christianity shall be made; it must be wrought, not by ignorant pretenders, irresponsible quacks, fickle enthusiasts, puerile novices, visionary speculatists, or disorderly fanatics, but by sound, duly educated, and duly authorized ministers.

But what will it avail even for such to lament the desecration of the Lord's day, and inculcate its due observance, if they fail most scrupulously to hallow it themselves under all circumstances, at home and abroad? What will it avail if they periodically urge their people to be prayerful and heavenly minded, to subordinate the world to their eternal interests, to be fruitful of good works, and to let their lights shine before others, if they themselves who are devoted as Nazarites to God, are wanting in respect to any thing which they inculcate? What will all their elaborate preaching avail against the more constant, more urgent and more skil-

ful influence of the world, of unsubdued passions, and the devices of the adversary, unless their public efforts are followed up by private teaching and exhortation, and by a daily exhibition in their intercourse with the people, of their own blameless example? To what purpose will be any alarm they may feel on account of heresies, vice, social and political disorder, mobs and riots, if they do nothing more than has heretofore been done, to extend the influence of moral restraints, by teaching and applying the Gospel to the young, the unlettered, and as far as possible, to every individual?

There is balm in Gilead, and a Physician there. But who can, or ought to apply the remedy, besides the ministers of the Gospel, whose office it is, and who are authorized and set apart for this express purpose? In short, what is to be expected or hoped, in the best view that can be taken of the present state of things in respect to religion, even in this favoured land, unless God's method of enlightening, reforming, and saving men, be duly applied; unless the means which he has provided, and with which he co-operates, are universally employed?

When our Lord ascended up on high, he received gifts for men, yea, for the rebellious also, that the Lord God might dwell among them. And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. Now, God dwells with men by his Spirit. The agency of the Spirit in giving efficacy to the Gospel, and perfecting the object for which Christ came into the world, is the great promise of the New Testament. On this, all the success and all the hopes of Christianity depend. But it is necessary that this dependence should be recognized, acknowledged, and felt; that the Gospel should be so ministered that the excellency of the power by which its effects are produced may be seen and known to be of God, and not of men; that the preaching and inculcation, in whatever way, of its truths, should be regarded as a simple instrumentality, like that of planting and watering seeds of grain, employed, in conformity with the Divine appointment, in perfect dependence on the co-operation of this superiour agency. All reliance on any thing else is wholly repugnant to the subject. All pomp and circumstance, all show of learning and

subtlety, all pride and adulation, all strife and contention, in this matter, is as much out of place as insensibility, indolence, negligence, selfishness or error. Where these things are, there may be much to please the eye and the ear, much to quiet the consciences, and gratify the feelings of the worldly-minded, much of every thing except the presence of the Divine Spirit. Where these things are interposed, they seize the imagination, and arrest the attention, so that whatever of truth is preached becomes unfruitful. It does not take hold of the mind. The case may be compared to that of a husbandman who, before scattering his seed, should spread over the ground a thick coating of salt, or who should envelope the seed itself in some destructive composition.

The gracious presence of the Divine Spirit is to be anticipated where it is sought with cordial and intense desire, and where the proper instrumentality is employed, in perfect reliance on His influence, in a manner suitable to the weakness and insignificance of those who interpose this instrumentality, and their entire and constant dependence on Him for wisdom and grace, right apprehensions of the truth, and preservation from error; where it is employed, not with ostentation, dogmatism, or intolerance, but with meekness and fear; where the teacher feels himself to be but a worm of the dust, an earthen vessel, and is conscious of the immeasurable distance between him, as a creature ignorant and imperfect, and the glorious author and supporter of the Gospel; where it is employed under a deep conviction that it will be a savor of life, or of death, to the hearers, and that the results will depend essentially on the manner in which he executes his trust.

Solemn and momentous office! Ministers are ambassadors for Christ, commissioned to treat with guilty men in His name, proposing his terms of pardon and peace, and praying them, in his stead, to be reconciled to God. But they go under the ægis of his almighty power; and while they abide by his instructions, and devote themselves to the duties of their mission, in the spirit of perfect allegiance and perfect dependence, he will be with them, protect them, and maintain his cause. Nor will he shut them up either to gloom and discouragement, or to any earthly sources of cheerfulness and joy. He has set them an example, not indeed of seclusion and repose, but of labour, condescension,

and love, the imitation of which, while it will require their utmost diligence, the constant exercise of their best affections, and the use of all their gifts and talents, in the various walks of usefulness, will be to them an unfailing source of the purest and most exalted happiness. He went about doing good both to the souls and bodies of men, especially to the poor, ignorant, afflicted, and miserable. He calls them to follow in his steps; reminds them that it is more blessed to give than to receive; and admonishes them that the disciple is not above his master, nor the servant above his Lord.

That the method which has been insisted on is no where impracticable, is evident from what Baxter was the means of accomplishing under the most discouraging circumstances, while he was emaciated and borne down by sickness and infirmity, and believed it his duty, in addition to his pastoral labours, to be constantly engaged in writing for the public.

On his first settlement at Kidderminster, which was in the disturbed and fanatical period of Cromwell, when the country was distracted with every species of political violence and religious controversy, "he found the place," according to his biographer, "like a piece of dry and barren earth, overrun with ignorance and vice. Immorality, and opposition to the Gospel, prevailed among all classes. His doctrine was unpalatable, his manner of life, and hostility to vice and irreligion in every form, still more so. But by patient continuance in well-doing, and the blessing of God on his labours, he overcame all their prejudices, and produced universal love and veneration, and the place became rich in all the fruits of righteousness."

In his own personal narrative, after an account, among other things, of his feeble health, he says, "I shall next record, to the praise of my Redeemer, the comfortable employment and success which he vouchsafed me during my abode at Kidderminster, under all these weaknesses. And first, I will mention my employment; second, my successes; and third, those advantages by which under God they were procured."

"Before the wars, I preached twice each Lord's day; but afterwards but once, and once on every Thursday, besides occasional sermons. Every Thursday evening, my neighbours who were most desirous, and had opportunity,

met at my house, and there one of them repeated the sermon; afterwards they proposed what doubts any of them had about the sermon, or any other case of conscience, and I resolved their doubts. Last of all, I caused sometimes one and sometimes another of them to pray, to exercise them; and sometimes I prayed with them myself; which, besides singing a psalm, was all they did. Once a week, also, some of the younger sort, who were not fit to pray in so great an assembly, met among a few more privately, where they spent three hours in prayer together. Every Saturday night, they met at some of their houses, to repeat the sermon of the former Lord's day, and to pray and prepare themselves for the following day. Once in a few weeks we had a day of humiliation, on one occasion or another. Two days every week, my assistants and myself took fourteen families between us, for private catechising and conference; he going through the parish, and the town coming to me. I first heard them recite the words of the catechism, and then examined them about the sense; and, lastly, urged them, with all possible engaging reason, and vehemency, to answerable affections and practice. If any of them were stalled through ignorance or bashfulness, I forbore to press them any further to answers, but made them hearers, and either examined others, or turned all into instruction and exhortation. I spent about an hour with each family, and admitted no others to be present; lest bashfulness should make it burthensome, or any should talk of the weaknesses of others."

"Besides all this, I was forced, five or six years, by the people's necessity, to practise physic. A common pleurisy happening one year, and no physician being near, I was forced to advise them, to save their lives; and I could not afterwards avoid the importunity of the town and country round about. Because I never once took a penny of any one, I was crowded with patients."

"But all these my labours (except my private conference with the families), even preaching and preparing for it, were but my recreation, and as it were the work of my spare hours; for my writings were my chief daily labour; which yet went the more slowly on, that I never one hour had an amanuensis to dictate to, and especially because my weakness took up so much of my time. All the pains that my infirmities ever brought upon me, were never half so griev-

ous an affliction, as the unavoidable loss of time which they occasioned. I could not bear, through the weakness of my stomach, to rise before seven o'clock in the morning, and afterwards not till much later; and some infirmities I laboured under, made it above an hour before I could be dressed."

"Every first Wednesday in the month, was our monthly meeting for parish discipline; and every first Thursday of the month, was the minister's meeting for discipline and disputation."

"For ever blessed be the God of my mercies, who brought me from the grave, and gave me, after wars and sickness, fourteen years' liberty in such sweet employment! How strange, that in times of usurpation, I had all this mercy and happy freedom; when under our rightful king and governour, I, and many hundreds more, are silenced, and laid by as broken vessels, and suspected and vilified as scarce to be tolerated to live privately and quietly in the land! How mysterious that God should make days of licentiousness and disorder under an usurper, so great a mercy to me, and many a thousand more, [non-conformists under the second Charles,] who, under the lawful governours which they desired, and in the days when order is said to be restored, do sit in obscurity and unprofitable silence, or lie in prisons; while all of us are accounted as the scum, and sweepings, or off-scourings of the earth."

"I have mentioned my secret and acceptable employment; let me, to the praise of my gracious Lord, acquaint you with some of my success."

"My public preaching met with an attentive, diligent auditory. Having broke over the brunt of the opposition of the rabble before the wars, I found them afterwards tractable and unprejudiced. Before I entered into the ministry, God blessed my private conference to the conversion of some, who remain firm and eminent in holiness, to this day; but then, and in the beginning of my ministry, I was wont to number them as jewels; but since then I could not keep any enumeration of them. The congregation was usually full, so that we were fain to build five galleries after my coming thither; the church itself being very capacious, and the most commodious and convenient that ever I was in. Our private meetings also were full. On the Lord's days there was no disorder to be seen in the streets; but you might hear a hundred families singing psalms, and repeating

sermons, as you passed through them. In a word, when I came thither first, there was about one family in a street that worshipped God, and called on his name, and when I came away, there were some streets where there was not one poor family in the side that did not so; and that did not, by professing serious godliness, give us hopes of their sincerity. And in those families which were the worst, being inns and ale-houses, usually some persons in each house did seem to be religious."

"Though our administration of the Lord's Supper was so ordered as displeased many, who kept away, we had six hundred that were communicants, of whom there were not twelve that I had not good hopes of, as to their sincerity.— I hope there were also many who had the fear of God, that came not to our communion in the sacrament; some of them being kept off by husbands, by parents, by masters, and some dissuaded by men that differed from us."

"When I set upon personal conference with each family, and catechising them, there were very few families in all the town that refused to come; and those few were beggars at the town's ends, who were so ignorant that they were ashamed it should be manifest. Few families went from me without some tears, or seemingly serious promises of a godly life. Some of the poor never did competently understand the body of divinity. Some of them were so able in prayer, that very few ministers did match them in order and fulness, and apt expressions, and holy oratory, with fervency. Abundance of them were able to pray very laudably with their families, or with others. The temper of their minds, and the innocence of their lives, were much more laudable than their parts. The professors of serious godliness were generally of very humble minds, and carriage; of meek and quiet behaviour unto others; and of blamelessness and innocence in their conversation."

He then speaks of his occasional labours in other places, and his endeavours with his brethren in the ministry, of whom he says, "When I attempted also to bring them all conjointly to the work of catechising and instructing every family by itself, I found a ready consent in most, and performance in many."

"I must here, then, to the praise of my Redeemer, set up this pillar of remembrance, even to his praise who hath employed me so many years in so comfortable a work, with

such encouraging success. Oh, what am I, a worthless worm, not only wanting academical honours, but much of that furniture which is needful to so high a work, that God should thus abundantly encourage me, when the reverend instructors of my youth did labour fifty years together in one place, and could scarcely say they had converted one or two in their parishes! And the greater was the mercy, because I was naturally of a discouraged spirit; so that if I had preached one year, and seen no fruits of it, I should hardly have forborne running away, like Jonah; but should have thought that God called me not to that place."

"Having related my comfortable success in this place, I shall next tell you by what and how many advantages this was effected, under that grace which worketh by means, though with a free diversity. I do it chiefly for their sakes, who would know the means of other men's experiments, in managing ignorant and sinful parishes."

"The advantage was, that I came to a people who never had any awakening ministry before, but a few formal, cold sermons from the curate—and doing all in bodily weakness, as a dying man, my soul was the more easily brought to seriousness, and to preach as a dying man to dying men. For drowsy formality and contumaciousness, doth but stupify the hearers, and rock them asleep. It must be serious preaching, which will render men serious in hearing and obeying it."

"Another advantage which I had, was the acceptance of my person among the people. Though, to win estimation and love to ourselves only, be an end that none but proud men and hypocrites intend, yet it is most certain, that the gratefulness of the person doth ingratiate the message, and greatly prepareth the people to receive the truth."

"Another advantage which I had, was the zeal and diligence of the godly people of the place. They thirsted after the salvation of their neighbours, and were in private my assistants, and being dispersed through the town, were ready in almost all companies to repress seducing words, and to justify godliness, convince, reprove, and exhort men, according to their needs; as also to teach them how to pray; and to help them to sanctify the Lord's day. For those people who had none in their families who could pray, or repeat the sermons, went to their next neighbour's house who could do it, and joined with them; so that some of the houses of the

ablest men in each street were filled with them that could do nothing, or little, in their own."

"Their holy, humble, blameless lives, were also a great advantage to me. The malicious people could not say, your professors here are as proud and covetous as any; but the blameless lives of godly people did shame opposers, and put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, and many were won by their good conversation."

"Our unity and concord were a great advantage to us; and our freedom from those sects and heresies, with which many other places were infected."

"Our private meetings were a marvellous help to the propagating of godliness, for thereby truths that slipped away, were recalled, and the seriousness of the people's minds renewed, and good desires cherished. Their knowledge, also, was much increased by them, and the younger sort learned to pray by frequently hearing others. I had, also, the opportunity of knowing their case; for if any were touched and awakened in public, I should frequently see them drop into our private meetings. Idle meetings and loss of time were greatly prevented; and so far were we from being by this in danger of schism, or divisions, that it was the principal means to prevent them; for here I was usually present with them, answering their doubts, silencing objections, and moderating them in all."

"Another help to my success, was the small relief which my low estate enabled me to afford the poor; though the place was reckoned at near two hundred pounds per annum, there came but ninety pounds, and sometimes only eighty pounds to me. In giving the little I had, I did not enquire whether they were good or bad, if they asked relief; for the bad had souls and bodies that needed charity most. And this truth I will speak to the encouragement of the charitable, that what little money I have now by me, I got it almost all, I scarce know how, at that time when I gave most."

"Another furtherance of my work, was the books which I wrote, and gave away among them. Of some small books, I gave each family one, and of the bigger, I gave fewer; and every family that was poor, and had not a Bible, I gave a Bible to."

"God made use of my practice of physic among them also, as a very great advantage to my ministry; for they that cared not for their souls, did love their lives, and care for

their bodies ; and by this they were made almost as observant, as a tenant is of his landlord. Sometimes I could see before me in the church, a very considerable part of the congregation, whose lives God had made me the means to save, or to recover their health ; and doing it for nothing, so obliged them, that they would readily hear me."

"It was a great advantage to me, that there were, at last, few that were bad, but some of their own relations were converted. Many children did God work upon at fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen years of age ; and this did marvellously reconcile the minds of the parents, and elder sort, to godliness. They that would not hear me, would hear their own children. They that before could have talked against godliness, would not hear it spoken against it, when it was their children's case. Many who would not be brought to it themselves, were proud that they had understanding, religious children ; and we had some old persons of eighty years of age, who are, I hope, in Heaven ; and the conversion of their own children, was the chief means to overcome their prejudices, and old customs, and conceits."

"Another great help to my success, at last, was the formerly described work of personal conference with every family apart, with catechising and instructing them. That which was *spoken to them personally*, and which put them sometimes upon answers, awakened their attention, and was easier applied than public preaching, and seemed to do much more upon them."

"Another advantage which I found to my success, was, by ordering my doctrine to them in a suitableness to the main end, and yet so as might suit their dispositions and diseases. The things which I daily opened to them, and with greatest importunity laboured to imprint upon their minds, were the great fundamental principles of Christianity contained in their baptismal covenant—even a right knowledge and belief of, and subjection and love to, God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost ; love to all men, and concord with the church, and one another. I did so daily inculcate a knowledge of God our Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier ; love and obedience to God, unity with the church catholic, and love to men, and the hope of life eternal ; that these were the matter of their daily cogitations and discourses, and, indeed, their religion."

"Another thing that helped me was, my not meddling with

tithes or worldly business, whereby I had my whole time, except what sickness deprived me of, for my duty ; and my mind more free from entanglements than else it would have been ; and also, I escaped the offending of the people, and contending by any lawsuits with them. Three or four of my neighbours managed all those kinds of business, of whom I never took account ; and if any one refused to pay his tithes, if he was poor, I ordered them to forgive it him."

To these brief extracts, the addition of some remarks of Mr. Orme, in his life of their author, will doubtless be acceptable:

"The secret of his success, Baxter has disclosed to us in the most faithful and interesting manner. While we admire the grace of God, which so abundantly rested upon his labours, we cannot but notice at the same time, the extraordinary suitableness and adaptation, both of the instrument himself, and of the means which he employed, in the work he was honoured to accomplish.

"Abstracting all the temporary and local circumstances to which Baxter adverts as favourable to his success, the simplicity and intense ardour of his preaching, demand our notice. It was admirably adapted to instruct the ignorant, to rouse the careless, and to build up the faithful. He sought out acceptable words, but he had neither time nor taste for making what are called fine sermons ; he studied point, not brilliancy. His object was not to dazzle, but to convince ; not to excite admiration of himself, but to procure the reception of his message. He never aimed at drawing attention to the preacher, but always at fixing it at home, or guiding it to Christ. He never "courted a grin," when he might have "wooed a soul ;" or played with the fancy, when he should have been depicting the heart. His subjects were always the most important which can engage the attention of man,—the creed, the commandments, and the Lord's prayer—or, according to his own simple definition of them,—the things to be believed—the things to be done—and the things to be desired. These were the leading—indeed, the only topics of his ministry. Into these he entered with all the intense ardour of his acute, and deeply impressible mind. He never spoke like a man who was indifferent whether his audience felt what he said, or considered him in earnest on the subject. His eye, his action, his every word were expressive of deep and impassioned earnestness,

that his hearers might be saved. His was eloquence of the highest order; not the eloquence of nicely selected words, or the felicitous combination of terms and phrases, or the music of exquisitely balanced periods, (though these properties are frequently to be found in Baxter's discourses,) but the eloquence of the most important truths, vividly apprehended, and energetically delivered. It was the eloquence of a soul burning with ardent devotion to God, and inspired with the deepest compassion for men; on whom the powers of the worlds of darkness and of light, exercised their mighty influence; and spoke through his utterances all that was tremendous in warning, and all that was delightful in invitation and love. He was condescending to the ignorant, faithful to the self-righteous and careless, tender to the timid and afflicted; in a word, as a preacher, he became all things to all men, if, by any means, he might save some. It was impossible that such a man should labour in vain.

"Another thing which strikes us in the ministerial conduct of Baxter, was his careful avoidance of every thing which might prejudice his hearers against him, and his diligent cultivation of whatever was likely to gain their favour, or secure their impartial attention. No one could be less of a man-pleaser than he was; for apart from promoting the object of his ministry, he was regardless of human frown or favour. But he considered nothing unimportant which either stood in the way of his success, or was likely to promote it. His conduct in regard to his tithes; his remaining unmarried; his practising physic; his liberality to the poor; his distribution of books, &c., were all intended to be subservient to his great work. The gaining of souls to Christ was the only object for which he lived. Hence, amidst the seeming variety of his pursuits and engagements, there was a perfect harmony of design. His ruling and controuling principle, was the love of his Master, producing the desire of a full and faithful discharge of his duty, as his approved minister. This was the centre, around which every thing moved, and by which every thing in his circumstances and character was attracted or repelled. This gave unity to all his plans, and constituted the moral force of all his actions. It gave enlightened energy to his zeal, exquisite tenderness to his persuasions; warmth and fervency to his admonitions. It poured over all his public and private ministrations that holy unction,

which diffused its fragrance, spreading its bland and refreshing influences all around.

"A third point worthy of observation in his ministry, is, that it was not limited to the pulpit, or considered as discharged in the parlour. The blow which he aimed at the mass in public, was followed by successive strokes addressed to the individuals in private. The congregation was not permitted to forget, during the week, what they had been taught on the Sabbath. The man who would have been lost in the crowd, or who might have sheltered himself under the exceptions which belong to a general address, was singled out, convicted, and shut up to the faith, or left to bear the stings of an instructed and alarmed conscience. The young were instructed and led on; the strong were taught to minister to the weak; and the prayers of many a holy band, at once strengthened the hands of their minister, and "girded each other for the race divine." This was truly making full proof of his ministry, and promoting in his congregation the grand objects and aims of the fellowship of Christianity.

"When we thus connect the public talents and private character of Baxter, the energy and point of his pulpit addresses, with the assiduousness, the perseverance, and the variety of his other labours; his devotion to God, his disinterested love to men; what he was as a *pastor*, with all that he was as a *preacher*; we cease to wonder at the effects which he produced. No place could long resist such a train and style of aggression. All people must feel the force of such a moral warfare as that which he waged. There are few individuals who could escape without being wounded, or conquered by such an assailant. In comparison with him, how few are there even among the faithful ministers of Christ, who can think of themselves, or their labours, with satisfaction? Yet, was there nothing in Baxter but what the grace and power of God can do for others. There was something in his exertions almost superhuman; yet he seemed to accomplish all with a considerable degree of ease and comfort to himself. He never seems to have been hustled, but he was always busy; and thus he found time for all he had to do, while he employed that time in the most profitable manner. We have only to find an increase of such ministers in the church of Christ, and who will employ the same kind of means, in order to the accomplish-

ment in any place, of effects that will not shrink from a comparison with Kidderminster itself in all its glory.

"The effects of Baxter's ministry in Kidderminster, were lasting, as well as extensive. He frequently refers to his beloved flock, long after he had left them, in terms of the warmest affection. Nor did the effects of his exertions expire with that generation. Mr. Fawcett, who abridged the "Saint's Rest," in 1759, says, "that the religious spirit thus happily introduced by Baxter, is yet to be traced, in the town and neighbourhood, in some degree." He represents the professors of that place, as "possessing an unusual degree of candour, and friendship for each other;" thus evincing, 'that Kidderminster had not totally lost the amiable spirit it had imbibed more than a century before.'"

ART. II. GIBBON'S INFIDELITY.

By Rev. LEONARD WITHINGTON, Newbury, Mass.

BISHOP BURNET, in his preface to the history of his own time, informs us, that he set about that work with the greatest care; "for," says he, "I reckon a lie in history, to be as much a greater sin, than a lie in common discourse, as the one is likely to be more lasting, and more generally known, than the other." Every impartial reader must agree in the justice of this remark. The historian is a witness in a most important court—implicitly sworn, as he hopes for help from God, and reputation from posterity, to deliver the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It was a sad day for the interests of knowledge, when the maxim was introduced, that history must be made subservient to some other design. Sallust mentions it as one of his qualifications for the task he had undertaken, that he was free from the spirit of party. In modern times, facts have often as little to do with the writer's representations, as the canvas has with the effect of the images and the colouring of the painter's picture.

Infidelity is such a dry and sterile thing, that unless it comes forth as the appendage of some superiour design, it

can hardly be made interesting to the reflecting part of mankind. It must be grafted on a root, and supported by a trunk, not its own. Of the authors, who have written professedly in behalf of infidelity, few have survived the dust and the cobwebs of some vast library, where they are kept, like serpents and monsters in bottled spirits, only to show what prodigies nature has bred, and make us thankful that such beings, though horrible, are but rare.

I venture to say, that no splendour of diction, no ornaments of fancy, no prodigality of genius, can ever make a book popular and lasting, whose sole object is to disprove the fundamental principles of the Christian system.

Bolingbroke was certainly a fine writer, and one of the best masters of the English language; yet, who reads his philosophical works? They are only consulted by a few restless young men in our colleges, on the same principle that the wife, in the tale of Bluebeard, looked into the fatal chamber, merely because it was forbidden.

Infidels have recently become conscious of this. Knowing that their system is not like a tree, which can stand erect by its own strength; but is like a vine, which cannot grow upright, unless it has something to creep upon, they have made their infidelity subordinate to some better interest. One mixes it in a system of geology; another makes it the moral of a poem; a third teaches it in a work on medicine; and a fourth weaves it into a commentary on the Bible itself. Some accessory interest must always be brought in to arrest the attention, and bribe the feelings of mankind. It is a plant which can never grow, but under the shelter of a nobler shade.

One of the additional interests which have been brought in, of late years, to support it, is *history*. By some strange fatality, modern history has fallen into the hands of infidels. The fact, it must be allowed, was very different with ancient history. With the exception of Tacitus, I do not remember one of the ancient historians, who does not lean to the side of credulity, on the subject of the popular religion. Herodotus is a perfect old woman. Xenophon is as full of omens and prognostics, as Pagan priests could wish; and all of them, from the warmest conviction, join to support the religion of their country. And even in modern times, previous to the last century, the historian has generally been on the side of Revelation. Sir Walter Raleigh is said to have been

a free-thinker; but nothing of it appears in his history. Lord Clarendon, though a statesman and a tory, talks in a style which would now be thought rather canting; and it is impossible to read the preface of Burnet, without believing that he was a good man, in the evangelical sense of that expression.

But since these days, historians have sustained a very different character, and have written from a very different design. Bayle published his dictionary as a manual of skepticism; though on the whole the fairest of all the unbelieving tribe, from his frigid indifference. Voltaire after some interval followed; and Hume and Gibbon bring up the rear. Knowing that all men read history, knowing too that the negative discoveries of the unbeliever can interest very few; they have combined two designs into one, and have mingled the poison of infidelity in the streams of the purest knowledge.

Hume and Gibbon were however very different men. The one was vastly superiour in genius; the other, in patient application and diligent research. Hume has a style; so simple, so elegant, so easy, always rising with the interest of his story, and then sinking into the tranquillity of calm narrative, that his sentiments fall on the mind like sunlight, which always reveals the object, and never fatigues the eye. Gibbon's more ambitious style meets the mind like the blaze of some splendid conflagration, artificially beautiful and painfully brilliant. We begin to read with pleasure, but are fatigued and overpowered before the chapter is closed.

Hume was by nature and education a sophist. But his mind was far clearer, because superior to that of Gibbon; whose obliquities distorted his very language. Nothing can be more just than his criticism on his own style. "The most serious defect of my *Essay* (i. e. the first work he published, but which contained no defect which did not, in a degree, adhere to every subsequent performance) is a kind of obscurity and abruptness, which always fatigues, and may often elude the attention of the reader. * * Alas! how fatal has been the imitation of Montesquieu!" "But this obscurity sometimes proceeds from a mixture of light and darkness in the author's mind; from a partial ray which strikes upon an angle, instead by spreading itself over a surface."

Since so many historians have been advocates of infidelity, it may be proper to inquire, whether there is any thing

in the study of history which tends to unbelief. The answer to this question depends, in some degree, on the position on which the historian stands. In ancient times, it would seem that historical studies had no such tendency; for we have already seen, that most of the early historians, so far as supernatural power was concerned, erred on the side of credulity, and not of unbelief. But in modern times the effect is different. I am inclined to think, that since the corruption of Christianity and the rise of the enormous fabric of Roman power, the study of ecclesiastical antiquity has some tendency to make the mind skeptical. Speaking from my own experience, I have never had so many infidel thoughts pass through my mind, as when reading the histories of Socrates and Sozomen, together with some of the writings of the more credulous fathers. They generate a skepticism, which nothing but a recurrence to the pure and holy oracles of original Revelation can cure.

You read in ecclesiastical history, miracle after miracle; miracles of presumption, and miracles of folly, miracles wrought by the bones of a dead saint, to clothe with flesh the bones of a fat monk. In reading the history of these miracles, which require the most boundless credulity to believe them, your first thought is, that all miracles must be the delusion of human weakness, played on by designing power;—and the Gospel begins to suffer, because it is found in such company. But a little further reflection soon convinces an impartial man, that the first and later miracles have an entirely different character, and stand in a very different relation to human duty and happiness. It seems to have been ordained by the providence of God, that both the Old Testament and New, should be surrounded by a mass of rubbish and folly, in order to force our minds to discrimination, and compel us to separate the chaff from the wheat. The Old Testament comes down to us from antiquity, surrounded with the comments of the Talmud and Mishna; and the New comes incumbered with all the credulous comments of the fathers. But although both these accompaniments bear about the same proportion to the purity of the sacred history, as the weeds which grow on the borders of a field, bear to the wheat, and other grain, which they inclose, —nevertheless, to a heart of a sensual and material turn, careless and indifferent about religion, all this presents an excuse for not seeing the evidences of the Gospel. To a man

half blind already, a few clouds over the sun will be an apology for not beholding his light.

There is another effect of reading early ecclesiastical history: the follies of antiquity present much food for contempt and ridicule; and it is well known, that the satirist is never more delighted, than when he is demolishing what has been held sacred in the eyes of mankind. Now, though I would not say, with Hobbes, that all laughter is founded on pride, yet I am afraid that the laughter of a satirist is commonly allied to that passion. To be always trampling, with scorn and contempt, on things once deemed sacred, is not the best way to prepare our minds for things really so. Ecclesiastical history, it must be acknowledged by the warmest Christians, provokes some passions not the most favourable to the reception of the Gospel. This is especially true of the history of that long period from the second century down to the Reformation.

There is another very subtle influence exerted by these studies, in prejudicing the mind against the Gospel. There is a silent change constantly going on in the meaning of words, by which the reader finds himself unconsciously brought among very different objects, while he has been wholly unconscious of any change. This is true in all history; we find the best terms melting away, like snow banks at the bottom. When Rome expelled her kings, the word *liberty* meant what that sacred term ought to mean; and when in the days of Coriolanus, *tribunes* of the people were first instituted, they were real guardians of the people's rights. But how was it in aftertimes? It was by the abused name of liberty, that Cesar defeated the influence of the Senate, and by the help of a tribune he established his despotic power. The fact is, in all history, the words sink away under us; and are always undermined by a subterranean current, which leaves the superstructure, but destroys the foundation of the fabric, while we are tempted to consider it as always the same. *Repentance* and *faith*—what different meanings did they convey in the second and third century, from what they did in the mouths of the first preachers of the Gospel? Thus the whole system is overspread by a mist, too thin to be traced, but sufficient to alter the proportion of all we see. As we look at the very stars of heaven, through the medium of our grosser atmosphere, and the refraction alters their form and place; so the very terms

of Revelation, to one who has involved himself in the mists of ecclesiastical history, become waning and changeful, so that the wisdom of God is seen through the follies and perversions of some of the most doting of mankind.

In one word, *Popery* has been the origin of almost all the infidelity that has afflicted the world. And the outlines of this great system of delusion were drawn much sooner than Protestants have been willing to suppose. It is a melancholy truth, that some of the earliest of the fathers, and perhaps all after the period of Justin Martyr, lend their authority to certain false principles, on which the whole foundation of Popery is built. We have the testimony of St. Paul, (see 2 Thess. ii. 7,) that *the mystery of iniquity doth already work*, that is, the foundations of some great delusion and apostasy were already laid. It is one of the inscrutable wonders of Divine Providence, that the rivers of life, gushing so pure from its fountain, should so soon be polluted,—that so large a part of the world should be left so long to the gloom of Paganism, and the rest should be given up to an error, which had little else to gild it but the name of Christianity.

However, one thing may be said to reduce the difficulty. The view we have of the first ages of Christianity, is derived, to a considerable extent, from the character of the particular age when Christianity became predominant—the age of Constantine. Then they undertook to set up a standard of taste, to determine what writings to preserve, what events to record, whose memory to embalm, and whose character to adorn as confessors and saints. The writings *preserved*, are not always a specimen of the writings which once *existed*. I have always felt a hope, indeed, there is some reason to believe, that some pious effusions of greater simplicity than those of Tertullian and Cyprian existed; though the bad judgment of later ages, not knowing their value, left them to perish. And as to events, it is in Christianity as in politics, the most virtuous times, are those of which least is said. When the river swells with the melting snows, throws up the breaking ice, sweeps away the bridges, and desolates its banks, every newspaper records it; but, when it glides along its summer channel, with a refreshing stream, reflecting the bending trees, and diffusing life and gladness wherever it flows, we admire, but say nothing.

Thus, there is probably something in the history of the ages intervening between the purity and corruption of Christianity, calculated to confirm the infidelity of a mind not receiving its authority, and not loving its truths.

It will be observed that I do not say, that a careful study of history, in the extensive sense of that word, is conducive to skepticism; but in the peculiar position in which a modern writer may look back to the rise of Christianity, through ages infected by its grossest corruptions, an unspiritual eye may confound the darkness with the light, as a traveller may so place himself, that trees and mountains may partially intercept his view of the sun.

Gibbon has written his own life, and freely recorded the process by which he became a skeptic. It must be confessed that his lot was unfortunate. Born in an affluent and pleasure-seeking family, who knew little of Christianity except the name, he was sent at an early age to Oxford, with a very superficial knowledge of classical literature. Here, to use his own melancholy language—"without a single lecture, either public or private, either Christian or Protestant, without any academical subscription, without any Episcopal confirmation, I was left by the dim light of my catechism, to grope my way to the chapel and communion table, where I was admitted, without a question how far, or by what means, I might be qualified to receive the sacrament." His studies were neglected, and not a single tutor, or officer of college, undertook to direct his literary or religious pursuits. He saw, according to his own account, in the Doctors of the University, the most unedifying examples; and conscious, that wherever truth might be, the spirit of religion was not there, he was led to seek it in another communion. In this state, while suffered to run wild, some Popish books fell into his hands; he read them; became a convert, and was privately reconciled to the Romish church. The gates of Oxford were of course closed on the young apostate, and his father sent him to study with a Protestant clergyman, in the south of France, where the most untiring polemic industry was used to bring him back to the Protestant faith. But in all this machinery of conversion and re-conversion, it does not appear, that it was ever hinted to him, that *religion had any thing to do with the state of his heart*. It was always a source of mortification to him, that his reasoning powers

were captivated by the sophistry of the Romanists ; and he revenged the victory of a false religion over his mind, by becoming an infidel.

In order to form a just estimate of his reputation, we must consider some circumstances of the time at which he appeared. It was about the middle of the last century that Dr. Conyers Middleton, a man of extensive learning, and master of a fine style, published his "Free Inquiry" respecting the miracles of the early church, posterior however to the apostolic age. His theory is, that miraculous powers ceased with the Apostles. He supposes, that we can find an interval of about fifty years, when there is no mention made of the existence of, or claims to any such powers, during which some of the purest and best Fathers wrote, such as Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Polycarp. After this short interval of purity and truth, he imagines the lying spirit revived with Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian, and was handed down with fatal authority until it became swollen into the bloated heresy of Popery itself. It will be seen that this hypothesis seems to involve in the charge of delusion all the most venerated writers of the Church, previous to the Reformation. Chrysostom must be thrown into the same limbo of vanity with Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Augustin must lie with the first Gregory of Rome ; for they both of them record miracles which it is impossible for a Protestant to believe.* Dr. Middleton's book, which in this country would have been received with very general approbation, threw the whole English Church, which has retained a deeper reverence for antiquity than other Protestant denominations, into a flame. Not long after, Gibbon, who had read Middleton with great attention, published his history, and treated all those ancient miracles with that haughty, genteel sneer, for which he was so remarkable. The Church of England, which had prided herself on her liberality and learning, found that she was ranked in point of credulity with Papists and Pagans themselves. It was very exasperating. She arose against it, and attacked the historian ; and hence Gibbon has received a character for

* See the viii chapter, of the XXII Book, of the City of God. In this chapter Augustin appears, like a robust man dwelling in a sickly climate, strong in his natural vigour, but sickly from the influence of that credulous age. One of the most pleasing of his miracles, is that of a virgin of Hippo, who was cured by anointing herself with oil, into which a presbyter had distilled his tears, *aut pro illa orans Presbyter instillaverat lacrymas suas.*

misrepresentation which he does not deserve. Much that he sneers at, is unquestionably false ; though whether any error connected with sincere religion deserves a sneer, may well be doubted. Gibbon has been charged with faults he never committed, and hence his real errors are in danger of passing without reproof.

He certainly was a careful and most laborious investigator. He went up to original records, though he always found them first through the manuduction of some modern guide. I cannot pretend to be acquainted with but a very small portion of those dusty authors, whom he has arranged, with such surpassing erudition, at the bottom of his page. In a few cases I have traced him to his authorities ; and it seems to me, he is too honest a man ever to falsify his record ; he never relates an event without a witness. Often too, with great acuteness, he disentangles the web, which crossing testimonies had woven before him. His style, though not so dark, we think, as has been sometimes represented, is perhaps too smart and epigrammatical. Still it has the advantage of detaining the attention. Nor should we object altogether to his irony, or to his freedom in laying open the deformities of the Mother Church.

The great error of Gibbon is, he weaves one uniform texture of narration, without informing the reader of the very different gradations in which the events stand in point of probability. He is like an architect, who should build a bridge equally smooth on the surface, but in some places supported by granite arches, and in others by rotten piers. Thus he slips over the story of Mohammed, (relating to events which happened in the heart of the Arabian desert,) with the same confident tone, as he does the deeds of Augustus. In short, this skeptick is a dogmatist ; and no writer ever blended facts and opinions together, with such fatal skill. He never can let the event go without a comment ; he never can suffer a witness to speak for himself. Whoever is on the stand, or whatever is the cause, the court is always interposing. In short, his is the most coloured page that was ever written ; and coloured, not like Lord Clarendon's, who steps boldly forth, brush in hand, and gives a visible stroke, but coloured secretly, in the choice of words, in adjectives and adverbs, in associated ideas, in manner which is scarcely noticed until it is experienced in the powerful effect. Gibbon has a propensity to tread a middle line

between irony and concession; just as Swedenbourg steers between a metaphor and a literal meaning.

However, his day is over; all the harm he can ever do is probably done. It is the pride of this age, that the crossing streams of literature have purified the ocean. Not even the genius of Gibbon can cloud the truths of time; and though his history will be read for its facts, and its weighty maxims, it will be read with such allowance and exceptions by every discerning reader, as will preserve him from being blinded to the illustrations which the truths of Christianity have received from time.

It is remarkable that the object for which this work was written, should be so little promoted by it. As the pyramids which were built by the kings of Egypt, to preserve their names, are still preserved, though the names of their builders are lost; so this history, written to promote infidelity, will fail of its object, and last forever.

The history proceeds in an inoffensive tenour, until we come to the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters, in which the author gives an account of the rise of Christianity. I have already remarked, that he often presents a series of facts, as all standing on equal credit, without giving notice of the different degrees of probability by which they are supported. He sometimes seems to approach that vulgar delusion of supposing that an event, or writing, must be entirely received, or entirely rejected, without adverting to the degrees of probability on which a rejected testimony may stand. Thus, he treats with the utmost scorn, the fact alluded to by all the ecclesiastical writers, that Pilate sent to Tiberius an account of the Crucifixion.

"The Apology of Tertullian contains two very ancient, very singular, but at the same time very suspicious instances of imperial clemency; the edicts published by Tiberius and by Marcus Antonius, and designed not only to protect the innocence of the Christians, but even to proclaim those stupendous miracles which had attested the truth of their doctrine. The first of these examples is attended with some difficulties, which might perplex the skeptical mind. We are required to believe, *that* Pontius Pilate informed the emperor of the unjust sentence of death which he had pronounced against an innocent, and, as it appeared, a divine person; and that, without acquiring the merit, he exposed himself to the danger of martyrdom; *that* Tiberius, who avowed his

contempt for all religion, immediately conceived the design of placing the Jewish Messiah among the gods of Rome ; *that* his servile senate ventured to disobey the commands of of their master ; *that* Tiberius, instead of resenting their refusal, contented himself with protecting the Christians from the severity of the laws, many years before such laws were enacted, or before the church had assumed any distinct name or existence ; and lastly, *that* the memory of this extraordinary transaction was preserved in the most public and authentic records, which escaped the knowledge of the historians of Greece and Rome, and were only visible to the eyes of an African Christian, who composed his Apology one hundred and sixty years after the death of Tiberius."

But not one of these reasons will be found so conclusive as he represents. There was no need that Pilate should represent his own sentence as unjust ; for he sentenced Christ on the charge of striving to be a king,—a point on which Tiberius was peculiarly jealous. In the second place, it is not so absurd as our historian seems to insinuate, that Tiberius, who avowed his contempt for all religion, should conceive the design of placing the Jewish Messiah among the gods of Rome ; for all tyrants, however atheistic themselves, pay some external deference, at least, to the prejudices of their people ; and to adopt a new deity, was exactly according to the accommodating spirit of polytheism ; perhaps it was the best way to degrade Jesus from the exclusive pre-eminence which he might hold in the minds of some of the people. In the third place, it is not very absurd to suppose that his servile senate might venture on such a point to dispute his commands ; for as it is suggested by Reading in his notes on Eusebius, (see Eusebius, lib. ii. chap. 2d, page 47, Cambridge, 1820,) this is one of those indifferent points on which a tyrant allows his subjects a license, in order more effectually to veil his purposes in more important affairs. Bonaparte was accustomed to allow his senate to oppose his will in points which he deemed non-essential, as a decent veil to cover the deformity of oppression ; and we are told by Tacitus, that Tiberius often did the same. The bargain was with the senate, "you shall play with the shadow of authority, only leave me the substance." In the last place, it is not very improbable that so trifling an incident (as the Pagans would conceive it,) should escape the notice of the secular historian, and be preserved by a Christian teacher, who was

more interested in preserving whatever related to Christianity. The objections of Gibbon were first brought forward by *Tanaquill Faber*, and are well answered in a note to the English edition of Eusebius. I do not believe myself, on the whole, that Pilate wrote any such account; but still I should reject it, conscious that there are a great many probabilities on the other side.* So he rejects without doubt, and without adverting to any opposite evidence, the famous passage in Josephus, in which that historian alludes to the miracles, and describes the person of our Saviour. He has no doubt that it is a forgery, although he allows it to be a very skilful one.† The reader will find this question very beautifully discussed in one of Dr. Lardner's volumes; and it would be well worth the time of any one to read it, and to contrast the caution and doubts, the patient examination and careful result of Lardner the Christian, with the rashness and dogmatism of Gibbon the skeptick.‡ Lardner has

* Some people seem to be hardly aware, that a well-regulated mind moves by degrees over the scale of evidence, and often feels deeply the force of a probability, which is, after all, far from producing a settled conviction. In the mental world there is a twilight, as well as a noon-day; and all kinds of twilight, from the first dawn of a doubtful morning, to that which verges to highest illumination of meridian light. Thus the famous passage in John respecting the three witnesses, is rejected by our modern latitudinarians with scorn and contempt, as if nothing could be said in its favour; as if it were as manifest a forgery, as though it were foisted in by the last Trinitarian who happened to write in a religious dispute. Some have gone so far as to say it ought to be expunged from every subsequent edition of the Bible. But, with submission, I would suggest to these critical butchers, with their cleavers in their hands, that this is to lose all the intermediate ground between absolute proof and absolute disproof. A temperate judge never proceeds so in a court of justice. It is true the verdict must be absolute—one way or the other; but much evidence is always admitted which falls short of supreme conviction. Let us suppose that the evidence for the disputed part of these verses,—i. e. 1 John v. 7, 8,—to be as eighteen probabilities to two; there are eighteen probabilities or grains of evidence against their genuineness, and only two for it, (and this, perhaps, is a pretty fair statement of the case.) Ought the passage to be rejected from the text? I answer boldly, No. It ought to be retained, with a note stating how the evidence stands; and thus every reader would be taught to regulate his mind according to the nicer gradations of comparative evidence, and saved from a rashness equally uncritical and irreligious.

† In order to show that the passage is spurious, he points us to the objections of Le Fevre, (Havercamp. Joseph. tom. ii. p. 267—273,) the laboured answer of Daubuz, (p. 187—232,) and the masterly reply (Bibliothèque Ancienne et Moderne, tom. vii. 237—238) of an anonymous critic, whom he supposes to be the Abbé de Longuerue. However masterly the reply may be, it seems not to have satisfied all the learned judges of a more recent day. Bretschneider, an able German theologian, maintains the genuineness of the passage. See a translation of his *Capita Theologiæ Judeorum dogmaticæ e Flavio Josephi scriptis collecta*, auctore C. F. Bretschneider, *Leipsc*, 1812, in the *Christian Spectator*, vol. VII. for March, 1825.

‡ I allude to it from memory, and cannot therefore point to the volume. I call Lardner a Christian, because he was so compared with Gibbon. No man

a mind like a very delicate pair of scales, which, under the influence of almost equal weights, can incline one way without totally subsiding. But no sooner does the intellectual scale in Gibbon begin to incline, than one side strikes the ground, and the other kicks the beam. It illustrates what I have before remarked, that the skeptick is sometimes very dogmatical.

He often disguises the truth, when the sun-light of events forces him to see it, under the vocabulary of his own school. Whatever may be said of Christianity, it cannot be denied that it wrought a great reformation in the manners of men. This is evident from the testimony of its enemies. When Pliny, for the first time, had Christians before his tribunal, and subjected some of them to the torture, in order to find out what crimes they had committed, he tells us that they affirmed, this was the sum of their crime or mistake, that they were accustomed, on a stated day, to assemble, to sing a hymn to Christ as God (*carmenque Christo, quasi Deo*), and then to bind themselves, by a solemn obligation, not to commit any wickedness, and then to separate, after an innocent repast. We have likewise in a later age the testimonies of Lucian and Julian, (one of them a laughter at all religion, and the other a hater of Christianity,) to the innocence and simplicity of the first Christians. Now, mark how Gibbon manages this fact! He relates it; but clothes it in such language, that the simple reader is hardly conscious of what he is reading.

"It is a very ancient reproach, suggested by the ignorance or the malice of infidelity, that the Christians allured into their party the most atrocious criminals, who, as soon as they were touched by a sense of remorse, were easily persuaded to wash away, in the water of baptism, the guilt of their past conduct, for which the temples of the gods refused to grant them any expiation. But this reproach, when it is cleared from misrepresentation, contributes as much to the honour as it did to the increase of the church. The friends of Christianity may acknowledge without a blush, that many of the most eminent saints had been before their baptism, the most abandoned sinners. Those persons, who in the world had followed, though in an imperfect man-

knew better how to hold the balance of historical probability with a critical eye and an untrembling hand. The discussion on this passage is a beautiful specimen of the coolest impartiality.

ner, the dictates of benevolence and propriety, derived such a calm satisfaction from the opinion of their own rectitude, as rendered them much less susceptible of the sudden emotions of shame, of grief, and of terror, which have given birth to so many wonderful conversions. After the example of their Divine Master, the missionaries of the Gospel disdained not the society of men, and especially of women, oppressed by the consciousness, and very often by the effects, of their vices. As they emerged from sin and superstition to the glorious hope of immortality, they resolved to devote themselves to a life, not only of virtue but of penitence. The desire of perfection became the ruling passion of their soul; and it is well known, that while reason embraces a cold mediocrity, our passions hurry us, with rapid violence, over the space which lies between the most opposite extremes." [Vol. I. p. 267, Harpers' edit.]

I suppose the love of God is a passion; and I suppose that self-righteousness, under the form of a very partial but decent morality, is the greatest obstacle that the humbling spirit of the Gospel can meet with in its claims to enter the heart.

In some cases his insinuations vanish before the inductive method of reasoning. Thus he throws out, under the guise of stating the views of the Gnostics, some singular objections to the belief of Christians. The religion of Moses was to give place to a new economy.

"These Judaizing Christians seem to have argued with some degree of plausibility from the divine origin of the Mosaic law, and from the immutable perfections of its great Author. They affirmed, *that* if the Being, who is the same through all eternity, had designed to abolish those sacred rites which had served to distinguish his chosen people, the repeal of them would have been no less clear and solemn than their first promulgation; *that*, instead of those frequent declarations, which either suppose or assert the perpetuity of the Mosaic religion, it would have been represented as a provisional scheme intended to last only till the coming of the Messiah, who should instruct mankind in a more perfect mode of faith and of worship; *that* the Messiah himself, and his disciples who conversed with him on earth, instead of authorizing by their example, the most minute observances of the Mosaic law, would have published to the world the abolition of those useless and obsolete

ceremonies, without suffering Christianity to remain during so many years obscurely confounded among the sects of the Jewish church. Arguments like these appear to have been used in the defence of the expiring cause of the Mosaic law; but the industry of our learned divines has abundantly explained the ambiguous language of the Old Testament, and the ambiguous conduct of the apostolic teachers. It was proper gradually to unfold the system of the Gospel, and to pronounce, with the utmost caution and tenderness, a sentence of condemnation so repugnant to the inclination and prejudices of the believing Jews."

It would seem as if these wise Gnostics, and the reporter of their sentiments, had forgotten that there were such passages in the Old Testament, as the following: From the prophet Jeremiah, chapter xxxi, verses 31, 32, 33, 34, "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day *that* I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they brake, although I was a husband unto them, saith the Lord: But this *shall be* the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more." Again: Daniel, chap. ix, verses 24, 25, 26, 27: "Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy. Know therefore and understand, *that* from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem, unto the Messiah, the Prince, *shall be* seven weeks, and threescore and two weeks: the street shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times. And after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself: and the people of the prince that shall come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary; and the end

thereof *shall* be with a flood, and unto the end of the war desolations are determined. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week; and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abominations, he shall make it desolate, even unto the consummation, and that determined shall be poured upon the desolate." See also Isaiah, chapter lxvi.

But the passage to which I shall particularly turn the attention of the reader, is the close of chapter xv, vol. I. page 288. It is respecting the omission of Seneca and Pliny the elder, to notice the darkness at the Crucifixion of Christ. "But how shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic world, to those evidences which were presented by the hand of Omnipotence, not to their reason, but to their senses? During the age of Christ, of his apostles, and of their first disciples, the doctrine which they preached was confirmed by innumerable prodigies. The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, demons were expelled, and the laws of nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alteration in the moral or physical government of the world. Under the reign of Tiberius, the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice, in the age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence of the prodigy. Each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phenomena of nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe. A distinct chapter of Pliny is designed for eclipses of an extraordinary nature and unusual duration; but he contents himself with describing the singular defect of light which

followed the murder of Cesar, when, during the greatest part of the year, the orb of the sun appeared pale, and without splendour. The season of obscurity, which cannot surely be compared with the preternatural darkness of the Passion, has been already celebrated by most of the poets, and historians of that memorable age."

This passage will give me an opportunity to notice a very inconsistent demand, which is often made by unbelievers, relating to the proof of the miracles, supporting the religion of Christ. The demand seems to be this; that philosophic heathen should bear their testimony to these miracles, while they continued to despise and disbelieve them. Now is it not evident, from the nature of the case, that this was impossible? A man, in those days, must have been on one side or the other; he must have been in heart either a Christian or a Pagan. Let us suppose that the story of the supernatural darkness at the Crucifixion, had travelled to Rome, and reached the ears of Seneca and Pliny. They must have heard it, not as a natural phenomenon, but a supernatural work, wrought to establish a new religion. Let us suppose they both heard and believed it. What is the consequence? Seneca and Pliny are no longer what they were; that is, they are not Pagan writers, but they fall into the rank of Christians; and their testimony would be no more, in Gibbon's view, than that of Matthew, or Mark, or Luke, or John, or Paul, or a thousand other believers, who, by embracing Christianity, have left their implicit testimony to the truth of this miracle. The moment they become witnesses to the truth of the fact, they lose, in that very act, the qualification demanded of them: as the anatomist, who opens the animal to see how life operates, destroys life in the very process. Infidels call for the testimony of enemies; and we tell them, we have thousands of such testimonies, only with this qualification, that the moment they were competent witnesses, they ceased to be enemies. The testimony of every Christian in the first ages, is the testimony of a quondam enemy, overcome by the power of truth, and this is necessary from the very nature of the case; for certainly, we should not believe the testimony of a witness to a fact, which produced no conviction on his own mind. You demand the testimony of such men as Pliny and Seneca to the truth of Gospel miracles; forgetting that, had they believed them,

they could have no longer sustained their character as unbelievers, but must have become the despised disciples of the new religion.

But suppose both these writers, on hearing of this supernatural darkness, disbelieved it,—as was most probably the case, for certainly the very idea of a heathen philosopher, supposes a rejection of the miracles of the Gospel. What is more natural than for them to pass it by with silent contempt? No intelligent Christian supposes the darkness extended farther than the land of Judea: and some confine it to the district of Jerusalem. But let it be as extensive as the most enlarged construction of the words can require, the Roman naturalists must have heard of it, in connexion with the fact, and with the purpose for which it was wrought. Now what temptation had they to notice such a story, in works written expressly on the operations of nature. Had they believed the story, they would no longer have been the Plinys and Senecas required; and if they did not believe it, they must of course have regarded it as a superstitious tale, which they were not obliged to confute, in a work written with a very different design. If the object of Gibbon, in quoting their silence, was to prove to us that we have not their testimony in favour of the Gospel, it was certainly a very superfluous labour; for this is included in the very idea of their having continued heathens. But then it must be remembered, that in the very idea that thousands and thousands of those who were originally unbelievers, not in Rome, but on the very spot where the miracle was wrought, forsook their old opinions and embraced the Gospel, is included the fact that the enemies of Christianity have borne witness to its truth; though they must of necessity, in that very deed, have ceased to be enemies.

The evidence of omission is in all cases a very weak kind of proof; and becomes more weak in proportion as the omission is natural. In this case, I must confess that the silence of these writers seems to me exactly accordant with their circumstances and characters, even on the supposition that the darkness was known by them.

I should be sorry to copy Gibbon's example, and rake up the ancient scandal against the philosophers, with the same diligence with which he has gathered up every thing which could serve to blacken the character of the ancient Christians. I will only just hint concerning Seneca, that if what

Tacitus, that stern master of morals and truth, says of him, be correct, Seneca was not the man, after all the pompous morality of his writings, whom a Christian would select, as "adorning an age, and exalting human nature." There are a few chance words in Tacitus, which reflect a dark shade on the character of Seneca. When the Emperor Nero attempted to drown his mother at sea, and the news was brought him that she had escaped, he was in the utmost terror and consternation; he feared she would fly to Rome, reveal the deed, appeal to the indignation of the Senate, and arm the soldiers against him. He sent for Seneca and Burrus, to consult what was to be done; and on this occasion Tacitus says of him, in one of those sentences of his which speak volumes, *incretum an et ante gnaros*.* Is it possible? Was Seneca an accessory to one of the foulest deeds that ever blackened the annals of human nature? But however this may be, her death was decided on in this very consultation, and Seneca implicitly advised it, and justified it when done. What would have been said, what clamours and outcries of horror should we have heard, had half this wickedness been even tolerated by a Christian?

As to Pliny, if he did not believe the miracles recorded in the Gospels, it was certainly not for the want of a sufficient stock of credulity. He believed that there was a race of people in Scythia, somewhere north-east of the Sea of Azof, who had one eye in the middle of their foreheads, and fought with gryphons, a kind of winged beasts, for gold. He believed that the watch-fires made on the shores of Greece at the sixth hour of the day, i. e. 12 o'clock, could be seen in those regions where it was the third hour of the night, that is, one hundred and thirty-five degrees, or more than one third of the circumference of our globe. He believed that a boy on the shores of Italy, kept a tame dolphin, and used to ride out to sea on his back. He believed that earthquakes were omens and prognostics of far greater evils than they themselves produced. He believed that Mount Casius, between Egypt and Palestine, was so high as to catch the beams of the rising sun three hours before daybreak. He believed, like other infidels, every folly he was under no obligation to believe, and rejected those miracles to the belief of which the objection was complete.

He could believe any thing which pleased a sportive fancy, but nothing which tended to confirm the dominion of God.

These two chapters of Gibbon have had more efficacy in insinuating the principles of infidelity into the minds of the reading public, than all the laboured arguments of far more elaborate attacks upon our religion. They lie in the popular road to knowledge; they come to us under the guise of great candour; they are the doubts and surmises of a man, who professes to have no other object than to hold evenly the balance of historical truth. And yet they artfully insinuate whatever might engender doubts, and as artfully exclude all the counterbalancing circumstances by which these doubts might be removed.

There is one fallacy which runs through this history, to which we must allude in closing our remarks on this author. In judging of the influence of Christianity, as exemplified in the lives of its professors, he compares their lives with the abstract standard of Christian perfection, and not with the degrees by which they were made better than they formerly were, or than others around them continued to be. The faults of the Christians, their controversies, their ambition, were great, we confess. But how much better than the manners of the pagans,—their gladiatorial shows, their sensuality, their proscriptions, their wars, their seditions, their torrents of blood! The worst ambition of the most hypocritical bishop that ever abused the name of Christianity, is better than the best virtues of an Anthony who wallowed in drunkenness, and of a Sylla who bathed in blood.*

* The reader will perceive that the account which we have given of the supernatural darkness at the Crucifixion, and the answers given to the historian's objections, are different from what is attempted in Bishop Watson's letter to our Author. The Bishop's reply, notwithstanding his beautiful style and the classical elegance of his taste, is very unsatisfactory.—Charity requires us to give him credit for sincerity; but some learned men have sometimes defended a cause, as if they half wished to betray it; at least, as if its importance had never sunk from their heads, to occupy and inspire their hearts.

ART. III. REVIEW OF THE WORKS OF THE REV. DR.
BELLAMY.

By Rev. JOHN WOODBRIDGE, D. D. New-York.

THE Rev. Dr. Joseph Bellamy was born in New-Cheshire, Conn., in 1719. He was of a worthy and respectable family. He must have commenced study preparatory to a public education, very early in life; since, at the age of sixteen years, he was graduated at Yale College, in his native State. Not long after the completion of his collegiate course, he is supposed to have received those religious impressions, which issued, there is no reason to doubt, in the renewal of his heart to holiness, and his consequent introduction into the spiritual family of God. He was licensed to preach the Gospel when he was about eighteen; was acceptable and useful, wherever he was called to labour in the work of the Lord; and was ordained over the church and congregation in Bethlehem, as their pastor, in the spring of 1740, in the twenty-first or twenty-second year of his age. The hearts of that favoured people were especially attracted towards the youthful herald of the cross, in consequence of a general and earnest attention to religion among them, which had been produced by the divine blessing on his instrumentality.

As a preacher, he was not only bold, pungent, and convincing, but often extremely graphic in his delineations of character and events, so as to present a living and moving picture before the minds of his auditory. His occasional vulgarisms and eccentricities belonged as much to the times, as to the man. He could dissect the human heart with the skill of an anatomist. In the extensive revivals of religion, which occurred during the early part of his ministry, he was eminently active and useful, travelling from place to place, preaching daily, and enjoying the happiness, almost continually, of directing inquirers to the only foundation of hope for sinful men. After that glorious work of grace had been corrupted by enthusiasm, errors and divisions ensued, till religious excitements began to be dreaded as the harbingers of disorder, and every evil work. A deplorable and general spiritual apathy was the consequence; the friends of Zion were grieved, and Satan seemed to triumph. After this melancholy change in the state of the churches, Dr. Bellamy was chiefly employed in his studies at home, in

the duties of his pastoral office, and in the business of a teacher to young men, preparatory for the Christian ministry. He continued to be connected with the church in Bethlehem, to the close of his life, which was terminated on the 6th of March, 1790, in the seventy-second year of his age.*

* Previously to that memorable season of "refreshing from the presence of the Lord," which was enjoyed in Great Britain and in this country, near the commencement of the last century, a general religious declension began to be visible, threatening the utter extinction of vital godliness in both hemispheres. The complaints by English writers, both in the establishment and among dissenters, can leave no doubt respecting the state of religion in what was then called the mother country. "I cannot," says Burnet, "look on without the deepest concern, when I see imminent ruin hanging over this church, and by consequence, over the whole reformation. The outward state of things is black enough, God knows; but that which heightens my fears rises chiefly from the inward state into which we are unhappily fallen." Again: "What are we like to grow to? In what a case are we to deal with an adversary, atheist, papist, or dissenter, or in any sort to promote the honour of God, and carry on the great concerns of the Gospel, when so gross an ignorance in the fundamentals of religion has spread itself among those who ought to teach others." The state of the dissenting churches was little better than that of the establishment: as is apparent from the acknowledgments of evangelical dissenters themselves. The Rev. J. Baker, a correspondent of Doddridge, wrote to the latter, in 1744, as follows: "The dissenting interest is not like itself. I hardly know it. It used to be famous for faith, holiness, and love. I knew the time, when I had no doubt, into whatever place of worship I went among dissenters, but that my heart would be warmed and comforted, and my edification promoted. Now I hear prayers and sermons, which I neither relish nor understand. Evangelical truth and duty are quite old-fashioned things: many pulpits are not so much as chaste: one's ears are so dinned with 'reason,' 'the great law of reason,' and 'the eternal law of reason,' that it is enough to put one out of conceit with the chief excellency of our nature, because it is so idolized, and even deified." Again: "If the people departed from the doctrines of the reformation as much as the ministers, I should begin to think whether ours were an interest worth preserving."

The natural consequence of this departure from the faith, and growing stupidity in ministers and churches, was such as was lamented by the learned Bishop Butler, in 1736, in the following terms: "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of enquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly, they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to set it up as principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world." See "an Introductory Essay" to the *Miscellaneous Works of Philip Doddridge, D. D.* by the Rev. T. Morell, of Wymondley College.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the pulse of spiritual life had become extensively feeble and languid in the churches of New-England; the line of distinction between the holy and the profane, seemed ready to be obliterated; the peculiar doctrines of the reformation, which had been the glory of the early Puritans, were becoming less and less the subjects of earnest inculcation from the pulpit and the press. "About this time," says Edwards, in his *Narrative of Surprising Conversions*, "began the great noise that was in this part of the country, about Arminianism, which seemed to appear with a very threatening aspect upon the interest of religion here."

It was under circumstances like these, that God raised up instruments, in Europe and America, to revive his sinking cause. Among the happy men employed by Providence for this purpose, were Edwards, Bellamy, and others of a kindred spirit, in New-England. "The memory of the just is blessed."

His understanding was uncommonly vigorous; his talent of observation was peculiar; and his piety, if we may form an opinion from his life and writings, presented a rare combination of sound judgment, and the clearest intellectual views, with intense spiritual affections. By his love of knowledge, his intimate acquaintance with some of the ablest theologians in the country, especially with Jonathan Edwards, that "Coryphæus of modern divines," by his theological attainments, his mental discrimination, and his earnest attention to the revivals and religious controversies of the age in which he lived; he was eminently qualified to state with clearness, and defend with ability, the great principles of Christian doctrine, experience and practice.

The influence of his various publications has been great; they have done much to purify the churches of Connecticut from Arminian, Antinomian, and Neonomian errors,—and they have contributed not a little to perspicuity of statement, consistency of views, and force of argument, in some of the most popular evangelical writers in Great Britain, as well as America. They have been strongly recommended, by men of high distinction, at home and abroad. His "True Religion Delineated," published about four years after the treatise of Edward's on the Affections, was introduced to the world with the powerful recommendation of the author of that immortal work. Among those who encouraged the publication of an edition of his works in 1811, as the productions of "one of the most distinguished and useful writers of the last age," we find the names of Rodgers and Miller, of New-York; James P. Wilson, Trumbull, Morse, Azel Backus, Griffen, Woods, Stewart, and Asahel Hooker. Among those in Great Britain who have appreciated his labours with some degree of justice, it is sufficient to mention Erskine, Fuller, and Thomas Scott; men, who, as able defenders of Calvinistic theology, have had few superiours in any country, and who possessed, in no ordinary measure, that spiritual gust, which is perhaps the most essential requisite to a clear, full, and consistent reception of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity. The Rev. Dr. Burns, of Paisley, in Scotland, says of Dr. Bellamy, that he "has been long known and esteemed in the church of Christ, as one of the ablest defenders of divine truth."

It is to be regretted, that the works of Dr. Bellamy, and of other clear thinkers like him, are not more extensively

circulated and studied, in this age of Christian action, when there is peculiar danger of resting in a religion, which has its seat rather in the animal spirits, and physical instincts, than in the deep foundations of the understanding and heart.

A full analysis of his various writings, would exceed the limits, suitable to such a work as the Literary and Theological Review. I shall be gratified, if I can say any thing which will induce my readers to pay an increased attention to his luminous discussions, powerful argumentation, and striking though unadorned method of exhibiting the truth.

The first, and perhaps the most important treatise of Dr. Bellamy, was his "True Religion Delineated," written soon after the decline of the great religious excitement in New-England, and published about the year 1750, when he was little more than thirty years of age. It exhibits, throughout, the process of a mind accustomed to self-inspection, philosophical accuracy of thought, a patient study of the Bible, and a profound acquaintance with the subject of experimental religion, in all its branches. He evidently had an ardent zeal for the purity of revivals of religion, viewing them as inseparably connected with the rapid diffusion, and ultimate universal triumph of Christianity; and, with the strong sensibility of an enlightened lover of the cause of human holiness and happiness, he set himself to correct the extravagancies by which they had been vitiated, dishonoured, and to a great extent destroyed.

The fundamental principle which he assumes in this work, is, that "true religion consists in a conformity to the law of God, and in a compliance with the gospel of Christ;" and the correctness of this general view of the subject, must be admitted by every believer in the divine authority of the Scriptures. Dr. Bellamy begins with a discussion of the claims of the law, and the nature and effects of the obedience which it enjoins; thus portraying the essential features of that holiness, which is the same under all dispensations of religion, and in all worlds. He selects for his text, or a main principle whereon all his reasoning is to be built, that summary of the divine law which is contained in Matt. 22: 37—40, and which is as philosophically just and comprehensive, as it is spiritual and searching. His train of thought is as follows:

With respect to the *nature of love to God*, it implies a true knowledge of his attributes and character; a high esteem of him, and exultation in his prerogatives; benevolence, or an earnest desire that *he* may be glorified in us, in all creatures, and in all events; and a delight in his perfections, service, and the welfare of his kingdom.

The *motives* from which true love to God originates, are, the infinite worthiness and amiableness of his nature; and, in connexion with, and in subserviency to this, the relations towards us which he sustains, as our proprietor, law-giver, and supreme benefactor.

The *measure* of love to God which is required, is, the utmost extent of our natural capacity, without any allowance for our disinclination, or the strength of our aversion to this duty. Such love will infallibly lead to all those overt acts of obedience, which God has required of his creatures.

The *love to our neighbour*, which is enjoined, includes a due estimation of those qualities which render him worthy of our regard; a benevolent respect for his happiness; and a complacency in his moral worth.

The *motives* to this love, are, its intrinsic fitness; the command of God; and the divine example.

Its *standard*, is that degree of love which it is proper that we should exercise towards ourselves.

From these principles, Dr. Bellamy justly infers, that *holy love to mankind* differs essentially from those instincts which are commonly called natural compassion, good nature, and natural affection; and also, from party spirit, that love to others which is a mere reciprocity of love, and that love which one bad man feels to other bad men, because they are like himself.

Such is the religion required in the law; and, as it regards its nature and effects, it is the only true religion in the universe. By such a process, Dr. Bellamy is led to some most important deductions, respecting a number of the controverted and peculiarly humbling doctrines of the Gospel; and a due attention to his reasoning here, would do much to confirm the wavering in the sound scriptural views which were maintained by the fathers of the American church.

His second discourse, in which he shows, in what a *genuine compliance with the gospel consists*, is founded on John 3: 16; "For God so loved the world, that he gave

his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

In treating this part of his general subject, agreeably to the spirit of the text, Dr. Bellamy considers,

I. The *grounds* on which the Most High regarded mankind as being in a perishing condition; which are, their relation to Adam as their public head; their destitution of the divine moral image; their entire positive sinfulness; their aversion to reconciliation; the fixed bent of their hearts, when unrestrained, to the most aggravated degrees of wickedness; their insensibility to their actual vileness and ill-desert; and God's sovereign right to extend mercy to them or not, as should seem good in his sight:

H. His *motive* to do what he has done for their recovery; which was, not any injustice in the original constitution with Adam; not an excessive rigour in the law of nature, under which all mankind are born; not any diminution of their ill-desert on account of their utter moral impotency; not any expectation, on his part, that, ruined as they are, they would ever, of their own accord, heartily thank him for his wonderful mercy; but wholly his own infinite benevolence, and rich, free, sovereign grace:

III. The *necessity* of a *Mediator*, and how the way to life has been opened by him, whom God has provided:

IV. The *nature* of saving *faith* in the *Mediator*; and,

V. The *promise* of everlasting life to those that believe.

These several topics Dr. Bellamy treats in a very able manner. The whole discussion, indeed, is at once thorough, simple, and highly practical. Any man, who will read the whole treatise with candour, and with a disposition to apply its searching tests of piety in examining his own heart, can hardly fail to judge correctly of his character and state, in the sight of God. It exposes formality, self-righteousness, pharisaical zeal, and antinomian selfishness, with such plainness and power, as to destroy every hope of salvation which does not spring from spiritual renovation, and is not built on the Rock of Ages.

The entire tissue of the work, as well as of most of the other writings of Dr. Bellamy, presupposes the truth, in its main features, of the system which is usually called Calvinistic, in distinction from Arminian, Pelagian, and semi-

Pelagian views of the divine government and human nature.

Thus he maintains, that the glory of God is his highest end in the creation and government of all things; and that in reference to this end, he has specifically ordained evil, as well as good. Observe his words:

"When he first designed to create the world, as it was easy for him to have determined, that neither angels nor men should ever sin, and that misery should never have been heard of in all his dominions, so he could easily have prevented both sin and misery. Why did he not? Surely, not for want of goodness in his nature; but because, in his infinite wisdom, he did not think it best on the whole. It was not because he had not sufficient power to preserve angels and men all holy and happy; for it is certain he had: it was not because preventing grace would have been *inconsistent with their being free agents*; for it *would not*;" (let the reader mark this;) "it was not because he did not thoroughly consider and weigh the thing with all its consequences; for it is certain he did. But, upon the whole, all things considered, he judged it best to permit the angels to sin, and men to fall; and so let misery into his dominions. There is no doubt but that, all things considered, he thought it best to permit things to come to pass just as they did; and if he thought it best, it was best; for his understanding is infinite. But why was it best? What was his *grand end* in creating and governing the world? Why, look; what end is he at last like to obtain, and what will be the final result? Why, in all, he will exert and display every one of his perfections to the life, and so, by all, will exhibit a most perfect and exact image of himself. This is the greatest and best thing he can aim at in all his works; and this, therefore ought to be his *last end*. Now, it is evident, that the fall of the angels and of man, together with all those things which have and will come to pass in consequence thereof, will serve to give a much more lively representation of God, than could possibly have been exhibited, had there never been any sin or misery."—P. 89, 90.

"God has, in fact, permitted sin to enter into the world; does, in fact, permit many to die in their sins; will, in fact, punish them forever; and *all* consistent with the infinite goodness of his nature. And since it is consistent with his

goodness *to do as he does*, it was consistent with his goodness to determine with himself beforehand *to do so*. What God, *from eternity*, decreed to do, that God, *in time*, will do; therefore, if *all* God's *conduct* be holy, just and good, so also are *all* his *decrees*; unless we suppose it to be wrong for the infinitely wise God, from all eternity, to determine upon a conduct in all respects right; than which nothing can be more absurd."—P. 91.

All the author's works accord with the views expressed in these extracts, of the motive, extent, and particularity of the divine decrees.

His statement of the much vilified and hated doctrine of election, is such as every consistent Calvinist must approve. I give the following quotations:

"God is, through Christ, ready to be reconciled to all who will repent. He sends the news of pardon and peace around a guilty world, and invites every one to come. But inasmuch as mankind will not hearken, but are obstinately set in their way, therefore he takes state upon himself, and says, *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy*. Some he may suffer to take their own way, if he pleases; and others he may subdue and recover to himself, by his own all conquering grace. And to a certain number, from eternity he intended to show this special mercy; and these are said to be *given to Christ*. And with a special eye to these *sheep*, did he *lay down his life*; his Father intending, and he intending, that they, in spite of all opposition, should be brought to eternal life at last; and hence the *elect* do always *obtain*. With a view to these, it was promised in the covenant of redemption, that Christ should *see of the travail of his soul*."—P. 390 and 391.

"He has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and compassion on whom he will have compassion; and many times takes the meanest and vilest, that the sovereignty of his grace might be the more illustrious, and the pride of all flesh be brought low, and the Lord alone be exalted. And surely such a conduct infinitely becomes the Supreme Governour of the whole world."—P. 239. See also p. 240.

With nearly all Calvinistic writers, Dr. Bellamy maintains, (in opposition to Arminians and Pelagians, who, in direct contradiction of the divine testimony, declare *created holiness* to be impossible,) that Adam was *created* with a holy nature, or disposition to obedience; and also, that we

have become sinners, in consequence of our relation to him, as our federal head.

"Adam was created in the image of God. It was con-natural to him to love God with all his heart; and this would have been our case, had he not rebelled against God; but now we are born devoid of the divine image, have no heart for God, are transgressors from the womb; *by nature, children of wrath.*"—P. 221. The doctrine of our relation to Adam as our public head, is also clearly taught in pages 300 and 301, and in various other places.

Besides the words just quoted, Dr. Bellamy teaches the doctrine of *native depravity*, or *birth-sin*, in many passages of a most unequivocal import.

"We are in fact *born* like the wild asses' colt, as senseless of God, and as void and destitute of grace. We have nature, but no grace. And so we have a heart to love ourselves, but no heart to love God; and may be moved to zeal by selfish views, but cannot be influenced by the infinite moral beauty of the divine nature."—P. 200.

"We may learn that we were *born into the world*, not only destitute of a conformity to the law, but that we are naturally diametrically opposed to it in the temper of our hearts."—P. 201.

"It is plainly the very *native* bent of their hearts, to love themselves above all."—P. 202.

"Our *native* disposition to love ourselves supremely, live to ourselves ultimately, &c. is directly contrary to God's holy law."—P. 211.

It is maintained in the Quarterly Christian Spectator,* that Dr. Bellamy's views of native depravity, are the same with those, which, within the last few years, have been vindicated in that publication. The question may seem to be of little consequence in itself; and yet, the authority of such a name as his, (and this the Reviewer appears well to understand,) cannot fail to have its influence with the admirers of New-England theology. Do not the passages already cited manifestly teach that mankind are sinful from *their birth*? Could words have made Dr. Bellamy's meaning plainer? And is it to be supposed, that, in these repeated instances, this fearless and perspicuous writer has used language without meaning, or with a *jesuitical mental reservation*? He

* September No. for 1830; p. 407, 408, 409.

was an honest man, if ever man deserved that name. To what purpose, then, is the affirmation of the Reviewer, that "Dr. Bellamy does not, and how could he, decide precisely *when* sinful exercises commence?" Be it so; yet he does decide that our moral depravity is as early, at least, as our birth; a *doctrine* manifestly contrary to that of those who leave this point unsettled, or who say it is of no importance, and attempt to vindicate the propriety of infant baptism, and prayers for the regeneration of infants, on the principle, that if they live long enough, they *will commit sin*. Is this Dr. Bellamy's view of the matter? As far from it, as the east is from the west. And on what is the opinion predicated, that he is doubtful whether infants, *at their birth*, have any moral character? On a passage in which he affirms that sin is voluntary, or implies voluntariness, and denies that it belongs to the essence of our souls, like the essential attributes of our physical and moral nature. The Reviewer, by shifting the question, turns the attention of his readers from the main point at issue, which is our native moral corruption, by virtue of our connexion with Adam. But let us hear Dr. Bellamy:

"These are the earliest dispositions,"—meaning, as the foregoing sentences prove, loving ourselves supremely, delighting in that which is not God, &c.;—"that are discovered in our nature; and although I do not think that they are concreated by God together with the essence of our souls, yet they seem to be the very first propensities of the new-made soul. So that they are, in a sense, *connatural*, our whole hearts are perfectly and entirely bent this way, from their very first motion. These propensities, perhaps, in some sense, may be said to be *contracted*, in opposition to their being strictly and philosophically *natural*, because they are not created by God with the essence of the soul, but result from its native choice, or rather, more strictly, *are themselves its native choice*." Here Dr. Bellamy affirms, that strictly, moral depravity is not the *effect* of a wrong choice, as the advocates of the self-determining power of the will suppose, but that it is the wrong choice itself, and that this is *native*. But what is the meaning of the word *native*? The following are the principal definitions of the term, in its adjective form; *produced by nature, not artificial, natural, such as is according to nature, not affected*,

conferred by birth, pertaining to the time or place of birth, original.

To return to Dr. Bellamy. "But most certainly these propensities are not *contracted* in the sense that many vicious habits are, merely by long use and custom. In opposition to *such* vicious habits, they may be called *connatural*. Little children do very early bad things, and contract bad dispositions; but these propensities are evidently antecedent to every bad thing infused or instilled by evil examples, or gotten by practice, or occasioned by temptation." The beginning of depravity in children, then, according to Dr. Bellamy, is not "occasioned by temptation," operating upon their "innocent constitutional susceptibilities," but has its seat in their souls themselves, anterior to the agency of temptation upon them. By "choice," then, it seems but justice to admit, he must have intended, in common with President Edwards, the state or exercise of the moral affections, as well as specific acts of the will, considered as distinct from these affections. "And hence," he goes on to tell us, "it is become customary to call them *natural*, and to say that it is our *very nature* to be so inclined; and to say that these propensities are *natural*, would to common people be the most apt way of expressing the thing." Would it be "*the most apt way*," provided it were doubtful whether children began to be sinful, till some time after their birth? "But it ought to be remembered, that they are not *natural* in the same sense as the *faculties* of our souls are; for they are not the workmanship of God, but our native choice, and the voluntary, free, spontaneous bent of our hearts. And to keep up this distinction, I frequently choose the word *native*, instead of *natural*." pp. 201, 202.

This is the passage, from which the Reviewer is led to say, "we see not how any language could express the fact more fully and clearly, that sin commences and wholly consists in voluntary exercises and acts;" and, "Dr. Bellamy does not, and how could he, decide precisely *when* sinful exercises commence, though according to him, it cannot be till after the soul is formed;" and "there is a *space*, then, in the *order of nature*, between the creation of the soul and the commencement of depravity." What does all this mean? Independently of the views which Dr. Bellamy elsewhere expresses, (and we ought not, without good evidence, to believe that he directly contradicts himself,) this

passage itself, and its connexion, are directly opposed to the notion, that men are born without any moral character. He was too sagacious, to suppose, that universal depravity originates without any cause, or that it is simply the consequence of that moral agency, which was no less the property of Adam before the fall, than it is now of his posterity, and belongs alike to all accountable beings, whether holy or sinful, in all worlds.

In the paragraph immediately preceding this passage, Dr. Bellamy says, "We are born into the world not only destitute of a conformity to the law, but *are naturally diametrically opposed to it in the temper of our hearts*. The law requires us to *love God supremely*, but the native bent of our hearts is to *love ourselves supremely*. The law requires us to *love our neighbour as ourselves*, but the native bent of our hearts is to *be inordinately selfish*." Supreme self-love, or which is the same thing, seeking supremely our own happiness, is here declared to be the essence of sin, or the temper of heart which is diametrically opposite to the requisitions of the law. Some may affirm, that such self-love is not sinful, that it is an "*innocent susceptibility*," a part of our "*constitution*," and even the *spring* of virtue; but these individuals must, of course, agree with Dr. Bellamy in the opinion, that it is a *native* propensity; and, as he differs from them, in that he believed it was *criminal*, I do not see how they can help admitting, that he regarded moral depravity as an attribute of human beings, even *from their birth*. We have always considered it as a sound rule of interpretation, (and the present example confirms us in the justness of our opinion,) to endeavour to ascertain the scope of an author's discourse, before we decide peremptorily on the meaning of an insulated sentence.

Unfortunately for the Reviewer, the words immediately following the passage on which he lays such stress, are quite as decisive of Dr. Bellamy's meaning as those just quoted—"And now that these dispositions are, as it were, *thus born with us*, is as evident from experience, as any thing of this kind can be; for these are the earliest dispositions that man's nature discovers, and are evidently discovered before little children are capable of learning them from others." Yea,

* "How much earlier they exist, than they are disclosed to observers," remarks the Reviewer, "he (Dr. Bellamy) does not say." True, but he does

it is plainly the very native bent of their hearts, to love themselves above all ; to make their ease, comfort, and happiness, their last end, and their all ; and to seek for all from the *creature*, or, in other words, from that which is not God."

The Reviewer imagines, that he sees in page 219, the elements of that system, which attributes our sinfulness to the operation of our innocent appetites and susceptibilities, excited, in the absence of positive moral rectitude, by a world whose influence must be ensnaring ; and he intimates, that he and Dr. Bellamy, with whom he couples Edwards, have adopted the *same* philosophy in accounting for the moral depravity of mankind. But what does Dr. Bellamy actually say?

"God only creates the naked essence of our souls, our natural faculties, and power to think, and will, and to love and hate ; and this *evil bent* of our hearts is *not of his making*, but is the *spontaneous propensity* of our own wills ; for we, being born devoid of the divine image, ignorant of God, and insensible of his glory, do, *of our own accord*, turn to ourselves, and the things of time and sense, and to any thing that suits a graceless heart, and there all our affections centre ; from whence we natively become averse to God, and to all that which is spiritually good, and inclined to all sin. So that the *positive* corruption of our nature is not any thing created by God, but arises *merely* from a *privative* cause."

This, the reader will be pleased to observe, is introduced by Dr. Bellamy, as an answer to the objection, that, "If we are natively sinful, God made us so, and by consequence is the *author of sin*." It is to be noted also, that his very language imports, what many would account an unwarrantable supposition, that God might have made us holy from our birth ; and therefore, we become sinners in consequence of our being left to ourselves. The same doctrine he elsewhere more explicitly teaches.* Indeed, the phrase,

say, that they are *born with us*, that is, exist as early as our birth. The *quasi* form of the expression in the above quoted sentence, it is manifest, from comparing it with other passages already adduced, was not intended to intimate any doubt in the writer's mind, as to the time of the actual commencement of moral depravity, in the descendants of Adam. What right then, has the Reviewer to say as he does, that Dr. Bellamy means "merely that *these dispositions* exist as early as their subjects are capable of exhibiting any visible tokens of them?"

* See, for example, p. 221.

"a *privative cause*," supposes the possibility of such a *positive* act on the part of God, as might have hindered men from sinning, without any infringement of the laws of the nature he had given them; and this accords with various passages, already quoted from the writings of Dr. Bellamy. His view of the subject differed, therefore, in a material point, from that of those who affirm moral depravity to be the *certain* consequence, aside from any divine act in withdrawing gracious influences, of our physical constitution, our external circumstances, and the free exercise of our powers of moral agency. The same thing is manifest, from his resolution, in the paragraph immediately succeeding that just quoted, of the present arrangement, not into any stubborn necessity in the nature of our faculties as influenced by the world around us, but entirely into the sovereign will of God. Would the Christian Spectator have reasoned in the same manner? In answering the objection, "That it is not consistent with the divine perfections to bring mankind into the world under such sad and unhappy circumstances,"—Dr. Bellamy refers to the words of the apostle, "Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" All his reasoning, in reply to this objection, proceeds upon the assumption of God's sovereignty in that constitution, which connects the universal sinfulness of our race, with the disobedience of Adam. He affirms that, in consequence of our being "born devoid of the divine image, ignorant of God, insensible of his infinite glory, we are naturally disposed to love ourselves supremely," &c.; "that this temper is direct contrariety to God's holy law, is exceedingly sinful, and is the seat of all wickedness. Now," he adds, "to say it is not consistent with the divine perfections that mankind should be brought into the world, as *in fact* they are, is wickedly to fly in the face of our almighty Creator, and expressly charge him with unrighteousness. If we cannot see into this dispensation of divine providence, yet we ought to remember that God *is holy in all his ways, and righteous in all his works*, and that *the judge of all the earth will do right*."* But who would think of adopting this

* On the subject of native depravity, Dr. Bellamy's opinion seems to have coincided very nearly with that of Turretin, who says, Instit. Theol. tom. i. sec. 9, Q. 12, § 8, 9, "Licet anima sine ulla labe creetur a Deo, non creatur tamen cum justitia originali, qualis anima Adami ad imaginem Dei; sed cum ejus carentia in poenam primi peccati. Ut hic distinguendum sit inter animam

method of vindicating the Pelagian notion of the character and state of infants?

In regard to the *extent* of moral depravity in unregenerate men, Dr. Bellamy maintains, that it is total, implying utter enmity against God, and all true goodness. Thus he says, p. 222, that "their very best religious performances are sinful;" and p. 223, that "they are done in a manner directly contrary to the law of God;" that "there is not the least hope in the sinner's case, but what arises from the sovereign mercy of God;" that there are no promises made to unrenewed men; that they are dead in sin, cannot be subject to law, cannot please God; and p. 225, that "a sinner cares not a jot for God, and if he had ever so many motives, he would only serve himself, but not serve God at all;" and p. 226, that the "great earnestness of awakened sinners makes them feel and find that they are enemies to God, and dead in sin; and hereby a foundation is laid for them to see the justice of God in their damnation, and so the reasonableness of God's having mercy on whom he will have mercy."

As it regards the nature of the sinner's *inability*, Dr. Bellamy resolves it entirely into a wrong state of heart, affections, or will. In this he agrees, not only with Edwards, Hopkins, Smalley, and the New-England divines generally, of the last half century, but with Augustine, that great champion of the doctrines of grace, and a multitude of European theologians of later times. Indeed, after all the controversies which have been had upon the question, nearly all parties at this day will agree, that the inability of the sinner is a crime for which he deserves punishment, and not a mere calamity, like idiocy or madness, paralyzing the force of all command, and releasing its subjects, so far as it extends,

puram, impuram, et non puram. Illa pura dicitur, quæ ornata est habita sanctitatis; impura, quæ contrarium habitum injustitiæ habet; non pura, quæ licet nullum habeat habitum bonum, nullum tamen habet malum, sed creatur simpliciter cum facultatibus naturalibus; qualis supponitur creari a Deo post lapsum, quia imago Dei amissa semel per peccatum, non potest amplius restitui nisi regenerationis beneficio per Spiritum Sanctum. Quamvis autem animæ creentur a Deo destituta justitiâ originali; non propterea Deus potest censeri auctor peccati, quia aliud est impuritatem infundere, aliud puritatem non dare, quia homo se indignum reddidit in Adamo." While Turretin affirms, that our sin is to be attributed to a *privative cause*, he most unequivocally teaches that, had God pleased, he might have created us with a *holy nature*, so that our "natural faculties," instead of leading us into sin, would have been implicitly regulated by the principles of obedience. It is also his doctrine, that the want of original righteousness implies, in itself, our utter ruin, and that it cannot be restored without regeneration. Our character, at the very beginning of our existence, therefore, is, according to him, entirely different from what it would have been, had Adam never sinned.

from all blame. The Bible most manifestly attributes men's want of ability to obey, to the strength of their disinclination, or, the dominion of their wicked prejudices and passions. Hence, while it affirms most explicitly, that *no man can come to Christ, except he be drawn by the Father*; that *the natural or unrenowned man cannot know the things of the Spirit*; and that a *new heart, repentance and faith, are his gifts*; it, at the same time, in the most solemn manner, charges the ruin of sinners upon their inexcusable aversion to holiness, and their unwillingness to be saved on the terms proposed in the Gospel. That Dr. Bellamy held to a *real*, though criminal *inability*, on the part of sinners, is unquestionable; but this is nothing more than maintaining, in other words, the total moral corruption, and obstinacy in rebellion, of the unrenowned heart. Hence he says, pp. 148, 149, "As to *natural* capacity, all mankind are *capable* of a perfect conformity to this law. The sinning angels have the same *natural* capacities now, as they had before they fell. Adam, after his fall, had the same soul that he had before, as to his *natural capacities*. When sinners are converted, they have no new *natural* faculties, though they have a new temper. The law is exactly upon a level with our *natural* capacities. There can be nothing to render it, in any measure, a *hard* and *difficult* thing to love God with all our hearts, but our being destitute of a *right temper of mind*, and having a *temper* that is *wrong*; and therefore, we are perfectly *inexcusable, wholly to blame*, that we do not."

How much Dr. Bellamy's views differed from those of some writers, who allege, that whatever is such an *inability*, that it cannot be overcome by any thing less than almighty power, must, of course, be a merely *physical inability*, and consequently *innocent*, the following extract will suffice to show.

"If a sinful creature's not being able to help his being of a bad temper, does in the least free him from blame, then the more vile and sinful any creature grows, the less to blame will he be.—If we are so averse to God that we *cannot* love him; and if our bad temper is so strong, so settled, and rooted, that we *cannot* get rid of it; this is so far from being matter of excuse for us, that it renders us so much the more evil, guilty, and hell-deserving. The *more unable* to love God we are, the *more are we to blame*."—p. 155, 156.

Agreeably to his general system, and the current language of Calvinistic divines, Dr. Bellamy ascribes *Regeneration* to an immediate and special act of divine power, in distinction from the influence of external motives, or the much boasted moral suasion of the Arminian school.

"From all that has been said, we may learn that *those influences of the Spirit*, which will be sufficient *effectually* to awaken, convince and humble the sinner, and recover him to God, must be *irresistible* and *supernatural*. If they are altogether unwilling to see, &c., then they must be brought to it by an *all-conquering, irresistible* grace, or not at all.—If the clearest sight and greatest sense a natural man can have of what *God is*, instead of making him appear infinitely glorious and amiable, &c., will rather irritate corruption, and make the native enmity of the heart ferment and rage, as has been heretofore proved; then there must be a *supernatural, spiritual* and *divine* change wrought in the heart, by the *immediate* influences of the Spirit of God." p. 236, 237.

"If the true and real character of God itself is odious to a carnal heart, the idea of that character will excite, not love, but dislike. We are *dead in sin*; as perfectly dead, as the body of Christ was when it lay in the grave. And the same power which raised that from the dead, doth raise us from spiritual death. And we know, that a dead corpse must be restored to life, in order of nature, before it can see or hear." Vol. III. p. 308, 309.

It is not easy to see how these deductions can be avoided, consistently with the genuine laws of scriptural interpretation, or with the recognition of an *essential* difference between the character of saints, and that of sinners. If all that the impenitent need to lead them to the Saviour, be an increase of intellectual light, or new speculative perceptions, then it would seem, that they are to be pitied for their ignorance, rather than blamed for their perversity.

On the nature and extent of the *Atonement*, the statements and reasonings of Dr. Bellamy are peculiarly happy; but, instead of making quotations, or attempting to condense his thoughts, we would earnestly recommend to our readers the patient study of what he has written upon the subject, under the third head of his second discourse.

Besides "True Religion Delineated," the first volume contains a treatise on the "Divinity of Christ," an ingenious

Discourse on "the Millennium;" and an Election Sermon, preached before the General Assembly of Connecticut, May 13, 1762.

In his "Four sermons on the wisdom of God in the permission of sin," and in his "Vindication," he has treated a much controverted subject, in a manner peculiarly adapted to convince the understanding, and affect the heart. It will be a difficult task to confute his arguments, so long as the Scriptures are of divine authority, and God, as the creator and governour of the world, shall continue to be possessed of absolute perfection.

His doctrine is, that "a sight of the wisdom of God in the permission of sin, is very useful to promote holiness of heart and life;" and after proving this position by a few scriptural examples, he defines the phrase, "permitting sin," vindicates the divine wisdom in such permission, and closes with remarks and an application, highly practical, awakening, and spiritual. By God's permitting sin, is not intended any thing inconsistent, either with his utter hatred of it, on its own account, or with the freedom of the sinner's will; but merely, his neglecting to hinder it, for the reason, that in every instance of its actual occurrence, he judges that, all things considered, it would not be best to prevent its existence, and, therefore, his conduct in suffering it to take place, is not only justifiable, but praiseworthy.

In proving the divine wisdom in permitting sin, Dr. Bellamy begins with instances from Scripture, in which this wisdom is plainly asserted, and strikingly manifested; and then adduces some considerations of a more abstruse nature, illustrative of his general position.

We shall not attempt to give a synopsis of Dr. Bellamy's arguments on this subject; we refer our readers to the work itself; and shall merely lay before them a few thoughts, confirmatory of his general views.

God was originally under no necessity, save that of his own benevolence, to act at all as Creator; and if he had remained forever satisfied in the bare knowledge and contemplation of his own essential glories, the existence of evil, as of all things else *out of himself*, would have been impossible. In other words, if he had not chosen to act, there would have been no evil, as there would have been no creatures to commit sin, and to suffer punishment. This conclusion must be admitted, or it must be assumed that the Deity

is bound by a blind fate, or that beings exist independently of his choice and agency ; which is, substantially, the ancient Magian doctrine of two eternal principles, the one the source of all good, and the other, the necessary and indestructible fountain of all evil.

If it depended absolutely upon God whether there should be any creation, then most manifestly it depended upon him what that creation should be ; unless we suppose, that, though he was voluntary in beginning to act, he became afterwards a kind of passive instrument of the contingencies occurring among his own works.

As it respects *power*, therefore, God might have produced a different system, from that which does exist, in relation to its general nature, its extent, its specific details, and its ultimate results.

Every theory which admits these first principles of natural as well as of revealed religion, must, when divested of imposing verbiage and declamation, contain within it all the difficulties alleged against the hypothesis, that God permits evil for the sake of his own glory, or on account of the greater ultimate advantage of the universe.

Suppose sin to be the certain consequence of the introduction of a moral system ; it must still be allowed, that no such system would have existed, but by the choice of God ; that he might have made it more or less extensive, as it regards the greatness or number of the beings included in his original plan ; and that, in foresight of all the mischiefs it would occasion, he preferred the one he has chosen, to any other which is possible. He might have excluded sin, by having no moral agents. In determining to have such agents, therefore, he virtually decreed that sin should exist, to the extent of its actual occurrence ; and he did this, because he saw that thus a greater amount of good might be secured, than by any other means. If he did not form his purpose in this case, from a supreme regard to the general good, or to the welfare of what Edwards calls "being in general ;" it is hardly possible to clear his character from the imputation of malignity, in his giving existence to creatures, who he foresaw would fall, and involve themselves in eternal ruin.

The doctrine, that God has a right to form creatures, who, he foresees, will sin, and yet has no right to permit those to sin, whose disobedience he can hinder consistently

with their liberty, or the maintenance of a system of moral agency, must proceed on the gratuitous and absurd assumption, that he is less responsible for the consequences of his conduct as Creator, than as Governour, or rather that he is perfectly justifiable in doing that in the former character, which he could not do in the latter, without an utter disregard of righteousness. Are any prepared to say this? If there is any difficulty in his not hindering the sin of creatures when he can prevent it, is there not the same difficulty in his giving existence to creatures, who can and will sin?

The objection to Dr. Bellamy's theory, that it represents God as doing evil that good may come, (besides its assuming the erroneous principle, that it is evil in God as the Head of the Universe, to manage its concerns in such a manner, as most effectually to secure its highest welfare,) has the same force in opposition to the notion that sin is the certain consequence of a moral system, as to the theory against which it is specifically urged. If it is wrong to permit evil for the sake of the good which is to ensue, is it not, for the same reason, wrong to choose a system, which, from its very nature, cannot fail to include the evil, notwithstanding all possible influences to the contrary? Suppose that an individual, were this possible, should fabricate a self-moving machine, in certain foresight of the fact, that it would, in the course of its operations, destroy a definite number of lives;—would he not be as responsible for the disastrous result, as he would have been, had it been expressly included in his original plan? What if he should plead, that the destruction of life was not his *direct object*,—though he made such a catastrophe inevitable, by forming the machine, and actually perferred the existence of the evil to an abandonment of his purpose,—would his apology be admitted as satisfactory? If the Most High was benevolent in choosing a moral system, it was because he knew that such a system would be productive of greater good than any other; and of course, he felt himself justified in permitting sin to take place, for the sake of those higher interests, which he knew would not be so well secured by its exclusion.

It has been said, that according to Dr. Bellamy's theory, sin is a good thing, and the more of it the better; whereas, what he especially labours to establish, is, the supreme wisdom of God, in making use of that, which is in its nature only

evil as the means of displaying, in the highest degree, the glory of his immaculate righteousness, of his benevolence, and of all his perfections. And this is substantially the doctrine of all Calvinists, who maintain that God permits evil, with reference to the more extensive prevalence which will thereby be secured of holiness and happiness. The objection, fairly carried out, would imply a want of goodness in God, in decreasing the existence of *natural* evil, for the sake of the benefits with which it is connected; for it might be urged, with no less plausibility than was the inference with respect to sin in the former case, that on this principle, pain is a good thing, and the more of it the better.

Dr. Bellamy's theory has been met by the objection, that it is inconsistent with the sincerity of God, in his commands, invitations, and frequent and earnest warnings against sin. But is it not plain, without entering into any philosophical discussion of the subject, that the difficulty is as great, on any hypothesis, which admits the elementary doctrines of natural religion, as on that, against which it is in this instance alleged? On any supposition, compatible with a belief of the omniscience, or foreknowledge and supremacy of God, he gave existence to the present system, and cannot consistently with his wisdom, prevent those acts of disobedience, which do occur. He did not purpose to prevent them, when he gave being to the guilty actors. His commands are given, therefore, without any expectation that obedience will be rendered by any, except those, whose holiness he had from the beginning determined to secure. Is there no difficulty here to such narrow and darkened minds as ours? How can he be *sincere*,—the proud cavalier might ask,—in *commanding* his creatures to perform actions, which from circumstances arranged and determined by himself, he *knows*, and consequently has made it *certain*, that they *will not do*? Does it add any embarrassment to the subject, as it regards his *sincerity* in his requirements and offers of salvation, to say that he purposes to glorify himself by means of the sins of his creatures? Not in the least. Sin is as odious in itself, as contrary to the nature of God, and as malignant in its tendency, allowing that, in his infinite wisdom, it is designed and overruled for good, as it would be, were it to proceed unrestrained, to the utter destruction of all created happiness, and the subversion of his throne itself. Who will pretend that persecution is any the

less hateful, or ought any the less to be forbidden, because by means of it the souls of the faithful are purified, and because, in the mysterious counsels of heaven, the blood of the martyrs proves to be the seed of the church?

As it regards the free agency of creatures, it is no more abridged by Dr. Bellamy's theory, than by any other that can be conceived; for it has been a thousand times demonstrated, that the vaunted Pelagian liberty of contingency, or self-determination, is a mere chimera of the brain; or, were it true, it would be destructive of the very elements of intelligent and responsible conduct. It is the liberty of acting *without* and *against* all governing motives and reasons; which is, in other words, the liberty of acting in absolute blindness, and ignorance, and indifference to the objects of choice. The simple statement of the doctrine carries with it its utter refutation.

In most of the objections to the theory under consideration, the rights of God, as the universal Creator and Governour, are virtually denied, or overlooked. It is forgotten, that infinite righteousness demands of the Lord of all, a scheme and process of government, commensurate with the magnitude of the interests which were, by necessity, sustained and managed by his agency. As we are his property, it is infinitely becoming in him to employ us, and all that we have for his glory. "Have I not a right to do what I will with mine own?" How would God be just to himself, and to his kingdom, should he, from a partial regard to the welfare of individuals, neglect the adoption of any means which were necessary to the promotion of those objects of benevolence for which he made, and rules the world? "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour?" Our confidence in the Holy One of Israel is this, that, as he reigns over all, so he will suffer nothing to take place, which shall not be seen in the end to have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the manifestation of his glory:

"From partial evil, still educing good,
And better still—in infinite progression."

The hypothesis, that God permits the existence of sin, for the sake of the augmented holiness and happiness of which he purposes to make it the occasion, has many advantages to recommend it to the understanding and heart of

the enlightened Christian, especially as compared with the doctrine that sin is, in no sense, the object of the divine choice, but is merely *incidental* to the best possible system.

With what propriety, according to the latter theory, can the Most High be said to *predetermine* or *permit* sin? *Permit* what he cannot help, if he will have moral agents! The word ought not to be used; for, on this supposition, the *permission* of sin might with as good reason, be attributed to Gabriel, or Abraham, as to the Creator. What nonsense it would be, to speak of a mechanic as *permitting* that friction, which he in no sense chooses, which is an essential quality of all material substances, and which hinders the complete success of his experiments?

How can God be *benevolent*, in producing a system which he knows will go wrong, and which he foresees it will not be in his power to govern? Is not he, who voluntarily lets loose an *unmanageable* wild beast upon the community, answerable for all the consequences of this act of cruelty, or thoughtlessness?

The hypothesis to which I refer, is a virtual denial of God's justice in punishing sin. Is it doing evil that good may come, for God to permit sin, on account of the superior advantages which he designs to secure, by means of its introduction? Why then, for the same reason, must not this horrible imputation adhere to his character, provided that he punishes sin, in reference to the advantages of punishment to his empire at large? Yea, on this principle, he ought not, in any manner, as we have already intimated, to be accessary to any kind of suffering; for this would be doing evil that good might come; and, whenever suffering does occur, it is necessary, in order to the vindication of his character, that it should be understood as a *contingent*, or *incidental* result of "the best possible system." Under the heavy load of complicated calamities, therefore, we ought to say, "It is not our benevolent Creator who afflicts us; far from us be a suggestion so blasphemous; but our afflictions are simply fortuitous occurrences, unavoidably attendant on *the best possible system*."

But how is this hypothesis consistent with the Bible? There Jehovah claims it as his prerogative to manage the hearts of men as he pleases, and to elicit good from evil. "There are many devices in a man's heart, nevertheless, the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand.—The heart of a king

is in the hand of the Lord; and he turneth it whithersoever he will.—The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, are from the Lord.—Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.—Of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel *determined before* (*προϋποκειναι*) to be done.”

All *sincere* prayers for divine influence to renew the hearts of sinners, or to restrain their wickedness, are offered on the ground of God's ability to accomplish these effects with infallible certainty, while the beings upon whom he acts, retain the full exercise of all their powers, as moral and accountable agents. The same inference undeniably follows from the promises of God concerning the perseverance of his children in holiness, the safety of the church, and the final universal triumph of truth and righteousness. With what propriety can he promise that which he is unable to fulfil? or, if the events foretold should take place, how, provided that they were efficiently produced without his agency, would their occurrence be viewed as an evidence of his faithfulness, or as affording any ground of praise to the eternal King of Zion? He declares that he will give a new heart to his chosen, and repair the desolations of the church, *for his great name's sake*; and thus he teaches, at once, his supreme power and efficiency, and the decisive *reasons* of his conduct, in achieving results so glorious.

God expressly assures us, that all the evil which does take place, is permitted on account of the good with which it is connected in his wise designs. “Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee,” says the Psalmist, “the remainder of wrath wilt thou restrain.—For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth.”

God makes use of the wickedness of bad men, to punish the sins of his people. Thus Sennacherib was sent against a hypocritical nation; and Babylon, that scourge of the earth, was declared to be God's battle-axe, and his weapon of war. David recognized the divine agency, in the afflictions he endured, through the wicked conduct of his vindictive enemies. “Deliver my soul from the wicked, which is

thy sword." "So let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David." The celebrated C. Wesley, forgetting his Arminianism, has given a just and beautiful paraphrase of this sentiment :

"Lord, I adore thy righteous will ;
Through ev'ry instrument of ill,
My Father's goodness see ;
Accept the complicated wrong
Of Shimei's hand and Shimei's tongue,
As kind rebukes from thee."

We learn from the Scriptures, that the exhibition of the divine glory in redemption, was the principal design of God in creating the world ; and consequently, it was his purpose that sin, vile as it is in itself, should become the occasion of the greatest good. What else can be the meaning of Eph. 3: 9, 10, 11? "And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ, *to the intent*, that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places," or, to the different orders of celestial intelligences, "might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose, which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord." The same important doctrine is taught in Col. 1: 14—19.

The permission of sin becomes the occasion of the bright manifestation of divine justice on the one hand, and of the most triumphant and glorious display of divine mercy on the other ;—by means of which, as the felicity of the holy creation chiefly arises from *a discovery of God in his true character*, there is an augmentation of the happiness of the universe beyond all finite calculation. Luke 15: 7, "There is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, who need no repentance." This sentiment is repeatedly brought into view in the epistle to the Romans ; particularly in chap. 5: 20, 21, and chap. 11: 32—36.

But it is needless to multiply arguments. We cannot close our remarks on the "Sermons" and "Vindication," without commending them to the serious perusal of the candid and devout reader. He will find in them much to enlighten his understanding, to rectify his errors, to excite his gratitude, to inspire him with elevated confidence, hope, and joy, under all personal trials, and events that seem most

inauspicious to the cause of Zion, and the best interests of the world. While he will behold sin portrayed in its native deformity and odiousness, meriting and suffering the boundless displeasure of Heaven, he will at the same time see this monster made to reflect, from its scathed and tortured brow, the infinite glory of the divine JUSTICE, HOLINESS, TRUTH and LOVE. These are most sweet and comforting views to all who love the Lord, and pray for the peace of Jerusalem.

In his "Letters and Dialogues upon the nature of Love to God, Faith in Christ, and Assurance of a title to eternal life;" in his "Essay on the nature and glory of the gospel;" in his sermon entitled, "The law our schoolmaster;" and in his "Blow at the root of the refined Antinomianism of the present age;" Dr. Bellamy pursues his favourite themes—the immutable obligations of the law, and the distinguishing characteristics of Christian piety, with a perspicuity and power of argument, which have seldom been surpassed. Every species of religion, springing from self-love, or enthusiastic impulses, is exposed by his searching mind, and annihilated by his masterly reasoning. That his language is sometimes needlessly severe, is perhaps true; but he felt himself called, in Providence, to guard Christians against errors, which were sanctioned by great and beloved names; and it was not his "intention," as one of his contemporaries remarks, "to detract from the character of such worthy men as Hervey and Marshal, or to hinder the perusal of their writings. In these, no doubt, he saw many excellencies." While he rejoiced in the truths they defended, he was not unwilling, as a servant of Christ, to bear testimony against the mistakes by which they gave countenance to a selfish, superficial and merely periodical religion, and encouraged the hope of an *immediate witness of the Spirit*, amounting to little less than strict inspiration. On the reality, nature, and grounds of a scriptural assurance of salvation, there is nothing, perhaps, superiour to his third Dialogue, which, were it faithfully studied, could hardly fail to serve as an effectual antidote to certain fanatical opinions, which have their admirers and advocates at the present day. A single extract will suffice.

"Besides, my dear Theron, how will you know whether your immediate revelation comes from God, or from the devil? Leave holiness out of the account, and what is there

of this kind, but what the devil can do? If he can, how do you know but he will? How do you know but he does? Go to the Anabaptists in Germany, in Luther's time; go to the enthusiasts in England, in Cromwell's time, and see what the devil has done in former ages. Yea, I could name towns and persons in New-England, where and in whom Satan's mighty works have been to be seen, within less than twenty years." Vol. II. p. 294, 295.

The churches might be preserved from such delusions, were the friends of Scriptural Christianity as zealous and untiring in the cause of truth, as are the advocates of a spurious religion in multiplying their converts. Cowper has well said,

"No wild enthusiast ever yet could rest,
Till half mankind were like himself possessed."

Dr. Bellamy has treated at great length, and in his usually forcible and convincing manner, what was sometimes called "the half-way practice,"—a custom, then extensively prevalent in New-England, of admitting to baptism the children of parents not in full communion, on the condition of their "owning the covenant," or publicly avouching Jehovah to be their God. It was introduced by a Synod that met in Boston, in 1662, with the design of favouring such parents as had conscientious scruples respecting their right to the Lord's table; and in order that the descendants of the Puritans might be distinguished by some visible badge, from the heathen. It was certainly an innovation, not recognized in the Saybrook Platform, nor once alluded to in the Confession of Faith, Catechisms, and Directory of the church of Scotland. To justify it, many curious and subtle distinctions were introduced; and few men were better qualified than Dr. Bellamy, to disentangle the intricate web, which the defenders of the practice had ingeniously woven for its protection. His various works on this almost forgotten subject,* aside from their main design, will well repay the trouble of an attentive perusal, as the productions of a powerful intellect, as opening to our view a

* This practice was sometimes assailed by ridicule. Thus an individual who had offered his children in baptism, without coming to the communion, is humourously described with

"One foot within the pale of church
The other out of doors."

singular chapter in the history of former religious opinions, and as containing a lucid statement and vindication of some of the more important and practical doctrines of Christianity.

We find, that there is no new thing under the sun. Mr. Mather, the antagonist of Dr. Bellamy in this controversy, imputed the most absurd and odious doctrines to those whom he opposed. He charged them, particularly, with holding, "That the enmity of the carnal mind against God, consists in disinterested malice; that in regeneration, new natural faculties are created in us; that the unregenerate, being without these new natural faculties, let their hearts be ever so good, are under a natural impossibility of hearkening to the call of the gospel; that we must be willing to be damned, in order to be prepared for Christ; that Christ has no hand in our reconciliation to God." Dr. Bellamy, in his reply, says, "I was never acquainted with any man, or any book, which held these points." Nothing can be easier than a gross caricature of the sentiments of those, who maintain the faith once delivered to the saints. Mr. Mather had insinuated, that the sacramental controversy turned on these preposterous doctrines,—thus virtually imputing such nonsense and impiety to Baxter, Watts, Guise, Doddridge, Henry, Flavel, the authors of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the first settlers of New-England, Edwards, Bellamy, and a multitude of others, who were both the champions and ornaments of the Gospel of Christ. Such is the pure *odium theologicum*, which discolours and distorts every object, on which it fixes its jaundiced eye. Alas, poor human nature, when even the ministers of the Prince of Peace descend to chicanery, vituperation, and slander, in promoting principles which they profess to regard of vital importance to the honour of God, and the eternal well-being of their fellow-men!

The other works of Dr. Bellamy, published in the three volumes bearing his name, are "A Letter to Scripturists," vindicating the use of creeds and confessions in the churches; "Early Piety Recommended," in a discourse on Eccles. 12: 1; and "A Sermon," on "the great evil of sin as committed against God." In these, we observe the author's usual characteristics,—strong conceptions, a plain and energetic style, and zeal for the cause of truth and holiness.

Dr. Bellamy, and those with whom he was associated

in inculcating and defending evangelical truth, may well be called Christian philosophers of the purest school. They were not ambitious of novelties, or refinements of speculation. They sought neither inspiration, nor celebrity, amidst the groves of Academus and the rhapsodies of Plato, nor the scarcely less dreamy metaphysics of the Alexandrian Fathers. They brought to their researches the exactness of science, the simplicity of faith, and the ardour of piety,—but none of the enthusiasm of poetry, which forgets realities,

"And gives to airy nothing,
A local habitation and a name."

They loved the Bible ; it was their constant manual ; and the only religious philosophy they desired to know, was that which could bear the searching, purifying scrutiny of the word of God. Were they not metaphysicians, then ? Yes—but metaphysicians of an "ethereal mould." They studied to discover, and to present to the minds of others, the beautiful connexions, the more than earthly harmony, of those varied dispensations of the moral government of God, which were published successively in Eden, at Mount Sinai, and in the song of the angels to the shepherds in Bethlehem. Did they talk of the faculties of the soul, and its sublime relations ? *They did*—but it was with profound submission to the revelations of Him who made the soul. They rightly judged, that all minds must be such as they were declared to be by their Creator ; and that, whatever errorists might allege, there could be no laws of mental operation, or moral agency, which should nullify those passages of Scripture that ascribe to man a character of utter depravity, and to Jehovah unlimited dominion over the hearts of his intelligent creatures. Sometimes, perhaps, they launched out into deep waters beyond their soundings ; but even then, their ship carried the Master, who could rebuke the surge, and return them in safety to the shore. Reason, with them, amidst all its aspirings and flights, which seemed at times scarcely human, was but the servant of revelation. Their originality, for which they have been sometimes blamed, was attributable as much to the depth of their pious affections, as to their vigorous grasp of intellect, and patience of application. If, in any instances, they followed the *ignis fatuus* of a visionary theory, it was perhaps to demonstrate to us the danger

of implicit reliance on any other authority than that of the inspired volume, the "entrance" of whose "words giveth life."

They deemed it to be the duty of Christians to labour after the most just and consistent views of the truths of the Bible. The precept, "In understanding be men," was taken in the literal sense. Thus holy Brainerd wrote a short time before his death, to a young gentleman, who was a candidate for the Christian ministry: "Labour to *distinguish* clearly upon experience and *affections* in religion, that you may make a difference between the *gold* and the shining *dross*: I say, labour here, if ever you would be a *useful minister of Christ*; for nothing has put such a stop to the work of God in this late day, as the false religion and the wild affections which attend it. Suffer me, therefore, finally, to entreat you earnestly to give yourself to prayer, to reading and meditation on divine truths; strive to penetrate to the bottom of them, and never be content with a superficial knowledge."

These great men, it is true, were not eminent critics and philologists. Does it follow, therefore, that they were not qualified to decide on Christian doctrines? They had the most essential qualifications of interpreters of the Sacred Writings, high powers of investigation, plain common sense, love of the truth, simplicity of purpose, and deep humility. "The meek will he guide in judgement; the meek will he teach his way." Oh! that their spirit were found, in its purity, patience and glowing zeal, in the heart of every instructor in our theological seminaries, of every preacher, of every student for the evangelical ministry, of every professed believer in Christendom!

The discrimination with which they judged of the character of revivals of religion, and professed conversions, was never more necessary than *now*. In an age of innovation and excitement, every thing new and strange will find admirers. Has the great enemy of our salvation changed his character? Is he not still the father of lies? Does he not still seek to transform himself into an angel of light? Is there no danger except on the side of inactivity and indifference to religion? Tinsel may glitter as much as gold. The unreflecting savage may part with the wealth that would have enriched him for a bauble; but shall we be so unwise?

The meteor's sudden flash may startle us more than the full-orbed brightness of the meridian sun. But is its light, therefore, as useful to guide us through the devious paths and perils of our journey? "It greatly concerns us," says Edwards, "to use our utmost endeavours clearly to discern, and have it well settled and established, wherein true religion does consist. Till this be done, it may be expected that great revivals of religion will be but of short continuance." He also observes, that "the consequences of neglecting to distinguish between saving affections and their counterfeits, are often inexpressibly dreadful."

It is trifling to say in reply to such appeals, "This is the age of action;—away with your musty and worm-eaten speculations; it is time to leave all controversies, and the senseless jargon of other days, and *go to work for the salvation of the world.*" Such is often the cry of ignorance and indiscreet zeal on the one hand, and of indolence and a time-serving policy on the other. True, the salvation of souls, next to the glory of God, should be the prime object of our prayers, our charities, our unceasing labours. But men, be it remembered, may be converted to error as well as to truth; to pharisaism as well as to humility; to a party as well as to Jesus Christ. False religion may swell them with pride and fantastic hopes, while it forges for them fetters stronger than adamant, and never to be dissolved but by death. A soul saved, or lost forever! How overwhelming the thought! The infinite magnitude of such a result impresses upon us, with resistless force, the deep necessity of a clear and practical recognition of the peculiar traits of the Christian character, and of those humbling doctrines, by which, as by a fire, the dross of all false religion is purged off and consumed. It will be of no advantage in the great day, to have reckoned on numerous converts, unless it shall appear, that they have been converts to the pure gospel, delivered from the power of Satan, and assimilated, in temper and life, to the meek and lowly Saviour.

ART. IV. THEOLOGY A STRICTLY INDUCTIVE SCIENCE.

By Rt. Rev. B. B. Smith, Bishop of the Episcopal Church of the
State of Kentucky.

It is remarkable that the discovery of the great principle of correct investigation was not made in connexion with those sciences which were most likely to suggest it; but on the contrary, we are indebted to the very intricacies and delicacy of the science of mind for the developement of a principle which was not applied in the might of its simple power to the natural sciences, to which it now appears most akin, till centuries after it began to throw forms of proportion, of order, and of beauty over the most unsubstantial, and, until the days of Bacon, the most chaotic and absurd of all sciences, the science of mind, as previously taught for many generations. Chemistry, which now stands forth as most inductive of all sciences, was a strange medley of facts and theories, many years after mental philosophy and astronomy had undergone an entire transformation by the application of correct principles of philosophizing. But a curious enquiry here presents itself, whether mental philosophy, which first gave birth to the Baconian system, is not itself hereafter to be further modified by the operation of that very system, perfected as it has been, by subsequent application to more definite and tangible materials?

In certain respects, the strange facts just noticed, might have been anticipated. For the mind of man, more curious to turn in upon itself, and to examine its own almost unsearchable structure, than to learn any of the facts connected with external nature, might be supposed to concentrate its highest powers most patiently in the study of itself. And the impossibility of arriving at any satisfactory conclusions on this subject, by ransacking the stores of antiquity, or observing loosely the motley and seemingly contradictory manifestations of mind, must have driven the stern inquirer, to adopt some orderly method of procedure which might lead to results exactly coinciding with nature and with truth. And, thus, the necessity of overcoming the greatest of difficulties, led to the discovery of a principle which removes all others with comparative ease.

A like conjecture would have rendered it probable that the very next subject to which this principle, after its discovery, would have been applied, would surely have been Theology. For, more perhaps, than the science of mind itself, did it, at that period, require some spirit of order and of power to brood over its chaotic materials, and to restore them the symmetry and perfection which they bore in earlier times, before a deluge of speculation and error had been poured in upon them by the pride and waywardness of polemics. And if mind, in its most concentrated energy, had achieved the discovery of the inductive principle in the study of its own powers, it might well have been supposed that the science of Theology, to which the same concentrated powers of mind had been devoted with more patient energy, on the part of far the greater proportion of men most highly endowed by nature, through so many successive generations, would have been reduced to perfect order, long before sciences, then esteemed, and justly esteemed, inferior sciences, had partaken of the benefit. The fact, however, has turned out differently. No science has yielded so slowly to the influence of the inductive principle as the science of Theology. And yet the natural sciences themselves scarcely solicit the application of this principle more strongly than Theology; and surely none have greater need of its application.

In proof of the fact that Theology, even to this day, is generally treated of *most uninductively*, let any one take pains to consult standard works in the department of SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, (as the term unfortunately goes). To his amazement he will find that hardly one, if one of them, gives even a common definition of the subject to be discussed, not one a history of it, as a separate subject of inquiry, and surely not one which even claims to treat of it as an inductive science, to be approached, analyzed, arranged, and exhibited precisely on the same principles upon which a philosophic writer would treat of either of the subordinate departments of Natural Philosophy.

And yet it is clear, that no science is more strictly inductive than Theology. The etymology of the term, is, as usual, a sort of definition of the science. It is that science which treats of God, in his essence, his character, his works and his word, and of the various relations which he sustains to all intelligent beings, all created things, and all possible

events, and of their corresponding relations to him. It places God, where he actually is, at the centre of all beings, all things, and all events, and calls upon us to learn HIM by studying them. Carry this study as far as we may, the manifestations of Jehovah may no more enable us to ascertain the very essence of the Deity, than the attributes of matter enable us to penetrate into the very essence or intricate nature of matter. But whilst we cleave to the facts, are guided by the facts, and pause where the facts terminate, we do learn a great deal concerning the nature, the character, the works and the ways of the Most High God.

This definition makes Theology, what it really is, the central science of all other sciences. If we knew enough of beings of an higher order than men, to construct a science out of the materials of that knowledge, still the whole science would have its peculiar relation to God, and thus would become only one of the branches of Theology; just as the science of mind, the science of moral feeling, the science of anatomy, and even the science of history, all having man for their object, may be complete sciences in themselves, but still, considering the higher relations of man to God, are only branches of the greatest of all sciences, Theology.

In like manner Astronomy, Geography, Mineralogy, Chemistry, and all the natural sciences, are only so many departments of the boundless field where God has left upon all things the impress of himself, and where, therefore, we are to study the Creator, by the light of the works of his hands, and the events of his providence. This is, indeed, an elevated, but surely a correct view of the greatness of THEOLOGY, which may, by way of eminence, justly be denominated the CENTRAL SCIENCE.

How different a view of Physics is this, from that derogating, and even profane view which has sometimes been taken, according to which nature is placed at the centre of each science respectively, and the disjointed mass, severed from the centre of light and heat, has been made to teach lessons of downright Atheism; whereas, when all the departments of science are permitted to point, as they do spontaneously, to the centre of the vast system, they point to a glorious, intelligent sun, and that sun the God of the Universe.

The moment it is definitely settled that Theology is an
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inductive science, the mind is looking abroad for the materials of the science. For if we are to arrive at general truth by the careful induction of separate facts, the question instantly occurs, what are the facts? and how may access be had to them? Just as the botanist or the mineralogist must first collect specimens of plants and minerals, before they can proceed to that nice analysis and comparison, which will enable them to reduce the whole into subjection to general laws. All beings, all things, and all events are but so many manifestations of God; all these, therefore, form the inconceivably rich and varied and boundless material, out of which the theologian is to construct the noble science to which he is devoted.

Even before they are very minutely examined, these multifarious and almost infinite materials, naturally fall into a certain order. None can be more simple than the customary three-fold division, of the book of nature, the book of providence, and the book of revelation. Under the first division will be comprised all those facts which are technically comprehended in the word *Physics*; in the second, all those events in which intelligent beings are concerned, under the government of God; and in the third, all those higher and more glorious manifestations of himself which are recorded in the Bible. The book of nature teaches us that there is a God of inconceivable power and wisdom. The book of providence teaches us that he is a moral being, possessed of very high attributes of justice and goodness. The book of revelation teaches us, that there is one God the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of the Father, and one Holy Spirit, who spake by the prophets, constituting the one only living and true God; that this one God is a Spirit, infinite in power and wisdom, and infinite in mercy and truth; and that besides him there is no God.

It is remarkable, that of these three departments of the boundless field where the materials are to be sought for the construction of an inductive system of Theology, only the first has been fairly and fully examined on the principles of the inductive philosophy. That class of works commonly entitled *NATURAL THEOLOGY*, has been constructed upon a laborious induction of facts, to prove from the *material* works of his hands, that there is a God of great power and wisdom. Further than this, the first book of nature does not go; and its well instructed students pretend to derive

from it no further knowledge of God, than that of his being, and his very great power and wisdom.

But when the inquirer passes on to the book of providence, to that class of subjects treated of with such clearness and power by Butler in his *Analogy*, and by all the writers on *Ethics*, and the moral of *History*, and by the advocates of that cold and barren system, generally known by the term *Natural Religion*, he is amazed to find, that with the exception of the immortal Butler, few, if any, have been humble and docile students of the facts in the case, according to the principles of the inductive philosophy. But, inasmuch as the materials upon this portion of the field could only lead us imperfectly to spell and guess out the very same moral attributes of Jehovah, which it was the very design of the facts of revelation, to set forth in the clearest and most convincing point of view, the defect which has been mentioned is less to be deplored.

It is sad indeed to observe that the truths of the Book of Revelation have, most commonly, been approached in a far different spirit from that which becomes an inductive inquirer! From the days of Origen to this hour, philosophy, falsely so called, has first adjusted a preconceived system by the aid of a pernicious education, prejudices, or imagination, and has thus proceeded to string the facts of Scripture upon this three-fold cord, and to torture them into the requisite shape, whether they would or not. This spirit has shed a noiseless, unseen, but most deleterious influence over the theology of our own country, and in no section of it, perhaps, more fatally, than that where theology has been most studied. A metaphysical system, in strange and extreme contradiction to the inductive system, seems to have guided some of their most highly gifted inquirers. And it is much to be feared, that this dereliction of the only sound principle of investigation, will hereafter lead to a much wider departure from simple scriptural truth, than the devotees of metaphysical theology seem at present to apprehend.

Simply state the case inductively, that the Bible is a record of words and facts which embody the revelation of God to mankind, and the duty instantly becomes obvious, of analysing those words and facts, reducing them, by a method strictly inductive, into a proper order, and then, of deducing from them the legitimate general truth. As the beau-

tiful and living carpet which covers and adorns the earth is the proper field of the botanist, so the Bible is the proper field of the theologian; and the words and facts of the Bible are as much the materials of his science to the one, as plants and trees are to the other. Each should proceed with patient induction, and the general law or doctrine to which each will thus arrive, must be the truth.

Select for example the words and facts which relate to the existence, the nature and the attributes of God, directly considered; and to whatever general law or doctrine, the words and facts of Scripture inductively examined and arranged conduct, that is the truth on this subject, as far as God has been pleased to make it known. In like manner, select, analyze, and arrange the words and facts which relate to the soul of man, its essence, moral character and final destiny, and the doctrine, inductively deduced from them, is the truth. The same process should, most evidently, be adopted in reference to every particular point to which the Scriptures relate. And where the position is less directly approachable, and is, in any degree, matter of argument and inference, here, as in all other inductive sciences, the premises should be sustained by their facts, the chains of reasoning and the conclusion by theirs—all and each sustained and proved by express warrant of Scripture.

This method would soon land the theological student where the student of nature almost instantly finds himself under the guidance of correct philosophy, standing firmly upon the facts, without much danger of being bewildered by the theories with which they have been blended, or to which they have been made subservient. He will soon feel fully established in the **FACT** of the existence of one God; and the *manner* of his existence, as three persons and one God, will no more perplex him, than the fact that the brain is the seat of volition, will be perplexed by the question how nervous influence is diffused in order to carry volition into action. The fact of the immortality of the soul, will then be easily separated from all curious speculations upon the essence of the soul. The fact of spiritual regeneration by the Holy Ghost will then be dis severed from all nice questions as to the mode of the Spirit's operations. And, in general, the facts of Christianity, establishing all its prominent and essential doctrines, will be the truth to which the student will hold, with calm certainty, whilst the specula-

tions with which they have been entangled, will simply serve to amuse or to amaze him, whilst he weeps over the vagaries of which the mind of man has been capable.

It would certainly seem as if it were high time that this method of learning and teaching the science of Theology were understood and practised by all those who are training young men for the ministry, or at least in those schools where the sacred sciences are exclusively taught. Were this the case, and were our religious periodicals imbued with the same spirit, it would not be long before those weighty and impulsive productions which emanate from living ministers on the Lord's day, would be cast in the same mould; and the slow process commenced, by which the common mind of the great body of Christian people, would be elevated above the entanglements of party, to which a feverish existence is given, only by a mistical, mistaken, or pernicious theory, relative to some unexplained or unintelligible point in polemics.

The better educated and more reflecting classes of persons are those which first repose on correct principles of investigation. It is a slow process to raise the common mind from that unhappy level where the mists of error and the demons of party spirit delight to fix their abode; and where, strange to say, the common mind seems delighted to find itself, were it only for the sake of the excitement ministered by its own superstitions. A most torturing belief in supernatural beings and appearances, has very reluctantly and slowly given way to a correct philosophy, which delivers the imagination from this degrading and yet seductive thralldom.

In like manner, it may take a long time before plain, simple, scriptural Theology, constructed wholly out of the facts, and calmly contented simply with the facts, will take the place of a misty and vague kind of speculation upon the subject, which stimulates the imagination and the passions of men, and converts them into ferocious partizans; but the time will come, may the God of truth and of peace hasten the day! when the memory of our present religious controversies will seem as strange to us or to our children, as the memory of the dreams of the alchymist, or the speculations of the schoolmen. That principle which has set men right on other subjects, will not permit their minds forever to rove at random on that most inductive of all sciences, the science of Theology.

ART. V. MYTHOLOGY, SUPERSTITIONS AND LANGUAGES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS.

By HENRY R. SCHOOLCRAFT, Esq., Michilimackinac, Michigan.

Constitution of the Algic Society, for encouraging Missionary effort in evangelizing the North Western Tribes, &c., with an abstract of its Proceedings. Detroit, 1833. pp. 23.

The Gospel according to St. John. Translated into the Chippewa. By Peter Jones. London, 1831.

It is known that the Indian tribes of this continent live in a state of mental bondage to a class of men, who officiate as their priests and soothsayers. These men found their claims to supernatural power on early fastings, dreams, ascetic manners and habits, and often, on some real or feigned fit of insanity. Most of them affect a knowledge of charms, and practice incantations. Availing themselves of the popular superstition of their tribes-people, which animates the air with spirits of benignant or malign character, they arrogate a power over these myriads of the imagination, and thus dispense the awards of fate to their infatuated countrymen. Unlike the Magi, whom they strikingly resemble, or the priests of a more splendid era of mythological fable, they are surrounded by no circumstances of outward pomp. The simple wrapper that covers a warrior's breast, or the frontlet that decorates his brow, suffices for the priest. He, indeed, affects humility in dress, and is often the most meanly clad person in the village. But the response which he utters from beneath a cone of deerskins, is invested with as much solemnity, as if it issued from the most sacred recesses of Delphos.

Some of these men acquire a character for wisdom, and skill in divination, which draws votaries from distant tribes, and their names are spread abroad as prophets. They were denominated *powwows*, in the early settlement of the country; and are frequently referred to, in the journals of modern travellers, as medicine men, jugglers, and Wabenos,—terms not perfectly synonymous, but which we find it convenient to class together. It is seldom, in the history of the tribes, that one of these men has acquired celebrity, without his falling into the hands of some ambitious leader, who has

employed him for political purposes; as may be instanced in the success of Buckanjahela, Little Turtle, Tecumseh, and Black Hawk.

We have recently had an opportunity of conversing with one of this class of persons, who has, within late years, embraced Christianity; and having made some notes of the interview, we will advert to it for the purpose of exhibiting his testimony, as to the true character of this class of impostors. Chusco, whose private history we intend briefly to relate, is an Indian who has long exercised the priestly office, so to say, to his brethren on the northern frontiers. He is now a man turned of seventy. He is of small stature, somewhat bent forward, and supports the infirmities of age by walking with a staff. His sight is impaired, but his memory is accurate, enabling him to narrate, with particularity, events which occurred more than half a century ago. He was present at the great convocation of northern Indians, which followed Gen. Wayne's victories in the west, and to which most of these tribes look back, as an era in their history. We requested him to narrate to us the facts of his conversion to the principles of Christianity, indicating the effect of truth on his mind. He did this, in substance, as follows:

"In the early part of my life, I lived very wickedly, following the Meta, the Jeesukan, and the Wabeno, the three great superstitious observances of my people. I did not know that these societies were made up of rank and sinful errors, till my wife, whose heart had been turned by the missionaries, informed me of it. I had no pleasure in listening to her, and often turned away, declaring that I was satisfied with the religion of my forefathers. She took every occasion of talking to me on the subject. She told me that the Indian societies were bad, and that all who adhered to them, were no better than open servants of the Evil Spirit. She had, in particular, *four* long talks with me on the subject, and explained to me who God was, and what sin was, as it is written in God's book. I believed, before, that there was *one* Great Spirit, who was the master of life, and had made men and beasts. But she explained to me the true character of this Great Spirit, the sinfulness of the heart, and the way of having it turned from evil to good, by praying through Jesus Christ. By degrees I came to understand it. She told me that the Ghost of God only could make the

heart better, and that the souls of all who died, without having felt this power, would be burned in the fires existing in *mudjeemonedonong*. The missionaries had directed her to speak to me, and put words in her mouth; and she said so much, that I did not feel satisfied with my old way of life. Among other things, she spoke against drinking, which I was very fond of. I did not relish these conversations, but I could not forget them. When I reflected upon them, my heart was not as fixed as it used to be. I began to see that the Indian societies were bad, for I knew from my own experience, that it was not a Good Spirit that I had relied upon. I determined that I would not undertake to look into futurity any longer for the Indians, nor practise the Meta's art. After a while, I began to see, more fully, that the Indian ceremonies were all bad, and I determined to quit them altogether, and give heed to what was declared from God's book.

"The first time that I felt I was a sinner, and that I was in danger of being punished for sin, by God, is clearly in my mind. I was then on an island, making sugar, with my wife. I was in a conflict of mind, and hardly knew what I was about. I walked around the kettles, and did not know what I walked for. I felt sometimes, like a person wishing to cry, but I thought it would be unmanly to cry. For the space of two weeks, I felt in this alarmed and unhappy mood. It seemed to me sometimes, as if I *must* die. My heart and my bones felt as if they would burst and fall asunder. My wife asked me, if I was sick, and said I looked pale. I was in an agony of body and mind, especially during *one* week. It seemed, during this time, as if an Evil Spirit haunted me. When I went out to gather sap, I felt conscious that this Spirit went with me. It appeared to animate my own shadow.

"My strength was failing under this conflict. One night, after I had been busy all day, my mind was in great distress. This shadowy influence seemed to me, to persuade me to go to sleep. I was tired, and I wished to rest, but I could not sleep. I began to pray. I knelt down, and prayed to God. I continued to pray, through the night. I then lay down, and went to sleep. Here I date my peace. In the morning my wife awoke me, telling me it was late. When I awoke I felt placid and easy in mind. My distressing fullness had also left me. I asked my wife what day it was.

She told me it was the Sabbath (in the Indian, prayer-day). I replied, how I wish I could go to the church at the Mission. Formerly, I used to avoid it, and shunned those who wished to speak to me of praying to God, but now my heart longs to go there. This feeling did not leave me.

"After three days, I went to the Mission. The gladness of my heart continued the same, as I had felt it the first morning at the sugar camp. My first feeling when I landed, was pity for my drunken brethren, the Indians, and I prayed that they might also be brought to find the true God, and to find peace through God's Son. I spoke to the Missionary (Rev. Mr. F.) who, at subsequent interviews explained to me the rite of baptism, and the taking of God's bread and wine. They wished, however, to try me by my life, and I wished it also. It was the autumn after the next following summer, that I was received into the church."

We now turned his mind to the subject of intemperance in drinking, understanding that it had been his former habit. He replied that he had been one of the greatest drunkards living. He had not been satisfied with a ten days' drink. He would go on, and drink, as long as he could get it. He said that, during the night in which he prayed to God, it was one of the subjects of his prayers, that God would remove this desire, with his other evil desires. He added, "God did so!" When he arose, that morning, the desire had left him. The Evil Spirit then tempted him, by suggesting to his mind, "Should some one now enter, and offer you liquor, would you not taste it?" He averred he could, at that moment, firmly answer, "No!" It was now seven years since he had tasted a drop of strong drink. He remarked, that when he used first to visit the houses of Christians, who gladly opened their doors to him, they were in the habit of asking him to drink a glass of cider or wine, which he did. But this practice had nearly ruined him. On one occasion he felt the effects of what he had drank. The danger he felt himself to be in, was such, that he was alarmed, and gave up these drinks also.

He detailed some providential trials, which he had been recently exposed to. He had observed, he said, that those of his people who had professed piety, and had subsequently fallen off, had, nevertheless, prospered in worldly things, while he had found it very hard to live. He was often in a state of want, and his lodge was so poor and bad, that it

would not keep out the rain. Both he and his wife were feeble, and their clothes were worn out. They had now but a single blanket between them. But when these trials came up in his mind, he immediately resorted to God, who satisfied him.

Another trait in the character of his piety, may here be mentioned. The autumn succeeding his conversion, he went over to the spot on the island, where he had planted potatoes. The Indian method is, not to visit their small plantations from the time that their corn or potatoes are hilled. He was pleased to find that the crop in this instance, promised to yield abundantly, and his wife immediately commenced the process of raising them. "Stop!" exclaimed the grateful old man. "Dare you dig these potatoes until we have thanked the Lord for them?" They then both kneeled in prayer, and afterwards gathered the crop.

This individual appeared to us, to form a tangible point in the intellectual chain between Paganism and Christianity, which it was important to examine. We felt desirous of drawing from him such particulars respecting his former practices in necromancy, as might lead to correct philosophical conclusions. He had been the great juggler of his tribe. He was now accepted as a Christian. What were his own conceptions of the power and arts he had practised? How did these things appear to his mind, after a lapse of several years, during which his opinions and feelings had undergone changes, in many respects so striking? We found not the slightest disposition to avoid this topic on his part. He attributed all his ability in the deceptive arts, to the agency of the Evil Spirit; and he spoke of it, with the same settled tone that he had manifested in reciting other points in his personal experience. He believed, that he had followed a lying spirit, whose object it was to deceive the Indians, and make them miserable. He believed, that this spirit had left him, and that he was now following, in the affections of his heart, the spirit of Christ.

Numerous symbols of the classes of animate creation are relied on, by the Indian Metas and Wabenos, to exhibit their pretended power of working miracles and scrutinizing futurity.

It is one of the strong points of coincidence between ancient and modern soothsaying, that the office is exercised for gain. And Chusco, like the damsel of Thyatira, acquired

"much gain by soothsaying." The insignia of this office, with our Indians, is usually a medicine sack, containing vegetable and metallic medicines and mystic implements, of every imaginable diversity. Not unfrequently, there are one or more carved or stuffed animals or birds, a cowrie shell, or the hollow bones of some of the larger anseres. Whatever be the symbol exhibited, spirits are appealed to, to give efficacy and aid. And these are as numerous, as there are objects in the whole visible creation.

The objects which this man had appealed to, as personal spirits in the arcana of his lodge, were, the tortoise, the swan, the woodpecker, the crane, and the crow. He had dreamed of these in his youth, during the period usually set apart for this purpose. And he believed that a satanic influence was exerted, by presenting to his mind one or more of these solemnly appropriated objects, at the moment of his invoking them. This is the theory drawn from his replies. We solicited him to detail the *modus operandi*, after entering the juggler's lodge. This lodge resembles a truncated cone, with the apex open. It is formed of poles, covered with tight drawn skins. His replies were perfectly ingenuous, evincing nothing of the natural taciturnity and shyness of the Indian mind. The great object with the operator, is to agitate this lodge, and cause it to move or shake, without uprooting it from its basis, in such a manner as to induce the spectators to believe, that the *power of action is super-human*. After this manifestation of spiritual presence, the priest within is prepared to give oracular responses. The only articles within, are a drum and rattle. In reply to our inquiry as to the mode of procedure, he states, that in the days when he was guilty of this nefarious practice, his first essay, after entering the lodge, was to strike the drum, and commence his incantations. At this time, his personal manitos assumed their agency, and he received, it is to be inferred, a satanic energy. Not that he affects, there was any visible form assumed; but he felt their spirit-like presence. He represents the agitation of the lodge to be due to currents of air, having the irregular and gyratory power of a whirlwind. He does not pretend that his responses were guided by truth, but affirms that they were given under the influence of the Father of lies.

We interrogated him as to his use of physical and mechanical means in effecting cures, in the capacity of a Meta,

a medicine-man. He referred to various medicines, some of which, he thinks, are anti-bilious, or otherwise sanatory. He used two bones, in the exhibition of his physical skill, one of which was white, the other green. His arcanum also embraced two small stone images. He affected to look into, and through the flesh, and to draw from the body, fluids, as bile and blood. He applied his mouth in suction. He characterized both the Meta, or medicine dance, and the Wabeno, by a term which was translated to us, devil-work. Yet he discriminated between these two popular Indian institutions by adding, that the Meta included the use of medicines, good and bad. The Wabeno, on the contrary, consists wholly in a wild exhibition of mere braggadocio and trick. It is not, according to him, an ancient institution. It originated with a Pottawattomie, who was sick and lunatic, a month. When he recovered, he pretended that he had ascended to heaven, and had brought thence divine arts.

With respect to the opinion steadfastly maintained by this venerable subject of Indian reformation, that his deceptive arts were rendered effectual in the way *he* designed, by satanic agency, we leave the reader to form his own conclusions. In his mode of stating the facts to us, we concede much to him, on the score of long established mental habits, and the peculiarities arising from a mythology, exceeding even that of ancient Greece, for the number, variety, and ubiquity of its objects. But we perceive nothing heterodox in the general position. When the truth of the gospel comes to be grafted upon the benighted heart, it throws a fearful light on the objects which have been cherished there. The whole system of the mythologic agency of the gods and spirits of the heathen world, and all its clumsy machinery, is shown to be a sheer system of demonology, referable, in its operative effects on the minds of individuals, to the Prince of the power of the air. As such, the Bible depicts it. We have not been in the habit of conceding the existence of demoniacal possessions in the present era of Christianity, and have turned over some scores of chapters and verses, to satisfy our minds of the abrogation of these things. But we have found no proofs of such a withdrawal of evil agency, short of the very point where our subject places it—the dawning of the light of Christianity in the heart. We have, on the contrary, found in the passages referred to, the declaration of the full and free existence of satanic agency,

in the general import, and apprehend that the doctrine cannot be plucked out of the sacred writings.

The language of such an agency appears to be fully developed among the northern tribes. Spirit-ridden they certainly are. And the slavery in which they live, under the fear of an invisible agency of evil spirits, is greater even than the bondage of the body. The whole mind is bowed down under these intellectual fetters, which circumscribe its volitions, and bind it, as effectually as the hooks of iron, which pierce a whirling Hindoo's flesh. Whatever is wonderful, or past comprehension, to their minds, is referred to the agency of a spirit. This is the ready solution of every mystery in nature, and of every refinement of mechanical power in art. A watch is a spirit. A piece of blue cloth, cast and blistered steel, a compass, a jewel, an insect, &c. are respectively a spirit. Thunder consists of so many distinct spirits. The Aurora Borealis is a body of dancing spirits.

To give some idea of the Indian mythology, it is necessary to conceive every department of the universe to be filled with invisible spirits. These spirits hold, in their belief, nearly the same relation to matter, that the soul does to the body. They believe not only that every man, but also, *that every animal has a soul*. And, as might be expected, under this belief, *they make no distinction between instinct and reason*. Every animal is supposed to be endowed with a reasoning faculty. The movements of birds, and other animals, are deemed to be the result, not of mere instinctive animal powers, implanted and limited by the Creator, without inherent power to exceed or enlarge them, but of a process of ratiocination. They go a step farther, and believe that animals, particularly birds, can look into, and are familiar with the vast operations of the world of spiritual life. Hence the great respect they pay to birds, as agents of omen, and also to some animals, whose souls they expect to encounter in another life. Nay, it is the settled belief among the northern Indians, that animals will fare better in another world, in the precise ratio that their lives and enjoyments have been curtailed in this.

Dreams are considered by them, as a means of direct communication with the spiritual world, and hence the great influence which dreams exert over the Indian mind and conduct. They are generally regarded as friendly warnings of the personal manitos. No labour or enterprize is under-

taken against their indications. A whole army is turned back, if the dreams of the officiating priest are unfavourable. A family lodge has been known to be deserted by all its inmates, at midnight, leaving the fixtures behind, because one of the family had dreamt of an attack, and been frightened with the vision of blood and tomahawks. To give more solemnity to his office, the priest, or leading *eta*, exhibits a sack, containing the carved or stuffed images of animals, with medicines and bones, constituting the sacred reliqua. These are never exhibited to the common gaze, but the sack is hung up in plain view. To profane the medicine sack, would be like violating the altar. Dreams are carefully sought by every Indian, male and female, during youth, with fasting. These fasts are sometimes continued a great number of days, until the devotee becomes pale and emaciated. The animals that appear propitiously to the men, during these dreams, are fixed on, as personal *manitos*; and are ever after regarded as guardians. This period of fasting and dreaming is deemed as essential by them, as any religious rite whatever, by Christians.

The naming of children has an intimate connexion with the system of mythological agency. Names are usually bestowed by some aged person, most commonly the priest, under the supposed guidance of particular spirits. They are often derived from the mystic scenes presented in a dream, and refer to aerial phenomena. Yellow Thunder, Bright Sky, Big Cloud, Spirit Sky, Spot in the Sky, are common names for males. Females are more commonly named from the vernal or autumnal landscape, as Woman of the Valley, Woman of the Rock, &c. Females are excluded from participation in the priesthood, or jugglery. Not an instance of their having assumed this function is known to have occurred in the history of America. Both in this, and in every other department of life, they are apparently regarded as inclusive beings. Names bestowed with ceremony in childhood, are deemed sacred, and are seldom pronounced, out of fear or respect, it would seem, to the spirit under whose favour they are supposed to have been selected. Children are usually called, in the family, by some by-name, which can be familiarly used. A male child is very frequently called by the mother, bird, or young one, or old man, as terms of endearment; or bad boy, evil-doer, &c., in the way of light reproach; and these names often

adhere to the individual through life. Parents avoid the true name often, by saying, my son, my younger, or my elder son, or my younger or my elder daughter, for which the language has separate words.

The Indian "art and mystery" of hunting, is a tissue of mythologic reliances. The personal spirits are invoked to give success in hunting. Images of the animals sought for, are carved in wood, or drawn by the Metas on tabular pieces of wood, by applying the mystic medicines to which, the animals are supposed to be drawn into the hunter's path. And when animals have been killed, the Indian feels, that although they are an authorized and lawful prey, yet there is something like accountability to the animal's suppositional soul. An Indian has been known to ask the pardon of an animal which he had just killed. Drumming, shaking the rattle, and dancing and singing, are the common accompaniments of all their superstitious observances, and are not peculiar to one class alone. In the Wabeno dance, which is esteemed by the Indians, as the most latitudinarian, love songs are introduced.

The system of Manito-worship has another peculiarity, which is illustrative of Indian character. During the fasts and ceremonial dances, by which a warrior prepares himself to come up to the duties of war, every thing that savours of effeminacy is put aside. The spirits which preside over bravery and war, are alone relied on; and these are supposed to be offended by the votary's paying attention to objects less stern and manly than themselves. Venus and Mars cannot be worshipped at the same time. It would be considered a complete desecration for a warrior, while engaged in war, to entangle himself by any other but sentiments of Platonic love. We think this principle should be estimated in the general award which history gives to the chastity of Indian warriors. We would record the fact to his praise as fully as it has been done; but we would subtract something from the *motive*, in view of his paramount obligations of a sacred character, and also the fear of the ridicule of his co-warriors.

In these leading doctrines of an oral, and of course, somewhat varied school, may be perceived the ground work of their mythology, and the general motive for selecting familiar spirits. Maneto, or as the Indians pronounce it, Monedo, signifies simply *spirit*; and there is neither a good

nor bad meaning attached to it, when not under the government of some adjective or qualifying particle. We think, however, that so far as there is a meaning, distinct from an invisible existence, the tendency is to a bad meaning. A bad meaning is, however, distinctly conveyed by the inflection *ish*. The particle *wee*, added in the same relation, indicates witch. Like numerous other nouns, it has its diminutive in *os*, its plural in *wug*, and its local form in *ing*. To add "great," as the Jesuit writers did, is far from deciding the character of the spirit, and hence modern translators prefer *Gezha*, signifying merciful. Yet we doubt whether the word God, should not be carried boldly into these translations. In the conference and prayer room, the native teachers use the inclusive pronominal form of "Father," altogether. Truth breaks slowly on the mind, sunk in so profound a darkness as the Indian's, and there is danger in retaining the use of words like these, which they have so long employed in a problematical, if not a derogatory sense.

Vitality, in their forms of utterance, is deeply implanted in the Indian dialects, which provide by the process of inflection, for keeping a perpetual distinction between the animate and inanimate kingdoms. But where vitality and spirituality are so blended, as we see them, in their doctrine of animal souls, the inevitable result must be, either to exalt the principle of life, in all the classes of nature, into an immortal spirit, or to sink the latter to the level of mere organic life. Indian philosophy has taken the former dilemma, and peopled its paradise, not only with the souls of men, but with the souls of every imaginable kind of beasts. Spirituality is also clogged with sensual accidents. The human soul hungers, and it must have food deposited upon the grave. It suffers, and the body must be wrapped about with cloths. It is in darkness, and a light must be kindled at the head of the grave. It wanders through plains and across streams, subject to the providences of this life, in quest of its place of enjoyment; and when it reaches it, it finds every species of sensual trial, which render it, not indeed a heaven of rest, but another world, very much like this. Of punishments and rewards, we hear nothing; and the idea that the Master of life, or the merciful Spirit, will be alike merciful to all, irrespective of the acts of this life, or the degree of moral turpitude, appears to leave for their Theology, a

belief in deistical Universalism. There is nothing to refer them to a Saviour, and, of course, no occasion for the offices of the Holy Ghost. Darker and more chilling views it would be impossible to present. Yet, it may be asked, what more benign result could have been, or can now be anticipated, in the hearts of an ignorant and wandering people, exposed to sore vicissitudes, without the guidance of the light of Revelation?

Some of the mythologic existences of the Indians admit of poetic uses. Manabozho may be considered as a sort of terrene Jove, who could perform all things, but lived on earth, and excelled particularly in feats of strength and manual dexterity. All the animals were subject to him. He also survived a deluge, which their mythology provides, having climbed an extreme elevation during the prevalence of the waters. The four cardinal points are so many demigods, of whom the West, called Kabeun, has priority of age. The East, North, and South, are deemed to be his sons, by a maid, who incautiously exposed herself in bathing to the west wind. Iagoo is the god of the marvellous, and many most extravagant tales, of forest and domestic adventure, are heaped upon him. Kwasind is a sort of Samson, who threw a huge mass of rock, such as the Cyclops cast at Mentor. Weeng is the god of sleep, who is represented to have numerous small emissaries at his service, reminding us of Pope's creation of Gnomes, who climb up upon the forehead, and wielding a tiny club, knock individuals to sleep. Panguk is death, in his symbolic attitude. He is armed with a bow and arrows. It would be easy to extend this enumeration.

The mental powers of the Indian, constitutes a topic which we do not design to discuss. But it must be manifest, that some of their peculiarities are brought out by their system of mythology and spirit-craft. War, public policy, hunting, abstinence, endurance, and courageous adventure, form the leading topics of their mental efforts in speaking. These are deemed the appropriate themes of men, sages, and warriors. But their intellectual essays have also a domestic theatre of exhibition. It is here that the Indian mind unbends itself, and reveals some of its less obvious traits. Their public speakers cultivate a particular branch of oratory. They are careful in the use of words, and are regarded as standards of purity in the language. They appear to have

an accurate ear for the rhythm of a sentence, and delight in rounding off a period, for which the language affords great facilities, by its long and stately words, and its multiform inflections. A drift of thought, an elevation of style, is observable in their public speaking, which is dropt in private conversation. Voice, attitude, and motion, are deemed of the highest consequence. Much of the meaning of their expressions is varied by the vehement, subdued, or prolonged tone, in which they are uttered. In private conversation, on the contrary, all is altered. There is an equanimity of tone, and careless, easy vein of narration, or dialogue, in which the power of memory is most strikingly brought out. The very voice and words of the supposed speaker are assumed. Fear, supplication, timidity, or boasting, are exactly depicted; and the deepest interest, or merriment, are excited. All is ease and freedom from restraint. There is nothing of the coldness, or severe formality of the council. The pipe is put to its ordinary use, and all its symbolic sanctity is laid aside with the wampum belt, and the often reiterated state epithets, "Nosa" and "Kosinan."

Those of the aboriginal race who excel in private conversation, become, to their tribes, oral chronicles, and are relied on for traditions as well as tales. It is necessary, in listening to them, to distinguish between the gossip and the historian—the narrator of real events, and of nursery tales. For they gather together every thing, from the fabulous feats of Manebozho and Misshozha, to the hair-breadth escapes of Pontiac, or the Black Hawk. They are generally men of a good memory, and a certain degree of humour, who have experienced vicissitudes, and are cast into the vale of years. In the rehearsal of their tales, transformations are a part of the machinery relied on; and some of them are as accurately adapted to the purposes of amusement or instruction, as if Ovid himself had been consulted in their composition. Many objects in the inanimate creation, according to these tales, were originally men and women; and numerous animals had other forms, in the first stages of existence, which they, as well as human beings, forfeited, rather by the power of necromancy, than of transmigration. The evening star, it is fabled, was formerly a woman. An ambitious boy became one of the planets. Three brothers, travelling in a canoe, were translated into a group of stars. The fox, lynx, hare, robin, eagle, and numerous other

species, retain places in Indian astronomy. The mouse obtained celestial elevation by creeping up the rainbow, which story makes a flossy mass of bright threads, and by the power of gnawing, relieved a captive in the sky. It is a coincidence, which we note, that *Ursa Major*, is called by them, the bear.

The earth, also, is a fruitful theatre of transformations. The wolf was formerly a boy, who was neglected by his parents. A shell, lying on the shore, was transformed into the racoon. The present name of this animal, *Aisebun*, signifies he was a shell, being the noun singular, with the inflection for the past tense. The brains of an adulteress were converted into the addikumaig, or white fish. The power of transformation was variously exercised. It most commonly existed in magicians, of whom *Mishósha* retains much celebrity in story, as the magician of the lakes. He possessed a magic canoe, which would rush forward through the water, on the utterance of a charm, with a speed that would outstrip even Capt. Haldimand, in his miraculous canoe journey, detailed in "Wacousta." Hundreds of miles were performed in as many minutes. The charm which he uttered, consisted of a monosyllable containing one consonant, which does not belong to the language; and this word has no definite meaning. So that the language of magic and demonology, has one feature in common in all ages, and with every nation.

The intellectual creations of the Indians, admit of the agency of giants and fairies. Anak and his progeny could not have created more alarm in the minds of the ten faithless spies, than do the race of fabulous Weendigos to the Indian tribes. These giants are represented as cannibals, who ate up men, women, and children. Indian fairies are of two classes, distinguished as the place of their revels is either the land or water. Land fairies are imagined to choose their residence about promontories, water-falls, and solemn groves. The water, besides its appropriate class of aquatic fairies, is supposed to be the residence of a race of beings called *Nibanaba*, which have their analogy, except as to sex, in the mermaid. The Indian word indicates a male. Ghosts are the ordinary machinery in their tales of terror and mystery. There is a glimmering of the idea of retributive justice, in the belief that ghosts are capable of existing in fire.

Efforts to better the condition of the Indians, are coeval in date with the settlement of the country. The *Algie Society*, a programme of whose organization, at a remote point, is prefixed to this article, appears to have mainly the design of a society of inquiry for collecting and preserving facts in the moral and intellectual history of the Indian tribes, having a particular bearing on missionary labour. As such, it seems to have an appropriate field of labour, without treading, particularly, on the grounds of any previous institution. It is religio-literary in its character, and differs, in this respect, from the Inquiry Societies at Andover and Princeton, which are directed exclusively to the attainment of recent missionary intelligence and data.

We approve, most fully, of the objects set forth in its constitution, and should rejoice to see the day, when not a few benevolent individuals and churches only, but the whole American people, should lend their efforts to introduce both information and reformation among our Indian brethren. As an instance of the spirit which accompanies its incipient proceedings, we notice, that the Rev. Messrs. Butler and Worcester were elected honorary members during their confinement in the "Georgia Penitentiary." Although we doubt the abstract propriety, on gospel grounds, of the resistance of these eminent missionaries to the laws of Georgia, yet knowing the motive, and appreciating the firmness of their conduct, we have ever hailed it as an evidence of Christian independence boding good to the Indian churches, and we cherish the voice of approval from a distant frontier. We think the duty of the Christian community to the aboriginal race, is rendered more imperative, as their trials, temporal and spiritual, multiply. We think these trials are the harbingers of eventual good. But there is danger that the friendly voice be misinterpreted, more particularly in the present interesting era of the missionary enterprise, when the field of foreign labours is irradiated with the bow of promise, while dark and gloomy clouds seem, to human view, to be gathering over the prospects of the Indians. We may resume this subject in the sequel.

One of the prominent means of benefitting the great mass of the Indian population, is translation. We are of the number of those who think that our Indian languages have been unjustly decried, although they have also, in some respects, been over-rated. Peculiarly adapted, as they are, to the

wants of Indian life, they appear capable of almost unlimited application and extension. To a vocabulary, simple in its roots, they supply a set of principles, which enable the speaker, by the formation of derivatives and compounds, to multiply and re-multiply words and expressions, in a manner, of which the English language gives not the slightest conception. Not only the subject-noun, but its qualities, its position, its pronouns, nominative and objective, and the action, of which it is the active, passive, or reflective object, are all indicated in a single expression. This concrete character of the language, fills its words with meaning, requiring often an entire sentence for its explanation. The objection to this process of word-making is, that the expressions are inconveniently long—a difficulty not felt by the Indians in its oral use, but which appears very striking when it comes to be written, and written as it usually is, without accents to guide in the pronunciation, and without any uniform system of orthography.

The language seems to be particularly full of resources, when it is applied to the phenomena of nature. The heavens and the earth, as visibly displayed, appear to constitute to the Indian mind, a volume which even a child may read. All that relates to light and shade, to colour and quality, to purity or impurity, to fluid or solid, to matter or spirit, seems to be woven into the texture of the language with silken threads. Light and sound, taste and feeling, hearing and smelling, are exercises of the senses, rivited in words to the objects acting or acted on. To love and to hate, to see and to burn, are words never employed disjunctively, but constantly reveal, by their affixes or suffixes, the object loved or loving, seen or seeing, hated or hating, burned or burning. One expulse of the breath, indicates both quality and position. Red or blue cloud, deep or shallow water, up or down the stream, on or in the earth, by or in the tree, in the canoe, on the canoe, behind the canoe, before the canoe, under the canoe, or above the canoe, are simple compounds. All its inanimate substantives are varied to assume vital forms, and are thus transferred to the class of living beings. Indeed, the primary increment of all their verbs, appears to be a dyssyllable, which denotes life, or essence of life. *Iah*, indicates being, or to be, and is to be traced by one of its syllables, through every active verb. Such a language

seems peculiarly adapted to the purposes of religion. Its double pronominal plural, including or excluding the object addressed, gives it an appropriate term of supplication to the Supreme Being. And we incline to believe, that he who has ever understandingly heard a converted Indian pray, will scarcely need to consult a philological disquisition to determine the applicability of the language to the active uses of Christianity. The following is the first verse of Genesis:

<i>Wiaahkud</i>	<i>Gashá</i>	<i>Monedó</i>	<i>geé</i>	<i>ozheten</i>	<i>goshig</i>	<i>giá</i>	<i>akkeé</i>
Pronominal form of the adverb 'first,' with the inanimate termination 'ni,' to correspond with the verb	Genesis, God, Merciful, from 'Gashé' which signifies 'gentle,' 'kind,' 'benevolent,' and naturally kind, as a father to children, &c.	Spirit.	'He,' with the termination for past tense indicating 'did.'	Third person singular of the verb 'To Make,' with inanimate termination 'ni,' 'one.'	Sky—Firmament—Heaven. 'Japhsing' is sometimes substituted for the word 'ni,' however, only the 'local' form for 'above.'	and	Earth.

But we have not space to pursue this subject. We will merely add, that unlike most modern languages, the Indian dialects are perfectly homogenous in their materials, and strictly systematic in their principles. The tone of conversation and dialogue appears to be more elevated, than among analagous classes of words in civilized life. The diction is simple and pure, and hence the common addresses of their speakers, when literally translated, are admired. Exalted and disinterested sentiment is often unfolded with a happy perspicuity, in their sententious polysyllables. And the mind is led to wonder, in the philosophy of its syntax, where a people so literally "peeled and scattered," should have derived, not the language itself, but the principles by which it is governed.

The first translations of portions of the Scriptures into the Indian languages, date nearly as far back as the planting of the colonies. The efforts of Roger Williams, and the translation of the entire Bible into the Natic, by Elliot, are now, however, regarded as mere literary materials. The earliest attempts of this kind of modern date, which have come to our knowledge, are those of the Moravian Brethren. The translations of Zeisberger into the Delaware are evi-

dences of his research and piety; and his comprehensive history of Christ must be a work of inestimable value to the western remnant of that tribe. We are not aware that Mr. Heckewelder, who wrote copiously on the language, translated any of the Scriptures. Dencke's three epistles of John are, we understand, in use by portions of the western Delawares. Brandt's Gospel of John, in the Mohawk, has, we think, been suppressed, within late years, by the American Bible Society. The introduction of the Greek word "logos," and some other foreign idioms, were not deemed admissible in a translation intended to be read by a people whose knowledge was confined almost exclusively to the vocabulary of the Mohawk.

An error, analogous in one respect, has been committed in the anonymous translation of the New Testament into to the Chippewa, or rather Otto-Chippewa, recently (1833) published at Albany. The word "baptize," introduced from its Greek root, with Indian inflections for tense, and Indian pronouns prefixed and suffixed, must create, in the Indian mind, the sensations of a jargon, when contrasted with their appropriate vernacular terms for this rite. Other objections have been suggested to this translation; but as we do not intend to offer a detailed *critique* on it, they will be omitted. One remark we deem, however, of sufficient importance to state. It is the frequent violation of gender, and the careless application of words, which by the natives, are appropriately restricted to the brute, or human creation. Thus, in Matthew i. 23, the compound term "tahsunjeko," applied to the virgin, is usually restricted to animals, and coincides, more nearly with the sense of being with fold. Onijánissi would be the appropriate word. The general term, "oskinegequa," a young woman, used in the same verse, is not distinctive, as the language has another (keekong) descriptive of a virgin. The dialect in which this version is written, approaches nearer the Ottawa than the Chippewa, containing many words which are peculiar to the former, and being characterised throughout by the consonants *p* and *t*, in words wherein the latter employ *b* and *d*, and also by the harsh inflection "*ink*," instead of *ing*. The adverb "*dush*," is employed as a suffix to proper names, in which it has the same relative character of aggregation, as if the word *then* were incorporated with the words John or Peter. We understand the thought-work of this translation is originally due to the

captive John Tanner, who was taken, when a boy, by the Ottowas; but the chirography and arduous literary labour in revising and retouching, are by a medical gentleman, late of the army, who has published valuable observations in other departments of research.

There is one feature, which is equally open to critical censure, in all the Scripture translations into the Indian tongues, which have been attempted in this country. None of them appear to have been made from the original Hebrew or Greek text. Most of these essays are based on English or German versions, in which the idiomatic phrases are less at one with the original. Neither is there given a system of alphabetical notation which may serve as a guide to the powers of the Indian vowels, and also in tracing the degree of fidelity which has been observed in adhering to these standards. To write the Indian as we would write the English, is to have some three or four different sounds for each vowel, and for each diphthong; besides an ample range in the alterative powers of the consonants. All these come to be accurately understood by the school-boy, from constant use and repetition. But when the eye falls upon an *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, or *u*, in the Indian, the query arises, which of the *English* sounds of the vowels are designed to be conveyed, and what rule shall the tongue resort to, in emitting the profusion of consonants usually accompanying them. We hope the time has arrived when this question will be met. All the mission Boards are equally interested in it. The missionaries of most of them have done something in the way of preparing primary books for the Indian schools. And each one appears to have followed a method, in some respects peculiar. Our table is crowded with primer-like pamphlets of this character, in the orthography of which, it may be observed, there is a singular oscillation between redundancy on one hand, and affected simplicity on the other. Mr. Pickering's system has been adopted in the Sandwich Islands, and has been, to some extent, employed on this continent. Although we cannot fully concur in all his positions, so far as relates to the western tribes, we approve most of them, and think the essay eminently entitled to the notice of the Mission Boards, in fixing on a general system.

Peter Jones' translation of the Gospel of John into the Chippewa, named in our caption, comes to us, with the clear page, square-faced type, and firm white paper of the

London press. We mention these external advantages, as they are to a remarkable degree wanting in the American publications of similar kind. Mr. Jones is, in some respects, the most remarkable personage who has appeared, not only in his particular tribe, but among the Chippewa race. He has not risen, like his kinsmen, Minnowana, or Pontiac, to induce his countrymen to cast away European manufactures, and to lead them up to the cannon's mouth. Nor like a Red Jacket or a Metea, opposed every advance in agriculture, and the transference of portions of untilled land into money annuities. He has risen up like another Obookiah, to unfold the banner of the Cross, and lead his people to become sharers in the great spiritual conquest waged for the redemption of the world. The venerable Skenandoah raised his bony arms in this cause, years ago, but the Oneidas were not prepared to follow him with the zeal that has attended Peter Jones. We have it from verbal authority, that this individual was the first convert to Christianity among the Chippewas in Upper Canada. He was arrested by the truth at a religious assemblage in the open air, near the banks of Lake Ontario. He immediately abandoned the use of ardent spirits, and assumed a character of devoted activity in spreading the revealed truth. His people listened to him with eagerness, and many of them forsook their vices, gave up drinking and Sabbath-breaking, and embraced the doctrine of salvation through a crucified Redeemer. We have now before us a report of two years standing, in which the number of Chippewa converts, and persons under school instruction, is stated at 1579, besides about 500 Mohawks, and other members of the ancient league of the Six Nations.* We do not mean to infer, that all this change, so far as human agency is concerned, is due to this native missionary. We do not forget the apostolical labours of Elder Case, and his adjuncts, and of John Sunday, and his native brethren. But we regard Peter Jones as the initial conquest, the prop, so to say, on which others stood, and which by being knocked away, let the waters flow freely, and augmented their current.

Translations of the Scriptures from such a man, must come with great respect for the *motive*, and much confidence in the right interpretation of spiritual meanings. We

* Eleventh Annual Report of the Managers of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, &c. Philad. 1832.

are informed, this gospel, as well as his previous translation of Matthew, has been extensively circulated among his people. So far as relates to the system of orthography, it falls, in a measure, under the remarks before made; but it observes a strict grammatical concord, is written in a pure dialect, and is more elementary, in the mode of its notation, than any other of the recent Scripture translations, which we have looked into. It avoids the foreign idioms and words, which we adverted to, in alluding to the Albany version of the New Testament, and exhibits no traces of the materialism which, we are told, mark some parts of that laborious performance. The Indian verb, "zegahun," is given as the equivalent for "baptise," as in John i: 25—26. The substantive verb *To Be*, deemed by many philologists to be wanting in the Indian languages of this continent, is freely used by Mr. Jones, in its auxiliary forms, as in John i: 1, 6, 15, &c. We have, in a preceding page, adverted to the existence of this verb in the northern dialects, as affording the probable root of active verbs, and deem it a subject inviting discussion, as bearing on a point early started by theologians—the origin of the American tribes. The verb IAH, spelled "ahyah," in the verses referred to in Mr. Jones' version, having the particle for past tense, "ke," prefixed, or "hun," suffixed, appears to be restricted in its use, to objects possessed of independent vitality, if not of spirituality. For it cannot be applied, in any of its numerous forms, to the existence of mere *passion or feeling*—accidents, which by a peculiarity in the rules of the grammar, are referred to as subordinate *parts* or increments of an *inanimate* character, and not as units, or *whole bodies* of existences. The native speaker cannot therefore say, *I am glad, I am sorry, &c.*; but the literal expressions are, *I glad, I sorry, &c.* This restriction has probably caused philologists to observe, that the verb declarative of existence was wanting, and discouraged them in the search after it. They have naturally concluded that it was *uniformly* absent, because it was so in a large number of expressions. When it becomes necessary for the Indians to denote abstract existence, in the constituent *parts* of the body, or in any *gross* or *material* object of the creation, the corresponding verb for it is ATTA. And these two verbs preserve an exact parallelism, so far as the pronouns permit. In the conjugation of the verb *Iah*, as in the Latin *sum*, a departure

from the *radex*, may be made by the introduction of *do*, *dow*, *ow*, *ew*, &c., words variously spelt, and supplying much of the verbal texture of Mr. Jones', and other translations.

But we would not divert attention from the great practical end of translation, in the search after critical prerequisites. The great object of missionaries is not to write philological treatises, but to teach the gospel; and to promote this end, minor considerations may be sacrificed. We do not intend to countenance the idea that inaccuracies in any part of the system of primary schools, or Bible translations, should be introduced. We would hold the missionary up to the duty of being a scholar, as well as a Christian. We believe the greatest degree of scientific precision, in elementary instruction, is compatible with the highest efforts in experimental Christianity. The two objects are independent, but not at variance. Attainments in the one may, interchangeably, precede or follow attainments in the other. But we conceive the *spiritual* wants of the tribes to be such, that no means, and no *want of means*, should interpose a bar to their relief. As we have before indicated, we think their *claims on the American churches and the American people* to be of an imperious character. We cannot fully reconcile it to the principles of national duty, to see the fields of Foreign Missionary labour, so pressed with young men panting for the service of Christ, while our own poor, wandering and comparatively small tribes, are so inadequately supplied.

It is true, we have no millions to be preached to in a single language. Here are no splendid temples of idolatry to be overthrown. Infanticide is not to be arrested in parents, nor widows rescued from the funeral pyre. No car of Juggernaut is driven on the plains of the Missouri or the Arkansas. No offerings are committed on the Mississippi, under the mistaken belief that its waters are sacred. Nor do thousands of zealous devotees wander to a shrine of brick which is supposed to contain a few hairs of Buddha, or Vishnoo. But here, in the bosom of our own territory, exist more than two hundred thousand men, women, and children, each of whom *has a soul to save or lose*. Great numbers of these people speak the same language, and no small portion of them are favourably situated to practise agriculture, grazing and the mechanic arts. Most of them have

annuities to aid in the incipient work of civilization. They are not besotted, like seven-eighths of the caste-ridden population of India, with the idea of a degraded birth. Nobler sentiments of natural liberty never were uttered, than those which are embalmed in the history of their orators and warriors. Their simple arts of magic and manito-worship, are ready to totter with a touch. And there seems nothing but active, united, persevering efforts necessary, to win them over to the side of virtue, and lead them in the paths of eternal truth. We owe them a great moral debt. Our duty as philanthropists, and our duty as Christians coincide. And we fully respond to the sentiment of one of the recent delegates from the Congregational churches of England, that our first and most imperative duty, with respect to heathen nations, is at home. Let the American churches come up to this duty, with a determination to work as well as pray. Grecian fable teaches us, that he who would not put his shoulders to the wheel, called in vain upon Hercules. And shall Christians, who have the lamp of inspired truth to guide them, practise a more lukewarm philosophy?

The gloomy aspect of the Indian question, for several years, may appear to present discouragements to the minds of many. But we doubt whether discouragement is its legitimate effect. The assertion of independent political power by tribes living entirely within the bounds of chartered States, was made at a time most unpropitious for its admission. Whatever may have been the original and just right of the Indians to both soil and sovereignty—and here we think there can be no dispute—the period for successfully asserting and maintaining it, was manifestly anterior to the establishment of our present federative system. Those Indian politicians who have been most able in defending their rights, would, with the same power of advocacy, half a century ago, have procured a successful decision on it. But it was then tacitly waived, and like all rights once waived, the reassertion of them is attended with insuperable difficulties. It was to have been anticipated that the enjoyment of peace, and their advance in civilization, would lead the southern Indians to bring up the question. Circumstances had been preparing their minds for it during several years. Its active discussion, during the last ten or fifteen years, is the natural result of the growing population of the States, on the one hand, and the growing intelligence of the Indians,

on the other. Apart from all bearing the question *may have*, or *may have had*, on temporary politics, we think its discussion and settlement was desirable, both in a religious and political point of view. Politics was interested to know whether there could be any incremental portions of the community possessing powers paramount to the entire sum of the increments. Christianity was interested in the consideration of several axioms of duty. Was the Christian injunction, "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," and again the directions, "when they persecute you in one city, flee to another," to be construed into general maxims of non-resistance to political power, *ab initio*. There was still a weightier question. It was the reasonable doubt, extensively felt, whether these Indian communities, living in the midst of other communities without being incorporated with them, could ever become *extensively* and *permanently* civilized and evangelized. It was not doubted, that there were portions of the impinged tribes well instructed, and comparatively opulent and happy. There were schools and churches established among them, and no small amount of missionary investment made, which, by the transference of tribes to new locations, must be hazarded. But it was also known, that there were large portions of these very communities poor, degraded and intemperate, and that the exaltation of some of the principal chiefs and headmen to be landlords and planters, had had the effect to leave the condition of the commonalty more irretrievably deplorable. And it soon began to be felt, that whatever might be the amount of missionary success, or the abstract rights of the Indians, the cause must depend for its perpetuity in Indian life and institutions, to the removal of the tribes to positions where they could freely exercise the sovereignty they claimed, and were entitled, and aspired to.

We have occasion to know, that these considerations were felt by some of the sincerest friends of the Indian cause, and that they were, at the same time, regarded as governing principles by our most enlightened statesmen, who deplored a political necessity, which seemed to place it beyond their power to exert themselves successfully for the Indians while they occupied their locations east of the Mississippi. The question being now virtually terminated, the duty of the Christian community is clear. It is to follow them with the oil and balm of the word, wherever they go, and fearlessly

to perform the good Samaritan's part. We should emulate the zeal and perseverance of Paul, and the eloquence of Apollo. There is much encouragement to press forward. The tribes are emancipated from political thralldom. They possess, to a considerable extent, herds and flocks, and horses, and an ample domain. And although

"———no sunny fountains
Roll down their golden sands,"

recent and authentic statements represent them to be in the possession of an exuberant soil, and a genial and healthy climate, which, by moderate exertions, will yield them both comfort and opulence.

We respect the feelings of those portions of the southern tribes, who still remain east of the Mississippi. We fully admit and lament the injustice of their fate. We have, not in a single instance only, paused to admire the manly, correct, and eloquent sentiments which they have put forth in various ways. Their struggle has excited, and still continues to excite, deep feelings of sympathy in the church. Sound heads and warm hearts have been active in their cause. The records of these churches indicate the success and faithfulness of missionary labours among them. It has been recently announced that, of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations, not less than one thousand evangelical converts to Christianity, have been recognized since the period of the conversion of Catherine Brown.* We are unadvised of the policy intended to be pursued by the unexpatriated portion of the tribes, but we incline strongly to the opinion, that their best interests, spiritual and temporal, indicate the expediency of their reuniting with their western brethren.

With respect to the tribes occupying more northern latitudes on the frontiers, to whose mythology, superstitions and languages, we have more fully adverted, in the preceding parts of this article, we have but a single remark to add. We think the present era of our public policy, appeals strongly in their behalf. Brought, by the recent legislation of Congress,† to experience, in a great measure, the effects of a legal severity of guardianship, induced wholly by the

* See St. Louis Observer, Vol. 1, No. 46.

† Document No. 474, House of Representatives, 23d Congress, 1st session, p. 131. With a map.

belligerent attitude of the southern tribes, they have neither the same pecuniary means to sustain themselves, nor the same degree of benevolent sympathy enlisted in their favour. All the tribes who occupied the area of Ohio and Indiana, (the Miamies excepted,) have made such arrangements with the government as eventually *will*, and, in a great measure, already *has*, transferred them to positions more southerly in latitude, and more favourable to their increase, west of the Mississippi. The Pottowattomies of Illinois will, by a late treaty, expatriate themselves to a favourable location between the Mississippi and Missouri, in the same latitudes they now occupy. This will leave the Menomonees, Ottowas and Chippewas, as the occupants of the remaining angle of the Union, east of the Mississippi, and not within the limits of any chartered State. The area thus occupied is extensive. It is intersected by the great chain of Lakes, and their intercommunications with the upper Mississippi. Extensive portions of it, particularly the peninsula of Michigan, and the territorial region of Green Bay, are of a valuable agricultural character. And in proportion as the more northerly parts embrace unprofitable tracts, their fishing and commercial privileges are enhanced. The tribes who are thus located, are placed measurably beyond the causes of migratory disturbance, and being on the line of open communication with the northern and middle States, seem circumstanced at a future, and not distant period, to present peculiar claims on the benevolent resources and enterprise of these portions of the Union.

ART. VI. ELEMENTS OF MENTAL DISCIPLINE.*

By Rev. Thomas H. Skinner, D. D., Professor at Andover.

STUDIOUS and pious habits have, by some persons, been thought unfriendly to each other; hence there have been men of piety who renounced learning, as well as men of learning who neglected piety; and thus have arisen two of the most fruitful sources of evil to mankind, (I know not which is worse,) ignorant religion, and irreligious knowledge.

As in other cases, mutual repugnance here, has sprung, at least to some extent, from mutual misunderstanding. Pious men have sometimes identified learning with what the Scriptures have reprobated under the name of the wisdom of this world; and men devoted to learning have sometimes strangely misconceived of religion, as almost the same thing with contempt of intellectual excellence.

The former mistake (I omit now the consideration of the latter) is not difficult to be explained. Learning as generally cultivated and used, and as treasured in books, bears the image and superscription of the unsanctified world, and indeed is that world's chief strong-hold and champion: such learning is destined to come to nought. Except to resist and countervail its tendencies, the simple spirit of piety can choose to have but little to do with it: and on the supposition that all learning must be such—a 'mistake which it is not surprising some pious men have fallen into—entire non-intercourse with learning, except if possible to abolish it, would not be undesirable or unwise. But learning need not bear the world's stamp, or be pervaded with the world's spirit. Piety may dwell with it, may enjoy and use it, as lawfully as wealth, or honour, or any of the good things of this life. Indeed, piety and learning have a peculiar affinity for each other; the association of them is natural, and ought, if possible, to be invariable. All their elements and tendencies harmonize perfectly; and, if combined, would increase each other's efficiency: Piety would exalt and illuminate learn-

[* This article was delivered as an Introductory Lecture at the opening the present academic year in the Theological Seminary, Andover. The author has kindly consented to its publication here, at the particular request of the Editor and of many who heard it. It is thought best to retain its original form of a Lecture unaltered.—EDITOR.]

ing, and learning would contribute to the dignity, the strength and the enlargement of piety : they ought always, therefore, as far as possible, to dwell and live, with and in each other ; each loving and cherishing the other as itself.

No assertion carries with it higher evidence of its truth than this. Learning is the delight of man's rational nature ; it is indeed our reason's natural spouse ; and never is the sacred volume more falsified and perverted than when adduced as a witness against it. Is that book an enemy to learning which demands the highest measures of learning in order to its being well expounded or thoroughly understood ? Is it an enemy to itself ? Why, if the Bible be against learning, does it inculcate a religion which is light, and in which there is no darkness at all ? Why does it style the disciples of that religion children of light ? Why does it allure us to Him who is its great theme and charm, by informing us that in Him dwell all the treasures of knowledge ? Why does it bestow such elegant, such high wrought encomiums on learning and understanding, as are not to be found in all writings beside, of ancient and modern times ? Why does it transport us with visions of heaven, as of a world of perfect knowledge ? The Bible against learning ! what else comparatively is in favour of it ?

The church, on this point, has been under no mistake. The outcry against learning, which, in almost every age, has to some extent been raised within her borders, was not her own voice, but that of frenzied fanatics, or unlettered bigots, in membership indeed, but, in this respect, not in fellow-feeling with her. What friend has learning ever had, as constant, as faithful, as munificent, as efficient, as the church ? What testimony has she given in behalf of learning by her standing demand for it in the ministry ? Her first ministers, heaven-taught, had the various languages of men as perfectly at their command, as their own vernacular tongue : and what in them was the product of miracle, she has required to be as perfectly as possible supplied in their successors by thorough education. This, at least generally, has been, and is the fact. The church has demanded learning in her ministers ; she has encouraged it in all her members ; she has expended treasure and life in maintaining it, both within and without her pale ; and she has at this moment thousands of devoted, enterprising, and indefatigable labourers, night and day, employed in its service.

The existence, gentlemen, of this institution, is one among many proofs, that the portion of the church with which we are particularly connected, can give their approbation to none but a learned ministry: and your attendance here is proof, that deeming yourselves called of God to the work of the ministry, you have settled it in your minds that as learning is no longer to be acquired by miracle, you are also called of God to go through a preliminary course of theological study. The point is decided. However strong and ardent may be your desire to be even now engaged in the business of saving men, and whatever temptations, labours, expenses, difficulties, may be incidental to a complete course of preparatory discipline, you have begun, and before you enter the sacred office, you will have finished such a course. You cannot but see from what has been said, that, assuming the correctness of your judgement as to the employment you are designed for, in future life, I regard this determination on your part, as duteous and coincident with the will of God concerning you. I shall not surprise you then by saying, that it gives me more pleasure to meet you in this sequestered place, pursuing the slow and it may be tedious process of mental discipline, observing fixed and severe rules of study, giving your thoughts to (abstract principles,) patiently exploring and comparing different doctrines and philosophies, and going from day to day the same unvaried round of intellectual application; than I could have in seeing you already engaged in the labours of the ministry with whatever zeal or popularity. I meet you, as I suppose, at the post of duty, where there may be more self-denial, but where certainly there is more safety, more honour, and more usefulness, on the whole, than any where else. As one appointed to take part in the business of assisting you through the present, in one view, the most important period of your earthly existence, I shall doubtless be expected on this occasion, to make my remarks of a tenour strictly congenial with that of your appropriate pursuits here, that is, in some respect instructive to you, as devoted theological students, endeavouring by every means in your power to acquire the mental discipline and furniture requisite to your regular entrance on the great work before you. This, I admit to be incumbent upon me. I address you then as a company of strict and severe students, pursuing for the highest and most sacred of all purposes, intellectual improvement; and I shall

aim exclusively in all my remarks, to promote your success in this pursuit. My specific object is to make the way to success plain.

The begining, the summit of wisdom in conducting this pursuit, as well as every other in which our faculties can be employed, is, without question, putting them under the influence of the fear of the Lord—subjecting ourselves absolutely to the command of a holy will and purpose—making all our studies and intellectual exertions instances of a strictly spiritual and religious manner of life. He who in a course of study maintains the closest walk with God, takes the best way to make study available to its immediate purposes. He is more likely to excel in mental improvement, in strength and vigour of understanding, in ability to think, investigate, and instruct, in learning and all intellectual treasures and resources; than if he should allow the desire of intellectual pre-eminence, or the love of learning, to domineer within him, altogether unregulated, unrestrained, unmeddled with, by any religious principle or feeling. Will it be questioned, that nothing is so well suited to draw out all the powers of the mind into their most perfect operation, as to bring it into intercourse with Him who is the source and centre of all minds? His presence alone, felt and enjoyed, will more quicken, and illuminate, and enlarge the mind of man, than all other influences beside. Why should it not? It rouses and stimulates all that is spiritual or intellectual within us, to be consciously in the presence of a man of great intellectual excellence: must not he then who, by the sense-surmounting power of faith, dwells in the secret place of the Most High, have of all men, other things being equal, incomparably the purest, richest, mightiest mental life? A consciousness of the *presence* of the Supreme Mind—what intellectual alertness, what stirring of the mental fires, what proclivity to thought, what capacity of great and just conceptions, what security against partial, low, uncomprehensive views, must not that feeling imply! Along with supreme intelligence too, supreme goodness is associated, and the feeling of the one as present, includes necessarily the feeling of the presence of the other. What were that person's advantages for mental improvement, who should have the constant companionship of a fellow-man, first among mankind, not only in genius and knowledge, but in moral worth also! What then must be his intellectual advantages who daily and closely walks with God!

It can hardly be questioned by any one of my present hearers, that it is practicable to have such access of mind to the mind of the Infinite Spirit. What else but such access is living piety? It is the thing itself. Piety is but an empty name, if it be not the access of man's mind and spirit, to the mind and spirit of his omnipresent Maker.

Nor do I suppose that any one here can doubt the practicability of maintaining a constant and ever-deepening sense of the presence and fellowship of God, in a course of severe study. It is, indeed, impossible to be *directly* communing with God, while giving the mind wholly to study. The human mind can give itself directly to but one thing at once: this, however, is true in respect to all other as well as intellectual occupations. But it is possible to conduct other pursuits with more or less of spiritual feeling. They may be conducted by men presumed, on the whole, to be pious, with almost no recognition during the day of the Divine Providence or existence; or, notwithstanding the law of finite mind, which forbids its attending perfectly to more than one thing at once, they may be engaged in with a heart so filled with the Spirit of God, as to have every instant a heavenward aspiration, and to be, in a manner, in a perpetual intercourse with heaven; insomuch that it may be said with strict truth, that every thing is done, even eating and drinking, to the glory of God, and in the name of Christ. Thus may men practise agriculture, or any manual occupation; and why may not the deepest and intensest studies be prosecuted in the same manner? Why may not men be exploring the causes and relations of things, conversing with truth in its purest and brightest forms, enriching their hearts and understandings with the choicest treasures of wisdom and learning, and be doing this in the very frame of spirit, in which one should wish to die, or to stand before the last judgement seat—doing it in the fear of God, and with instant prayer for his blessing and assistance? It is a strange, however frequent mistake, to think that there is any incongruity between the severest mental application, and the highest degrees of spiritual mindedness. There is, indeed, danger that high intellectual pursuits, uncontrouled by pious feelings, may lead to every species of irreligious indifference and misbelief; but there is no necessity that such pursuits should be so uncontrouled. There are no pursuits in which men can engage, more congenial with the spirit of piety. Think-

ing, studying, reflecting,—what so directly tends to intercommunion between the mind, and its infinite Author? Plainly, there ought to be no studying, no thinking, unassociated with thoughts of God, and acknowledged dependence on him. It has been with perfect justness observed, that the thought of God, to a serious mind, might be expected to come second to almost every thought. It is, indeed, wonderful that the contrary sentiment should have ever been avowed. That those who have the charge of business, of government, of domestic affairs, should be supposed to have temptations to unspiritual habits, is not surprising; but that students, men devoted to the search of truth as their only calling, and above all, that Theological Students should complain of such temptations, is as if a man should undertake to excuse his neglect of a duty, by pleading the multitude of the inducements and facilities which he had for performing it. From no members of the church should as high measures of personal holiness be expected, as from her ministers, and those who are preparing for the ministry. No places under heaven should be so distinguished for spiritual living, as the seats of our Theological Schools. You may, gentlemen, sink very low in pious feeling, while pursuing your preparatory studies in this Institution; you may become remiss in devout meditation, and in private prayer; you may indulge worldly feeling, and fix your heart on the honour which cometh from man; you may be inflated with ambition; you may dwell in spiritual darkness, and have almost no symptom of the Divine life left within you. Or, on the other hand, you may rise to an unusual height of sympathy and intercourse with heaven; you may make your studies a link for communion with the spirits of the blessed, in their rapt meditations; you may read, and write, and reflect, and meet your instructors, and one another, and take your recreations, and return to your books, and be doing all to the glory of God, and under the light of his countenance. I will not mention all the reasons why you should choose the latter course; let me but repeat by way of recommending it, that it is at the same time the road to the highest possible success in study, and that which, of all other courses, best agrees with the just tendencies and demands of a studious life.

It may now be thought, perhaps, that enough has been said to our purpose;—that if regard be not paid to the

counsel which has been given, little may be expected from the prescription, or the observance of any other counsel ; and that if the course recommended be followed, no further directions will be necessary. However just the former conclusion may be, the latter can by no means be admitted. A mind unsullied by evil might still need instruction, in order to be able to see every path of wisdom and truth it should pursue: much more then, any human mind, at best pure but in part, however elevated and fixed in holy feeling and resolution. Could you rise at once above every disadvantage of your present imperfect state ; could you from this moment transcend in purity of heart, the greatest of all the saints, you would have the docility of a little child, and be conscious, also, of more than a little child's necessities and dependence. Holiness, in the highest degree in which it is ever possessed on earth, does not supersede instruction as to what is wise and prudent in particular practice ; it only gives aptitude to seek for, and appreciate, and follow good instruction. Hence while study should be begun and prosecuted in intercourse with God, he does not truly maintain that intercourse, but is an instance of deplorable self-conceit, who, on account of fancied illumination from heaven, thinks himself above the need of all teaching as to the particular principles and rules best to be observed in pursuing a course of study.

As hope is the spring of endeavour, a student should keep himself, amidst all his intellectual toils, under the impression of the most animating fact, that the human mind, in every power, is illimitably improveable. To the loftiest height of intelligence ever attained by man, the ascent was from an embryo state of intellectual life. Nor was that ascent the bare result of necessity, or of any thing in the nature of mind, or of peculiarity in the structure of a particular mind. It can now be hardly questioned that the best human mind ever created, if shut out from the first from all external influences, would be, at even the remotest period of its existence, scarcely cognizable as a mind : nor would it be in a less undesirable condition, though not so immured, provided all fit care and culture should be withheld from it. The life of the mind, like that of the body, depends for its growth, on its receiving appropriate nourishment and attention. It must at first be duly cared for and fostered by others ; afterwards by both others and itself ; and then by itself at least, perpetually, in order to reach and retain its just

stature and strength. It needs culture; but there is the highest encouragement to bestow culture upon it, in its wonderful improveability. There is almost no point of improvement, which any sound human mind should despair to reach. The original peculiarities of different minds are undoubtedly great, and they are, usually, proportionally great in developement, if not suppressed through neglect or unhappy discipline; but it will scarcely, on reflection, seem extravagant to say, that no one has attained higher intellectual eminence, on the whole, than might be attained by any sound minded man, provided health and life should not prematurely fail; and if, from the early buddings of intellect, suitable methods of application and training should be employed, with due diligence and perseverance. Without, however, what might be thought going to extremes on this subject, one who has given himself to the cultivation of his mind, may find limitless scope for his hopes of intellectual increase. He may, and he should, while pursuing his exhausting labours, enliven his spirit with thoughts like these: "Mind, the brightest thing in existence, is that which is the most susceptible of advancement. My Maker, that he might see in me his own image, gave me a mind; and by his grace I have been taught its value, and inclined to prefer the care and education of it, before all the delights of sense. Moved by His spirit, I cry after knowledge, and lift up my voice for understanding; I seek for her as silver, and search for her as hid treasure: and I shall gain, if I faint not, the object of my desires; I shall find myself in possession of a better and still better mind; I shall be constantly acquiring a more and more perfect use of my powers; I shall be increasing continually in my ability to think, to analyze, to reason, to discourse: my thoughts will be becoming more and more just; my views be enlarging; my knowledge growing; my mind, in all respects, rising, expanding, strengthening, stretching forwards and upwards toward the perfection of mental being: let me but persevere in my disciplinary course, and nothing can intercept the glorious result. Not more irresistibly does the rising sun advance on his way, than my mind will continue to improve under the faithful use of proper means of cultivation." There need be no check certainly to this thrilling anticipation of intellectual advancement, except, at most, in regard to that short twilight season of superannuation, through which a few of mankind pass

near the close of life: nor is it certain that even this exception should be made, as it is not, perhaps, evident that senile dotage might not, in every instance, be avoided, by judicious discipline, seasonably commenced and never discontinued.

But while the unbounded improveableness of the mind should constantly inspirit him who is climbing the steep ascent to intellectual excellence, he should keep clearly in view, *what it is* whose improvement he seeks. This is not mind in distinction only from organized body; nor the *human* mind, in mere distinction from mind of other orders; but *the whole human mind*, and not exclusively one or more of its attributes. The just discipline of the mind, is the discipline, in due measure, of all its powers. Where some of these are cultivated to the neglect of others, the result is intellectual disproportion and general imbecility. Nor is it probable that the favourite faculties themselves will be as well developed and improved, as they would have been, under no more than a due share of attention. Let analogy here instruct us. The general health of the body is necessary to the vigorous and full growth of any part; so that if by excessively educating one member, we impair the vital energy of the system, we injure the object of our partiality more perhaps, than perfect neglect would have done; and thus, doubtless, a partial discipline of the mind has often defeated its own purpose. A youthful student, on a very hasty examination of his peculiar mental structure, perhaps without any examination, thinks that nature designed him for a mathematician or a poet, and determines to nurse, with the utmost assiduity, the particular power which, by destination, is to make him illustrious. Henceforward he remits attention to every study which is not in his own view directly adapted to increase his reasoning, or his inventive faculty. The consequence is, the total failure of his unadvised plan. He becomes distinguished for nothing, or nothing but vanity and weakness. Such, more frequently perhaps than is commonly supposed, is the direct result of disproportioned mental discipline. And is it not what the known nature of the human mind should lead us to expect from the course pursued? Are not the several faculties of the mind, integrant, composing, and constituting one whole; so that one part being absent or defectively developed, the whole is necessarily disordered, and like a machine in a similar condition, incapable of equal and efficient move-

ment? Nay, to speak with perfect truth, are the mental faculties aught but the simple essential mind itself, regarded in relation to its several states and functions? and, if so, is not the neglect of any one faculty, the neglect of the substance mind? and should not the mind be expected to suffer from such neglect? and if it do suffer, will not the injury appear in every mental operation and developement? I cannot but think that failure in intellectual education, is to a great extent referable to the cause I am considering. There are comparatively but few human minds to which the power of education is to any considerable extent applied; but how much fewer to which it is applied with the assiduity which the high excellence and destination of the human mind demand? And even where it is applied with the greatest diligence, how often is that diligence used without so much as a distinct aim, to discipline all the mind's energies in equal degree, and draw them out into symmetrical developements? Some examples there are of what man may become by judicious education, and they are the admiration of the world. Had such education, every human being's natural right, been general, to what rank in intelligence would not the race have attained. We wonder at the small results of education, but we should rather wonder that the results are so great considering the extreme want of pains and discretion, in conducting the business of education itself.

I have not intended, by any thing which has been said, to recommend a course of discipline which should disregard original diversity in different mental constitutions, or the mental peculiarity of each individual. A symmetrical intellectual developement does not demand such a discipline. On the contrary, no discipline which does not accommodate its appliances to what is peculiar in each mind's make and temperament, is at all suited to produce a well proportioned or a full intellectual maturity. And I submit this remark as one of prime importance, and deserving a place among first principles, in the science of mental culture. To frame one discipline for every mind, is not less absurd than to prescribe one medicine for every disease, or one dietetic regimen to every person. Some minds are originally gifted with one faculty in large, and another in small dimensions: some are surprisingly precocious, and others very late in developement: some are quick and others slow in movement: some phlegmatic, and others mercurial in constitutional temper. It is

easy to see what must be the result, when minds thus variously constituted are subjected to precisely the same training. Not one of them may attain to its just stature; not one be of full dimensions or well proportioned: many may be perverted and many spoiled; while by discretion in training all might have become specimens of mental excellence—ornaments, more or less brilliant, to human nature. It is manifest, what scope now presents itself for the exercise of censure upon prevailing practice in the discipline of mind, especially the minds of the young; but I forbear: I cannot, however, suppress the remark, that nothing appears to be of deeper concern to teachers—those who by profession are cultivators of mind—than the most careful attention on their part, to the native as well as the acquired faculties of those particular minds that Providence commits into their hands, to be trained and educated for life and eternity.

There is, however, another observation, more pertinent to my present auditory, which I deem it more important to introduce in this connexion. It is that youth, and especially those young men, who having gone through the primary parts of a liberal education, regard themselves as not wholly incompetent to judge rightly of their own mental peculiarities, may fall into a serious mistake as to this important point. They may mistake in two ways: they may decide justly in respect to their individual idiosyncrasies, or peculiarities of mind, yet not take the right course in mental self-training; or they may misjudge in the former respect. How often has it happened, that young men, feeling in themselves the strong and resistless promptings to certain mental applications, have piously and perhaps justly concluded, that they should cherish these promptings as indications of the Divine will respecting what they should do with themselves; but have thenceforward made the indulgence of these high natural propensities, almost the whole of their future education; and thus have weakened all their other powers, and, in a manner already explained, their essential mind itself; and so have defeated their own ardent purpose, and the end of their creation? The tendencies of the mind in one direction, are often an admonition, not so much that these tendencies are not to be neglected, as that certain others are with greater pains to be elicited and strengthened, so that the mind's balance and symmetry may be preserved. It is, indeed, of the highest moment, that the natural apti-

tudes of the mind be favoured, and sedulously cherished in education. The greatest results may depend upon attention to this point. Many a mind has scarcely become conscious of intellectual life, under perhaps quite a considerable course of teaching, until its peculiar bent of nature happened to be fallen in with by disciplinary influence; when at once, new and surprising manifestations of power began to take place. Still nothing were more unwise, than on making such discoveries as this, forthwith to withdraw attention from the mind's other faculties, and make the cultivation of the prominent one, the sole object of concern. That one should certainly have paramount care, but the judicious cultivation of the others may be indispensable to its arriving at its destined size and strength.

I spoke of another mistake sometimes made by youthful minds, namely: a misjudgement as to what their original peculiarities are. They take for these, their unjustifiable inclinations. For the peculiarities of their original mental structure, they make no serious search; but their dislike to severe and protracted study, and their preference of what they think will require less pains, is almost invincible; and from their reluctance to think themselves indolent or irresolute, they gladly take these feelings for a bias of nature, pointing out something else as the proper object of their pursuit, than what demands such laborious and tedious application. I need not mention the ordinary result. The noblest of minds giving itself up to idleness or ease, under whatever temptation, gives itself up also to eventual inefficiency and contempt. No mind is so mighty as to be proof against indolence. Who can tell but that brighter spirits than any now shining in the firmament of fame, have passed away under its influence, unthought of, or despised? How many Newtons may be lying in unknown or ignoble graves, because they mistook temptations to self-indulgence, for natural intimations that they should forego a course of intense mental application.

This remark suggests another fundamental maxim. Mind, though of all things the most improveable, is so, only by the workings of its own peculiar activity. It cannot advance otherwise, be the impulses on it what they may, than by advancing itself. It can make no progress by yielding itself passively, to any outward influence. It is impossible indeed, to conceive how it can rationally act, that is, as

mind, act at all, unless there be somewhat out of itself, its own image at least, objective in respect to it: and it is also most evident, that all the outward objects or circumstances with which it has any intercourse, give it some exercise, and leave on it some impression: and these two facts show how important it is that the most consummate wisdom and virtue be employed, in conducting all the plans and processes of intellectual education. Nevertheless, the mind does not advance, is not moved at all, except as it moves itself; and is not the creature, as fatalists teach, but the lord of its circumstances. If its circumstances have decisive influence on it, one way or the other, it makes them decisive, by its own choice or consent. If consciousness ascertains us of any thing it is this; nor is there a human breast that does not witness against the opposite dogma, as no less a contradiction of universal experience, than of every principle of morality and religion. The mind cannot be in any way injured, neither can it be improved, be its advantages what they may, but by the free exercise of its own activity. To be self-active, is the property of all life. The very definition of life, according to the ancients, and it seems to be a true one, is self-activity. That, and that only, is a living thing which is self-active; a dead thing may be moved, but a living thing is one that can move itself. The mind of man is a living thing; it has the highest kind of life; nay, as far as we know, is all life: it is therefore essential to the human mind to be self-active; and it is not mind, but something which mind, as such, disowns, that one is advanced in, when he advances without mental activity on his own part. But this cannot, I presume, have escaped any one's consideration. Every living thing that increases at all, does so by the workings of its own life. Thus grows the living plant, the living body, and every other thing that lives and grows. Its increase, according to its kind, is by the inward operations of its own peculiar life. Can it be otherwise as to the mind of man?

I am aware that the truth now stated, with some degree of emphasis, is familiar to my hearers; but my fear is, gentlemen, that you have not all given it the influence it should have on every one's manner of seeking intellectual improvement. Too many of those who are engaged in that pursuit, seem to have lost sight of it, in a great degree, plain and obvious as it is. It is practically overlooked, not only

by those who hope to become intelligent and learned, as a matter of course, because they live in a university, or in a literary society, and have abundance of books at command, though they are at almost no pains to improve their advantages; but by many others likewise, who seem seriously engaged in their studies. There are many of this latter class, who amid all their zeal for mental improvement, appear not to understand how it is that such improvement is to be acquired. They do, indeed, recognize the necessity of some sort of mental exertion on their own part; they apply themselves to books and lectures, and are much occupied, it may be, night and day; but still they are occupied only as one would be, who should labour with all his might to provide himself food, and yet never partake of it; or, to speak more accurately, who should eagerly partake of food, and then paralyze, or in some way restrain the digestive functions. What patient thought do these students exercise, in searching out the exact truth of whatever presents itself to their apprehensive faculty? Or what *intellectual* entertainment do they give to it? Are their minds impregnated, inspirited, moved to reflection and comparison, to analysis and inquiry, to abstraction and classification, or to any thing analogous to the processes of rumination and digestion? Do they pause to consider the *how*, the *why*, and the *wherefore*, of what meets their thought? Do they muse, and pry, and penetrate into unexplored recesses of truth? Nothing of the kind. They doubt, perhaps, whether such free and extended thinking be pious, or modest, or lawful; more probably they have not patience to endure so difficult and slow a method of cultivating the mind. Be the reason what it may, the result is, from the very nature of mind, that they make little or no solid improvement. Something they may gain by that exercise of attention which they give to the products of other minds; they come in this way to know that things of this and that name, or class, are among the materials of universal knowledge; but with the things themselves, they have no just acquaintance; and from such intercourse as they have with these things, it is, perhaps, questionable, whether, on the whole, their minds are more injured or improved. They acquire that sort of knowledge which inflates, but does not strengthen; which makes one wise in conceit, but foolish in discourse and action; which produces confidence

without clear conviction ; which capacitates men to despise and denounce others, and to carry themselves as gods, but not to forbear, and be gentle, and give instruction with meekness. They must needs move slowly, who would move surely and successfully up the hill of knowledge : it cannot be ascended in a day, or a month, or a year. Haste does only harm ; things must have their natural course, and they who cannot wait, should cease all expectation, and all hope, and betake themselves to some other pursuit. I wish I could write in every student's heart, that beautiful saying of ancient wisdom, " Truth is the daughter of Time." How many hurry through books and systems, as if rapidity in mental growth and in reading were the same thing. Not such as these become mighty in intellectual power ; this is the attainment of those sons of patience, who pause a year, it may be, on a volume or a theory, before they can exactly pronounce concerning it. They pause for reflection, and while they pause, life springs within them with new strength ; their minds grow apace ; they extend their views ; they see the wide and ever enlarging relations of things, and thus do they become more instructed by continued reflection on one book or page, than the other class of students by the reading of a life time. I repeat the sentiment : The human mind does not otherwise advance than by the exertion of its own living power. Things exterior to itself may favour its growth, but cannot make it grow. Converse with books, and lectures, and schools, will not suffice. Knowledge cannot be read into it, or lectured into it, or introduced into it in any way, except as the mind itself draws it, in and digests it, by its own patient thought and reflection.

And with this remark another should be connected : not only must the mind that would gain the just size and use of its powers, depend for that result on the inward workings of its own mysterious life, but it must designedly and diligently exert itself to keep those workings free of restraint. It must assert and maintain its liberty, which, from its circumstances, it cannot do without great decision and effort. The importance of the mind's being free of all restriction, and especially of a blind, servile reliance on other minds, in order to a just exercise and development of its faculties, cannot be overrated. Nothing in the philosophy of mental discipline deserves more consideration. What remarkable examples have we of the congenialness of freedom to the mind of

man ! Some who now rank among the first of human minds, were almost classed with those of bare mediocrity, until they escaped from the yoke of an early bondage, and felt the elevating and enlarging power of mental independence. Perhaps there are few thinking men who are not, to some extent, examples of this influence. Who that is much addicted to thorough investigation has not sometimes found himself at a stand in his thoughts while looking to other minds for aid ; but after ceasing from that dependence, and applying himself to the subject as exclusively in his own strength as if it had never before engaged human attention, advanced with the utmost ease, and with wonder at his former embarrassment ? While I remember instances such as these, of the influence of freedom on the operations of the mind, I recoil with indignation at the evil of intellectual slavery. That the mass of men, however, should escape at once from this base bondage, desirable as it may be, is out of all hope : may even the expectation be indulged, that those heaven-selected few will be entirely emancipated, whose destination in life is to labour for the deliverance of their fellows, and who are now engaged in preparing themselves for that work. Is it not possible, gentlemen, to be too confident even in this expectation ! You admit, I doubt not, the importance of your having perfectly free minds in your disciplinary course : you see that nothing will so directly and greatly contribute to your success : you intend that your minds shall be free ; perhaps you think them free already. And yet you well know, that it is often the strongest of the chains of mental bondage, to have a full persuasion of not being at all subject to it. No one, you will admit, should be confident of exemption from this bondage, any further than he shares the heavenly liberty which the Son of God bestows, by his renewing and sanctifying power. A mind which could retain an independence on all created minds and influences, would still be a slave, unless free of self-conceit and the vassalage of sin. Here is the prime slavery of human intellect ; and he is but a specimen of the worst kind of madness, who boasts himself of mental liberty, while subject to ambition or any form of selfishness, or is a stranger to his ignorance and nothingness in the presence of the great God.

A truly free mind is of course an humble one, which, conscious of its moral imperfection, can make no boastful

pretensions of its liberty. It is modest in these pretensions, in proportion as the ground for them is strong and extensive. And this fact leads me to mention, as another essential principle in the philosophy of our subject, that *humility*, not less than liberty, lies at the basis of all solid improvement of the mind. Not only has a proud mind no true acquaintance with God and his truth; it can have but little knowledge, and no just appreciation of the powers and products of other human minds. What limit is there to that young person's self-idolatry, who can take but a glance at the various productions of human genius and learning, and retain a high conceit of his own powers and attainments! There is much of error, and much of useless speculation, and much that is pernicious in these productions; but there is so much of truth, and wisdom, and power in them also, that to know them but imperfectly, were enough to make any single mind amazed at its own ignorance and short coming. What more unpromising in a young man then, than to be growing in self-confidence and self-admiration, while pursuing a preparatory course of study? Seest thou a man, a young man especially, wise in his own conceit, there is more hope of a fool than of him. A student of this class studies unquestionably to worse than no purpose. He thinks himself in possession of perfect independence and power of mind; but who, to one capable of judging in such a case, appears in more pitiable imbecility and bondage?

It might be useful to show in some detail, if time permitted, how the quality just recommended should be expected to develop itself in the inmates of this Institution. I can, however, barely advert to two points, in which, I think it cannot but exemplify itself to every one, in whom it exists in any considerable degree. You declare, gentlemen, by your attendance here, that you do not despise exact system and rule in study, though prescribed not by yourselves. This well agrees with the supposition, that you have the true spirit of self-discipline, and especially that element of it of which I am remarking. You are persuaded that the prayerful consultations of wise and good men who have passed, and passed successfully through a course of Theological study, are more likely to originate a judicious plan to be pursued by those who are just entering on such a course, than they in their inexperience could originate for themselves. Hence your subjection of yourselves to the

settled regimen of our school. What else now can those expect from you, who would not forejudge you as insincere or fickle, but that your studies, even to the end, will be attended to, in strict observance of all our regulations; that you will give your time and your strength to such books and subjects as our order and discretion may prescribe, postponing your own contrariant wishes herein, to the fixed plan of the Institution; and that you will observe the very hours and seasons here set for study, recreation, and prayer; and not different, though to yourselves, individually, they might be more convenient ones, of your own appointing? All this, in honour to your claims to be held as sincere and consistent men, we ought to take for granted; and we shall take for granted, will, in all ordinary cases, be verified by fact.

Again; assuming that the root of sound self-discipline in this respect is within you, we cannot but anticipate that you will cherish and exhibit a peculiar spirit of modesty, in relation to the great subject matter of your studies in this place. Theology, it is true, so far as it proceeds beyond the certain announcements of revelation, consists in results of human reasoning and philosophizing. So far, of course, it should, like any other science, be examined and judged of freely, in the independent and just exercise of reason. It is the greatest possible violation of humility—it is an arrogation of the Divine authority, to demand an implicit belief in any system of Theology one hair-breadth farther than this. It is an assumption of the prerogative of the Most High. Think freely, therefore, gentlemen; think independently, think thoroughly for yourselves, on the subjects of Theological, as well as of every other science. In respect even to the first principles of revealed religion, there is no irreverence in the utmost liberty of thought, provided it be not licentiousness, under liberty's cloak. Nevertheless, it is a profane and haughty spirit that moves not softly, and tremblingly, and with great self-diffidence, over all the ground of Christian Theology. It were a manifest denial that the Scriptures are an inspired revelation, to suppose that the substantial truths which they contain remain yet to be ascertained; and those may see plainly, with whom they class themselves, who hesitate to adopt what has been the common faith of the Christian church in every age. Besides, there is something, in a manner sacred, in the uninspired thoughts and

speculations of sound Christian divines. Among these authors are not a few of the best and greatest of mankind ; martyrs, confessors, and reformers ; men of giant understandings, and hearts as large as the universe ; and they have given us in their immortal works, the best fruits of their labours. I need not ask whether those can be very modest or very intelligent youths, who can hastily discard, or irreverently controvert, the doctrines and opinions of such men.

I have only to add in closing these familiar remarks on the principles of mental discipline, that the mind, like the body, needs its refectations and its remedies, and that want of attention to these may defeat every end of discipline, and be fatal to intellectual progress. Here, however, opens a very wide field, which I must not enter. Let me only say, that I deem this subject worthy of a much more thorough and philosophical examination than it has yet received—an examination, which, I trust, some one competent to the task will give to it. The importance of bodily temperance and exercise has been much insisted on ; but the mind has a being of its own, independent of the body ; and much as it may suffer by its union to the body, from corporeal infirmities, it has independent ailments and infirmities of its own ; and if the body can injure the mind by being ill-conditioned, the mind, by the same cause, can injure the body, even to the speedy destruction of its life. Whence, I infer, that plans for promoting bodily health merely, omit much the more important part of what is needful, for the vigorous health of the mind. There is food, medicine, and exercise for the body, and these by their good influence on the body, may indirectly benefit the mind : but there is food, medicine, and exercise also for the mind ; and the withholding of these may keep both mind and body diseased, and languishing, beyond hope of cure by human means.

ART. VII. AUTHENTICITY OF I. JOHN V. 7, 8.

By Rev. WM. W. HUNT, Amherst, Mass.

IN KNAPP'S edition of the New Testament, I find a part of the seventh and eighth verses of the fifth chapter of John's first epistle included in double brackets. The passage begins after the clause, *ἐν τρεῖς εἰσιν αἱ μαρτυροῦντες* (*there are three that bear record*), and includes the following: *ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἐν εἰς. Καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ* (*in heaven the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one. And there are three that bear record on earth*). In explanation of these brackets, the author says, in the preface, "His ea notantur quæ sine dubio spuria esse censebam;" (with these, i. e. brackets, those passages are marked which I suppose, without doubt, are spurious.) Such is the opinion of Dr. KNAPP, one of the most orthodox and learned biblical scholars in Europe. But what is the opinion of other critics on this subject?

Mr. SCOTT says, "It is well known that many volumes have been written concerning this passage, in order to prove or disprove its authenticity. But whether the Triunitarians interpolated it, or the Arians and other Unitarians omitted it, is, to this day, a matter of controversy, and not likely to be determined."

Mr. HENRY says, "There are some rational surmises that seem to support the present text and reading."

ROSENMUELLER says, "Verba hæc non esse genuina ple-rorumque criticorum hodie est sententia;" (that these words are not genuine is now the opinion of most critics.)

The BISHOP of ST. DAVIDS, after a minute and learned discussion, says, "Upon the whole view of the important and interesting subject of these pages—the evidences internal and external, direct and indirect, of the controverted verse are so many, so various, and so powerful, as to leave in my own mind no room to doubt that we have, in the testimony of the three heavenly witnesses, the authentic words of St. John."

Mr. NOLAN, (an English divine,) in an inquiry into the integrity of the Greek Vulgate, after stating the internal and external evidences for the verse, adds, "I trust nothing fur-

ther can be wanting to convince any ingenuous mind that I. John V. 7, really proceeded from St. John the evangelist."

Mr. GRIER, after noticing the arguments for the passage, says, "I feel compelled to abandon my former prejudices against the verse, and to think that a person should almost as soon doubt the genuineness of the rest of St. John's epistle, as that of the disputed passage."

Such are the opinions of some of the learned critics upon this passage.

From these contradictory opinions, I turn to the arguments by which they are supported.

1. In the first place it is argued *against* the passage, that it is not found in any of the ancient Greek manuscripts. While there are Greek manuscripts up to the fourth century, there are none, it is said, which contain this passage previous to the year 1300. This, it must be confessed, is a strong argument. It would seem that if the passage was contained in the autograph of the Apostle, it would have been preserved in *Greek*, along with the rest of the epistle, that it would have been found in some one of the many Greek manuscripts, scattered through the period of nine centuries. The omission is somewhat unaccountable, on the supposition of its genuineness.

2. The second argument against the passage is, its omission in many of the ancient and eastern versions. It is wanting in two Syriac versions, in the Arabic Polyglot, in the Coptic, in Ethiopian, in the Slavonic, in the Armenian, &c. The American missionaries to Palestine tell us that it is wanting in the New Testament which they found there; and Sir Wm. Jones, that it is wanting in the copy which he found among the Christians of India.

3. It is argued on this side of the question, that the passage is not quoted or referred to by any of the Greek fathers. Some of these fathers wrote continued commentaries on the New Testament, and on this very epistle;—they quote the preceding and subsequent clauses;—they had frequent occasion to quote this clause; but it is not referred to by any of them until the fifth, or, as is affirmed by some, the twelfth century. Would this have been the case, it is asked, if they had known of this passage? And would not some of them have known of it, if it ever belonged to a genuine copy of the epistle?

4. It is omitted in some of the manuscripts of the Vul-

gate, and in those which contain it, it appears in a variety of shapes, some placing the eighth verse before the seventh, others placing the seventh verse only in the margin. There is also a variety of readings in those Greek copies which contain the passage. Some, in the seventh verse, read *ἐν ἑνὶ* (*are one*), others read *ἐν τῷ ἐν ἑνὶ* (*are to one*), and in the eighth verse, instead of *ἐν τῇ γῇ* (*on earth*) one Greek edition reads *ἐν τῇ γῇ* (*upon the earth*). From this variety of readings, it is contended that those transcribers who thought proper to insert the passage, had no certain reading before them, and therefore no sufficient authority for inserting it.

These are the principal arguments against the authenticity of the passage; and surely they are of such a nature as to shield one who doubts respecting it from suspicion and reproach.

But is there nothing to be said in favour of the passage?

1. In the first place, we find some negative arguments.

The omission of the passage in the Greek manuscripts, it is said, and very truly, can be easily accounted for; as the clause immediately preceding the passage, and the last clause in the passage itself, are precisely alike, except the addition in the latter case of *ἐν τῇ γῇ* which is generally allowed to be genuine. Now what was more easy and likely, than for the eye of a transcriber to be caught by so similar a clause, so near, and pass on without suspecting an intervening passage, especially if the last word ended both lines in the copy? Such mistakes are made by every transcriber. And an omission in one Greek manuscript would account for an omission in all the rest; since that one might be the copy from which they were all taken. Still further: an omission in the Greek *manuscripts*, would of course account for the omission in many of the versions and all the Greek fathers. Thus almost the entire argument against the passage is set aside, by supposing what might easily have occurred in transcribing. But this is not all. Suppose the passage wanting in all the Greek manuscripts until the year 1300. So also the Hymn to Ceres had been lost for sixteen centuries, when it was found in a manuscript at Moscow, and that manuscript written as late as the fourteenth century: yet no one ever doubted the genuineness of that hymn.

Besides, if there are no Greek manuscripts, but one, for the verse after the end of the third century, there are no Greek manuscripts against, before that period. And if no Greek

fathers quote such a Greek text ; no Latin *heretics* ever objected to the Latin text. And further still, if no Greek father quoted 1 John V. 7, neither did any one quote 1 John V. 20, (this is the true God, &c.) during the first three centuries ; or 1 Tim. iii. 16, (God was manifest in the flesh) for the first four centuries ; and yet the genuineness of these passages is now established by incontestible evidence.

These are some of the *negative* arguments. And, certainly, every one must acknowledge that they very much reduce the weight of evidence against the passage.

2. The first *positive* argument which I shall introduce is, that the passage is found in the Latin version.

The value of this argument will be understood by a brief history of that version. I give it, for substance, from Robinson's Calmet and Horne's Introduction.

At a very early period the Scriptures were translated into Latin. In the time of Augustine, there were several of these versions ; but only one of them adopted by the church, that is, by ecclesiastical authority. This was called *Vulgata* (common), because it was made from the Greek common version (*Koine*). This version was made in the beginning of the second century. It was very literal, and gave scrupulously the meaning of the original. As the manuscripts had become corrupted, revision was undertaken by *Jerome* in the year 383, in pursuance of a commission from the Bishop of Damascus. While Jerome was employed in this revision, he ventured to commence a new version of his own, out of the originals, by the counsel of his friends, and from his own sense of the necessity of such a work. This was completed A. D. 405. He enjoyed the oral instruction of learned Jewish Rabbis of Palestine, and availed himself of all the former Greek versions, and of the Hexapla of Origen. His new version exceeded all others in usefulness. It preserves many true readings, where the modern Hebrew copies are corrupted. It gradually acquired so great authority in the West of Europe, that ever since the seventh century, it has been exclusively adopted by the Roman Church. This is called the Modern Vulgate. It is almost as old, as the oldest Greek manuscript. It was made by one of the most learned of men. He resided in a central position, about equally distant from the two grand seats of learning and religion, Rome and Constantinople. He had before him a Latin version two centuries older than

any Greek manuscript now extant. He had access to all former Greek versions, and of course to many Greek manuscripts. His version was widely circulated, was contested, but stood the test. It is acknowledged to contain the true reading, in many places where the Hebrew is corrupted, and in some, where the Greek manuscripts are mutilated.

This version contains the passage before us. And this fact must be regarded as strong evidence of its genuineness. But this is not all.

3. The passage was quoted at a very early period.

The following is acknowledged to be the language of Cyprian: "*Dicit Deus, 'ego et Pater unum sumus,' et iterum de Patre, et Filio, et Spiritu Sancto, scriptum est, et hi tres unum sunt,*" ("The Lord says 'I and the father are one: and again, of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, it is written 'these three are one.') *Scriptum est* evidently implies that what follows (*hi tres unum sunt*) was extant in Scripture. But where is this phrase found in the Scripture, except in the verse now under consideration, and especially connected with *Patre, Filio, et Spiritu Sancto*? Nor does it weaken the evidence of Cyprian's reference to this verse, that he employs the term *Filio* instead of *Verbo*, as both words mean the same thing, and the former was the more usual appellation of Christ in that age.

Cyprian then does quote the passage; and it is admitted that it was quoted by Fulgentius.

Now Cyprian was born in the year 240 and Fulgentius 464. The former wrote nearly a century before the date of the earliest Greek manuscript. That he used Greek copies is acknowledged even by Griesbach. They were both of them learned men, and had the means of knowing what was genuine, as well as any other men.

MILL, an English editor of a Greek Testament with various readings and critical notes, says of this evidence; that it would be abundantly sufficient to authenticate the seventh verse, if that verse were found in no copy from their time to the present day.

The passage is said, (nor do I know that it is disputed,) to have the testimony of the African Bishops of the fifth century: which, as some one observes, is equal to an hundred manuscripts of the same age; ("*Instar centenorum codicum qui optimæ notæ sunt seculi quinti.*")

There is also not a little evidence, that the passage is

quoted or referred to by distinguished Greek writers of the third and fourth century; and it is found in all the printed editions of the Greek Testament. Every editor, it seems, thought there was sufficient reason for inserting it, and the earlier editors did not even suspect that it was spurious.

Such are some of the *external* evidences urged in favour of the verse. There are some *internal* ones; or, as Henry calls them "rational surmises." Some have thought that the general scope of the Apostle *requires* the seventh verse. Bishop Horsely says, that the sense *absolutely* requires it: but Sir Isaac Newton says, that the connexion is best preserved by expunging it; while another commentator suggests, that the sense would be rendered more perspicuous by the omission both of the seventh and eighth verses.

An argument from the *general scope* can have no great weight on either side; still we may be allowed in some "rational surmises."

If the words $\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\eta\ \gamma\eta$, (*on earth*) which are found in some of the early Greek manuscripts, are genuine, and they are generally allowed to be, then the seventh verse seems to be necessary; *for* why should the Apostle say that there are three that bear record *on earth*, unless he had spoken of witnesses somewhere else?

There is another thing. Bishop Middleton, whose opinion is law on the subject of the Greek article, says, that $\kappa\alpha\iota$ before $\epsilon\kappa$ in the eighth verse necessarily implies a reference to something that has gone before—"These three agree in *the one*." What one? Nothing is said about any *one*, if the seventh verse be rejected. In that verse there is a *one*: and the article $\kappa\alpha\iota$ is clearly a reference to that.

A Professor of Greek, distinguished for critical accuracy in that language, on being shown this construction, gave it as his decided conviction, that the article here *absolutely* requires the disputed passage, and that, while he never before felt at liberty to use that passage as a proof text (not having before carefully observed the article and the preposition), he should not hesitate to use it thus in future.

There is another argument from the grammatical construction. Take away the disputed passage, and there are three neuter nouns connected with a masculine article and a masculine participle, which certainly is a very singular construction. True, there is something masculine in the idea of witnesses: true, too, there is the same construction

if that passage be inserted; yet the figure of *attraction* would account for it in that case. With the seventh verse, the language is good Greek; without that verse, it is at least somewhat solecistical.

Such, as I think, is a fair view of the question before us. To which side shall we incline?

If the arguments were exactly *balanced*, charity should incline us to receive the passage. Its omission can be accounted for without involving the moral character of any one; but its interpolation could hardly be less than direct and wilful forgery in the revelation of God. Now charity thinketh no evil; it requires evidence before it permits a suspicion, much more before it authorizes so serious a charge.

There is another consideration of the same nature. The Bible is the revelation of God, and the only one which he has given to men. Here are the words of eternal life,—the truths by which men are to be saved. It is immensely important that this book, as a whole, have all the weight of Divine authority. Now what is the influence upon the community, of rejecting a part of it—of calling a verse, here and there, spurious? Other verses are soon suspected, especially if they reveal an unpleasant doctrine, or inculcate an unpleasant duty. The public confidence is shaken, and infidelity is encouraged.

There is another consideration still. It is admitted on all hands, that the sentiment of the passage is found in other parts of the word of God. Unitarians themselves assent to this, contending that, if this verse were genuine, the *unity* here spoken of, would be only the same as that in which the Saviour declared that he and the Father were one.

If then the arguments *for* and *against* the verse were *equally balanced*, there are strong reasons in favour of admitting it. But, unless I am much mistaken, there is a decided preponderance in *favour* of the verse. The evidence *against* the passage is all *negative*, simply a want of evidence in favour, which is always regarded as an inferior kind of evidence: while the evidence in *favour* is, the great portion of it, *positive*. The evidence *against* begins in the fourth century; decided evidence in *favour* is found by the middle of the third. The evidence *against* can easily be accounted for; the evidence in *favour* would require some almost inadmissible suppositions. There is no evidence

against from the passage itself ; while the language is the language of John, and the principles of Greek construction, which would otherwise be violated, are here sustained. In view of all this, then, I am constrained to admit the genuineness of the passage, and until new, and weightier evidence arise, I shall adopt, in reference to this subject the practice of Cecil. "I have," said he, "a shelf in my study for tried authors, and one in my mind for tried principles and characters. When an author has stood a thorough examination, and will bear to be taken as a guide, I put him on the shelf. A hundred subtle objections may be brought against this principle, I may meet with some of them perhaps ; but my principle is on the shelf. Generally I may be able to recall the reasons which weighed with me to put it there ; but if not, I am not to be sent out to sea again. Time was when I saw through and detected the subtleties that could be brought against it. I have past evidence of having been fully convinced, and there on the shelf it shall lie."

ART. VIII. REVIEW OF UPHAM ON THE WILL.

By Rev. ENOCH POND, Professor at Bangor, Me.

A Philosophical and Practical treatise on the Will. By Thomas C. Upham, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Bowdoin College, 1834.

(Continued from Vol. I. p. 539)

THE views of Prof. Upham are substantially the same with those of Edwards ; but the plan and object of his work are different. President Edwards had constantly in view the clearing and establishing of certain important conclusions of a theological nature ; and he went into the subject of the Will only so far, and in such connexions, as it bore upon these conclusions. Whereas Prof. Upham investigates the subject without any particular reference to its theological bearing, and pursues it altogether upon general principles. He seems to forget, for the time, and

would have his readers forget, all the knotty questions which have been agitated respecting "free-will and fore-knowledge absolute," and enters upon the subject as one of independent philosophical inquiry.

Prof. Upham divides his work into four parts; the first relating to the general nature of the will; the second to its laws; the third to its freedom; and the fourth to its powers. In the first part, there is a classification of our mental states into the *intellectual*, the *sentient*, and the *voluntary*; and the relation of the two former of these states to the latter, which constitutes the principal topic of inquiry, is clearly pointed out. In the second part, the important fact that the Will, like every other mental faculty, has its laws—as the law of causation, and the law of uniformity, on the ground of which its operations may be calculated on and predicted—is established by a great variety of proof. In the third part it is proved, that this subjection of the will to law is not at all inconsistent with its freedom, but that both these facts—the freedom of the will, and its subjection to law—are to be received, each on its own appropriate evidence, whether they can be satisfactorily harmonized by us, or not. In the fourth part, there is a full discussion of the subject of voluntary power, in which Prof. Upham dis-cards the self-determining power of the will, in the sense in which this phrase was understood by Edwards, as inconceivable and impossible.

It has been already observed, that Prof. Upham considers our mental states under three divisions, the *intellectual*, the *sentient*, and the *voluntary*. We have no doubt that this classification is correct, and that it is worthy to be adopted by all subsequent writers on the philosophy of mind. It accords with the testimony of consciousness, and of common sense, and is recognized in the various languages of men. A thought is not a feeling, nor is a feeling a volition. These three mental states are obviously distinct, and are to be referred to distinct departments of the human mind.

Most writers on intellectual philosophy have distinguished between the understanding and will, or between the intellectual, and the sentient and voluntary powers; while not a few have confounded these two latter powers, reckoning either the sentient states of mind as voluntary, or the voluntary states as sentient. It will be our principal object,

in what follows, to trace out the so frequently unobserved distinction between the sentient and the voluntary powers of man, or between his feelings and his moral exercises. We shall pursue this distinction more in detail than it came within the plan of Prof. Upham to do, and exhibit some of its important bearings in relation to the great subject of experimental religion.

Our sentient feelings may be divided into several classes; and the first among them, which requires to be mentioned, is our *appetites*. The appetites, such as hunger, thirst, &c., are feelings in the mind, occasioned by particular states of the body. We are not directly voluntary in them. They constitute powerful motives to action, but are not themselves voluntary action. They were given us for an important purpose, and should be kept under a wise controul, but do not themselves possess a moral character.

Next to the appetites may be classed *the natural affections*, such as pity, and parental love. The love of parents for their children is not itself of a moral nature. It is not action, but a powerful motive to action, impelling those who possess it to provide for the little ones committed to their care. It is a mere feeling, which we have in common with the brutes, and which, like the appetites, should be duly regulated and controlled. The same, in general, may be said of the feeling of pity, and of all those feelings which are commonly classed under the head of natural affections.

There is a class of feelings denominated *muscular*, as they are supposed to arise from a particular state of the muscular system. The playfulness of the child, the weariness of the labourer, and the lassitude of the aged and infirm, are instances of this kind of feeling. No one can doubt that such feelings have a near connexion with the will, and a powerful influence upon it; and yet no one can regard them as directly voluntary.

To the sentient part of our nature belong the large class of *nervous* feelings or affections. These affections are not voluntary, and of course do not possess a moral character. They are *mere feelings* springing up in the mind, on account of a particular state of the body—the nerves. In some states of nerves, persons are cheerful; in others they are melancholy. Sometimes they laugh, and then they weep. These nervous affections often assume a *religious* aspect, and lead those under their influence to rejoice in

hope, or to tremble with apprehension, or to sink in the darkness of despair. Still, there is nothing in them of a truly religious nature, and they are not to be confided in, as affording decisive evidence of character, one way or the other.

Among the sentient feelings may be classed, the various *emotions* and *passions*,—such as surprise, astonishment, wonder; the emotions of beauty, grandeur, sublimity; joy, sorrow, grief, fear, anger. In the same class may be included feelings of regret and of gladness; feelings of approbation and disapprobation; the feeling of moral obligation to do what is right, and of remorse when we do wrong. Among the sentient feelings, we also include a class of instinctive desires and aversions, such as the universal desire of happiness and aversion to misery.

We here speak of these emotions or feelings in their simple state. They may doubtless be indulged under circumstances, and to a degree, that may give them a moral character. But in their simple state, they seem to be mere constitutional feelings, implanted for wise purposes, and which it is our duty to regulate and control. They spring up spontaneously in the mind, on the presentation of their appropriate objects. They are not exercises of the will, but operate in a thousand ways, to move and influence the will. They are intimately connected with our moral affections, and yet are clearly and entirely distinct from them.

This will appear, as we proceed to speak of our moral exercises or affections, and to show in what they consist. Our moral exercises are all exercises of *the will*. They are all, in some sense, *voluntary*. There is nothing pertaining to us which can be said strictly to possess a moral character—nothing sinful or holy, right or wrong—in which we are not voluntary.

But though all our moral exercises are exercises of the will, and in this respect are to be distinguished from our mere feelings, still, it may be proper to speak of them under several classes. And the first to be mentioned is, that of our *simple choices* or *volitions*. These include a vast number of our mental exercises. Every word we speak, every limb we move, every external action we perform, implies a previous choice or volition. We will to raise the hand, and we raise it. We will to open our lips and speak,

and it is done. And so of every other voluntary motion of the body.—These simple choices are rapid in their succession, and short in their duration. Each fixes upon something supposed to be directly within our power, and requiring immediately to be done; and with the doing of it, the volition passes away, and another of the same kind succeeds.

In this respect, our simple choices differ widely from our *purposes*, our *resolutions*, our *intentions*. A purpose embraces a plan or course of conduct, more or less general, and requires often a vast number of simple choices to carry it into effect. An individual purposes to go a journey. He forms the purpose deliberately and of choice. He is as voluntary in it as he can be in any thing; and the purpose, the plan itself, is one. But how many steps must be taken, and how many simple choices put forth, in order to bring him to his journey's end.

Our purposes often are so general as to include, not only a multitude of simple choices, but several distinct purposes under them. A young man, for example, purposes to become a preacher of the gospel, and to pursue a course of study preparatory to this important work. But, as he revolves the subject in his mind, he perceives that a great many subordinate purposes must be formed, in order to carry this greater and more general purpose into effect. And very likely, in the course of his preparatory studies, he repeatedly changes some of these subordinate purposes, while the general purpose to become a herald of salvation remains unshaken.

A *resolution* is a fixed choice or purpose to do something, or to attempt the doing of it, at some future period. Thus, we resolve to perform a particular action to-morrow, and something else the next week, and something else the next year. These resolutions are deliberately formed, formed in view of motives, and are exercises of the will. Still, they differ materially from those more simple exercises of the will, by which they are carried into effect.—If it should be objected, that we sometimes resolve to perform certain actions *immediately*—to do them *now*, it would be sufficient to reply, that the resolving to do them, is not the doing of them—that the resolution, in this case, and the simple choice by which it is to be accomplished, are very different things.

An *intention* is a choice, a purpose to bring about a par-

ticular end, by means of some overt act or actions. For this reason, our intentions are sometimes denominated motives.* Thus we frequently ask, when we see an outward action performed, "What was the *motive* of him who performed it?" meaning by the inquiry, "What was his *intention*?" That we are voluntary in our intentions, is evident from their nature. They partake of the nature of a choice. The same is farther evident, since to the intention, and to this alone, attaches the entire moral character of the external action springing out of it. What is the overt act, the mere motions of the body, separate from the intention, out of which these motions grow? Judas came into the garden with much apparent cordiality, and said to Jesus, "Hail, Master, and kissed him." But who thinks the better of Judas for this, so long as we know that his intention was to betray his master into the hands of his enemies? And who thinks the better of any person for an overt action seemingly kind, when we know that the intention is hostile and evil?

Another class of our voluntary exercises consists of our *desires* or *wishes*. The term desire is sometimes used to express affections which are not voluntary—mere *feelings*, which belong to the sentient part of man. Thus our appetites, and our natural affections, are not unfrequently called desires. There are also certain universal and instinctive desires, as the desire of knowledge, and the desire of happiness. But that, in a large class of those exercises which are commonly denominated desires or wishes, we are voluntary, and that these exercises possess a moral character, there can be no doubt. The thief perceives it possible to obtain a sum of money by stealth; he earnestly *desires* to obtain it; he resolves that he will obtain it; and he enters on a course of measures accordingly. Now it would be difficult to show that this thief was not as voluntary and as criminal in his desires, as in his subsequent resolutions and endeavours. Indeed, may not the foundation of his guilt be traced, to the indulgence of these guilty desires?—David Brainerd conceived it possible, by much sacrifice

* The term *motive* is used in metaphysics in three different senses; first, to signify *external* or *objective motives*; secondly, to denote those *sentient feelings* which are awakened in the mind by the presentation of external motives; and thirdly, in the sense above alluded to, or to express our *intentions*, which operate as motives to overt action.

and exertion, to bring some of the American Indians to a knowledge of the Saviour. He earnestly *desired* the accomplishment of this important object; he resolved that he would attempt its accomplishment; and he entered on a course of measures accordingly. Now, is there nothing morally excellent and holy in these benevolent desires of Brainerd? Was he not commendable and praiseworthy, before God and men, for indulging them? And is it not evident, from this consideration, that his desires were voluntary?

Our desires, in the sense in which we here use the term, are in reality *choices*, *preferences*, and differ from our simple choices, chiefly in respect to their object. They fasten upon objects which are not immediately attainable; if the object of a desire were immediately attainable—if by a single movement, we could put our hand upon it, and secure it, the desire would become a simple choice, a volition, and the object in question would be attained.* Indeed, a desire, in the voluntary sense of the term, may be defined to be a wish, a preference, a choice, of something which is not immediately attainable.

Possibly there are other voluntary exercises, which come not under either of the classes which have been mentioned. Such may be some of those religious exercises, which are made the subject of express command in the Scriptures. We cannot conceive that God should directly require any thing of his creatures, in which they are not voluntary, or that he should command them to put forth exercises over which they have no controul. He may command us, and he does, to cultivate our understandings, and to regulate our sentient feelings; because in doing this, the will is concerned. But he does not command us to have *mere feelings*, when the appropriate occasions for them are not present to us; nor to repress them altogether, when the occasions are present. He does not command the man, who has long

* Dr. Brown says, "Those brief feelings, on which certain bodily movements are immediately consequent, are commonly termed *volitions*; while the more lasting wishes, which have no such direct termination, are simply denominated *desires*. Thus we are said to *desire* wealth, and to *will* the motion of our hand. But if the motion of our hand had not followed our desire of moving it, we should then have been said, not to *will*, but to *desire* its motion. The *distance*, or the *immediate attainableness* of the good, is thus the sole difference." Cause and effect, p. 34. To the same effect, see Payne's Elements, p. 370. "There is no radical difference," says Payne, "between will and desire."

been destitute of food, not to feel the sensation of hunger; nor does he require him, when his cravings are satisfied, to call up such a sensation. He does not forbid the kind parent to feel parental affection; nor does he require those who are not parents to have such affection. He does not forbid us, when an object of distress is before our eyes, to feel emotions of pity; nor does he require us to feel such emotions, when no object of distress is present. And so of our sentient feelings generally. We are required to regulate and cultivate them, and to have them under a wise controul. We are also to express them in all proper ways, and on suitable occasions. We are to "rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep." But we are not required to excite these feelings, and to put them forth, when there is no occasion for them; neither to repress and eradicate them, when there is occasion. In a word, they are not the subjects of *direct* command. Our voluntary exercises are commanded or forbidden, according as they are right or wrong; but our involuntary states of mind, except as it regards the regulation and expression of them, are not the subjects of prohibition or command, and there is no reason why they should be.

Some of our commanded religious exercises are obviously voluntary, as submission to God, a choosing of him for our portion, and a willingness to be in his hands and at his disposal. But there are others which have been thought to be of a different character. Such, for example, is *love* to God. 'Love,' it is said, 'is never a voluntary affection, Who can love or hate at pleasure? Does it depend on the will, the choice of the parent, whether he shall love his children; or on the choice of endeared and devoted friends, whether they shall love one another?'—The difficulty in this case, if there be any, arises entirely from an ambiguity in the meaning of the word, *love*. This word is sometimes used to express feelings purely sentient; as in the case of parental and sexual love. And if it had no higher sense when applied to God, there would be no more holiness in loving God, than there is in the fondness of animals for their young, or in the attachment of the turtle to his mate.* But

* The venerable John Newton, in one of his letters to Hannah More, says, "We seem to want some other word by which to denote our supreme regard to God, than that which expresses our affection to creatures. When we speak of *loving him*, it must be in a different sense. Creature love is a passion;

this word is also used to express a holy, voluntary affection. We are required to love all men with a love of benevolence; or, in other words, we are to desire and seek their good. But such an exercise is voluntary. We are required to love all good men with a love of complacency; which implies that, in view of their holy and amiable characters, we choose them as our friends, and prefer them above all others, as those with whom to take sweet counsel, and in whom to repose confidence and affection. But this exercise, too, is voluntary. We are required to love God, with a supreme and constant love. But what does this mean? Not that we are to cherish towards him a mere *sentient feeling*,—but that, in view of the infinite excellencies and glories of his character, and the relations subsisting between him and us, we choose him as the portion of our soul—prefer him above every other object—desire, above all things, to please and honour him—and seek our happiness in him, and in him alone, forever. This is to love God with a holy, voluntary affection, as he has most reasonably required in his law. And this is the only love of God, which is of any value in his sight.

Should it be insisted, that there is a *feeling of delight in God* involved in all our exercises of love to him, and that without this feeling he is never embraced as the portion of the soul; we are far from denying the existence of such a feeling. But to which department of the mind is it to be referred? Undoubtedly to the *sentient*; and it should be regarded rather as a motive to love, or perhaps, in many instances, as a consequent sensation, than as constituting any part of that holy, voluntary affection which is represented in the Scriptures as the fulfilling of the law.

It has been doubted whether *repentance* is a voluntary affection. But what is repentance? Not conviction, or distress, or sorrow. "Godly sorrow *worketh* repentance," but is not itself repentance. Repentance is a voluntary turning from sin. Viewing sin to be (what it is) unreasonable, base and odious in the extreme, the true penitent renounces it, turns away from it, and condemns and abhors himself on account of it. Without doubt, there is much more feeling, as well as intellectual light, involved in exer-

Divine love is a *principle*. It arises from an apprehension of his adorable perfections, especially as they are displayed in the great work of redemption." "There is a sensibility of feeling in creature love, which is no proper standard of our love to God." *Memoirs of H. More*, vol. i, p. 369.

cises of true penitence. But then, repentance does not consist, either in mere feeling or intellectual light, but in a voluntary renouncing, and turning away from sin.

It has been questioned, also, whether *faith* is a voluntary exercise. But in order to understand the nature of this exercise, it is only necessary to distinguish between the *act* of faith, and that which is implied in it. There is certainly much, that is not voluntary, implied in faith; such as an acquaintance with the material facts and doctrines of the gospel, and an intellectual assent to the truth of these doctrines. But mere intellectual prerequisites, such as these, do not constitute evangelical faith. Such faith consists essentially in a voluntary committing of the lost soul to Christ—in a giving up of one's whole guilty and ruined self to him—in reposing affectionately, confidently, and exclusively upon his outstretched and omnipotent arm, for deliverance and salvation. Such is the *act of faith*; and it is evidently an act in which the subject of it is free and voluntary.

It would be needless to proceed farther in analyzing and examining the different religious exercises. Suffice it to say, that we hold every such exercise, so far as it is the subject of direct command, and so far as it partakes of the nature of holiness, to be a *voluntary* exercise—to belong to the voluntary, and not to the sentient part of our nature. God has never required any thing of his creatures, in which they were not, in some sense, voluntary; nor does he regard them as holy or sinful, or as entitled either to reward or punishment, for any thing which they have not themselves voluntarily done.

From the description which has here been given of the voluntary part of man, and the classification which has been attempted of his voluntary exercises, we may see in what *regeneration* essentially consists. Regeneration implies much previous light and knowledge in the understanding; but the great and needed change does not lie here. A person may be enlightened to any extent, and still not be regenerated, or be any the less guilty in the sight of God. Indeed, guilt, in the unregenerate, uniformly increases, in proportion to the degree of their resisted light. Regeneration, too, implies a waking up of the benumbed sensibilities—an exciting and quickening of the feelings; but neither does the change under consideration lie here. The feelings

of sinners in the day of judgement, and in the world of despair, will be intensely excited, so much so, that they will bite and gnaw their tongues for pain; and yet they will not repent of their evil deeds.

Regeneration is a change of the *voluntary exercises*—a change of the desires, purposes, and affections of the soul. Till the voluntary part of man is changed, the seat of the sore within him is not touched. The dominion of sin is not broken. Till the voluntary part is renewed and sanctified, he is destitute of that holiness without which no man can see the Lord.

But it is not enough to say, that regeneration is a change in the voluntary affections; it is a change in all the different classes of these affections. It involves a change, not only in our simple choices or volitions, but in our purposes, intentions, desires, and in all the voluntary affections of the soul. From a want of attention to this point, some good men have failed to make an adequate representation of the subject of regeneration. It has been said by some, that the sinner may change his own heart as easily as he can move his tongue, or lift his hand. 'In changing the heart he is voluntary, and in lifting the hand he is voluntary, and one voluntary act may be performed as easily as another.' But although in both the actions here referred to the subject is voluntary, yet obviously they are very different in their nature—so different, that the one cannot, with any propriety, be introduced to illustrate the other. In lifting the hand, a simple choice or volition only is concerned; but in regeneration, there is much requiring to be changed, besides our simple choices or volitions. Our desires, our purposes, indeed all the voluntary affections of the soul must be changed, so that old things may pass away with us, and all things become spiritually new.

Some have said, that regeneration is a change in the *ultimate purpose* of the soul. Previous to regeneration, the ultimate purpose of every person is to *gratify self*; but subsequent to regeneration, the ultimate purpose is to *glorify God*. Now, though it is certain that, in regeneration, this ultimate purpose is always changed; and though the ultimate purpose may never be changed without regeneration; yet, to represent regeneration as a mere change of the ultimate purpose, is far from being an adequate view of the subject. The hearts of men, their voluntary exercises,

do not consist of mere purposes. There are desires, there are preferences, there are various forms of voluntary affection, which, in connexion with the change of purpose, require also to be renewed and sanctified. In view of the holy and excellent character of God, the sinner must begin to love him—must choose him as the portion of his soul, and prefer him above every other object—before he will change the whole purpose of his life, and devote himself to the glory of his Maker.

It is obvious from what has been said in the foregoing pages, that the sentient part of man lies between his intellectual and his voluntary part, and forms an important connecting link betwixt the one and the other.—In approaching our fellow beings, with a view to exert an influence upon them, we first address ourselves to their intellectual nature. We address them through the medium of the senses, and infuse ideas into their minds. But no sooner do these ideas enter their minds, than they awaken emotion, *feeling*, of some kind or other; and thus bring us in contact with the sentient man. But if the ideas communicated are of an interesting character, the process of influence will not stop here. These awakened feelings, in connexion with the ideas which have awakened them, will operate as motives to the will, and decisive action will be the result.—The position of the sentient nature, between the intellectual and the voluntary, and the influence which it exerts, one way and the other, is clearly illustrated by Prof. Upham.

“The understanding, whatever opinions may have formerly prevailed on the subject, is, in no case, in direct contact with the will. When, therefore, we speak of the operation of the intellect upon the will, we mean an indirect or circuitous operation; that is to say, one which is carried on *through the mediation of the sensibilities*.” “Strike out the sensibilities, therefore, and you necessarily excavate a gulf of separation between the intellect and the will, which is forever impassable. There is, from that moment, no medium of communication, no bond of union, no reciprocal action.”

It is the more important that this point be satisfactorily settled, because some good men, in their speculations, seem to have placed the sensibilities, at least such of them as are brought into exercise on the subject of religion, on the other side of the will. The faculty of feeling, or the heart, (as they term it,) lies back of the will, is deeper down in the profundities of the soul, and requires a more thorough operation of the Holy Spirit radically to affect it. Tell such persons that regeneration is a change in the voluntary exer-

cises—the exercises of the will, and you seem to them to represent it as a superficial work. It is not sufficiently deep and thorough. It does not go down to the feelings of the heart—But we have seen in this discussion, that the whole sentient region lies between the intellect and the will, and that a change in the mere feelings, which did not reach the exercises of the will, would be superficial indeed. In a religious point of view, it would be worthless. There is nothing deeper in the soul than its voluntary exercises, including its intentions, preferences, desires and purposes. There can be nothing better in the sight of God than a renewal of these. In these voluntary affections, previous to sanctification, is the seat of all sin. In these, subsequent to sanctification, is the seat of all holiness. These constitute, in the religious sense of the term, the *heart*,—out of the good treasure of which proceed all good things,—the *heart*, which we are required to keep with all diligence, since out of it are the issues of life.

From what has been said, we see the futility of an objection commonly urged against *the entire sinfulness of unregenerate men*. When this important doctrine is inculcated and enforced, we are often pointed, by way of objection, to the amiable natural dispositions and affections of certain unregenerate persons. We are told how kind they are in their families; how much they love their children, and how well they provide for them; and how pitiful they are to objects in distress.—Now certainly we would not say a word to discourage the cultivation and proper development of the amiable natural affections. These affections were implanted for important purposes, and they should be cultivated, and be made to exert their appropriate influence. But it is important to be said and understood, that these affections, however amiable, do not partake of the nature of religion or holiness. They belong to the sentient, and not to the moral part of man. They are mere feelings, and not voluntary exercises. They operate as powerful motives to action, but are not action, and do not, in themselves, possess a moral character. Openly vicious men, who profane the name of God, and trample upon his authority and institutions, often love their children, and provide for them, as well as others. They are pitiful, too, to objects in distress, and willing to exert themselves to afford relief. The very brutes possess these natural affections in great strength,

and often act under their influence; but the brutes are not on this account holy, nor do they possess a moral character.

To have stupified, and blunted, and in great measure eradicated the amiable natural affections, by long continued habits of sin, does indeed imply extreme depravity. It implies that those who have done it, and have become (as the apostle expresses it) "without natural affection," are far gone in wickedness. But to possess these natural affections in high degrees, and to act habitually under their influence, does not necessarily imply the exercise of holiness. Persons may act in this way from year to year, and be useful in their families, and respected in society, and never once think of God, or feel under any particular obligations to God, or have the least regard, in what they do, to his authority or glory.

It has been observed already, that moral depravity has its seat in the voluntary affections. There is nothing within us, which can be regarded as partaking of the nature of sin, in which we are not voluntary. But it is a mistake to suppose that the *influence* of depravity is felt only in the voluntary affections. Its baneful influence extends out into every department of the mind, impairing, deforming and corrupting all. The influence of depravity upon the understanding is to darken, weaken, confuse and blind it. The influence of depravity upon the conscience is to sear and stupify it, and unfit it to perform effectively its important functions. The influence of depravity upon the sentient feelings is to throw them into confusion and disorder; to blunt and impair those of the higher kind—those which prompt to holy action; and to strengthen and increase those of an opposite tendency—those under the influence of which temptation predominates, and the soul is drawn into the vortex of sin.

It is on account of this disordered state of the sentient feelings, that external motives operate so strangely upon the mass of men; that what ought to be the weaker motive so often predominates; and that considerations which ought to have great weight and influence produce so little effect. The sentient part of the man is so disordered and deranged,—the nobler sensibilities are so blunted and stupified, and the baser ones are so increased and strengthened—that the motives in favour of sin, which are intrinsically weakest, and which ought to be spurned at as of no account, awaken

interest, excite feeling, and ultimately carry away the will ; whereas the motives in favour of holiness, which are intrinsically strong, and ought to prevail with uniform and overwhelming power, excite little or no interest, meet no correspondent emotion waking up in the soul, and have no effective influence to redeem the will from that bondage of corruption in which it is enslaved.

The situation of sinners, as here set forth, is indeed fearful and deplorable. They are endowed with noble faculties and susceptibilities—every thing that they need, in order to constitute them moral agents, and render them capable of knowing God, and doing their duty. And God justly holds them responsible for the use of their faculties, and requires that they serve him to the full extent of their powers. But they have sinned—sinned long, and with a high hand—and by this means, the whole mind has become impaired and disordered. The understanding is darkened, the conscience is seared, the noble sensibilities are benumbed, the baser ones are strengthened, and the powers of the soul all lie in disorder and ruins.—And here is the inability, of which sinners complain, to love God and do their duty. Their inability is altogether moral, and altogether criminal. It arises, not from a want of faculties or powers, but from the inveterate love, and the long continued and universal prevalence of sin, by which the habit of sin has become confirmed, and has shed its blighting, disastrous influence over all the susceptibilities of the soul.

From what has been said, we learn not only the *necessity* for the special operations of the Holy Spirit in conversion, but the appropriate *sphere* of these operations.—The necessity for the special operations of the Holy Spirit, in order to the conversion of the soul, is absolute ;—not however, as we have said, on account of any essential defect in the constitution of man, or any want of natural ability to do his duty ; but on account of his voluntary sinfulness, and the influence of this sinfulness in darkening the mind, searing the conscience, and deranging and impairing, more or less, every part of the mental and moral system.

The first work of the Divine Spirit is, probably, to pour light into the understanding. It is to present the truths and motives of the gospel in such a manner as to excite attention. But we are not to limit the influence of the Spirit to the mere work of presenting external motives. Some, we know,

very low and inadequate ideas of the operations of the Holy Spirit.

From the understanding, the Spirit passes into the sentient mind, wakes up the benumbed sensibilities, and corrects the disorders which sin has occasioned there. Under these influences of the Spirit, the sinner begins to *feel*—feel the force of moral obligation—feel the urgent claims of duty—feel remorse, distress, and alarm in view of his sins. The world, for the time, loses its power with him; temptation is disarmed of its wonted influence; while the truths and motives of the gospel come down upon the soul with prodigious weight.

From the sentient part of the man, the Spirit soon passes, unless he is resisted and grieved away, to the voluntary part. The external motives of the gospel, combining with the awakened sensibilities within, predominate over all opposing influences; the will is bowed; the heart is humbled; and the work of sanctification is commenced.

An important part of what is usually called the strivings of the Spirit, and a part which we think has been too much overlooked, is confined to the sentient region of the soul. Here, an important preparatory work is to be done. Previous to the commencement of the Spirit's striving, every thing is in confusion here. Temptations to sin strike the mind powerfully, awaken interest, and carry away the captive will; while the exciting truths and motives of the gospel are presented and urged in vain.

Yet, in all these operations of the Spirit, no law of the mind is suspended, and the free and regular exercise of no faculty is restrained. The subject of them feels that he has experienced a great change, a glorious change; and he devoutly ascribes it to the sovereign grace of the Holy Spirit. Still, he has been conscious of no constraint put upon any of his faculties. He knows that, from first to last, he has had the free exercise of his thoughts and feelings; that he has acted under the influence of motives, and acted freely.

The views which have been taken of this subject enable us to detect an *ambiguity in certain terms*, which, in various ways, is having an unhappy influence. There is a class of terms which are used to express both the sentient feelings, and the voluntary exercises; and on this account, these entirely different classes of affections are sometimes

mistaken the one for the other. Thus, the term *desire*, which, for the most part, expresses moral affections, is in some instances used to signify *feelings* which are sentient and instinctive. And the word *love*, which (in religion) is commonly used to express a moral exercise, sometimes denotes a mere natural feeling or affection. And the same remark may be made respecting the word *heart*. This word is sometimes used to express sentient feelings, and sometimes moral exercises; and from a want of discrimination in regard to the different senses of the word, has arisen much of the controversy respecting the power of sinners to make themselves new hearts.

But there is no word in our religious vocabulary which requires discrimination in regard to its use, more than the very common word *feeling*.* This word properly relates to the sentient part of man; and yet, for some reason or other, it is very commonly used in reference to his moral part. Thus we hear about holy feelings, and sinful feelings; and religion, it is said, should be a matter of feeling, and not a mere outside profession.

From a want of discrimination in regard to the meaning of this word, persons often mistake their own characters. In some instances, they have more religion than they think they have; and in others, they have less.—There are some excellent Christians, who are subject to sudden and painful changes of feeling. They get into the dark, as the saying is; nothing goes right with them; they find themselves exceedingly unhappy; and they think, for the time, that they have no religion. We have known some Christians, who had periodical returns of such distressing seasons. And strange as it may seem, we have known some, to whom a strong dish of tea, or a potion of anodyne, would bring almost instantaneous relief. Now it may be true of Christians, in such seasons of distress, and doubt, and fear, that they have more religion than they think they have. The difficulty may be primarily in their sensibilities, or perhaps in their nerves, and not in their moral exercises. They may have as strict a regard for the honour of God and

* It might be well to inquire how this word has come into so common use among Christians of the present day. They certainly did not borrow it from the Bible. We never hear David, or Paul, or John, or any other of the inspired writers, talking about their *feelings*. Yet a Christian now, who should imitate them in this respect, would be regarded in some circles, with much suspicion.

his law, and for the advancement of his kingdom, at such times as ever ; and their troubles may be primarily and chiefly sentient.

On the other hand, there may be persons, and there have been thousands, whose sentient feelings mislead them in the opposite direction. They are strongly excited on the subject of religion, are full of something which they call light and joy ; and have no doubt, for the time, that their sins are forgiven, and that they are the favourites of heaven. But the event soon proves, that their good feelings, and their religion, were all sentient. It did not reach the moral affections, in such a way as to accomplish a thorough change in them. The gush of excited feeling quickly subsides, and the character becomes ordinarily worse than before.

In opposing a mere outside religion—a religion of morality or of mere forms—evangelical Christians have been accustomed to lay much stress on the feelings. And this is well, if they will but discriminate, and use the word feeling in a safe sense. Too much stress cannot be laid on the moral feelings—the voluntary exercises ; for in holy exercises of this kind, the whole of religion essentially consists. But too much stress may be laid on those sorrows, and joys, and griefs, and sympathies, which are merely sentient. There is no religion in feelings of this kind, more than in the feeling of hunger or thirst. Such feelings may be intimately connected with religious exercises, either as prerequisite motives or as consequent emotions ; but in themselves, they possess no moral or religious character.

From not discriminating in regard to the different kinds of feelings, persons often misjudge respecting the proper *evidences* of piety.—Here, we will suppose, is a person of strong and excitable passions, whose religion is characterized by seasons of deep feeling. He often weeps at meetings, and on other occasions, and is transported, at times, with the ardour and intensity of his religious affections. He can tell of elevations and depressions, of joys and sorrows, beyond those of his brethren generally. Still his character is not remarkably consistent or uniform. He is fitful and unsteady in his feelings and conduct ; to-day up, to-morrow down ; to-day intensely engaged in religion, and to-morrow as much engaged in something else. Now this man may think himself an eminent Christian, and may be thought so by others ; and we would by no means be understood to say

that he is not a Christian. But we do say that there is much in his character, on which both himself and others may lay considerable stress, on which no dependence can safely be placed. There is much in his supposed religious character which is merely sentient, and in which there is no more religion, than in the crackling of thorns under a pot, or in the tears which are shed at a funeral.

We must not be understood, however, as wishing to discourage feeling in religion. We ought to feel. It is desirable we should feel. It is desirable that the *sentient* feelings should be excited and engaged. Why should they be engaged on every other subject in which we are interested, and be dull and stupid here? But it is important that our religion should go deeper, and that the evidence of it should be laid deeper, than the mere sentient feelings. It is important that we should discriminate in regard to the nature of our feelings, and ever remember, that we have no more of religion, and no less, than we have of *voluntary*, *cheerful* devotedness to God, and a *willingness* to obey his commands. A man may have ever so much mere feeling; he may weep his eyes out in grief, or rise to ecstasy in moments of joy; and still, if he is not voluntarily and perseveringly devoted to God and his service, he cannot have satisfactory evidence that he is a Christian. Or a man may have very little mere sentient feeling—so little as to think that he has none at all, and on this account may reject all hope that he is a child of God; and still, if he is voluntarily and perseveringly devoted to God and his service; if he loves the cause of God, and seeks its advancement, and prefers the peace of Jerusalem above his chief joy; what better evidence can such a person desire, that he is in the number of those who shall enjoy the triumphs of God's holy kingdom forever.—What we wish, let it be repeated, is not to discourage feeling in religion—even sentient feeling, if it is properly regulated; but we wish to insist on something better. There must be a *voluntary* devotedness to God; there must be *principle*—solid, enduring, religious principle; and this may be expected to abide, when the hay, wood, and stubble of a merely sentient and fitful religion are all consumed.

From a want of discrimination in regard to the different kinds of feelings, impenitent sinners are often involved in needless difficulty and trouble.—We frequently see persons,

who believe in the reality of experimental religion, and are sensible of its importance, and know that it is of great importance for them, living year after year in the neglect of it, on the simple ground that they do not, and cannot *feel*. At least, they do not feel so deeply as they think desirable and necessary. Their minds, they think, must be more strongly excited; they must be exercised with deeper sorrow and anguish; and strange as it may seem, they are desiring and longing for spiritual distress. They would give any thing they possess, if they could only be wrought up to that pitch of distress and anguish which they think their case requires.

To persons such as these we would say, in the first place, it is impossible for you, in this state of mind, ever to feel the distress you desire. How can you? For the moment you begin to feel distress, your desire begins to be gratified, and this gives you joy; and how can joy and distress exist in the same mind, in relation to the same subject, and at the same instant?—But suppose you could feel all the distress that you desire; you would be not at all the better for it. There is no virtue or holiness in distress. And you would have no more natural ability, or higher obligations, to submit to God, than you have now. To be sure, it might be more likely, in that case, i. e. if your distress arose from proper considerations, that you would submit to God; for the motives in favour of submission would be more powerful. The motives from without would be aided and seconded by powerful motives from within. But you have motives enough now to lay you under entire obligation. You have motives enough now, if duly considered, and suffered to have their proper weight, to secure the concurrence of the will on the side of holiness. If you doubt this, then just look about you, and think over again the various and urgent motives of the gospel;—motives drawn from heaven, earth, and hell;—from the justice of God, and his mercy—his love, and his wrath: and tell me, if here are not motives enough to lead you, and bind you, to an immediate and unconditional submission. Now, it is incumbent on you to consider these motives—to weigh them—and yield to them. And if your reluctant heart shrinks back from a consideration of them, it is incumbent on you to call them up, and press them home upon it, again and again. And if you cannot *feel* as much as you desire, then *submit without feeling*. At any rate, submit to God, and put an

end to your protracted and wicked controversy with him. And if you cannot have, at present, a religion of strong feeling, have that which, in itself, is better—a religion of holy, settled principle,—a religion of voluntary devotedness to God, and of cheerful obedience to his known commands.

The submission of the heart to God is the immediate duty of every sinner; and when the submission is made, it should be the business of after life, to repair the wastes and the mischief which sin had occasioned, and restore harmony to the disordered soul. It should be the business of life, to enlighten and improve those understandings which had been darkened and perverted by abuse and neglect; to repress those appetites and passions which had become strong by indulgence; and to revive and cultivate those nobler sensibilities which had been stifled under the cruel dominion of sin. The feeling of moral obligations should be cultivated, till it becomes so strong, that it cannot be resisted and set at nought with impunity. Our feelings of sympathy should be cultivated, till we find it easy to rejoice with those who rejoice, and to weep with them that weep. The nobler feelings of the soul should all be cultivated, till every external motive to duty shall find a chord of sympathy within; and then the way of life will be a way of pleasantness, and all her paths will be peace.

At present, we cannot pursue this interesting subject farther; and with a few words relative to the author, whose classification of the mental powers has led us into the foregoing train of remark, we must conclude. Without affirming that we agree with Prof. Upham in every minute point of speculation, we have no hesitation in saying that his work is one of great value to the literary and religious community. It indicates throughout, not only deep and varied research, but profound and laborious *thought*, and is a full, lucid, and able discussion of an involved and embarrassing subject. The style, though generally diffuse, is always perspicuous, and often elegant; and the work, as a whole, will add much to the reputation of its author, and entitle him to rank among the ablest metaphysicians of our country.

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LITERARY

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. VI.—JUNE, 1835.

ART. I. AUTHENTICITY OF THE PENTATEUCH.

By Rev. C. E. STOWN, Professor of Bib. Lit., Lane Seminary, Cincinnati.

ALL manuscripts and printed editions of the Hebrew sacred books begin with the five usually ascribed to Moses. The old Hebrew name was חֻמְשֵׁי תּוֹרָה (i. e. *ch'mishshah chumshae thorah*), *the five-fifths of the law*; or abbreviated חֻמְשֵׁי חֻמְמָשִׁים (i. e. *ch'mishshah chummashim*), *the five-fifths*. Each book by itself was called חֻמְשָׁה (*chum-mash*), *a fifth*. To this the Greek appellation corresponds, namely πεντατεύχος (*pentateuchos*), *the fivefold volume*, from πέντε *five* and τέχος *an implement or volume*.*

The more common Hebrew name of the Pentateuch is הַתּוֹרָה (*hattorah*), *the law*; so called because the books contain the civil and ecclesiastical law of the Hebrew nation. The Hebrew name of the separate books was the first word or words in each. Thus the first book was called בְּרֵאשִׁית (*b'raeshith*), *in the beginning*, from its first word; the second, וְאֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹתָם (*v'aeleh sh'moth*), *and these the names*, from its first two words; and so of the rest.

The names in our English Bible are derived from the Greek translation called the Septuagint, and were chosen by the Greek translators or editors as significant of the subjects or contents of the several books. Thus the first was called GENESIS, because it gives an account of the origin or *genesis* of the world; the second was called Exodus, because it contains a history of the going out or *exode* of the Israelites from Egypt; and so of the rest.

In investigating the subject of the authenticity of these

* Rosenmueller's Prolegomena to Scholia on the Old Testament, Vol. i. p. 1, 2.
VOL. II.

books, I take it for granted, that my readers know and acknowledge the following facts :

1. That the books, composing what is now called the Old Testament, originated with the Hebrew nation, and were a part of their literature. This fact is as obvious and as well ascertained, as any historical fact can be.

2. That these books were written at successive and distant periods of time, and were generally known, at least to the literary part of the nation, from their first publication. A simple inspection of the books, particularly in the original language, will make this fact as plain in reference to them, as it is in regard to any series of English writers from the reign of Henry VIII. to the present time.

3. That the leading historical circumstances alluded to in these books, such as the removal from Egypt, the establishment in Canaan, the institution of monarchy, &c. are matters of fact. This is sustained by all historical testimony ; and, besides, it is a necessary consequence of the admission of the two preceding postulates.

One other preliminary remark is necessary to the subsequent argument.

The books of the Old Testament, particularly the first five, are alleged to be of higher antiquity than any other writings extant ; and from the nature of the case, the validity of this claim must be ascertained or impugned by an examination of the books themselves, and not from contemporary sources ; for, by the very statement, there are none. If a man were to affirm that he had spent twenty years entirely alone on a desolate island, you would judge what credit might be due to his story by a careful observation of his language and character, the consistency or inconsistency of his narrative, its agreement or disagreement with other facts known to you from other sources, and other circumstantial evidence of a similar kind ; and you would not require him to bring witnesses to testify directly to the fact asserted, that he had spent twenty years there entirely alone, because they had been with him all the time, and had seen him.

Some infidel writers demand evidence in regard to the Bible fully as inconsistent with the nature of the case as this would be ; and it is on such groundless assumptions that the chief strength of their reasoning depends. From the very nature of the case, the early books of the Old Testament must stand or fall principally by *internal evidence*, by evi-

dence drawn from the books themselves; and this, as I hope to show, is abundantly sufficient to place them above the reach of suspicion.

The question then recurs, who was the writer of the first five books of the Old Testament?

Universal tradition ascribes them to Moses, the great lawgiver of the Hebrew nation. This is the undivided and uncontradicted testimony of Jews and Christians, orthodox and heretics, orientals and occidentals, Persians and Arabians, Greeks and Romans. It was first seriously called in question by Thomas Hobbes, of England, about A. D. 1650, at least three thousand years after the first publication of the books.

We would observe, however, that in the second century after Christ, the small sect of the Nazarenes rejected these books, not on any critical grounds, not that they ever attempted to prove them spurious; but merely because they disliked some of the doctrines supposed to be contained in them. It was to their religious authority, rather than to their genuineness, that the Nazarenes objected.

We inquire, then, is there any thing in the books themselves, which contradicts, or throws suspicion over, this unanimous testimony of antiquity? What is the *circumstantial evidence* in this case?

The whole character and structure of the books, all the circumstantial evidence, ratifies and confirms the testimony of antiquity, that Moses was the writer.

1. These books were evidently written by a Hebrew. The national language and peculiarities, and especially the strong national feeling everywhere manifested in these books, make this too obvious to be denied; and indeed it is universally admitted.

2. They were evidently written by a Hebrew who was well acquainted with every thing relating to ancient Egypt and Arabia, with the climate, soil, and productions of these countries, with their civil history, with the customs, modes of dress, and domestic manners of the inhabitants; and who was also familiar with the religion and science of ancient Egypt. Even a slight perusal of the books will satisfy any one who is competent to judge, that this is the fact.

Now, with this statement compare the life of Moses as given in Exodus ii. iii. Moses was born in Egypt, and lived there forty years. He then went to Arabia, there married,

and lived forty years in that country. He, therefore, had the best possible opportunity to become acquainted with every thing relative to the natural and civil condition of those two countries.

But how could Moses become familiar with the religion and science of ancient Egypt? Egyptian science was jealously guarded by a hereditary priesthood, and kept a profound secret, even from native Egyptians of the lower orders, much more from slaves so oppressed and despised as the Hebrews were. The sacerdotal order was the highest rank of nobility in the nation; to it the king himself always belonged; and in order to learn any thing of the secrets of Egyptian wisdom, it was necessary to be on terms of personal familiarity with this proud and jealous class of nobles.* How could an enslaved Hebrew attain such an elevation? We know how this happened in regard to Moses. Exposed in early infancy, for the purpose of evading the cruel decree of a jealous tyrant, he fell into the hands of the daughter of the Egyptian king, and adopted as her son, he became *learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians*. Moses is the only Hebrew known, who ever possessed this advantage; and if no other Hebrew ever possessed this advantage, no other one could have written the Pentateuch.

3. The exact correspondence of narrative and institutions, shows that these books were written by the author of the institutions. The institutions are not given continuously, fully, and in statute form. They are interspersed with the narrative, and inserted just as the exigencies arose which demanded them. Often they are at first but slightly sketched, and when afterwards they were misunderstood, they are repeated in more definite language and with full explanations. For example of the repetition and revision of laws compare

Exod. xxi. 2—7 with Deut. xv. 12—17.

Num. iv. 24—33 with Num. vii. 1—9.

Num. iv. 3 with Num. viii. 24.

Lev. xvii. 3, 4 with Deut. xii. 5, 6—21.

Exod. xxii. 26 with Deut. xxiv. 6, 10—15.

Exod. xxii. 16, 17 with Deut. xxii. 29.

None but the lawgiver himself, who wrote from day to day, as his laws became necessary, and revised them when-

* Compare Herodotus, Book ii. c. 3, 100, 111, 164, 168; and Jahn's *Hebrew Commonwealth*, translated by C. E. Stowe, Andover, 1833, p. 24.

ever circumstances called for a revision, and recorded in the same book the exigencies that gave occasion to their enactment and revision, would have written in this manner.

4. The interrupted and broken manner in which the narratives and institutions are recorded, point to Moses as the author. Burdened with care, overwhelmed with business, beset with dangers at the same time from his own people and from their enemies, guiding a numerous nation debased by slavery through a trackless and barren wilderness, and preparing them for freedom and for intellectual and moral elevation, he could write only by snatches, and with a mind but ill at ease. No author by profession would ever write fiction or true history in a style like this: much less would a religious impostor clothe his composition in such a garb. All pretended revelations, from the Koran down to the Book of Mormon, are of a more continuous and uniform structure.

5. The difference between Deuteronomy and the other books corresponds with the fact that Moses was the writer. Deuteronomy, unlike the other books, is written in a continuous, oratorical, and parental style. The patriarch speaks in the tones of authority and rebuke, just as we should suppose Moses might talk in his old age, after his journeyings and his perils were over, the responsibilities of government committed to other hands, and he was at leisure to speak out his whole heart to a nation which had grown up from childhood under his more than paternal care, and which had been the object of his constant solicitude and most intense exertions for more than half a century.

6. The extreme brevity and simplicity of the early parts of the narrative, and its gradual accumulation till the time of Moses, when it at once assumes a settled historical form, corresponds with the fact that Moses was the author.

7. The agreement of the books with each other, and the unity of design and the mode of execution manifest through the whole, favours the supposition of the authorship of Moses.

In short, so far as the books themselves are concerned, all the circumstantial evidence is in favour of the concurrent testimony of antiquity, and there is nothing at all against it.

But there is also direct testimony that these books were written by Moses.

By this testimony, two points are to be proved, namely,

1. That the Hebrews, from the earliest times, have had books which were written by Moses ; and
2. That those were the same books which we now possess.

Before entering on the examination of this proof, the reader is requested to re-examine the three postulates before stated and conceded.

1. The first direct testimony on the two points above stated, is the declaration of the books themselves.

In Deut. xxxi. 9—13, 24—26, there is an express injunction that the whole Mosaic code should be read to all the people assembled at Jerusalem at the feast of tabernacles every seventh year. If Moses wrote this precept, then the Mosaic books were generally read every seven years to the assembled Hebrew nation, from the time of the death of Moses till the termination of their national existence ; for we know that the Hebrews generally were punctilious observers of the Mosaic laws, particularly of those which have reference to feasts and ceremonies. On this supposition, there is scarcely a possibility of deception or corruption.

If Moses did not write this precept, then there was a time subsequent to his death when it was first introduced. On this supposition, the introducer of it would have imposed upon himself the task of persuading all the adult citizens of his nation, that they had heard the law of Moses publicly read every seven years, when they had never heard any such thing ; or that they had been wilfully guilty in neglecting one of the most explicit statutes of their civil and ecclesiastical code. Would such deception have been possible ? Would not such a charge have excited to immediate investigation, and investigation have led to immediate detection ? Would any impostor needlessly interpose so insurmountable an obstacle to his own success ?

To illustrate the impossibility of such an imposition, take an analogous example. A century or two hence, some patriotic citizens of this country may think it would be very useful to have the United States' constitution publicly read to the assembled people in all the principal cities and towns of the union, once in every seven years. To effect so desirable a purpose, they pretend that this was a law passed when the constitution was first adopted, and not only passed but observed, and that thousands of people then living had

actually heard the constitution thus publicly read; or that the nation, for a long time, had lived in open violation of the fundamental law of the land. What success would be likely to attend a measure of this kind?

Is it objected that there were periods in the Hebrew history when the Mosaic law was neglected? I answer, never for so long a time, that there were not thousands of Hebrew citizens living, who could remember when it was strictly observed. Never so universally, that there were not hundreds who carefully perused the Mosaic law in private, and scrupulously conformed their lives to it. Even during the worst times of Israelitish idolatry, Jehovah declared that he had reserved to himself seven thousand who had not bowed to Baal (1 Kings xix. 18); and during the long period of the Babylonian captivity, the Mosaic books and the writings of the subsequent prophets, were to many pious Hebrews the chief solace of their afflictions (Dan. ix. 2, 13). Consequently, there has never been a time since the death of Moses, when this precept could have been introduced. And if this precept were introduced by Moses himself, then there has never been a time when his laws could have been essentially corrupted or changed; for since the Hebrews have lost their national independence, the law of Moses has been read by them in its original language, in every quarter of the globe, every seventh day instead of every seventh year. What possibility of practising such an imposition upon them has ever existed?

Not only have we direct testimony, that the precepts and laws were recorded by Moses (Exod. xxiv. 4, 7; xxxiv. 27); but the historical narratives also were committed to writing in the same book and by the same hand (Exod. xvii. 14, *בַּסֵּפֶר*, *bassapher*, *in the book*; Numb. xxxiii. 1, 2). The history, therefore, stands on the same ground with the statutes; and both always have been included, and are to the present day included, under the general name of *the law*, and *the book of the law*. The book of Deuteronomy is full of appeals to *this law*, and the book of *this law* (xvii. 18, 19); and in connexions where the reference is plainly to historical facts, and not to mere precepts (xxviii. 61, compared with vs. 59, 60; xxix. 19—27). Thus far we have direct testimony from the books themselves.

2. The second class of direct testimony is that of the

subsequent historical books. These continually refer to the books of Moses, as well known and familiar to the whole nation, from the time of the death of Moses to the termination of the Old Testament history. (See Josh. i. 7, 8; xxiii. 6. Compare Josh. xxiv. 26 with viii. 32, 34. See also 1 Kings ii. 3; 2 Kings xxii. 8; 2 Chron. xxxiv. 14.)

To prove that these references are made to the very same books of Moses which we now possess, nothing more is necessary than to make a careful comparison of the passages in the historical books with the passages alluded to in the Pentateuch. Thus, compare 2 Kings xiv. 6 with Deut. xxiv. 16. 2 Kings xxiii. 2—25 and 2 Chron. xxxv. 1—19 with Lev. xxvi. 3—45, and Deut. xxvii. 11—xxviii. 68. In this instance, the different precepts mentioned in the historical books as particularly observed by king Josiah, are scattered through various parts of the Mosaic books, and very extensively cover the ground in question.

Again, compare Ezra iii. 2—6 with Lev. vi. vii. Ezra vi. 18 with Num. iii. 6—45; viii. 11, 14. Compare Neh. i. 7—9 with Lev. xxvi. 41; and Deut. iv. 26, 27; xxviii. 64; xxx. 3—5.

Thus every allusion in the historical books has its corresponding passage in the Mosaic books; and there is no discrepancy in this unbroken series of incidental and unsuspected testimony, continued through a period of more than a thousand years. The books of Moses were completed about the year 1451 B. C., and Nehemiah, the last historical book of the Old Testament, was not written till about the year 430 B. C. It is important to notice, also, that the series commences with Joshua, immediately after the death of Moses.

3. The series of prophetic books afford testimony, both as to the existence and identity of the five books of Moses, equally strong with that deduced from the historical books. To set this matter in a clear light, let us take a few of the earlier prophets, in the order of time, and compare their allusions to the Mosaic law with the Pentateuch as we now have it.

Joel lived about 650 years after Moses.

Compare Joel i. 9, 13 with Lev. ii. vi. 14; Num. xv. 4, 5, 7; xxviii. 7, 14; Deut. xii. 6, 7; xvi. 10, 11.

Amos lived about 660 years after Moses.

Compare Amos ii. 9 with Num. xxi. 21, 24; iv. 4 with Num. xxviii. 3, 4; iv. 10 with Exod. vii—xi; iv. 11 with Gen. xix. 24, 25; ix. 13 with Lev. xxvi. 5.

Hosea about 670 years after Moses.

Compare Hosea ix. 10 with Num. xxv. 3; xi. 8 with Gen. xix. 24, 25; xii. 4, 5 with Gen. xxxii. 24, 25; xii. 12 with Gen. xxviii. 5; xxix. 20.

Isaiah about 690 years after Moses.

Compare Isaiah i. 9—14 with Gen. xix. 4, and with various precepts; xii. 2 with Exod. xv. 2; li. 2 with Gen. xii. 2. xvii. 2; liv. 9 with Gen. viii. 21, 22.

Micah about 700 years after Moses.

Compare Micah vi. 5 with Num. xxii—xxv; vi. 6 with Lev. ix. 2, 3; vi. 15 with Lev. xxvi. 16; Deut. xxviii. 33.

We might go on with the same process of proof through the remainder of the prophets, and the whole series of the New Testament. Indeed, so constant is the reference and so exact the coincidence, that if the Mosaic books were to be entirely destroyed, the sense of them might be gathered, to a great extent, from the subsequent parts of the Bible. Yet so great is the diversity of style and manner in these subsequent books, as to prove conclusively, that they must have been written by a succession of different men, in distant ages, of different habits, and in circumstances altogether diverse.

Thus in favour of the authenticity of the Mosaic books, we have the unanimous testimony of antiquity, with nothing in the books themselves to discredit it, and every thing to confirm it.

We have the direct testimony of the books themselves, confirmed by the whole series of national writers through a period (including the New Testament) of about fifteen hundred years.

We have observed, also, the impossibility of imposition, interwoven as these books always have been with the civil history, the political institutions, the literature, and the religion of a proud and once powerful nation; who alone have survived the wreck of ages, and still exist, a living miracle in attestation of the truth of a religion which they despise and hate, suffering the full weight of the penalty denounced in their own sacred books against their own obstinate unbelief, and carefully preserving, as their pride and their treasure, the

volume which pronounces the awful sentence of their own condemnation. (See Deut. xxviii. 15—68.)

Pagan testimony, so far as there is any, confirms the authenticity of the Mosaic books. We have all the evidence which the nature of the case admits, and tenfold more than that which satisfies us in regard to the writings of Homer or Herodotus; and even more than we have for the genuineness of the most distinguished writings in our own language, such as the works of Shakspeare and Milton.

The hypotheses of those who reject the authorship of Moses, are all conjectural, and very little is attempted towards establishing them, in the way of argument. The whole force of argument is expended in endeavouring to disprove the authorship of Moses; and then liberty is freely taken to substitute any wild fancy, that may happen to strike, in place of the common opinion. The arguments will be considered in the next section; here I shall merely give a statement of the several hypotheses, in their chronological order, according to the digest of professor Rossenmueller, in the *Prolegomena* to his *Scholia* on the Old Testament (Vol. i. p. 17—29, third edition, Leipsic, 1821).

1. 1650, Thomas Hobbes, the celebrated English metaphysician and deist, in his work entitled '*Leviathan*,' hazarded the conjecture, that the first five books of the Bible were called the books of Moses, not because he wrote them, but because they relate to transactions in which he was the principal mover. He concedes, however, that Moses might have written those particular passages which are said in the books themselves to have been written by him (for example, Exod. xvii. 8—14; Num. xxxiii. and the like;) and also the Hebrew code of laws in Deuteronomy x—xxvii.

2. 1655, Isaac Peyrere, a Frenchman, and a leading writer of the sect of Præadamites, who was willing to discredit the authority of the Mosaic books, so far as they stood in the way of his favourite theory of the existence of men on earth anterior to Adam, conjectured that Moses kept a journal of the more important transactions in which he was engaged, to which he prefixed a chronicle of Jewish affairs from Adam to his own times; but that these books, with the exception of a few fragments, have long since perished. This work, he supposes, was the source whence the *Book of Jehovah's wars* (Num. xxi. 14) was derived, and

from this last work the book of Numbers was afterwards compiled.

3. 1670, Benedict Spinoza, the famous Jewish pantheist, a man of great metaphysical talent and a wayward mind, expressed the opinion (in *Tract. theol. polit. c. viii. ix.*) that all the historical books of the Old Testament, of which the earliest is Deuteronomy, were written by one author, whom he supposes to be Ezra. As there is so little of connexion between the several books, and such diversities of style and manner in them, he thinks that Ezra must have been abruptly called off from his work by some untoward accident, perhaps sudden death, and have left it in a very unfinished state.

4. 1678, Richard Simon, a learned French catholic, conjectures (*Critical History of Old Testament, B. I. c. ii. in French.*) that the Pentateuch was thrown together after the death of Moses, from the notes of the public scribes appointed by him, according to the Egyptian custom, to record the public transactions from day to day.

5. 1685, John LeClerc, an active and learned theologian of Holland, advanced the opinion, that the Pentateuch was composed by the Hebrew priest, who was sent by the king of Babylon to instruct the Samaritans in the Hebrew religion (2 Kings xvii. 27, 28). He afterwards acknowledged the futility of this hypothesis and rejected it (*Dissertation ii. concerning the writer of the Pentateuch*).

6. 1785, John Godfrey Hasse, a German writer, conjectured that the Pentateuch was composed at the time of the Babylonian captivity, such fragments of the Mosaic writings as then existed being incorporated with it. He also afterwards retracted and refuted his own theory.

7. Frederic Charles Fulda, another German writer, is of opinion that some things contained in the Pentateuch, such as the decalogue, the song after the passage of the Red sea, &c. were written by Moses; but that the body of the work was not composed before the time of David.

8. John Christian Nachtigall supposes that a few genealogical tables, some national songs and traditionary narratives, together with a few statutes engraven on stone and brazen tables, might have been preserved from very early times. From these ancient monuments, stories and ballads were written by the students in the prophetic schools instituted by Samuel. Out of all these materials, the joint la-

bours of several learned men, perhaps under the superintendence of Jeremiah, produced the Pentateuch at the time of the Babylonian captivity. None of the genuine writings of Moses are preserved, except the decalogue inscribed on tables of stone, the enumeration of the journeyings of the Israelites through the Arabian desert (Num. xxxiii), and a few short songs.

9. John Severin Vater, in his commentary on the Pentateuch (in German), attempts to show that a part of Deuteronomy and some portion of the other books might have been written as early as the times of David and Solomon; but that the work could not have been completed in its present form till after the Babylonian captivity.

10. Leonard Bertholdt supposes that the Pentateuch was put into its present form by Samuel, and deposited in the ark of the covenant; and that a copy of this work, written on Egyptian linen by the hand of Samuel, was the *book of the law* found by Hilkiah in the temple (2 Kings xxii. 8).

11. William M. L. de Wette. During the reign of Josiah, a volume of the law was found in the temple (2 Kings xxii.) which was only the book of Deuteronomy; and this is an epitome, by a later hand, of the more ancient books. The other four books were composed at different times, between the reign of David and that of Joram, principally near the time of the Babylonian captivity.

12. Charles Francis Volney, a lively and versatile French traveller, in his 'Researches on Ancient History' (Part i. c. vi—ix. in French), supposes that the Pentateuch contains some things written by Moses; but that the books which we now have are the result of the joint labours of Hilkiah the priest, Jeremiah the prophet, Shaphan the scribe, and Achbor, with the aid of king Josiah; and that they were written for the purpose of encouraging the Hebrews in their dangerous collisions with Egypt, Babylon, and the Scythians (see 1 Kings xxii).

The hypothesis of Professor Gesenius, which agrees in the main with that of de Wette, is examined and completely refuted by Professor Stuart, in the *North American Review*, for April, 1826, and republished in the *Biblical Repository*, for October, 1832.

Such are the most plausible hypotheses of the most able men, who have rejected the authorship of Moses; and what have they to stand upon? Compare this mass of fog and

contradiction with the undivided testimony of antiquity, that Moses was the writer of the Pentateuch, and the exact coincidence of this testimony with all the facts in the case, as exhibited in the preceding chapter, and the overwhelming amount of evidence from other sources; and then say how it is, if you can, that men, and learned men too, can reject that which has all evidence in its favour, and believe that which has no evidence at all to support it? A man who is seriously inquiring after truth, can never fall into follies like these; and as to the man who does not in simplicity love the truth, who investigates for the purpose of finding something to establish a favourite theory, or studies for the pleasure of forming ingenious conjectures, of such it is generally true that *much learning makes them mad*, and the more learning they have, the more mad they become.

But what are the objections against the authorship of Moses, which have led men to adopt such a variety of conjectures, to escape from the admission of this simple fact? This is our next topic.

FIRST OBJECTION.—The books contain some passages of which Moses was not the writer.

This is true. Who ever wrote a historical work extending through a period of twenty-five hundred years, without making some quotations from preceding writings? And does the existence of such quotations, accurately and literally made, diminish the value of the history, or increase it?

In Num. xxiii. xxiv. there are some highly finished and magnificent passages of poetry ascribed to Balaam. If the book be worthy of credit, these are not the compositions of Moses, but of Balaam; for Moses does not profess to write fiction, but true history. Num. xxi. vs. 14, 15, there is a quotation from an ancient writing called the *book of Jehovah's wars*; vs. 17, 18, a quotation from a joyous song of the Israelites, with which they celebrated the unexpected discovery of a well in the Arabian desert; and vs. 27—30, an extract from an ancient war-song of the Amorites on occasion of their victory over Moab. We suppose all these passages to be what they profess to be, namely, quotations, and not compositions by Moses; for if Moses did write them, they must be fictitious, and not true, as they profess to be.

Again, Gen. xlix. we have the dying address of Jacob to his sons, apparently word for word as he uttered it; and Gen. xxvii. the blessing of Isaac on his two sons. So,

several of the first chapters of Genesis, if we may judge from their style and structure, and the several distinct titles by which the different narratives are introduced, are not original compositions by Moses, but selections made by him, under divine direction, from very ancient documents, in his possession, by different writers at different periods. Perhaps the same may be said of Gen. xxxvi. which gives an account of the posterity of Esau; and of Gen xxxviii. which relates the crimes and follies of Judah and his sons.

For proof of the compilation of the early parts of Genesis from several different and very ancient documents, I refer my readers to a single fact, which is very obvious in the English translation, and still more so in the Hebrew original; I mean the different names of the Supreme Being, which occur in the different documents. In Gen. i—ii. 3 (which is one piece of composition, the second chapter really beginning with what is put as the fourth verse, as the title, *these are the generations*, shows) the name of the Supreme Being is uniformly God, אֱלֹהִים (*a'lohim*). In the second document, including ii. 4—iii. the name of the Supreme Being is uniformly JEHOVAH God, יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים (*y'hovah a'lohim*); in the third document, including chapter iv. it is JEHOVAH only; in chapter v. God only, except in v. 29, where a quotation is made, and the name JEHOVAH used; in vi—ix. God and JEHOVAH are used promiscuously, except once (ix. 26), where a quotation is made and the name JEHOVAH God is used; in xii. xiii. JEHOVAH only; in xiv. in connexion with Melchizedeck there is a name of the Supreme Being altogether peculiar, that is, God Most High, אֵל עֶלְיוֹן (*ael elyon*), except v. 22, where Abraham prefixes to this appellation the name JEHOVAH. It is inconceivable that all this should be the result of mere accident. The changes of the name correspond exactly to the changes in the narrative and the titles of the several pieces; and each document uniformly preserves the same name, except when a quotation is made, and then, as the fidelity of history requires, the name used by the person introduced as speaking, is inserted. It is perhaps impossible to decide definitely respecting the amount of quotation of this kind, but in the first fifteen chapters of Genesis it seems to be very considerable.

Now do all these accurate quotations impair the credit of the Mosaic books, or increase it? Is Marshall's Life of Washington to be regarded as unworthy of credit, because

it contains copious extracts from Washington's correspondence, and literal quotations from important public documents? Is not its value greatly enhanced by this circumstance? Is not the clear, direct style of Judge Marshall as obvious throughout the work, as it would have been if it had not contained a single quotation? The objection is altogether futile. In the common editions of the Bible the Pentateuch occupies about one hundred and fifty pages, of which perhaps ten may be taken up with quotations. This surely is no very large proportion for a historical work extending through so long a period.

SECOND OBJECTION.—The books contain some passages which could not have been written till after the death of Moses.

This also is true. Deut. xxxiv. relates the death and burial of Moses, in the style of plain, sober history, and not in that of prophecy. Again, Gen. xxxvi. 31—39, there is a continuation of the catalogue of Edomitish chiefs, supplementary to the original catalogue left by Moses.

But the strength of this objection, by those who offer it, is made to rest principally on the change of obsolete for well known names of places. For example, Gen. xiv. 14, it is said that Abraham pursued the eastern chieftains to Dan; but in Joshua xix. 47 and Judges xviii. 29, we find that this city was then called Leshem or Laish, and that it was not called Dan till some centuries after the death of Abraham, when it was taken by the Israelitish tribe of that name, and made their chief city. So in Gen. xiii. 18, Hebron is mentioned; but we find by Joshua xiv. 15 and xv. 13, that the original name of the city was Kirjath-Arba, and that it did not receive the name of Hebron till several centuries after the time of Abraham. So in regard to Bethel, Gen. xiii. 3, originally called Luz, Gen. xxviii. 19.

There are some other passages of the same kind, but those enumerated are sufficient to set forth the objection in all its force. The facts are admitted, the inference denied.

It is a necessary part of the economy of revelation, that subsequent sacred writers should be authorized to give such additional notices and make such verbal changes in the preceding books, as might be necessary to render them intelligible to succeeding generations. Examine the passages objected to. It is important as matter of history, to know something of the death and burial of Moses, and these facts

are inserted in their proper place. The sacred writers regarded their writings as public property, and were not at all concerned to claim individual credit for every word they wrote. In modern books, these necessary additional notices are put in by way of note or appendix ; but the ancients knew nothing of these arts of modern authorship, and whatever was necessary for them to write, must be written in the text. Interpolation is something added aside from the author's purpose ; and is a very different thing from a note in explanation or illustration of a writer, added by an authorized hand, in exact and ascertained coincidence with the author's design.

Examine next the change of names. Observe, the Hebrew name is substituted for the Pagan—the sacred for the profane. Where a place was generally known by both names, both are inserted : see Gen. xiv. 2, 7, 8 ; Deut. iii. 9 ; iv. 48, and numerous other passages. Where the pagan or ancient name had become entirely obsolete, in the process of transcription the obsolete name was either entirely omitted or mentioned only once or twice, for the purpose of explanation, as in the cases of Laish, Kirjath-Arba, and Luz, above referred to. Now is not this just as it should be, if it were intended that the Bible should be intelligible ? The thing wanted is, to direct the mind of the reader to the right place ; and how is this to be done, but by calling the place by the name by which it is known to the reader ? Take the example of the principal commercial city of the West. It was once called Losantiville. But in order to tell the truth about any transaction that occurred here at that time, must we say that it took place in Losantiville, and as we avoid a falsehood, avoid saying that it took place in Cincinnati ? And if, at some future time, it should be very generally unknown that this city ever bore the first name, and it should become necessary to republish a work relating to the city, originally written when it bore that name, would it not be necessary to add the name Cincinnati to that of Losantiville, if we would have the readers understand what place is meant ? Take another example. The chief city of New-England was once called Shawmut, then Trimountain, finally Boston. Now, in order to tell the truth, must we say, that Mr. Blackstone came to Shawmut, and Mr. Cotton came to Trimountain, and Sir Harry Vane came to Boston ? Or, in order to be understood, must we not say, that all these men came to

Boston? And in republishing an ancient work, must not the obsolete name be explained by the well known name? This is all that is done in the Bible; only the name is explained in the text, instead of a marginal note—a refinement in the art of book-making then entirely unknown.

The Bible regards only important, essential truths, and has no concern for the unimportant trifles which pertain merely to the etiquette of authorship.

Something also has been attempted in the way of objection from the expression, *the Canaanite was then in the land* (Gen. xii. 6; xiii. 7, and other places); as though this expression implied, that at the time when these books were written, the Canaanites must have been already expelled. Nothing can be more empty and foolish than this objection. The Canaanites originally dwelt on the coasts of the Persian gulf (Eichhorn's Introduction, vol. iii. p. 169), and had no inheritance in the land of Canaan, which God had given to Abraham, but into which they had emigrated, or (to use a phrase well understood in our new settlements) in which they were *squatters*. It is the intention of the sacred writer simply to show, that when Abraham went to take possession of the land which God had given him, the Canaanite was already there before him.

The proper meaning of the Hebrew word *אז* (*aaz*), (in these passages translated *then*), is *at that time*. (See Gesenius's Hebrew Lexicon, Leipsic, 1833, on the word).

The objection derived from what is said of the name JEHOVAH (Exod. vi. 2—7) is equally groundless. It is the meaning of the word—the *self-existent, the unchangeable*—that is here brought to view (compare Exod. iii. 14). In his dealings with the patriarchs, God had shown himself to be the ALMIGHTY; in his dealings with their descendants he would show himself to be THE SELF-EXISTENT AND UNCHANGEABLE.

The same objection is insisted upon by reference to such passages as Deut. iv. 46, 47, 49. It is said, that these passages should be translated *beyond Jordan*, or *on the other side of Jordan*, and not *on this side Jordan*, as in our translation; and that, as these passages refer to places east of Jordan, and as Moses must have written on the east side of the river, and not on the west, these passages could not have been written by him.

Admitting the statement to be true, the same answer that is given in respect to the change of names, is applicable also here. But the objection is groundless in point of fact. The Hebrew word עֵבֶר (*aeber*), which the objection assumes to be restricted to the meaning *beyond* or *on the other side*, has, by the custom of Hebrew speech, a more extensive and indefinite application; and which side of the river is intended, is designated by adding to the word עֵבֶר, the word מִזְרָחָה (*mizrachah*) *eastward*, or מַעֲרָבָה (*maarabah*) *westward*. For proof of this, examine Josh. v. 1; ix. 1; xii. 7; 1 Chron. xxvi. 3, where the same word עֵבֶר is used in reference to the western side of Jordan; so that if the use of this word in Deuteronomy proves that the Pentateuch was written after the Israelites dwelt on the western side of Jordan, the use of the same word in the other passages quoted, must prove that the books of Joshua and Chronicles were written while they dwelt on the east side of Jordan, which is contrary to well known and universally acknowledged fact.

The same principles apply to all other objections of this class, and it is unnecessary to specify particulars any further.

Before we leave this objection, it will be interesting to consider one fact in reference to the Pentateuch, which, to a mind accustomed to investigations of this sort, affords indubitable evidence of its authenticity. It is this, that the narrative throughout keeps pace exactly with the natural progress of society, and in the minutest circumstances accurately corresponds to the manners appropriate to each period and place. This is one of the most difficult achievements in works of fiction; and the most laboured and ingenious attempts at literary forgery have been detected by slight inaccuracies of this kind, of which the frauds of Chatterton and Ireland are memorable examples. Much more difficult, and indeed utterly impossible, would it have been to preserve this congruity in a fictitious work running through so long a period, and embracing such a variety of manners, as come within the scope of the Pentateuch; especially at that early age, before writing had begun to be an art, and when there were no authors whose ingenuity was sharpened by the necessity of earning their bread by

the labours of the pen. All ancient attempts at forgery are, in this respect, awkward and incongruous in the extreme, and open to immediate detection.

Examine a few passages of Genesis in reference to this point. Abraham comes from the east, a rich and powerful man, but a simple herdsman. When guests arrive, he runs himself to the herd and selects a calf for their repast, while his wife prepares their bread; and he sets milk before them instead of wine, although the grape had then long been cultivated (Gen. xviii. compare xiv. 18). Isaac, made rich by the inheritance of his father, and luxurious by intercourse with the Phœnician merchants, drinks wine and has a taste for venison prepared with careful cookery (Gen. xxvii). Jacob, instead of advancing in refinement and luxury, driven from his father's house and seeking a shelter among the eastern nomadic relatives of his mother, was brought back to the pastoral simplicity of his grandfather Abraham. *He was a plain man, dwelling in tents* (Gen. xxv. 27). Esau, on the contrary, who remained in Canaan on the grounds of his father, meets his pastoral brother with the retinue of a prince (Gen. xxxiii). Trace also the gradual rise and increase of commercial intercourse (Gen. xxxvii. 25; xli. 57; xlii. 27). In Abraham's time there were no such facilities for trade; and when a famine arose in Canaan, he was obliged to take his family into Egypt to find sustenance for them (Gen. xii. 10). Observe again the primitive simplicity of the regal office, and the gradual developement of a formal and luxurious court in Egypt (Gen. xiv; xii. 14, 15; xliii. 32; xlvii. 7; xl. 1. Compare xxi. 22; xxvi. 26). In Mesopotamia, we find Jacob receiving compensation, not in silver and gold, but in flocks and herds and servants (Gen. xxx. xxxi); but in Canaan, in the neighbourhood of the Phœnician merchants, we see money told by weight even in Abraham's time (Gen. xxiii. 16); and in the time of Jacob, coin is in circulation (Gen. xxxiii. 19). So in the first part of Genesis we hear nothing of horses and carriages; and they are first mentioned when Joseph sends for his father to come to Egypt (Gen. xlv. 19—27; xlvii. 17). This corresponds to the historical fact, that the Egyptians were the first people who trained horses for domestic use (compare 1 Kings x. 28, 29). Thus in all the little circumstances, by which literary forgeries are

always detected, we find the Pentateuch minutely accurate, and giving the most unequivocal proof of authenticity.*

THIRD OBJECTION.—The language and style of the Pentateuch too nearly resemble that of the later writers, to admit the supposition that it was written in the age of Moses.

This allegation is denied entirely. There is a striking difference in language and style, both generally and in the use of single words. The differences of orthography are very great, and of the same kind with those we observe in English books written at different periods. There are also in the Pentateuch many words, which are obsolete in the subsequent books, either not used at all, or used in an entirely different sense. Professor Jahn of Vienna has enumerated more than two hundred words of this kind, exclusive of those which occur but once, and of those which there might be no occasion to use in the subsequent books. For example, in the Pentateuch we have the words נַעַר (*naar*) and חוּא (*hua*), instead of נַעֲרָה (*na'rah*) and חוּיָא (*hia*), *damsel* and *she*; the third person plural feminine of verbs is written without final ה in the Pentateuch, but with it in all the other books, as תִּהְיֶינָה (*tihyena*) for תִּהְיֶינָה (*tihyena*), תִּבְנֶינָה (*tabona*) for תִּבְנֶינָה (*tabonah*), and many other instances of the same kind. The month called אָבִיב (*aabib*) in the Pentateuch, is called נִסָּן (*nisan*) in the later books. So the word דָּגָה (*dagah*) in the sense *to multiply*, זָבַד (*zabad*) in the sense *to give*, זָכֹר (*zakur*) meaning *male*, &c. There is the same difference in the use of whole phrases. For example, in the Pentateuch; *to die* is *to be gathered to one's people* (Gen xlix. 29, 33), in the other books, it is *to be gathered to one's fathers* (Judges ii. 10; 2 Chron. xxiv. 28), or *to be gathered to one's sepulchres* (2 Kings xxii. 20).

It is also worthy of notice, in reference to this objection, that all the foreign words which occur in the Pentateuch, are Egyptian, while the foreign words of the other books are Aramean. Now, the Arabians spoke essentially the same language as the Hebrews, and allowing these books

* See Eichhorn's Introduction to the Old Testament, vol. iii. p. 151—155, in German.

to have been written by Moses, the Egyptian was the only foreign language from which words could have been borrowed; but on the supposition that the Pentateuch was written after the Hebrews were settled in Canaan, the foreign words must have been borrowed mostly from their Syrian neighbours, as is the fact in reference to all the books written after that period. For examples of Egyptian words in the Pentateuch, see אֲבְרָהָם (*abraek*, Gen. xli. 43) rendered in the English translation, *bow the knee*, אָחֻז (*aachu*, Gen. xli. 2.) translated *meadow*, שֹׁשַׁן (*shaesh*, Exod. xxvi. 1), translated *fine linen*, יָאוֹר (*y'or*, Exod. i. 22), translated *the river*; and several other words of the same kind.*

Again, most of the changes which take place in the orthography of a language, occur in the vowels rather than in the consonants, and as the Hebrew Bible was originally written mostly without vowels—these being added by the Massorites after the Hebrew had ceased to be a spoken language—there must of course be much fewer archaisms than occur in books where the vowels are all written. So the Koran, being originally written without vowels, is as well understood now as it was in the time of Mohammed; but if the text were to be read with the pronunciation of the Mohammedan period, probably many words would appear obsolete. The same is true, to a great extent, of the sacred books of the Syrian church.

Again, changes in language are produced by change of circumstances, advancement in the arts and sciences, intercourse with foreigners, multiplicity of writers, &c. Now as the Hebrews were a simple, secluded, agricultural people, avoiding intercourse with foreigners, and religiously attached to every thing inherited from their ancestors, there was very little opportunity for change of language, till the time of the Babylonian captivity, when it underwent a very great change.

Finally, literal archaisms were gradually smoothed away in the process of transcription; as the orthography of our English Bibles has been several times changed, since its first publication under king James, in order to make it con-

* Compare Rosenmueller's Scholia on the Old Testament, vol. i. p. 30—32; and Jahn's Introduction to the Old Testament, translated by professor Turner, p. 177, 179.

formable to the different modes of orthography, which have prevailed at different periods since that time. This is very evident to any one who examines the vowel points of the Hebrew text in reference to the consonants with which they are placed.

FOURTH OBJECTION.—The inequalities of style and fragmentary structure of the whole work, show that it could not have been the composition of one man in one period, but of several men at different periods.

In reply to this objection, we say—

1. It has already been shown, that though Moses was the writer of these books, he has inserted in his work, literal and somewhat copious extracts from documents still more ancient ; so that there are in fact, in this work of Moses, fragments of the writings of several men, at different periods.

2. It has been shown, that the circumstances under which Moses wrote, necessarily led to those inequalities of style, and the fragmentary structure stated in the objection ; and that if the fact on which the objection is founded, did not exist, it would be a very strong presumptive argument against the authorship of Moses. (See p. 42).

3. The contents of the books are various, and therefore, the style and structure ought to vary to suit the constant variety of subject. In the books of Moses, we have plain narrative, sprightly dialogue, impassioned eloquence, the lyric ode, the didactic poem, legal enactments, and every variety of composition known to the ancients ; and written, too, under every variety of circumstance, from the vigour of manhood, and the pressure of care and numerous engagements, to extreme old age and comparative ease. What man, in his senses, would expect Moses to write all his compositions in the same style ? All multifarious writers, who write with skill, are unequal in their style. Examine the different compositions of Edmund Burke or Sir Walter Scott, and you will find as great inequalities of style as you can find in the books of Moses. A forgery would be altogether likely to preserve a greater uniformity ; for, as has been already remarked, all forged revelations, from the Koran downward, are of a structure comparatively even and uniform.

4. The general unity of design manifest in the books of Moses has already been alluded to.

Taking a summary view of the argument, we have in favour of the authenticity of the five books of Moses,

1. The unanimous and uncontradicted testimony of antiquity :

2. With this all the internal evidence exactly corresponds, as has been exemplified in a variety of particulars :

3. The declarations of the books themselves could have been made by none but Moses :

4. The whole series of Hebrew literature rests on these books, and demonstrates that they emanated from Moses :

5. The contrary hypotheses are self-contradictory, and entirely without foundation :

6. All the objections to the authenticity of these books are susceptible of an easy and satisfactory answer.

In conclusion, I request the reader seriously to ponder the following plain questions :

First ; why is it that men demand evidence in regard to the Bible, which they never think of demanding in reference to any thing else ; and which, in relation to all other subjects, they would pronounce at once to be unreasonable ?

Second ; why do they allow weight to objections in reference to the Bible, to which they would allow no weight whatever in reference to any thing else ; and which, in relation to all other subjects, they would pronounce at once to be absurd ?

This is a practical matter of the deepest interest, and every man must decide and act on his own responsibility.

ART. II. CORRESPONDENCE OF DR. WOODS AND REV.
MR. PLUMMER.

[The following letters, written at the dates annexed, are published here with the mutual consent of the writers, in the hope that they may contribute to promote the confidence and fellowship of Christians residing in distant sections of our country. EDITOR.]

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, ANDOVER, Aug. 28, 1833.

To the REV. WILLIAM S. PLUMMER,

REV. AND DEAR SIR,

I THANK you for your letter of July 1, in which you propose a correspondence with me on subjects of such a nature. I rejoice that God has given you a heart to cherish such meditations. The views you express are like music to my feelings. May the spirit of love prevail through our whole community! If we were careful to keep near to Christ, we should have more of this spirit, and should be enabled to do more towards diffusing it among others.

The general topic which you introduce as the subject of our correspondence, that is, *the importance of mutual love among ministers and Christians, and the means of promoting it*, has occupied my thoughts frequently for several years past. I have become fully persuaded that if the friends of Christ in the different parts of our country may, through divine grace, be brought suitably to love one another, and to unite their efforts to do good; the greatest hinderance to the spread of the gospel and the prosperity of the church will be entirely removed, and the way prepared for the accomplishment of those great objects for which we pray. Whatever unfavourable impressions I may have once had towards ministers of Christ living at the south, they have all been removed since I have been more conversant with individuals from that part of our country, and particularly since I became acquainted with that excellent man, the late Dr. John H. Rice of Virginia. The name of that brother is and ever will be dear to my heart. He was raised up to befriend the cause of *truth* and the cause of *love*. And though he was called to his final home in the midst of life, he lived long enough to do much towards accomplishing the object to which he was so sincerely devoted, and to make a deep impression in favour of it on the minds of

many who survive him. The cause for which he laboured was the cause of God. And when we think how much the heart of our blessed Saviour was set upon the prevalence of cordial affection among his followers, and how earnestly he prayed that they *all* might be one, as he and his Father are one; it may well grieve us to see any remainder of alienation and strife. Oh! may that blessed Spirit, which descended upon Jesus in the likeness of a *dove*, come and teach our hearts, and fill us with pure and holy affection!

For myself, dear brother, I see nothing which should prevent a hearty union and co-operation of all the friends of Christ in the United States. Even on theological subjects, what is wanting but a fair opportunity for men of different habits of thinking and speaking to explain their views and their language to each other, together with Christian candour and humility, and fervent prayer to God for the teaching of his Spirit? If the right course is pursued, controversy itself, so far as it may be necessary, will be conducted in a dispassionate manner, and with courtesy, forbearance, and meekness.

It seems to me that one of the best means of banishing prejudice and promoting mutual affection and confidence, is a free and frequent intercourse among ministers and Christians who live in different and distant parts of the country. The anniversaries of our benevolent institutions, as they are now held in our cities and villages, as well as the associations of ministers, and the meetings of ecclesiastical bodies must have a very salutary influence in this respect.

But my want of time and my various duties will permit me only to give out a few hints. I must cast the burden of the correspondence on you. I hope, my brother, you will open your mind with perfect freedom, and will write many sheets to my one. In this respect I shall feel happy in being deeply in debt to you. I am desirous of knowing all your views on the whole length and breadth of the subject which you have suggested, particularly, *the causes of the prejudice which has occasionally shown itself between different parts of our religious community, and the best means of promoting a right spirit, that is, the spirit of love and kindness, first in ourselves, and then among brethren in different parts and of different names.* The subject, though a difficult and delicate one, I know is congenial to your feelings.

As soon as your other duties will permit, I hope you will write me without reserve, and be sure not to limit yourself to my short measure.

I am, dear brother,

Yours with great esteem and love,
LEONARD WOODS.

PITTSBURG, Va. Sept. 3, 1833.

To the Rev. Dr. Woods,
REV. AND VERY DEAR SIR,

Your affectionate and very interesting letter of the 28th August was received a few days since. Its expressions of regard for me personally are more than reciprocated by my heart. Without delay, I shall, agreeably to your request, endeavour somewhat fully to discuss the matters referred to, beginning with some of the repelling influences between the North and the South.

Our very *geographical relations* to each other have been made, and are still made, an occasion of disunion. It is thought by many, a matter of great importance on which side of the Potomac they reside; and they allow themselves to look on the Potomac, as a place where two seas meet, or rather "where gravitation turns the other way." You doubtless remember the beautiful lines by Addison, in his letter from Italy, in which he describes this *geographical hatred* (which is by no means one of the weakest of the excitements to action). And Washington in his last address, says: "In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by *geographical discriminations—northern and southern—Atlantic and western*,—whence designing men may endeavour to excite a belief, that there is a real difference of local interests and views."

There is, and is known to be, a great difference between Northern and Southern *climate*, and whether right or wrong, people in each section of the country have the impression, that the character of those in the other section, partakes particularly of the effects of their climate.—The man of the South supposes, that the sharp north and north-west winds of the North, freeze up the soul, and chill generosity; whereas, were he to examine, he would

find, that the climate in the North has no other necessary effect than to produce steady habits, wise forethought, and sobriety of temper and conduct. On the other hand, the man of the North supposes, that he of the South, living under a burning sun, has a fervid imagination, an impetuous, fiery spirit, and is of necessity destitute of sobriety and prudence; when, in truth, no such effect generally takes place. I have never seen a more excitable people than in Boston and Providence, and I have never known more cool calculation than I have seen in many resident in the South. The effect of climate on character has been often celebrated by poets, but will not be much thought of by the philosopher.

It is often said, that there is a vast difference between Northern and Southern manners,—such a difference as constitutes us two sorts of people. The South boasts of her hospitality, and the North says, “You can afford it.” The North speaks in praise of her frugality and economy; and the South says, “They are obliged to practise these virtues, or starve.” If it were necessary, I might mention other things touching the article of manners. But what is the fact? Simply, that poor, virtuous, honest people, who mean to pay their just debts and keep from want, are willing, as well as obliged, to practise strict economy, in the South as well as in the North; and that the pious, independent population of the North, as well as in the South, are ready to extend needed kindness to the stranger; and when satisfied of one’s real worth, will welcome him to all their social enjoyments.

Perhaps nothing has had so powerful an influence in separating those who ought to have been chief friends (I mean the North and the South), as the miserable specimens of character sometimes furnished by each to the other, and which are unjustly supposed to stand for the whole. In the Southern country, a large class of our people, and some of them intelligent on most subjects, form their judgments of Northern people from some men, who have been much amongst us, and are famous for their low and ludicrous, though to them gainful, efforts in traffic. I need hardly say I refer to those called “tin pedlars,” or “Yankee pedlars.” These men, generally of low breeding and little character, having no permanent interest in the community, and incited chiefly by love of gain, have long taken advantage of

their migratory character, and the ignorance and credulity of our people, to practise deception and fraud. This is not true of all, nor even of the greater part, of these pedlars; but it is true of a sufficient number to excite suspicion of the whole class. The North has also sent to the South a host of men, who profess to teach penmanship, English grammar, mnemonicks, painting, music, &c., in six, ten, or twenty lessons; and these have often procured scholars, taught, held examinations, in which they have kept back all the ignorance, and paraded all the knowledge of their pupils, gotten their pay, and perhaps have not been gone a day, when the villainy has been discovered by the parent; and the next thing is, that he and his neighbours commence wailing against the *North*:—"O, these Yankees! they are all rogues!" On the other hand, a low-bred fellow from the South, of no standing in his own neighbourhood, travels to the North, talks of his property, of his negroes, and how he whips them—won't be insulted—requires the satisfaction of a gentleman—draws his dirk, &c., &c. People inquire who he is, and learning that he is from the South, exclaim: "What people these Southerners are!—so irritable, haughty, and bloody." I might enlarge here respecting some bad specimens of *religious* character; but it is needless. Nor need I stop to show the unfairness, not to say wickedness, of such judgments.

The North has long been endeavouring to establish an *independent literature*, partaking of her own idiosyncrasy, and she is succeeding, to no inconsiderable degree; while the South has a great fondness for the old English literature of the days of King James, and has not consented to come down later than the days of Queen Anne. The South has a scorn of very modern things in literature; while the North thinks so well of her powers, as to see no reason why she should not have her own literature, and even make words as she pleases.

But I pass on to remark, that *the form of church polity* in a respectable portion of the church in New-England is *congregational*. In the South, in a no less respectable body, it is *presbyterian*. And when we remember to how little purpose moderate men have laboured to unite those of conflicting views on this subject, we need not be surprised that this fact should disturb our quiet and unity.

Again; there has long been a disposition in some good

men in the North, to explain some points of theology in a way different from the one usually adopted by the reformers and the divines of the seventeenth century. Indeed, some of the Northern clergy have not, as I think, made themselves sufficiently acquainted with the views of the old Calvinists, and have sometimes grossly caricatured them. On the other hand, the great body of the Southern clergy have adopted with much warmth the views of such writers as Turretin, and are generally reluctant to admit that any improvement can be made in theology.

Then there is the question of *Slavery* in all its bearings. It is lamentable, that there is so little disposition either in the North or South, to maintain a good understanding, and yet fearlessly to do our duty, on this point. Farther. The church of God both in the North and South, allows itself occasionally to be chained ingloriously to the car of state. Its members and ministers sometimes become the tools of politicians. Could the Northern and Southern churches keep out of party politics and maintain good-will and brotherly love among themselves, we should soon see better days.

I will mention but one thing more which is of a repelling nature : I mean the spirit of evil speaking. When I have heard one from a Southern state, speaking evil of the North, accusing it of things of which none, or not more than one in a thousand, is guilty, I have wished that he could be placed in the Tremont House, as his lodging place for a season, that he might be ashamed of his falsehood and ignorance. And when in the North I have heard the South, or individuals in the South, publicly slandered, I have only wished that the slandered had been present, or rather that the slanderer had been doomed to spend one night under his hospitable roof. Indeed men in any land, who are addicted to evil-speaking, are mean-spirited. A ship master a few years ago, boasted how many hard things he had said against Christophe the tyrant of Hayti. Another master enquired whether he had been so bold as to say those things in the tyrant's presence. "Not I indeed," was the reply, "I took good care to be fairly north of Turks' island, before I opened my mouth."

I might speak of our difference of origin, and then discuss the subject of the planting interests of the South, and the manufacturing interests of the North. But I need not

dwell on these points. I can only say, that both of them have, I think, been made to assume an importance which does not belong to them.

Such are some of the principal repelling influences in our relative conditions. How far they are capable of being removed, I cannot say. Our geographical relations must remain by measurement the same; yet it is pleasant to see, that while Boston used to be at least two weeks from Petersburg, it is not one third of that time now. So that in one sense our geographical relations are changing. Our climate cannot be expected to change materially, or our views of its effects. Nor can bad specimens of character be hindered from going to or from any part of the country, wheresoever they list. The North will not be easily persuaded to give up her literary designs, nor the South her attachment to the Old English. Nor can it be expected that the forms of Church polity, which many good men in each section respectively believe to be most scriptural, will be suddenly renounced. Nor is it probable that the Northern and Southern clergy will soon be brought exactly to harmonize in their methods of explaining many points of theological truth, while yet it is believed that a substantial agreement exists among a large majority in each district. Nor can our Huguenotic Southern blood be changed into the blood of the Pilgrims, nor vice versa; nor our planting be exchanged for commercial or manufacturing interests. In short, it cannot be expected that human nature even in its best estate will be any thing but a poor, crazy, erring thing.

I proceed now to discuss a subject of great delicacy and importance. I refer to the *temper* or *spirit*, which Christians should cultivate towards one another. At the head of what I have to say, permit me to place the words of Bishop Horne (Preface to Commentary on Psalms, p. 71 of vol. 1st London, 1815). He says: "He has written to gratify no sect or party, but for the common service of all who call on the name of Jesus, wheresoever dispersed and howsoever distressed, upon the earth. When he views the innumerable unhappy differences among Christians, all of whom are equally oppressed with the cares and calamities of life, he often calls to mind those beautiful words which Milton represents Adam as addressing to Eve, after they had wearied themselves with mutual complaints and accusations ;

But rise, let us no more contend, nor blame
 Each other, blam'd enough elsewhere; but strive
 In offices of love, how we may lighten
 Each other's burden in our share of woe.—B. x. v. 956.

"Enough has been given to the arts of controversy. Let something be given to the studies of piety and a holy life. If we can once unite these, our temper may be better disposed to unite in doctrine."

The great question recurs;—How is our Christian temper to be improved? On this subject I would say something in compliance with your request, regretting that you have not been able, on account of other duties, to enlarge upon it as its importance demands.

I suppose the very first step towards the improvement of our temper, is, to learn our *past and present deficiencies*. We should solemnly arraign ourselves at the bar of revealed truth, and enquire honestly, whether we are not chargeable with some manifest and criminal deficiency. Such an exposition as a pious man, aided by the Holy Spirit, would give of 1 Cor. 13, would reveal, I fear, much guilt among Christians in all parts of our land.

The next matter to be attended to is, so deeply to impress our hearts with the value of a right temper, that we cannot forget its importance at any time. "I had rather have one year of brotherly love, than a whole eternity of contention," said one of my valued correspondents. Oh! did we but esteem love among the brethren as the Master did, we should find the fruits of it like the clusters of grapes in Canaan. For the improvement of our temper, we must remember the character of the matters which have "filled with fire and fury" the minds of disputants age after age. Among the Greeks it was fiercely debated, whether the *Illiad* or *Odyssey* was the most ancient, and how many oars-men *Ulysses* had. Among the Latins, what was the number of geese that saved the Capitol. You know the insignificance of the matters so long and so fiercely contested between the Nominalists and Realists. The tremendous act of ejection by which two thousand of the choicest ministers of England were deprived of their livings and liberties, was based upon trivial things, having in themselves little or no importance. Some years ago it was fiercely discussed in Scotland and even in the United States, whether faith or repentance comes first. A long list of such subjects, that have agitated the church, might be

given. I do not deny that there have been many very important discussions in the church, but these have less frequently produced high inflammation. Generally the less important a question is, the more warmly is it disputed. Your own recollection will furnish illustrations in abundance. It would be a blessed thing for the church could all the ministers of Christ, and all editors learn to be far more earnest upon the great things of revelation, than upon matters of minor consideration.

A holy suspicion and distrust of our own judgement, and an openness to receive new light, would have a happy influence upon temper. On this subject I would refer to the excellent Treatise of Hermann Witsius *de Modesto Theologo*.

Let it be settled in our hearts, that no occasion or circumstance will justify the indulgence of a wrong temper—that God is never honoured, but always dishonoured, by such indulgence. “The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.”

We must also forever abandon that horrible maxim of persecutors, on which spiritual tyrants have erected their machinery for crushing the church; “*Afflictio dat intellectum*.” That he who will not be won by kindness, cannot be overcome by severity, is a truth firmly established by the history of the church. Do not suppose that I have any very painful fears of a rekindling, especially in this land, of the fire of persecution. But there are many ways in which we may “add afflictions” to our brethren, without any open violence.

It would be well if every Christian would remember, that in all parts of Christendom, even among those who differ most from him in sentiment and practice, there may be some, perhaps many, who far excel him in all that is lovely, and excellent in character. If men will compare themselves among themselves, let them not compare themselves with the poorest samples of character they can find; but let them select the greatest, humblest, holiest, and wisest men.

If we had not so much cause of indignation and reproach against ourselves for the low state of piety, faith, zeal, humility, and self-denial in our own hearts, and for the sad ebullitions of worldliness, selfishness, and rashness in our lives, we should be in better humour with our brethren. The truth is, *piety is low*, and to appease conscience we make

much ado about matters of little or no importance. We feel the beam in our own eye, and fearing lest others should see it, we make a diversion by calling their attention to something else. I might say much of the influence of languid piety to make partizans. But it is too obvious to need illustration.

It would also have a good effect on our temper, were we to sit down and enquire honestly, "how much may we yield? How near can we come to our brethren without any sacrifice of conscience?" Alas, the inquiry has generally been of a very opposite nature. "How widely may I differ from my brethren without guilt?" When men have honestly acted on the principle above recommended, the results have often been as astonishing as they have been happy. We may perhaps, on enquiry, think proper to give up some things as useless, which we once esteemed the very basis of our fabrick.

It would be well for us to enquire solemnly, whether there is the least probability of our acquiring a better temper, more love and harmony, by keeping up as wide a separation as possible; or by keeping our views and feelings concealed; or by letting things alone, as though they would change of themselves, or by a miracle.

If we cannot exercise the highest degree of required confidence in brethren who conscientiously differ from us, could we exercise that confidence, in case they would do some violence to their consciences, and come over to us in form and profession? Such violence to their consciences would destroy our respect for them, and thus we should be left without any basis for Christian friendship. For our judgements unite with Paul in saying, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin."

It had been a happy thing for our world, if all men had duly distinguished between *principle* and *opinion*, between *judgement* and *notion*, between *speculation* and *belief*. For want of this distinction, we have frequently adopted uncharitable conclusions respecting others. Suppose a man in conversation lets slip an Arminian idea, but in prayer or in affliction, utters sound scriptural doctrine, and evidently leads a humble and holy life; this man's Arminianism is mere *opinion*, *notion*, *speculation*, and though injurious even to his heart, yet does not *govern* his heart.

It is an old but despised rule of conduct in Polemics,
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that we must studiously guard against imputing to others those errors in doctrine, which they reject. In this respect, have not some pious and able men in New-England, and some Presbyterians in the Middle and Southern States, been greatly injured? On each side they have been reproached with opinions which they are as far from entertaining as their opponents. Andrew Thompson, in his review of some of Edward Irving's works, says with great justice—"Happy for man, he is capable of being inconsistent." It does, indeed, require but little acumen to perceive, that doctrinal error has no *natural* stopping place this side of the gulph of atheism. But men do not generally go to the *natural* stopping place, but, through divine mercy, are held at some point of the declivity farther from ruin. Besides, it is the smallest number of men, who have any *system* of religious belief *philosophically* considered. Of one in a thousand, (and perhaps not more,) it may be said: "Touch a principle and you shake a continent."

I do not feel able to close this branch of the subject better, than by giving you part of a paper entitled, "Humble Requests both to Conformists and Dissenters, touching their temper and behaviour towards each other." It was drawn up by the excellent John Howe, upon the occasion of the passage of an act of exemption from penalties in favour of Dissenting Protestants, passed by Parliament in 1685. There are some things in it, of course, peculiar to the times and circumstances; but it is full of sound wisdom, and must be useful to all who read it aright. I know you will be interested in it, though it may already be before your mind. It is there moved, "that we do not over-magnify our differences, or count them greater than they really are. Remember that there are differences on both parts, among themselves, incomparably greater than these, by which the one sort differs from the other. How inconceivably greater is the difference between good men and bad! between being a lover of the blessed God, the Lord of heaven and earth, and an enemy! a real subject of Christ, and of the devil! Have we not reason to apprehend there are some of both these, on each side? Let us take heed of having our minds tinctured with a wrong notion of this matter, as if this indulgence divided England into two Christendoms, or distinguished rather between Christians and Mahometans, as some men's cyclopic fancies have an

unlucky art to represent things ; creating ordinary men and things into monsters and prodigious shapes at their own pleasure. It has been a usual saying on both sides, that they were (in comparison) but little things we differed about, or circumstantial things. Let us not unsay it, or suffer a habit of mind to slide into us, that consists not with it. Though we must not go against a judgement of conscience in the least thing, yet let us not confound the true differences of things ; but what are really lesser things, then let them go for such. Let us hereupon carefully abstain from judging each other's state Godward upon these differences : for hereby we shall both contradict our common rule and ourselves. When men make conscience of small and doubtful things on the one hand, and the other, about which they differ, how little conscience is made of the plainest and most important rule, not to judge one another for such differences, Rom. 14: 3, 13 ! Why of all the parts of that holy book, is this chapter only thought no part of God's word ? or this precept so variously enforced in this chapter, and so awfully, ver. 10, 11. But why dost thou judge thy brother ? or why dost thou set at nought thy brother ? We shall all stand before the judgement seat of Christ. For it is written, 'As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to me !' Is it a light matter to usurp the throne of Christ, the judgement seat of God ? Yet how common has it been to say, such a one conforms, he hath nothing of God in him ! such a one conforms not ; 'tis not conscience, but humour ! God forgive both. Had they blotted Rom. 14 out of their Bibles ? 'Tis plain, by the whole series of discourse, that it is the judging of men's states, and that by such small matters of difference, that is the thing here forbidden. Some few things contained in this chapter, as, to receive one another (as Christians, or such whom God receives) notwithstanding remaining doubts about small matters, and not determining such doubted things in bar to the doubter, ver. 1, 2, 3 ; and not to lay stumbling-blocks in each other's way, ver. 13 ; not to do the doubted thing with a mind still unsatisfied, ver. 5, 23 ; not to censure, either him that does or forbears, not admitting a hard thought of him, or less favourable, than that what such an one does, he does to the Lord, and what the other forbears, he forbears to the Lord, ver. 6 ; these few things, I say, put in practice, had taken

away all differences, (that we are now considering,) or the inconvenience of them, long ago. And we shall still need them as much as ever.

"Let us not value ourselves upon being of this or that side of the severing line. 'Tis Jewish, yea, pharisaical, to be conceited, and boast ourselves upon externals, and small matters, especially if arbitrarily taken up; and is itself an argument of a light mind, and incomprehensive of true worth. Though I cannot sincerely be of this or that way, but I must think myself in the right and others in the wrong, that differ from me, yet I ought to consider, this is but a small, minute thing, a point compared with the vast orb of knowables, and of things needful, and that ought to be known. Perhaps divers that differ from me, are men of greater and more comprehensive minds, and have been more employed about greater matters; and many in things of more importance, have much more of useful and valuable knowledge than I. Yea, and since these are not matters of salvation we differ about, so that any on either side dare considerately say, he cannot be saved, that is not in these respects of my mind and way; he may have more of sanctifying savoury knowledge, more of solid goodness, more of grace and real sanctity, than I; the course of his thoughts and studies having been, by converse and other accidents, led more off from these things, and perhaps by a good principle, been more deeply engaged about higher matters; for no man's mind is able equally to consider all things fit to be considered; and greater things are of themselves more apt to beget holy and good impressions upon our spirits, than the minuter and more circumstantial things, though relating to religion, can be.

"Let us not despise one another for our differing in these lesser matters. This is too common and most natural to that temper that offends against the foregoing caution. Little-spirited creatures valuing themselves for small matters, must consequently have them in contempt that want what they count their own only excellency. He that hath nothing wherein he places worth belonging to him, besides a flaunting peruke and laced suit, must, at all adventures, think very meanly of one in a plain garb. Where we are taught not to judge, we are forbidden to despise, or set at nought one another upon these little differences.

"Nor let us wonder that we differ. Unto this we are too apt,

i. e., to think it strange, (especially upon some arguing of the difference) that such a man should conform, or such a one not conform. There is some fault in this, but which proceeds from more faulty causes. Pride, too often, and an opinion that we understand so well, that a wrong is done us if our judgement be not made a standard and measure to another man's. And again, ignorance of human nature, or inconsiderateness rather, how mysterious it is, and how little can be known of it; how secret and latent little springs there are that move this engine to our own mind, this way, or that; and what bars (which perhaps he discerns not himself) may obstruct and shut up towards us another man's. Have we not frequent instances in other common cases, how difficult it is to speak to another man's understanding? Speech is too penurious, not expressive enough. Frequently between men of sense, much more time is taken up in explaining each other's notions, than in proving or disproving them. Nature and our present state, have, in some respects, left us open to God only, and made us inaccessible to one another. Why then should it be strange to me, that I cannot convey my thought into another's mind? 'Tis unchristian to censure, as before, and say, 'Such a one has not my conscience, therefore he has no conscience at all;' and it is also unreasonable and rude to say, 'Such a one sees not with my eyes, therefore, he is stark blind.' Besides, the real obscurity of the matter is not enough considered. I am very confident an impartial and competent judge, upon the view of books later and more ancient, upon such subjects, would say, there are few metaphysical questions disputed with more subtilty, than the controversies about conformity and nonconformity. Blessed be God that things necessary to the salvation of souls, and that are of true necessity even to the peace and order of the Christian church, are in comparison so very plain.

"Moreover there is, besides understanding, and judgement, and diverse from that heavenly gift which in the Scriptures is called grace, such a thing as gust and relish belonging to the mind of man, and I doubt not, to all men, if they observe themselves; and this is as unaccountable and as various as the relishes and disgusts of sense. This they only wonder at, that either understand not themselves, or will consider no body but themselves. To bring it down to the present case. As to those parts of worship which are of most frequent use

in our assemblies (whether conforming or nonconforming), prayer, and preaching, and hearing God's word, our differences about them cannot but in part arise from the diversity of this principle, both on the one hand and the other. One sort do not savour prayer by a foreknown form ; another that which hath more of surprise, by a grateful variety of unexpected expressions. And it can neither be universally said, it is a better judgement, or more grace, that determines men the one way or the other ; but somewhat in the temper of their minds distinct from both, which I know not how better to express than by mental taste, the acts whereof (as the objects are suitable or unsuitable) are relishing or disrelishing, liking or disliking : and this hath no more of mystery in it, than that there is such a thing belonging to our natures, as complacency or displacency in reference to the objects of the mind. And this, in the kind of it, is as common to men, as human nature, but as much diversified in individuals as men's other inclinations are, that are most fixed, and least apt to admit of change. Now in the mentioned case, men cannot be universally determined either way, by their having better judgement ; for no sober man can be so little modest, as not to acknowledge, that there are some of each sentiment, that are less judicious than some that are of the contrary sentiment in this thing. And to say that to be more determined this way or that, is the certain sign or effect of a greater measure of grace and sanctity, were a great violation both of modesty and charity. I have not met with any that have appeared to live in more entire communion with God, in higher admiration of him, in a pleasanter sense of his love, or in a more joyful expectation of eternal life, than some who have been wont with great delight publicly to worship God in the use of our Common Prayer : and others I have known as highly excelling in the same respects, that could by no means relish it, but have always counted it insipid and nauseous. The like may be said of relishing or disrelishing sermons preached in a digested set of words, or with a more flowing freedom of speech. It were endless and odious to vie either better judgements, or more pious inclinations, that should universally determine men either the one way or the other in these matters. And we are no more to wonder at these peculiarities in the temper of men's minds, than at their different tastes of meats and drinks ; much less to fall out with them,

that their minds and notions are not just formed as ours are : for we should remember, they no more differ from us, than we do from them ; and if we think we have the clearer light, 'tis like they also think they have clearer. And 'tis in vain to say, Who shall judge, for every man will at length judge of his own notions for himself, and cannot help it : for no man's judgement (or relish of things, which influences his judgement, though he know it not) is at the command of his will ; and much less of another man's. And therefore,

“Let us not be offended mutually with one another for our different choice of this or that way, wherein we find most of real advantage and edification. Our greatest concern in this world, and which is common to us all, is in the bettering of our spirits, and preparing them for a better world. Let no man be displeased (especially of those who agree in all substantials of the same holy religion,) that another uses the same liberty, in choosing the way most conducing in his experience to his great end, that he himself also uses, expecting to do it without another man's offence.

“But above all, let us, with sincere minds, more earnestly endeavour the promoting the interest of religion itself, of true reformed Christianity, than of this or that party. Let us long to see the religion of Christians become simple, primitive, agreeable to its lovely original state, and again itself ; and each in our own stations contribute thereto all that we are able, labouring that the internal principle of it may live and flourish in our souls, and to our utmost diffused and spread unto other men's. And for its externals, as the ducature of our rule will guide us, so gradually bend towards one common course, that there may at length cease to be any divided parties at all.

“In the mean time, while there are, let it be remembered, that the difference lies among Christians and protestants, not between such and pagans. Let us therefore carry it accordingly towards each other ; and consider our assemblies are all Christian and protestant assemblies, differing in their administrations, for the most part, not in the things prayed for or deprecated, or taught, but in certain modes of expression ; and differing really and in the substance of things, less by mere conformity, or nonconformity to the public rule of the law, than many of them that are under it do from one another, and than divers that are not under it. For instance, go into one congregation that is a conforming one,

and you have the public prayers read in the desk, and afterwards a form of prayer perhaps used by the preacher in the pulpit, of his own composure, before he begins his sermon. Go into another congregation, and prayer is performed without either sort of form; and perhaps the difference in this is not so great. It may be the conformist uses no preconceived form of his own, and the nonconformist may. Both instruct the people out of the same holy book of God's word. But now suppose one of the former sort reads the public prayers gravely, with the appearance of great reverence, fervency, and pious devotion; and one of the latter sort that uses them not, does however pray for the same things, with judgement and with like gravity and affection, and they both instruct their hearers fully and profitably; nothing is more evident than that the worship in both these assemblies doth much less considerably differ to a pious and judicious mind, than if in the latter the prayers were also read but carelessly, sleepily, or scenically, flauntingly, and with manifest irreverence, and the sermon like the rest; or than if in the former, all the performance were inept, rude, or very offensively drowsy or sluggish.

"Now let us show ourselves men, and manly Christians, not swayed by trifles and little things, as children by this or that dress, or mode, or form of our religion, which may perhaps please some the more for its real indecency: but know, that if while we continue picquering about forms, the life be lost, and we come to bear the character of that church, 'thou hast a name that thou livest, and art dead.' We may e'er long (after all the wonders God hath wrought for us) expect to hear of our candlestick's being removed, and that our sun shall go down at noon-day.

"The true serious spirit and power of religion and godliness, will act no man against his conscience, or his rule understood, but will oblige him in all acts of worship (as well as of his whole conversation) to keep close to Gospel prescription, so far as he can discern it. And that he will find requires, that in subordination to the divine glory, he seriously working out the salvation of his own soul, and take that course in order thereto, put himself under such a ministry, and such a way of using God's ordinances, as he finds most profitable and conducing to that great end, and that doth his soul most real good. If you are religious, or of this or that mode or way of religion, to serve a carnal design for

yourself or your party, not to save your soul, you commit the most detestable sacrilege, and alienate the most sacred thing in the world, religion, from its true end; which will not only lose that end, but infer a heavy vengeance. Yea, and 'tis too possible to transgress dangerously, by preferring that which is less, though never so confidently thought to be divine, before that which is greater, or separately from its true end. You greatly prevaricate if you are more zealously intent to promote independency than Christianity, presbytery than Christianity, prelacy than Christianity, as any of these are the interest of a party, and not considered in subserviency to the Christian interest, nor designed for promoting the edification and salvation of your own soul. But that being your design, living religion will keep your eye upon your end, and make you steady, and constantly true to that, and to your rule, without which you can never hope to reach your end."

I did hope to be able to abridge Mr. Howe's thoughts, but found it impossible; every sentence seemed to be necessary.

It ought not to be forgotten that efforts have been made in older time, both on the continent and in England, to unite Protestants, and especially dissenters, and particularly Independents and Presbyterians, more closely (Life of Howe, pp. 39. 41. Also, Owen's Works, vol. 1. p. 239). These efforts proved great failures, and only drove the parties farther asunder. Most of these attempts occurred in the seventeenth century, and are no doubt familiar to your mind. In any efforts, therefore, to bring different parties among Christians more closely together, it must be kept constantly in mind, that failure is possible, yea, that it is certain, unless a right spirit in all go foremost. Let me give you the views of another (Dr. Owen) on this same subject. "I should be very sorry, that any man living should outgo me in desires that all who fear God throughout the world, especially in these nations, were of one way, as well as of one heart. I know I desire it sincerely; but I do verily believe, that when God shall accomplish it, it will be the *effect* of love, not the *cause* of love. It will proceed from love, before it brings forth love. There is not a greater vanity in the world, than to drive men into a particular profession, and then suppose, that love will be the necessary consequence of it; to think that if by sharp rebukes, by cutting, bitter expressions, they

can but drive men into such and such practices, then love will certainly ensue."

Nothing will be done to profit except in answer to fervent, frequent, and believing prayer to God. Let me therefore suggest as a subject for special prayer in our closets and among our own little circles, the increased union of all in the American churches, who love the appearing of Jesus Christ. He who prays most and most scripturally on this subject, will be the best friend to the cause.

I will now dismiss, at least for the present, the subject of Christian temper, by quoting a resolution of the excellent Philip Henry. "In those things that all the people of God are agreed about, I will spend my *zeal*; and as for other things about which they differ, I will walk according to the light God has given me, and charitably believe others to do so too."

I come now to consider some of *the good results that must flow from a sincere and close union between the Northern and Southern churches*. Such a union is of incalculable importance. Neither the Northern nor Southern States separately will be able much longer, if indeed they are now, to bind the great West to this side of the mountains. But the North and South *united* may, with God's blessing, do this for centuries to come. It is not worth while to depict the direfulness of the calamity of having the West cut off, either civilly or ecclesiastically, from the Atlantic States. Such an event may God ever avert! The North and South, if united, may hold the West to us, and we may still bless them by our men and money. On the other hand, any division among the Atlantic States must soon be followed by a corresponding severance of the Western and South-western States. If the Atlantic States ever separate from each other, war must ensue; and either the Potomac or the Roanoke will be the dividing line; and in either case, Virginia will be the battle-ground on which brother will murder brother. If you ask, what has all this to do with the blessing of union among the pious, I answer, I have no confidence in a continuance of our national union, except through the blessing of God on the efforts and prayers of his church, in the several sections of this land. And if the righteous be for division, will not the foundations be destroyed? Holy love can bind a world together.

A vast increase of happiness must result to those who

feel the bonds of union increasing in strength. Tell me, who ever gained a victory over prejudice, and bigotry, and selfishness, without an increase of enjoyment? On the other hand, misery ensues from the spirit of division. "There is a kind of bitter zeal, which is so fierce and violent, that it rather inflames than heals any wounds that are made; and is of so malignant a nature that it spreads and eats like a cancer, and if a stop were not put to it, it might endanger the whole body." So says Stillington in his *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity*. And need I prove, that such zealots are miserable in proportion to their zeal?

Cordial union would give easy success to all our benevolent efforts. Suppose, for instance, that it is agreed by good men and competent judges, that we ought to have a new theological seminary in any part of our country, and *all* the churches could be enlisted in its behalf. The seminary would soon be established, and no portion of the church would be burdened. The work would go on, "because the people had a mind to build."

Finally, were all branches of the church properly united, we should need no more books or sermons on the Evidences of Christianity, in order to silence infidelity. Glorious and powerful and rapid revivals of genuine religion would refresh this dying world, until "the light of the moon should be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun seven fold—as the light of seven days." These points, I suppose to be abundantly proved by such scriptures as John 17: 20, 21, and 13: 35, and Eph. 4: 11—16.

These good results contrasted with the countless evils of division, which all good men must feel, furnish an apology for any honest effort at union. Especially does the last reason for union just suggested, exert a power over my mind, that is altogether commanding. There is a solemnity about our Lord's last address to his disciples, and last prayer to his Father, which moves my whole nature. To hear Christ praying that we may be one, and that, too, that the world may be convinced of his Messiahship—is enough, one would think, to melt away the greatest hardness.

As to the means of effecting this desirable union, I would mention among the first, more familiar acquaintance with each other. Could this acquaintance be as extensive and as thorough as might be desired, the chief difficulty would

be over. If you will have the kindness to refer to the Introduction of Mason's Plea for sacramental Communion on Catholic Principles, you will see the history of a providential intercourse between the congregations of the author and of Dr. Romeyn, which resulted in the happiest consequences. They became acquainted, found the image of Christ in each other, and thus love sprung up, resulting ultimately in the overthrow of the *exclusive* communion of the Associate Reformed Church. I hold it to be a first principle in Christian economics, that, among good men, mutual acquaintance invariably generates mutual respect and affection. With men who are selfish, worldly, hypocritical, and unregenerate, it is not generally so. In order to promote this personal acquaintance, the number of delegates sent respectively by the General Assembly and the several Associations, ought, as I think, to be *increased*, rather than *diminished*. It ought also to be an object to procure the attendance, to a greater extent than at present, of distant brethren at our great anniversaries, and this in behalf of personal friendship and true Christian affinity. Free, brotherly correspondence, such as the present, may also be useful.

It would be a means of binding us together, deeply to impress our hearts with the truth, that they who are the most suspicious, and inclined to "stand by themselves," will be the greatest losers. When I see people acting thus, I think of the father who, seeing his son out on the limb of a tree, and sawing off the limb betwixt himself and the trunk, said, "Take care, my son, that you do not saw yourself off."

It would have a powerful effect in uniting us, should there be mutually exhibited a disposition, to leave to the management of each of the large portions of the nation, those subjects which are of a delicate and critical nature, without any officious interference. Let me illustrate my remark by a single allusion on each side. The peculiar relation of Orthodox and Unitarian congregational churches in New-England was, in by-gone days, a subject which those at a distance could not well understand. There was a mode of proceeding on this point, which did much perplex us at the South; and some few of our people may have said or written some hard things about this matter. But the majority said, "We have much evidence of the piety of our New-England brethren in reference to other things. We

must confide to their own discretion such subjects as pulpit exchanges with men of doubtful orthodoxy, and meeting with Unitarians in annual conventions." On the other hand, there has been, in the minds of some who reside in the North, a disposition to interfere unwisely, and to the injury of religion, with the subject of slavery. I hear of persons recommending the exclusion of the whole Southern and South-western churches from the privileges of a connexion and communion with our Presbyterian and Congregational brethren elsewhere in the United States. Now I need not assure you that every sensible and pious man in the South and South-west deplores the existence of slavery, as an enormous evil. Indeed when the subject was under discussion in our Virginia Legislature, all parties openly lamented its existence. On this point our Northern and North-western brethren must trust us a little, or, if necessary a good deal. Should any one reply, "On the same principles the Hindoos, and Africans, and Chinese might say—trust us with the management of our idolatries and our superstitions—do not attempt to disturb the peace of our nation and the harmony of our commerce by the introduction of your peculiar religious tenets." I answer, the cases are by no means parallel. If men insist on placing us, in the same rank with abominable idolaters and worshippers of devils, of course Christian communion between us is at an end. There must on such subjects be an exercise of forbearance, patience, kindness, and Christian confidence. You will not suppose that I have the slightest suspicion, that these remarks are applicable to yourself, or to those with whom you are associated. Dr. Porter's letter on Colonization is worth a wedge of gold.

I do not know that I shall have a more convenient opportunity of introducing a kindred topick. It is this: We should be much more disposed to strict union, if the North and South, respectively, would remember their own peculiar evils. If the South would calmly think of her slavery, her spiritual sloth and apathy, her ecclesiastical weakness, her lack of enterprize and energy in plans of usefulness; and if the North would duly reflect on her proneness to useless and injurious metaphysical discussions, her peculiar temptations to spiritual security and self-confidence, her tendency to high excitements, her exposure in religious matters to bitter and organized contention; there would soon be a better state of

things amongst us. We should no more think and speak as if we supposed all wisdom and excellence dwelt with us.

It is evidently wrong for us to differ or separate on account of matters about which we should blame two missionaries in foreign lands for differing or separating. I notice that in your civil governments in New-England, there is sometimes appointed what is styled a *Committee of Vigilance*, whose duty is to watch for offenders or for testimony against them, and whenever or wherever they suspect any thing wrong, to prosecute enquiries. Oh ! that every good man would constitute himself a committee of vigilance to watch the deceitful, subtle, erring passions of his own heart, receive testimony against himself for violating the law of love, and whenever and wherever he suspects any prejudice, coolness or indifference towards any of his brethren, or any branch of the church to be springing up in his own mind, solemnly to arraign himself and rebuke his spirit into shame and repentance. *Obsta principiis*, is the only safe rule.

We have several great national institutions, which are fitted to have a powerful influence in binding the North and South together. These institutions, so benevolent in their design and tendency, ought to receive undivided support from all the friends of religion in America. When by our efforts and prayers we favour these institutions, we render a service of peculiar value to our nation as such, *binding it together*.

Much may be done towards a closer union by the professors in all our theological seminaries holding up before the minds of their pupils, not only the example of our blessed Lord and Saviour, and of the beloved John, but also the examples of such holy, *peaceable*, affectionate, humble men as Martin Bucer of Germany, who without Melancthon's tendency to surrender principle, yet had all of his amiableness ; or of such men as Leighton, who, if he had possessed his father's firmness, would have possessed a character of most unrivalled symmetry ; or of such men as Robert Hall, who in the noble generosity of holy love, burst through the trammels of ages to embrace as brethren all who loved the Lord Jesus Christ. If I am not mistaken, there is often, if not always in Seminaries a *run* in favour of certain authors, or theological, or philosophical speculations. At one Seminary, without any apparently sufficient cause, you find the bent of

the young men's minds to be towards such authors as Cudworth and Coleridge. At another there is a great fondness for Calvin, Turretin, and Owen. Again, you will find Matthew Henry, John Flavel and Bates, the chief favourites. Anon the frigid, critical, neology of Germany is in the ascendant, inspiring self-conceit, rashness, and fondness of innovation. Now, under such circumstances, how incalculably important is it, that, as young men will have some ancient and foreign exemplars to admire and follow, pains be taken to introduce to their favourable regard those who are worthy of admiration and imitation? When such is the case, we shall not see young ministers issuing forth as theological warriors, armed cap-a-pie, or as walking statues, stiff as marble and cold as ice, being vainly puffed up by the conceits and whims of a scholastick training, nor stern in their manners; but to some extent like Christ, angels of love and mercy, moved by kindness and awed into sweet solemnity, going about doing good to all men. One generation of such ministers in the United States would bind together the discordant elements of our national character in ties so strong and numerous and pleasant, as to defy the assaults of the wicked.

Perhaps there is not a little pride of ancestry, and pride of territory, both in the North and the South, which, while it exists, will be no inconsiderable barrier to such an intimate union as is desired. The South prides herself on account of her eminent statesmen and warriors, and preachers. Nor does the North forget her great men,—her orators, her scholars, her presidents and professors, her learned divines. This sectional or provincial pride would not be very mischievous, did it not preclude, as it generally does, a due consideration of the worth of others. It is much more noble to say, "*Et genus, et proavos, et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco.*" Let it therefore be our constant endeavour to put away all pride and boasting, each esteeming others better than himself, and in honour preferring one another.

The religious press in the Atlantic states should be made to exert a more benign and harmonizing influence. Correspondents for our periodical publications should be secured in different sections of the land. Northern men must write for Southern papers, and *vice versa*. And should the "Literary and Theological Review," which has been proposed, be commenced, it should contain articles from all

portions of our church, and assume a ground in which they may all agree. I would suggest the expediency of the editors of religious papers in Charleston, Richmond, Philadelphia, New-York, and Boston, engaging regular contributions to their sheets from good men in remote parts of the land, and this for the express purpose of strengthening the bands of union.

Did we all feel, that love and concord are worth more than platforms, symbols, and books of discipline, it would help to remove our suspicions and jealousies. Do not understand me as being opposed to confessions of faith, and well-digested forms and laws of government. All I wish to say is, that a regard to these, is by no means the highest Christian duty. We have responsibilities and duties vastly superiour to those created by such conventional things. I will illustrate my meaning by a fact. In 1685, James II. granted briefs for collecting money for the relief of the French Protestants, who had fled from their country upon the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Beveridge, good man as he was, opposed the reading of the brief, on the ground of its being contrary to the rubric. Tillotson reproved him in these words: "Doctor, doctor, charity is above rubrics." Oh! that all men believed with Tillotson! how often do men perish in their sins, and that canonically too! Summerfield recommended that some *canons* in New-York should be spiked.

The last means I shall mention for promoting a closer union among American Christians is, to cultivate the spirit of doing good to *all men*. Were the hearts of American Christians properly affected, and their hands properly engaged, about the great objects of benevolence, disunion would be at an end. To the joy of many hearts our national societies seem to be going on towards the occupancy of such ground, and the adoption of such measures, as will summon the highest energies of the whole church. That the American Bible Society will soon adopt resolutions, contemplating the supply of the *whole world* with the Bible, within a definite period, I can hardly doubt. The Missionary, Tract, and other Societies, are also widely extending the sphere of their operations. What do these things mean? One thing they certainly teach is, that "the tug of war" will soon be here, when cowards, traitors, formalists, lovers of money and lovers of sloth, will be tried as by fire.—"Ye men of Israel, to your tents," or "gird yourselves for the

battle," is the cry that ought to be uttered through the length and breadth of the American church. The day cannot be far distant, when those who will not "follow the Lord fully," will be sorely tried, and when the host of Immanuel must and will present an unbroken line of holy steadfastness to the embattled legions of sin and darkness. Satan and his allies are the *common*, and will soon be the *avowed* enemies of all sincere Christians, and of all righteousness, and we shall be compelled and disposed to make common cause with *all* who "seek for glory and honour." Let the rush, the first fierce onset come. The sooner, the better, if we are but prepared. Any brave soldier prefers the din of arms and the hard-fought battle, to the dull monotony of a quiet encampment year after year. I would suggest, whether it is not a great calamity, that our national societies did not adopt the additional words, "and foreign," in their title; and farther, whether it would not be wise, even now, to adopt this change. However this may be, I hope, as Rev. Mr. Temple said, "they will *deserve* the name."—Let all good men then come forth and encourage, rather than discourage, the present movements towards a noble enlargement of heart and Christian effort.

Perhaps the church never more needed to offer the prayer; "Lord, increase our faith." Were our faith what it ought to be, our efforts would also be. Oh! that we did but believe all that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken! When we think of the little beginnings which Franke made (viz. \$3 28), or which Andrew Fuller's favourite society made (viz. £13 2s. 6d.), and indeed when we trace the history of any of our benevolent societies, must we not feel that we are subject to the rebuke, "O fools and slow of heart to believe." This faith, while it unites to Christ, will unite us to one another; "just," (says some one) "as lines approach nearer the centre, the nearer they approach to one another."

Let us keep our own minds, and the minds of our brethren, always impressed with the truth, that he is the best fisherman, not who has the longest and nicest rods, and strongest lines, and best apparatus; but who catches the most fish. There is much instruction in the following parable of Andrew Fuller: "In one of the new Italian republics, two independent companies are formed for the defence of the country. Call the one A. and the other B.

In forming themselves and learning their exercise, they each profess to follow the mode of discipline used by the ancient Romans. Their officers, uniforms and evolutions are, after all, somewhat different from each other. Hence disputes arise, and B. refuses to march against the enemy with A. as being disorderly. A. gives his reasons why he thinks himself orderly; but they are far from satisfying B., who not only treats him as deviating from rule, but as almost knowing himself to do so, and wilfully persisting in it. A., tired of jarring, marches against the enemy by himself. B. sits at home busily engaged in studying order and discipline. "If your form and rules," says A., "are so preferable to ours, why do you not make use of them. *Discipline is a means, not an end.* Be not always boasting of your order; and reproach others for the want of it; let us see the use of it. It is true, like the Quakers in 1745, you have bought waistcoats for our soldiers, and we thank you for them; but we had rather you would fight yourselves." The object of establishing Seminaries was not that we may *have* seminaries. The object was to train up a race of men "mighty in the Scriptures," who would give themselves continually to prayer and the ministry of the word. The object of organizing the American Bible Society, was not that we might *have* such a society, but that we might send the Bible over the earth. So the object of having a church organized, was not that we might be organized, or being organized, might look beautifully; but that we might go on in the conquest of the world to Christ's authority. Can we not all remember this, and not forget that they are most pleasing to God, who devote themselves most unreservedly to his cause, and most honestly use the means and skill which they possess, for spreading the truth. We have been too long in the habit of looking on the church merely as a fortified city, and not as an "army with banners."

Thus, my dear sir, have I made an entrance upon a great subject, having had time only to throw out some hints. If what I have written shall correspond with your own views, I shall be gratified. I fear the length of this letter may alarm you; but I could not be more brief and give you even a *sketch* of my thoughts. The Lord cause his face to shine upon you and yours forever.

Yours, very respectfully and affectionately,

WM. S. PLUMMER.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, ANDOVER, Sept. 18, 1833.

To Rev. Wm. S. PLUMMER:

MY DEAR BROTHER,

My reply to yours of September 3d must be very brief; though a letter so interesting in all its parts as yours, and touching upon so many weighty subjects, deserves a more particular notice. It must have been refreshing to your own heart, to dwell on subjects of such a character. And your thoughts, if exhibited to your brethren, could not fail to do good. You will at least have the blessedness of a *peace-maker*; and I cannot but hope that the efforts which you and others are making, will, through the divine blessing, be successful in promoting a spirit of affection and concord among Christians in our country to an extent never known before. And permit me to say, what I doubt not will appear as important to you as it does to me,—that among the great variety of considerations which are adapted to remove alienation and strife, and to join Christians together in the bonds of holy brotherhood, there is none to be compared with the grand peculiarity of our religion, *the love and death of our Lord Jesus Christ*. If we would labour most effectually to bring Christians to love one another, we must exhibit before them the essential principles of the gospel; must tell them, that *God is love*, and that he *so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son for their redemption*. And we must tell them that *Jesus loved them* with a love stronger than death, and freely submitted to the sufferings of the cross, that they might have eternal life. This great gospel principle must be earnestly inculcated and deeply impressed upon the minds of Christians, in order to excite them to love one another. Let them rightly consider and truly believe *the great love of Christ towards them*, and they will at once come under the influence of a motive all-powerful. They will put away anger, wrath, envy, evil speaking, and every unchristian feeling, and will *all be one*, as Jesus prayed they might be. Other motives are indeed powerful; but they will avail most, when placed before the minds of Christians in connexion with the great, all-commanding motive, *the cross of Christ*. This is destined to be the means of subduing the spirit of ill-will and contention, and filling the world with love and peace. I know you love to dwell on this sacred theme, not only in your instructions to your own beloved congregation, but when pleading the cause of be-

nevolence on the most public occasions. It seems to me indescribably important, that the grand, essential principles of Christianity should be so clearly set forth and be made so prominent in our religious anniversaries, that a sanctifying influence may be shed upon all that is done, and that the exercises may prove effectual means of advancing Christians in the strength and activity of holy love.

I must defer what further I have to say on these interesting subjects to another opportunity. In the mean time, may you experience all the sweetness and fervour of Christian love in your own breast, and help to promote it in those around you.

I am yours,

In fraternal affection and confidence,

LEONARD WOODS.

ART. III. LOVE TO THE DOCTRINES OF THE BIBLE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

By Rev. Edward W. Hooker, Bennington, Vt.

THE word of God describes various evidences of a renewed heart. That we may know our true spiritual state, it is important to try ourselves by them all. Each evidence is also to be examined in its particular exercises. As regards love, for example, the professor of religion is to enquire, not only have I, in general, a benevolent spirit; but do I love God, his people, law, service, kingdom, and the doctrines of his holy word? Love, as a "fruit of the Spirit," exercises itself toward all its appropriate objects. The Christian under its influence will not love one proper object, and be averse to another; love God, but withhold his affections from some child of God; or love one precept and not another; one doctrine of the Bible and not another. If you are a true Christian, you will give evidence of it in this, that you love all that God requires you to love; himself, each child of his family, each precept and each doctrine of his holy word.

The object of the present paper is to consider "the love of the truth,"—attachment to the doctrines of the Bible,—as an evidence of grace in the soul. God has set forth in his word a system of holy and glorious truths, toward which no Christian can feel indifference or aversion ;—some of these are, the doctrines of the Trinity, the deity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit ; the sovereignty of God, as displayed both in his moral government, and in the accomplishment of his own most holy will and pleasure ; as comprised in this last, the doctrines of decrees and election ; the free moral and accountable agency of man ; the universal, native, and total depravity of mankind ; regeneration, by the special and supernatural agency of the Holy Ghost ; the atonement of Christ for man's sins by his sufferings and death ; justification by faith in Jesus Christ alone ; the final perseverance of the saints ; the judgement of the world by Jesus Christ at the last day ; and the future and eternal punishment of the wicked and blessedness of the righteous. The subject named at the head of this article, is discussed with particular reference to these doctrines ; for reasons which will be obvious. They, with others, compose the system sometimes called "evangelical," or "orthodox ;" sometimes "the doctrines of the reformation ;" but a better, and an apostolical appellation, is that given by Paul, viz. "Christ crucified." Even some skeptical men, denying the inspiration of the Scriptures by the Holy Ghost, but interpreting Scripture language as they do that of other books, have candidly acknowledged that they teach this system of doctrines. If so even they judge, the man who professes himself a pious believer in the Bible as God's word, can withhold neither his faith in these doctrines, nor his love to them, and at the same time make good his claim to being considered a Christian.

Here we should distinguish between love to the doctrines of the Bible, and some things men are in danger of mistaking for it, to their ruin. An assent of the understanding, simply, to a truth of the Bible, it scarce needs be said, is not love to it. Men's understandings are often convinced of things as true, which they oppose, and to which they are utterly averse. This is true in relation to doctrines of the Bible, in many men. They regret that they are true, and their feelings are against them ; while knowing in their own consciences that they are immutable truths. Love to the doctrines of the Scriptures should also be carefully distin-

guished from that preference which arises from some selfish or sinister reason. In the controversies respecting religious doctrines, it is not unfrequent that feelings of partizanship enlist unconverted men on the side of the truth. Do not boast that you are ready to contend for the truth. Do you love it? An orthodox head, as well as an Arminian or Pelagian one, may be associated with an unrenewed heart. A devout Christian can find no more complacency in orthodoxy itself, united with heartlessness and inactivity in the service of Christ, than in a blustering and denunciatory Pelagianism or Arminianism. Love to the truth is also to be distinguished from that kind of intellectual interest which arises from seeing its positions ingeniously proved or ably defended, in argument. It is also to be distinguished from simple hereditary preferences. Men are sometimes found preferring the faith of their fathers or ancestors; without any satisfactory evidence that they love the truths of the Bible therein set forth, for their own sakes. Some probably die in the speculative faith of their fathers in the very truths of God, and "die in their sins," and are for ever lost.

Love to divine truth is an affair of the heart, as renewed by the Holy Spirit. It fixes the mind, the whole soul on the instructions of God's word. The sincere lover of the divine doctrines says of God, "I have esteemed the words of his mouth as more than my necessary food." "I rejoice at thy word, as those that find great spoil." "Thy words were found and I did eat them; and thy word was unto me the joy and rejoicing of my heart." His preference of divine truth is decided; "I have chosen the way of truth." He earnestly desires and prays for increased knowledge of it and guidance into it; "O send out thy light and thy truth, let them lead me, and let them bring me unto thy holy hill, and to thy habitation." He finds sacred satisfaction in seeing others receiving, honouring and obeying it; says, with that apostle whose character seemed all love, "I rejoiced greatly, that I found of thy children walking in the truth;" "I have no greater joy than to hear that my children walk in the truth."

This Scripture account of love to divine truth, is attested by the experience of all who have been renewed by the Holy Ghost. It is deeply interesting to trace in the religious exercises and character of devoted Christians, their love

to the doctrines of God's word. They describe their feelings not only respecting divine truth in general, but particular doctrines in which they have found peculiar satisfaction and to which they had great aversion, before they became Christians. They are not only convinced of them in their understandings and consciences, but rejoice in them, with an affectionate joy. Doctrines which they once regarded with indifference; or at which they were uneasy and jealous, and against which, perhaps, they often contended with all their powers; the Spirit of God has taught them to see in an entirely different light, and to esteem them as cause of gratitude and love to God. We might give, did our limits permit, multitudes of most instructive examples from the Scriptures, and from Christian biography, showing affectionate delight in divine truth generally, and in many particular doctrines, as an evidence of grace, prominent, bright and beautiful.

The reasons of this holy affection to the doctrines of the Bible are various. It is *God's* truth. In every Scripture account of it, he hears the voice of his Father and his God. He also perceives the character of God, which he supremely loves, as reflected by each truth of his word. There is also an excellence in the nature of divine truth itself, to his spiritual taste. "How sweet are thy words unto my taste; yea, sweeter than honey to my mouth." Its effects also render it inestimable in its value. Its adaptedness to humble, quicken, sanctify him, and render him conformed to the character of his Lord and Saviour, renders it precious to his soul. He loves it also for its effects on others, as the instrument of their conversion and sanctification to eternal life. He looks upon a world in sin and rebellion against God; sees every where the "stout-hearted and far from righteousness." What, he asks, shall break the power of this rebellion, bring down these stout hearts, stay the enmity of these spirits, bring back these wanderers to God? He remembers "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God," and joins in the prayer of David, "Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O most mighty in thy glory and in thy majesty;" "thy right hand shall teach thee terrible things;" "let thine arrows be sharp in the hearts of the king's enemies, whereby they fall under him;" fall to be subdued, brought to obey and love him. His heart delights in such truths; gives glory to God for them, and for all they accomplish by the power of the

Spirit of grace, to the salvation of man and the glory of God. In short, the Christian feels that his heart is attached to the doctrines of God's word, by cords which nothing can sunder. As he loves the divine character, so he loves divine truth. As he finds satisfaction in contemplating it here, he lives in happy anticipations of spending eternity in the contemplation of it, amidst the glories of heaven. And it is an animating reflection, that if here, where he "sees through a glass darkly," the doctrines of God's word appear so lovely, sublime glorious; what will they be, when contemplated in the light which, to eternity, shall beam from the throne of his Redeemer and his God.

We consider, more particularly, the influence of love to the doctrines of the Bible on the Christian's character, habits of thought, feeling and action. We shall find this part of the subject to have close application for the consciences of professors of religion in this day of fondness for modifications of doctrine, and of professions of new discoveries respecting religious truth.

Love to the doctrines of God's word will lead to prayerful and diligent searching of the Scriptures, to know more of them. The true Christian will desire to be an intelligent one, respecting divine truth. He will be content with no past attainments in the knowledge of it. "I follow after;"—"I count not myself to have apprehended." With the fervent desire to know the truth better which he so much loves, he will look up to his Father and his God, saying, "lead me in thy truth, and teach me, for thou art my God; thy Spirit is good, lead me into the land of uprightness." In forming our opinion of Christian character, we are warranted in building our judgement respecting individuals, as regards this evidence,—love to the truth,—very much on the devotedness and diligence with which we find them enquiring for it in "the lively oracles of God." The professed Christian who lives upon opinions he has gathered, and from lack of interest, or from disinclination, spends little time in his closet with his Bible and his God; is one whose love to the truth is very questionable. For where there is grace in the heart, there is implanted a spiritual taste; and that taste will seek its gratification in an increasing knowledge of these beloved truths.

It will also lead the Christian to seek satisfaction in the various means of advancing in knowledge of it. Conversa-

tion with intelligent Christians, the writings of devout and able men ; plain, faithful preaching of the truth ; will all be highly prized. He finds, with other Christians, satisfaction, like that of the disciples on the way to Emmaus, in "talking together of all these things ;" and his heart will burn within him, through this means, as owned of the Spirit for his quickening. Such a Christian will naturally and easily fall into conversation upon divine truth. He prizes next to the Bible the books which are enriched by large drafts from the pure word. A text of Scripture is a bright spot to his eye, shedding light all around it. The preaching and writings of good men are valued by him, according as they help his conceptions of divine truth. He will sit in the sanctuary, with devout satisfaction while he hears "the voice of the Lord," in his proclaimed truths. It will be to him like the "voice from the excellent glory," which the disciples heard in the mount of the transfiguration. Spoken by a frail and imperfect man like himself, it may be ; yet he will listen to it, "not as the word of man," but as the voice of God speaking through the lips of an "ambassador for Christ." The messenger will be forgotten in the message. He will be conscious, that on the one hand, his devout affections for the truth and the feasting of his soul upon it, will be observed by Him to whose eyes "all things are naked and open ;" and that, on the other, if there lurk in the most secret recess of his soul a feeling which is reluctant at the reception and approval of "jot or tittle" of the doctrines of God's word ; that too will be known to Him "whose eyes are as a flame of fire."

Another influence of love to the truth will be its inducing a jealous care that the head and the heart shall go together. The real lover of the truth will never be satisfied with mere intellectual progress and attainment in it. "Though I understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and have not love, I am nothing."

Another influence of love to the doctrines of the Bible will be to inspire perfect confidence in their adaptedness to do good to the souls of men. Many calling themselves Christians, and among them some ministers, question or deny the profitableness of doctrinal instruction ; and assert the hurtfulness of it ; especially of certain doctrines. Those of the original and total depravity of man, divine sovereignty, decrees, election, the work of the Holy Spirit in renewing the

soul, and the perseverance of the saints, are more frequently distrusted, as to their effects, than others. Respecting these, or any other doctrines set forth in the Bible, it will be the last question a lover of divine truth will ask, 'will they do any good? will they not do hurt?' His confidence in the eternal and "only wise God" will be too childlike, implicit and firm, to permit him to believe that in putting his holy word into the hands of men, he has given them instruction which will "do no good," and may or will "do hurt," as is a frequent allegation in these days. He will remember that which is written, "if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost; in whom the God of this world hath blinded the eyes of them that believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel should shine unto them;" and that also which is written respecting the very ministry of the truth, as being to some, "a savour of death unto death." He will remember that it is not through the unhappy tendencies of these doctrines that any are driven away from Christ and lost; but because they turn them into the means of injury to themselves, by "wresting the Scriptures to their own condemnation." If men will not submit to be slain by the "sword of the Spirit," as wielded by "the power of the Spirit," that they may live unto God; but will violently use it by perversion, to slay their own souls; the Christian proves that "their blood will be upon their own heads." His confidence in it, as of salutary efficacy, is implicit and happy, while he considers the good which it has done to his own soul; and to the thousands on earth, and the "ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands" now in glory. In view of the strange opinions of some, that there are doctrines in the Bible which do hurt; he may ask himself "is it possible that I have entered the kingdom of heaven, not only under hazards from my own wicked heart, the world, and Satan; but in hazard too from some of the very doctrines of the Bible." And his whole soul will recoil at the thought, as if Satan had whispered blasphemy in his ears. No. The Christian, loving the doctrines of God's word, will be willing to leave the effect of every one of them to Him, in the sure confidence that God can and will take care of his own truth.

Love to divine truth is a steadfast principle. We see changes in the minds of professors of religion, at the present day; from professed belief of the doctrines of the gospel, to

an unsettled state of mind, and skepticism respecting them ; and then to positive aversion. This is a dark sign, as respects the true spiritual state of any one. That doctrine of the gospel which a Christian has once loved, he will no more cease from loving, than he will "fall from grace." What is an apparent change, from loving any given doctrine, to distrust of it, and aversion, is only the manifestation of the solemn fact that it never has been loved. Love to the truth is not a thing which will, "like a vapour continue for a little time and then vanish away," leaving the Christian to be "tossed to and fro, and carried about by every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men and cunning craftiness whereby they lie in wait to deceive," and at the sport of the feelings of uneasiness, prejudice and aversion. The truths which the Christian begins to love, he will love to all eternity. The very thought of a change of the state of his affections towards any truth of God, would distress him like the undermining of the foundation of his hope.

The true Christian, as loving the doctrines of the Bible, will be willing to have them embraced in his confession of faith ; and when he joins himself to the visible church, will be willing to declare to men, before God and all heaven, that he believes them. There is in our churches at the present time a singular sensitiveness respecting creeds and confessions. A fear of too great explicitness, and of their embracing unpopular doctrines, has led some churches to revise their articles from plain intelligible English, into a censurable generalness of phraseology ; or a phraseology liable peculiarly to diverse and unharmonious constructions ; which opens the door for those to enter the church who do not love the truth of God. Now if a Christian has "received the love of the truth ;" if the doctrines of the gospel have done his soul good ; if he expects to be sanctified and saved through their means ; what motive can he possibly have for keeping his belief of them secret. If he believes they have been to him "a savour of life unto life," why should he not tell the world so, with the explicitness of language, and the frankness of feeling, which become one who supposes himself to have "passed from death unto life !" Does the man who has been rescued from the borders of the grave, feel ashamed to tell his fellow men what was the medicine which has ministered to his restoration ? And shall the converted man, in whom, through the instrumentality of the holy truths of

God, has been laid the foundation of eternal health,—immortal vigour—be ashamed to tell the world from which he separates himself, in a Christian profession, the doctrines of God which have been blessed to his regeneration? And shall a church of the Lord Jesus Christ, bought with his blood and renewed and sanctified by his Holy Spirit, be unwilling to record in their creed, and show to the world, the doctrines by which they live and grow and thrive; and in which they hope to rejoice eternally in the presence of “the Lord God and the Lamb.” No. That Christian who loves the holy truths of God, will take sacred and sweet delight in giving honour to them and their author, by a full and ingenuous showing of it in his confession of faith. And a church which has not travelled down into the darkness and delusion for which that of Laodicea was so solemnly rebuked, would shrink from the crime of revising any truth of God out of their symbols of faith. Secrets to keep, in matters of faith! Ashamed to tell the world what they believe! If the love of God and of the truth be in them, and in exercise, they would as soon think of making a secret of their hope of eternal life; as soon think of being “ashamed of Jesus.” To those whose breasts have been the seats of such unhappy workings, and whose declarations to the world respecting their faith have become equivocal, we commend the solemn consideration of that word of Christ, “Whosoever therefore shall be *ashamed of me and of my words*, in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.”

Love to the doctrines of the Bible will forbid the substitution of any thing else which professes to be a part of Christian character, instead of a cordial belief of those doctrines. Here is a point of eminent danger with multitudes who are considered converts, and who enter the church, at the present day. Much is said, and with propriety, of “coming out on the Lord’s side,” of “being for God,” “working for God,” and “coming up to the help of the Lord against the mighty.” Along with this however we also have—what surely does not well comport with these things,—much said in depreciation of the importance of doctrines and doctrinal instructions,—and of those doctrines especially which prostrate the pride of the human heart, and show the sinner to himself as in the hands of a holy and sovereign God. The popular voice

calls loudly for what is termed practical preaching, as invidiously contrasted with doctrinal. The professed fears of many attribute to some of those holy truths of God, at which the human heart most reluctates, tendencies which hinder or check revivals of religion, perplex young Christians and introduce disputes. *Do duty, and let alone the truth*, is the substance of too much of the pulpit preaching and private advice which is given to dying men; on whose knowledge and obedience of the truth is solemnly depending the eternal life of the soul. Thus, as it has been well remarked by a sound and discerning minister, "religion is made to condemn the truth." The questions are serious in their bearing on this great practical error. Is it *the love of God* which thus in effect attempts to set *doing* at variance with *believing*? which puts zeal instead of knowledge and "sanctification through the truth?" which professes to bring out the *commands* of God to bear on the consciences of men, while it shuts up the *doctrines* of God, by silence concerning them, or by cautious and timid presentations of them, in which their meaning is misunderstood; or by caricatures of them, which hold them up to derision and contempt?—Love to the truth will be found allied with a belief in such a thing as integrity of Christian character,—of the importance of both doing the commands and believing the doctrines of the sacred word. The true Christian will feel, and act on the feeling, that love to all divine truths is one of the chief corner-stones which constitute the basis of Christian character. The conviction will be settled and immutable in his mind and heart, that he can no more preserve the integrity and consistency of his character as a Christian without being a cordial lover and believer of the whole truth, then he can be a Christian without repentance or "faith toward the Lord Jesus Christ."

Love to divine truth will be an effectual preventive against all uneasiness and dissatisfaction with its doctrines. It is an absurdity in terms,—the idea of a Christian being uneasy and dissatisfied with what he professes to love, and love to which is an essential element of Christian character. What does one who professes himself a follower of Christ declare to a sinful world, which is worthy of a declaration, if not that he is attached to the truths of God's word? There are doctrines in relation to which the feelings of the professor of religion will assist him easily to

perceive the relevancy and importance of this point. Take, for example, the doctrine of the deity of Christ. If you are a true Christian, this is a truth which you love, and in relation to which you feel no uneasiness or dissatisfaction. So of the atonement of Christ; if there be a doctrine of the Bible which you love, surely it is this. So of the free moral agency and accountableness of man; your mind is in no balancing of uneasiness, has no dissatisfaction with this. Here, now, is the doctrine of God's sovereignty, including among other things, "his having mercy on whom he will have mercy;" the doctrine of the original and total depravity of mankind; the doctrine of regeneration, as declaring man's dependence on the renewing power of the Holy Spirit. These are as clearly doctrines of the Bible, as the first named. They have God for their author; are as holy in their character; as essential in the great system of divine truth; are as important to the production of given effects on the heart and conscience of the sinner. They are also to be loved by the Christian. They are so loved. There is scarce a doctrine in the Bible with which Christians have testified stronger satisfaction, than with the doctrine of divine sovereignty, for example: if you are a Christian, you include these last named among the truths which you approve and love. If you call yourself a Christian, and still are averse to these truths; explain this to yourself, if you can, and still keep hold of your hope. If you do love these truths, how is it possible that uneasiness or dissatisfaction with them can have place in your breast? What kind of a Christian must that be, who unites in his experience these strange contraries, love to divine truth, and also uneasiness and dissatisfaction with some of its grand articles. We press this, as a point for consideration, because we see multitudes who are professedly the friends of God and his truth, who sit with a most mysterious uneasiness under the preaching of certain doctrines, and have a very singular sensitiveness respecting their holding a place in their articles of faith.

In this connexion we remark, that love to divine truth will utterly forbid all disposition to be excused from receiving any given doctrine of the Bible, because that difficult questions can be raised respecting it by skeptical men; or because God has not stripped it of mystery, and laid it open to human conceptions. It will also most authoritatively repress all inclination to assent to the cavils of unbelieving

men, respecting the doctrines of the Bible. A *Christian* is the last man on earth from whom to expect such things.

Love to the doctrines of the Bible will constrain the Christian to a faithful and fearless defence of them, whenever he hears them reproached or denied. The true Christian is of a tender spirit, respecting every thing which touches the honour of God. Of the doctrines of his Father's word, which he has received in love, and in which his soul rejoices, he says, "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of mine eye." His soul is hurt, "cast down within him," when he sees them dishonoured by unbelief, held up to ridicule, and contemned; and, above all, when he sees these things in men professing the religion of Christ; perhaps even in the sacred office of the ministry. Living in a world where God speaks by his word, and writes out upon its pages, as with a sun-beam, his glorious "mind and will," he cannot withhold himself from "contending earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints." He hears a voice saying to him, "Speak, and hold not thy peace, for I am with thee." He feels that silence would be to betray the truth. For is not the truth worthy of defence? Is not the God of truth to be feared? Must great doctrines of the gospel, "pertaining to life and godliness," be cast down, and trampled upon; and that, too, in the church, and in the pulpit; and not a son of God lift his voice in their defence? Shall the church yield by one inch after another, "the ground of the truth;" or let presumptuous and unholy hands take away the pillars of its temple, and prostrate it in the dust? Have Christians nothing to do, but to believe the truth for their own good; and may they quietly suffer dying men, with whom they are soon to stand before God in judgement, to trifle with it, to treat it with indignity; and to cast out its name as evil? No; the love of Christ in his true friends will constrain them to do their duty. Girding themselves "with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit," and watching for the divine honour, "with all diligence," they will ever be ready. In every conflict respecting the doctrines of the sacred word, they will be seen wielding "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God;" moving on, firm, faithful, "valiant for the truth." "The Captain of their salvation" will go before them; lead them, encourage their spirits; and make "the weapons of

their warfare mighty, through God, to the pulling down of the strong holds."

But the Christian is not one who delights in controversy, except called to it for the honour of his Lord. He will, therefore, covet more the delightful employment of propagating the knowledge of the truth among men. If his faith in the doctrines of the gospel is not to be hidden in a corner; neither will he shut up the knowledge of them from others. "To do good, and to communicate, forget not," applies to imparting the knowledge of truth, as well as to almsgiving. In this he will have regard not only to the propagation of the gospel in heathen lands, but the promotion of the pure faith among all around him. The very church sometimes becomes in a measure corrupt in the faith; and there arises occasion for saying to many professing Christians, "For whereas, for the time, ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again, which be the first principles of the oracles of God." But not more imperious is the necessity for communicating the truth to the nations which "sit in darkness," than it sometimes is to re-communicate it to those who have once seemed to know it. There is an indistinctness of view in individual Christians, and pervading many of the churches of our land, respecting divine truth, which is both surprising and alarming; and in many professors of religion, an ignorance of truth, and an aversion to it, which is almost heathenish. The Christian enters into the desire of his Lord, to have "all men come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore, he will seek in various ways to aid men's acquaintance with it; will promote their study of the Scriptures as the great depository of divine doctrines; will "reason with men out of the Scriptures;" will promote publications which set forth plain, scriptural, instructive delineations of divine truth; will uphold the preaching of the truth, and endeavour to bring all he can to attend upon its ministrations. In whatever the good knowledge of God's holy truth can be advanced among men, in that he will labour, cheerfully, diligently, humbly; and God will make it to be successfully. For "the truth is great, and must prevail." God may, for a time, permit men to rage against it, and their opposition to check its progress; and the subtlety and ingenuity of false philosophy to perplex and try men's minds, and to lead away into the dark mazes

of error, those who have "not received the love of the truth." And those who thus sin may, for a time, feel encouraged to think, that they shall "cast down the truth to the ground," and yet prosper. But God is all this time saying, "in his secret place of thunder," "I know thy going out and thy coming in, and thy rage against me." And the time is coming, when he will make them tremble and submit; or, as despisers, wonder and perish. "He hath given a banner to them that fear him, that it may be displayed, because of the truth." And "yet a little while, and he (the King of truth) that shall come, will come, and will not tarry;" and will gather around their banner, multitudes that know and rejoice in the truth; and the enemies of it he will clothe with shame. While these things are certain, the lovers of his truth have nothing to do, but to move steadily onward, labouring to scatter the "light of the knowledge of the glory of God." Their hearts' desire and prayer to God shall be answered; and his knowledge will yet fill this fallen world.

There are modes of thinking, and attitudes of mind, in many churches in our country at the present time, respecting several of the doctrines of the sacred word we have named, which make necessary a close application of the subject of this article.

Respecting those who "receive not the love of the truth," it is a solemn, fearful declaration, "For this cause, God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." If men sin against God, persisting in their feelings of aversion to the doctrines he has taught, let them be well aware of the fearful danger to which they expose themselves. If they continue averse to them, their doom is thus foretold. God will not permit men to trifle with his truth. Mark the expression, "strong delusion." Error, inasmuch as it is opposed to the powerful truth of God, is brought forth with the best strength of the human mind, and rendered plausible and almost irresistible, by sophistry and ingenuity. See how one whose mind is not the residence of "the love of the truth," is enticed, led, overcome, ensnared, as he looks upon the plausible delusions of error, in which while the *name* of a holy truth is perhaps retained, its *character* has undergone a complete transformation, so that it is no more the

truth. He says in himself, "How reasonable this looks ; how consistent with the feelings of my heart ; how clear ; here is no mystery ; here are no 'hard sayings ;' all meets my mind." And with some wrested Scriptures, to sustain the ingenious sophistries of unbelief, he draws the conclusion : "This must be the truth." He sits down satisfied, because he has succeeded in getting away from doctrines which were unwelcome to his feelings. "Strong delusion !" binding the soul with its cords of iniquity, perhaps never to be sundered, till death separates his body to the grave, and his soul to the scenes of eternity. Take heed how by "receiving not the love of the truth," you provoke God to send upon you "strong delusion."

That professor of religion has occasion to fear respecting his own spiritual state, who finds himself uneasy, dissatisfied, disposed to dispute against any of the doctrines of the Bible we have named. Ask yourself, "Is my heart right with God ?" What must be the state of your affections toward him whom you call your Father in heaven, if you find yourself excepting against any portion of his revealed will !

That professor of religion has occasion to be anxious respecting himself, who wishes to set aside any doctrine of God's word, on the plea that it is unessential to be believed, in order to salvation ; or, that it is a point of difference between man and man, on which true wisdom is silence. There is in use much language of this description, respecting some doctrines we have particularly stated. The remark is a common one, as a short-hand way of putting down a doctrine,—“This is one of those points which are of no great importance.” Points ! The whole truth of God is made up of “points ;” and every one of them is designed by the Spirit of God, to be “sharper than any two-edged sword.” God has filled his word with these, that they may take effect on the soul of the sinner, and test the state of the professed Christian. And the moment a man winces under their effect, and endeavours to get away from it, he is trying to get away from the sword of the Spirit. And if he succeed, he will at last find that he succeeded, most fearfully, in getting away from being converted to God. It is an opinion gaining considerable credence, and that, too, among those who would feel themselves injured by any questions about their orthodoxy, that they have been converted, and

that others can be, without concerning themselves with the doctrines we have mentioned. Such will find in the end, that they are to prove converted through the means of these as well as other doctrines, and brought into harmony of feeling with them, or that they have not been converted at all. The only wise God knows what effects need to be accomplished upon your heart; and what truths are adapted and necessary to the accomplishment of these effects. If you are to be born again, it will be through the means, and into the belief of these much despised truths. God will not commit himself to the dictation of any sinner, as to the means by which he will be converted. You must submit to the means he has appointed in his *whole* and holy truth.

The opinion has place in the minds of some men in the sacred office, that it is practicable to modify or lay aside these "offensive doctrines," or interweave them with others, so that they shall not be distinctly perceived; that there is what a sensible writer calls "a certain wise way," in which their offence shall be made to cease. Others there are, who go farther, and pronounce them the needless peculiarities of a system; and hold them up to ridicule, under some opprobrious epithet or appellation; and pronounce preachers of them enemies of the conversion of sinners, and of revivals of religion; and pride themselves on converting sinners by an easier way, and in the taking up of the stumbling-blocks out of their path to the cross, by keeping or putting these *hated* doctrines out of sight. And multiplied conversions are counted, as produced by this more excellent way. It is proper to remind such, that the day is approaching, when God has declared, that "the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is;" when it will be seen whether such ministrations have been, truly, building on the foundation God has laid, that which shall abide; or that which God will "consume with the breath of his mouth, and destroy with the brightness of his coming." Take heed of the impiety of the attempt to be wiser than God, in fixing upon the means by which men shall be brought to his footstool.

The assumption is made by those who talk of doctrines which are not essential, or "minor points," that though God has revealed by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and preserved almost miraculously in the world, for six thousand years, his announcements of these truths; yet that it is man's right to sit in judgement on their real value; and if he plea-

ses, to pronounce them unessential. It is a strange fact, that men confessedly unconverted and out of the church, oppose these doctrines as of *some importance*; while men professing themselves Christians and in the church seek to degrade them from their dignity and hide their glory, by pronouncing them unimportant,—“non-essentials.” We are constrained to ask whether of these twain is the greatest offender against God; he who opposes a truth in the acknowledgment of its magnitude, or he who despises it under the pretext of its insignificance?

Now we ask for that Scripture which warrants this so common and popular notion, that there are doctrines in the Bible unessential to be believed. Which is the doctrine of God’s word, on which a minister can be silent and yet blameless? Which is the truth so unessential, that, respecting it a man may live in unhappy, spirit-chafing prejudice, and yet not have to “give account thereof in the day of judgment?” Tell us what is that doctrine of God with which a man may contend, secretly or openly; which he may shut up in studied silence, or openly malign; and yet lie down on his death bed in peace, feeling that he owes to God no repentance, and to man no acknowledgment of dishonour done to the Bible? Can a man pass from fighting against a truth of God, to the bliss of saints and angels bowing before the throne in adoration of his truth?

The plea of the unessentialness of given truths goes upon a principle which would excuse almost any errourist who ever rejected a truth of the Bible. If I may with impunity pronounce one truth unessential; another may declare another so. If I may set aside one truth, which I call unessential, and not endanger my soul; why may not another do the same by two, three, five, which he pleases to consider so, and be as safe as myself? Where is the line which separates between me and the Universalist, the Deist, yea, even the Atheist, in this matter?

No: let no man who calls himself a Christian, and a lover of divine truth, talk of *unessential truths of the ETERNAL God*: of the majesty of heaven sending down from amidst the brightness of his glory, a book in which he trifles with men, by giving them their choice what portion of its announcements they will believe, and what they will set aside as not of sufficient importance to be believed. If you are a sincere lover of divine truth, you will spend no time,

and commit no sin, in making exceptions to doctrines of the Bible; nor in searching for excuses to quiet conscience in withholding your assent from any given truth. On the contrary, you will embrace in the range of your holy affections the whole. You will fear breaking in upon the perfection and harmony of the great system of divine truth, by thus taking away *one*. And if you expect to meet God in heaven as your reconciled Father; and to be owned and blessed, through eternity, as a child of his love; believe him in all the declarations of his truth; and love them,—as you are bound to love Himself,—with all your soul, mind and strength. And be yours the blessedness of the blissful contemplation of all God's glorious truths, in the light which shall beam from his eternal throne!

ART. IV. REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF POPERY.

By Rev. PHILIP F. PHILIPS, Fredericktown, Md.

A History of Popery, including its Origin, Progress, Doctrines, Practices, Institutions and Fruits—To the Commencement of the nineteenth Century.—By a Watchman—With an Introductory Essay by Samuel Miller, D. D. New-York, published by John P. Haven, 1834.

THE Romish Hierarchy has long occupied a prominent place among the powers of the earth,—in some cases exemplifying the political anomaly of a power within a power, but in most cases subordinating (at least in attempt) all other powers to itself.

When speaking of the Romish Hierarchy we do not refer to the church as established in Rome in the days of the primitive disciples, to whom the Apostle addressed an epistle; but to the church of Rome as in its creed and claims it is now, and (with some changes and modifications in infallibility and immutability), as it has been for nearly ten centuries. We refer to the system which makes the church of Rome the "mother and mistress of all churches,"—which teaches subjection to a human head, and comes forth with terrible anathemas against all who dare to doubt its claims.

This system is frequently denominated *Popery*, from the peculiar and distinctive feature in its government. And it is just as proper, as it is, for a similar reason, to call that form of government where the power is chiefly in the hands of diocesan bishops, *Episcopalian*, or that where government is administered by elders or presbyters assembling in council *Presbyterian*, or that *Congregational* which submits questions for decision to the whole congregation.

It is remarkable that while Catholic writers in this country become almost furious when denominated *Papists*, a distinguished writer of their own, the other side of the water, adopts the name, and publishes a book entitled "*The Papist represented and misrepresented.*"

Faber, in his "Difficulties of Romanism," denominates this body of professed Christians, *the Latin church*; and as they keep their creed, send forth their letters, and say their prayers, in this dead language, the name is neither disrespectful nor inappropriate. And as the provinces north of us are appropriately termed *British*, from being under the British government; so may we term these churches *Romish* churches, since the man who governs them is not only chosen without their voice, but has his crown and throne and residence in Rome. We shall therefore without hesitation denominate those who hold the Bishop of Rome to be the universal bishop, *Romanists* or *Papists*, and the system itself *Romanism* or *Popery*.

Towards individual members of this communion, we cherish not an unkind feeling. But to a system so essentially erroneous, so opposed to the word of God, and the dearest rights of man, as we deem this to be, we can never be reconciled. We would examine it, and ask others to do it, with the same spirit with which we are willing our own faith should be examined,—with the spirit of honest enquiry, and with a continual reference to the word of God.

The history of Popery in all its bearings, political and moral, is of vast importance in estimating the past changes and present condition of the world. An examination of the Feudal System, of the maxims and practices of chivalry, of the crusades, are important for the same purpose; but their influence is brief and limited when compared with the wider and more enduring dominion of the papal hierarchy.

When the pretended successor of St. Peter claimed the use of both swords, and began in the name of the Deity to use

them, the influence of this usurped authority was every where felt. A new despotism was established over mind, which extended through most of the civilized world. Every interest of man was affected by it. The king held the sceptre of government by a new tenure, and the subject was bound in his allegiance, or absolved from it, by a new authority. Not only the flames of martyrdom, and the extended massacres which sometimes carried desolation through whole nations, but the revolutions, insurrections, and gun-powder plots of the political world, can, in many cases, be traced to his Holiness, or some of his agents.

Public morals throughout Christendom received, at the same time, a severe shock. The Bible is the most powerful means for counteracting human depravity ; but its perusal was forbidden. It is, indeed, the divinely appointed means ; and no invention of man can supply its place. Revelation is the sun in the moral heavens ; but it passed into a long and dreadful eclipse, and the night of the dark ages succeeded. A moral pestilence walked in that darkness, the traces of which are still visible. The difference between Spain and Scotland, New-England and Brazil, are mostly attributable to the same cause. The student cannot possibly understand the past history and present condition of the world, without understanding the character and tendency of Popery. The system has cast a shadow over the world itself, which, though broken by beams of light, still remains ; the final passing away of which will, we trust, be the precursor of millennial glory.

The history of Popery is important also in ascertaining the nature of the system itself. The claim of infallibility precludes the possibility of change, and places the seal of present approval upon all the past. Any change, whether it *re-formed* or *de-formed* the church, would prove that the church were wrong either before or after the change took place ; and thus their claim of infallibility would be overthrown. The doctrine of infallibility was very important in promoting the ambitious schemes of the court of Rome ; but it was very inconvenient in other respects. When a false step had been taken, or a gross error adopted, it was not a little unpleasant to be compelled to maintain it. Their adherence to the position once taken, is not to be viewed as simply the obstinacy of ignorance clothed with power, but a course which necessity dictated ; though a necessity created by their own fault.

In accordance with the doctrine of infallibility, whatever they have done, they do now, and must always do. To support the character they have assumed, they make this their general aim, though the deviations and contradictions exhibited in their course, furnish a sorry comment upon the claim of infallibility.* Let a person become acquainted with their history, even as recorded by their own authors, and their claim to infallibility will appear as superlatively ridiculous, as it is pre-eminently blasphemous.

We say then, let those who would know what Popery is, examine its history. The materials are abundant. Our ancestors knew its character and abhorred it. Some of them sealed their testimony against it with their blood, and going cheerfully to the stake, were burned with their Bibles, which they had been guilty of reading, suspended to their necks. What they were compelled to learn by observation and experience, we can learn from history; and we must, as a nation, understand it, or our ignorance will be our ruin.

The history of Popery is not only thus important, but contains also much that is *wonderful*.—Wonderful, that the most pure and benevolent religion ever presented to man, should be made the pretext of, and in its perversions, the apology for, persecutions the most relentless, cold-blooded and cruel the world ever saw! Wonderful, that such iniquitous designs should be so long prosecuted undetected. Wonderful, that a man professing to be a disciple and minister of the meek and lowly Jesus, should literally set his foot upon the neck of kings, and compel them to hold his stirrup and to kiss his toe! Wonderful, that crowned heads should so long submit to such indignities and assumptions!

The system devised to sustain these, and other enormities in the ingenuity of its structure, and in its long continued influence, stands without a parallel upon the pages of history. The Pope and his helpers succeeded in making men believe, that the sanctions of the Divine government belonged also to his,—that, holding the keys of heaven and hell, he could hurl anathemas against the disobedient, which

* An examination of their practical infallibility, is like observing the vibrations of a motionless body. It is infallibility continually contradicting itself, or immutability constantly changing. Take the following as a specimen: Pope Adrian, with his whole synod, did deliver to Charles the Great the right and power of electing the Pope, and of ordaining the Apostolic See. This was contradicted by other Popes, admitted by Pope Leo eighth, and again contradicted by the Council of Trent. *Barrow on Sup. of the Pope.* p. 341.

would settle in curses upon them, adhere to them like their very existence, and torment them in whatever world they were found. The man who could wield these elements of power, who, according to his own claims and the almost universal consent of mankind, was the representative of God upon earth, might despise the laws of nations and the power of civil rulers with impunity,—teach his adherents to imitate his example, and shield them in their rebellion; and this, according to the testimony of history, he did, whenever it suited his inclination.

That must have been a subtle and most efficient engine of power, which could reduce a refractory prince to subordination, with about the same certainty that it reduced the most abject of his subjects. On the other hand, it was but a feeble resistance a prince could offer to this power, when on account of disloyalty to the Pope, his subjects could be reduced to the utmost distress by a papal interdict, and threatened with the tremendous thunder of utter excommunication and final damnation in the name of the Almighty. The following brief description will show the nature of a papal interdict. “The sentence of interdict was the great instrument of vengeance and policy employed by the court of Rome. It was denounced against sovereigns for the lightest offences, and made the guilt of one person involve the guilt of millions, even in their spiritual and eternal welfare. The execution of it was calculated in the highest degree to strike the senses, and to operate with irresistible force upon the minds of the people: the nation was of a sudden deprived of all exterior exercise of its religion; the altars were despoiled of their ornaments; the crosses, the relics, the images, the statues of the saints, were laid on the ground, and, as if the air itself were profaned and might pollute by its contact, the priests carefully covered them up, even from their own approach and veneration. The use of bells entirely ceased in all the churches; the bells themselves were removed from the steeples, and laid on the ground, with other sacred utensils. Mass was celebrated with shut doors, and none but the priests were admitted to that holy institution. The laity partook of no religious rite, except baptism to new born infants, and the communion to the dying. The dead were not interred in consecrated grounds, but were thrown into ditches, or buried in the common fields. Marriage was celebrated in

church-yards. The people were prohibited the use of meat, as in Lent, and were forbidden to salute each other in the streets, or so much as to shave their beards, or give any decent attention to their persons. Every circumstance carried symptoms of deep distress, and apprehension of Divine vengeance."*

This sentence was pronounced against England by Pope Innocent in the thirteenth century, on account of the disobedience of King John. The interdict not being effectual in restoring that king to loyalty, it was followed by excommunication. Then, indeed, John began to feel the misery of his situation, as no civil or military officer would serve under an excommunicated king. Still, however, he kept his place, and the Pope took the next step, which was to absolve his subjects from their oaths of fidelity and allegiance, and to declare every one excommunicated, who had any intercourse with him, public or private. He not only gave permission, but an absolute command, to the people to violate their oaths to their sovereign. Before the final sentence of deposition was issued, the king was compelled to submit, and deliver up his kingdom into the hands of the Pope.

In addition to these general considerations, there are others, peculiar to our times and country, which most urgently demand an examination of the whole system of Popery.

Reflecting men have for years anticipated, what is now indeed begun, an attempt to import and establish that system of superstition in this land of civil and religious freedom. This is evidently a favourite scheme at present with the court of Rome; one that is enlisting the efforts and co-operation of the whole papal world. For the accomplishment of it, they have commenced a series of special efforts. One form of action, in addition to the means under the controul of the "propaganda de fide," is the organization of voluntary associations, under the patronage of some of the principal members of the holy alliance.

Another circumstance which gives impulse to their movements, is the restoration of the order of Jesuits. Now that the world, as it is supposed, have forgotten their manners and morals, this order is restored, even after having

* Hume's History of England, Vol. 2. Chap. 4. McGavin's Prot. Vol. I. p. 170.

been banished from every country in Europe. They are the best disciplined corps ever established for extending and perpetuating the conquests of Popery. Concerning this order, Hume has said, that "by the very nature of their institution they were engaged to pervert learning, to refine away the plainest dictates of morality, and to erect a regular system of casuistry, by which *prevarication, perjury, and every crime*, where it suited their ghostly purpose, might be *justified and defended*." These corruptors of public morals the Pope had need of, and he has therefore restored and employed them. Not only is Popery strengthened by the revival of this order, but infidelity, superstition, avarice and ambition, are rapidly rallying under its banner; and they do not come uninvited or unrewarded. It offers to infidelity the gratification of vengeance on the religion of Christ, to superstition its appropriate element and nourishment, to avarice the gains of purchased indulgence, and to ambition the promise of sovereign rule.

It should also be borne in mind that our government tolerates all religions and that our rulers are elective. That a hundred thousand foreigners are landed annually upon our shores, most of them under the controul of ecclesiastics appointed abroad, and bound by oath to support the claims of the Roman Pontiff. In the light of these considerations we would ask, "is it not possible that Popery may in an evil hour, by adroitly adjusting herself to some party interest, seize the reins of our government? Suppose it done, and all our free institutions would wither, as leaves touched with frost. Suppose it done, and what is the prospect presented to every other class of our citizens? What says the record of past ages, the experience of the exiled, persecuted, worn out servants of the Lord in past periods of the world to this question? What could any who differ from them expect but the dungeons of the inquisition, the fire and fagots of persecution?"*

In this crisis of our country's history, when it is so evident that the system of Popery is to be presented to our whole nation either with Jesuitical sophistry and concealment, or in the language of truth, it is encouraging to see that the reading community are turning their attention to it. The change from almost total indifference has been produced

* Preface to the History of Popery, page 21.

with unprecedented rapidity. There is a quickened movement in the world of mind; the press is meeting the rising demand. More has probably been published during the last three years in our country, on the subject of Romanism, than had been published in thirty previous years. Among the works which have been sent forth from the press, in addition to the able controversies recently collected and published, may be mentioned "*McGavin's Protestant*," a work of immense value, which has passed through eight or ten editions in England, within a few years. Another is "*Cramp's Text Book of Popery*" which, as it contains authentic documents from the *Holy Council of Trent*, the decrees of which every priest and monk has sworn most solemnly to defend, ought to be studied by all who desire to know what this system really is. Much greater reliance can be placed upon this source, than upon the statements of living teachers of that body among us, who believe that no faith is to be kept with heretics, i. e. Protestants, and that in some cases falsehood may be more expedient than truth. *The Rhemish Testament* with the authorised notes and commentaries of infallibility, has also been published, and may be profitably consulted for the same purpose. Also *Fulke's learned Refutation of the Rhemish notes*. *Barrow on Papal Supremacy* is a work of great erudition, in which the doctrine in question is perfectly exploded, and the iniquitous means by which it was gradually established are also exposed. To these may be added, *Viller's Prize Essay on the influence of the Reformation*.—*The life of Luther by Scott*.—*The History of the Reformation in France*.—*The People's right to read the Scriptures defended*.—*The Secret instructions of the Jesuits*.—*Secrets of Female Convents disclosed by Scipio De Ricci, a Roman Catholic Prelate*.—*Henry and Antonio from the German of Bretschneider*.—*The Difficulties of Romanism by Faber*.—*Pascal's Provincial Letters*, and *The History of Popery by a Watchman*. This last mentioned work, which it is our present purpose to introduce to the acquaintance of our readers, is presented to the public with an introductory address by the Rev. Dr. Miller, of Princeton. Of his ability to speak upon this subject, and of the value of such a commendation of the book, it would be needless for us to testify.—In these works the character of Popery is disclosed in truth and faithfulness. They will lead to investigation, and that is all that the cause of truth

requires. Many who have wondered at the firm ground recently taken by the Protestants, if they would only examine for themselves, (as in the name of truth and our common country we beg they would do,) will be astonished and confounded at the testimony produced on this subject. A general analysis of the work we have selected for notice, is furnished in the title page itself, in which the author informs us that his *History of Popery* includes its *origin, progress, doctrines, practice, institution and fruits*, to the commencement of the nineteenth century. To traverse so wide a field, and bring the results within the compass of a small volume fitted for general circulation, necessarily required brevity and condensation. In the first chapter our Author notices the *origin* of Popery, traces the early deviations from the Scriptural simplicity of primitive church government to the final attainment of universal ecclesiastical power by the Bishops of Rome, and also his acquisitions as a temporal prince, by the aid of Pepin of France, which last event occurred about 756. In the second chapter he notices the events preceding and contributing to the rise of Popery, mentions the favour of secular power under Constantine and his successors,—the decline of science,—the neglect and banishment of the Bible,—and the gradual conformity to Paganism, which early commenced in the introduction of images and the rites of idolatry into religious worship. In the third chapter the Catholic argument for the supremacy of the Bishops of Rome is examined; and in the fourth, early historical testimony is brought forward upon the same subject, in the course of which the following paragraphs occur, which present the general results from this investigation; page 57—

"From these historical facts the following conclusions are demonstrated, viz: 1. A general council of the Christian Church assembled at Calcedon in the fifth century, knew nothing of Papal supremacy, for they passed a decree absolutely incompatible with it. Secondly; a general council of the church thus sanctioned the principle that clerical precedence in the Church is not derived from divine appointment, or succession to the Apostles, but from the dignity of the cities which were the seat of clerical influence and power. Thus, on the ground that Constantinople was equal in dignity to Rome, the council decreed that the Bishop of the former ought to enjoy the same honours and prerogatives with the Bishop of the latter. This decision cuts up papal pretension root and branch. For if supremacy derived from Peter had been then known, such a decree would not then have been passed. The supremacy of the Pope then, as has been suggested, was founded on the supremacy of the city where he dwelt. The rival pretensions which have been stated gave rise to dreadful wars and abominable crimes. The Bishop of Constantinople, elated with his success, and the favour of the imperial court under which he was protected, did not hesitate to attack the Roman Prelate, and wrest from him some of his provinces. The

Roman Pontiff, in his turn, inflicted grievous wounds on the eastern Bishops. And these quarrels about precedence between those who claimed to be Fathers and Pastors of the church, show beyond all question that both parties were merely wolves in sheep's clothing, for they wasted and devoured the church for their own aggrandizement. The Roman Bishop was on the whole most successful in his enterprizes of ambition."

The fifth chapter exhibits the progress of Popery for twelve centuries succeeding its rise, its claim and exercise of unlimited power spiritual and temporal, interference with civil governments, internal conflicts and corruptions, sale of indulgences, establishment of the inquisition of order of Jesuits, &c. The views of our Author on several points may be seen in the paragraph which follows, page 60.

"The beginning of the seventh century was marked by three important events in the history of the church, and of the world. The proclaiming of the bishop of Rome universal bishop, the establishment of image worship in the Christian church, and the rise of Mahometan delusion. In regard to the newly created and proclaimed Pope, scarcely a year elapsed from the commencement of this sacerdotal empire, when the very idolatry which had been so strenuously opposed by preceding bishops, was not publicly established and patronized by the sovereign pontiff. The ancient Pantheon, formerly the general sink of all abominations of paganism, was now restored, though under a different name, to its original destination.

"The mediatory demons of corrupted Christianity, occupied the vacant places of the mediatory demons of the Gentiles. Instead of Jupiter and his kindred deities, the Virgin mother of Christ, and all the martyred saints, received the blind adoration of the revived ten horned beast."

Having traced the progress of Popery to the nineteenth century, our author, in the subsequent chapters, introduces the following topics, viz: *The doctrines, idolatry, persecutions, superstitions of Popery,—prophetic views of Popery from the Scriptures, and its moral influence.* These topics are necessarily treated with great brevity, yet sufficiently extended to give definite and correct information. A work of this kind was much needed. Before we saw it announced, or heard of its preparation, we frequently heard a wish expressed, that such a work might be prepared for the American public. We think the author has rendered essential service to the cause of truth, and that the work will be extensively useful. Its value would, in our opinion, have been greater, had references been frequently made to *undisputed authorities*, or had the principal positions been sustained by larger quotations from the decrees of the Council of Trent, or some other of their approved standards. Should another edition be called for, we hope this will be done, either in the body of the work, in notes, or in an appendix. We are not aware

that the author is chargeable with inaccuracy or exaggeration in a single statement. But there is a class of readers predisposed to suspicion, especially where any of the great forms of error are exposed. To such readers, frequent references to Papal books would be serviceable.

After looking at the history of Popery, what, we are constrained to ask, has this system accomplished? The temporal interest of individuals has been promoted, schemes for the gratification of avarice and ambition have been formed and executed with unparalleled success, while all that is sacred in Christianity, has been prostituted for these purposes. But where are the sublimer trophies of this sublime system found? To diffuse the light of divine truth, to elevate the lower classes of society, to improve the condition of man, to lead the wandering back to holiness and to God, they have done nothing, absolutely nothing. We do not mean that there have been no individuals among them inclined to promote the cause of piety, but when any of this description appeared, they were evidently exceptions. We speak of the tendency of the system, and of those practices not only the most common, but which were sanctioned by the highest authority. When men have appeared as the advocates for purity and truth, amid prevailing corruptions, their works have been condemned, as were Pascal's and Quesnel's. If they have pressed the point of reform, they have been frequently either publicly executed under false pretences, or privately assassinated, by some deluded hireling of Popery.

For all the appropriate objects of Christian and philanthropic association, they have attempted nothing and done nothing. But we cannot say, that they have been either indolent or inefficient. They have excluded the Scriptures from general circulation, thus hiding the lamp of heaven, and taking away the keys of knowledge. They have corrupted the gospel, both in its doctrines and morals. They have banished piety, which is the soul of the church; but they have not buried the body; they have only multiplied their rags and robes about it; but as these have no embalming power, the whole mass hastens to putrefaction. They have succeeded in uniting civil and ecclesiastical power, until the world has groaned beneath the unhallowed union. They have compelled the governments of Christendom to a most degrading submission to ghostly power. They have taught civil rulers (in

the language of Pope Pius seventh, as late as 1809) that "their sovereignty is subjected to our throne."

Under their auspices, there has been a march of mind, but it has been backward into paganism. They have professed to convert the heathen to Christianity, but in doing it they have converted Christianity to paganism, consecrating the temples of the heathen gods and goddesses into temples for the worship of the Virgin Mary; filling them with the images of saints, and teaching their disciples to bow down to them and worship them. They have exhibited such perversions as have filled many enlightened countries with infidelity. They have sent, and are still sending, hundreds of thousands of their votaries to the graves of saints and other holy places. They have forbid to marry, and "commanded to abstain from meats, which God hath ordained;" thus filling out the picture drawn by the prophetic pencil of the great apostle.

There is one question we wish to notice before leaving this subject; we refer to the question, "whether the Roman communion have any just claims to be recognized as a church of Christ?"*

This question has been much discussed of late by able men. While we speak on it with unfeigned diffidence, there are in our estimation a number of considerations which are separately and alone enough to settle this question in the negative.

The argument derived from *prophecy* is, we conceive, conclusive. The language of prophecy is so clear and explicit in reference to Popery, that its fulfilment is considered a striking proof of the inspiration of Scripture. "I have known" says Bishop Watson "the infidelity of more than one young man happily removed by showing him the characters of Popery delivered by Paul in his prophecy con-

* There is no question relating to the Catholic controversy more difficult, than the one here discussed. In the judgement of Luther and the other Reformers,—of Protestants generally—of the majority of American Christians, and especially of the Fathers of our Church, the Catholic communion should be acknowledged to be a true church, though very corrupt, and its ordinances accordingly be admitted to be valid. To this opinion we strongly incline. There are, however, many difficulties attending it, and the opposite opinion is supported by powerful arguments, which ought to be seriously weighed. The difficulties attending the common doctrine, and the arguments of the validity of Catholic ordinances, are stated in the remarks which follow, and are here published as a defence of one side of a disputed point, with the expectation that the arguments on the other side will be soon presented to our readers.—Editor.]

cerning the man of sin (2 Thess. 2: 1), and in that concerning the apostacy of later times (1 Tim. 4: 1). Dr. Whitaker, Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, at the commencement in 1582, supported this Thesis—*Pontifex Romanus est ille Antichristus quem futurum Scriptura prædixit*, i. e. the Pope of Rome is that Antichrist whom the Scriptures foretold as to come.* Such has been the agreement in the interpretation of these prophecies, that the following proposition had been called a pillar in the Reformed faith, "That the Hierarchy of the church of Rome is the 'little horn' of Daniel, 'the man of sin' of St. Paul, and the 'Antichrist' of St. John."—But believing, as we do, in common with Protestants generally, that the Romish communion is the great predicted apostacy, that it is the "man of sin;" and "son of perdition," we cannot, at the same time regard it as a church of Christ. The word of prophecy, which is the testimony of Jesus, does not thus speak of his followers and friends.

Some have endeavoured to obviate this difficulty by maintaining that these expressions apply to the hierarchy, and not to the laity of this communion. There is, however, as we conceive, no ground in the Prophecies themselves, or in the general character of the body, for this distinction. We believe with the early Reformers and with many conscientious Romanists, that corruption has long prevailed "*both in the head and members.*" But even if this distinction could be established, it would only present to us a community without officers, and without ordinances, or a laity ministered unto by the predicted emissaries and servants of Satan, which could not of course be a church of Christ. For our part, we cannot even think of the position that this is the church of Christ, but there rises before our vision its terrible portrait drawn by the prophetick pencil. We see the *man of sin*, exalting himself against God, wearing the names of blasphemy, corrupting the whole earth, drunk with the blood of saints; and we ask, Is this the Bride of the Lamb pure and spotless? Is this the body of whom Christ is the Head?

It has also been justly remarked in reference to these predictions, that there is no intimation that this apostate body will be reformed, but that it is to be destroyed. Individuals therefore connected with it, who may be enlightened by the truth, are not to remain in it with the hope of reform-

* See Dr. Miller's Introductory Essay, p. 15.

ing it, but are to come out from a body which Christ has disowned, that they be not partakers of its sin and doom.

We admit that the gospel was preached at Rome, and a church of Christ established there; but there is no promise and no proof that it was to remain there to the end of time. There is an unauthorized conception of immutability associated in our minds with whatever has a divine origin. We know that whatever God doeth, it is forever; but in the moral as in the natural world, it is by the laws of order amid the laws of motion,—permanency in the midst of change,—continued identity through renovation and decay,—life and death,—the path at once of ruin and resurrection. Civil government has high authority, for it is written, “there is no power but of God;” “the powers that be, are ordained of God.” But civil government has been in constant fluctuation; the sceptre of empire has passed from hand to hand, and earthly kingdoms have not only constantly changed their boundaries, but continually passed away like the waves of the restless sea. So amid dying generations, and incessant change, may the kingdom of Christ be continued upon the earth. Firmly do we believe that the Lord Jesus Christ ever has had, and ever will have a church in the world. It was not always to have geographically the same centre and the same circumference. It has not always been seated upon the seven hills, and been awed by the thunders of the Vatican. The gospel was preached in Jerusalem and Antioch, and churches were established there, before it was carried to Rome. The church of Christ was visibly organized in the family of Abraham, before Rome was built.

We may be aided in the examination of this question by comparing the history of the apostacy of the Jewish church with that of Rome. In maintaining that the Jewish church was once the church of God, we are on common ground. It is also generally admitted, that they have long ceased to sustain that character, and possess now no claim to that appellation. Theirs was once a visible organization, owned of God, and preserved by miracle. We may not be able to fix upon the day when the Jewish church ceased to be the true church; but evidently that day arrived, before they condemned and crucified the Holy One and the Just. The light of prophecy, the peculiar privilege and divine guide of the Jews, lingered amid the desolations of Zion, until the advent of the Messiah, and then directed the eye and faith of the devout to the Infant Redeemer and to a new and

more glorious dispensation. From their high elevation the Jewish church have fallen, though not beyond the possibility of return. The Apostle Paul in his letter to the church of Rome, by referring to the excision of this visible organization once in living union with Christ, taught plainly the possibility that the church at Rome might be broken off. "If," said the Apostle in the language of solemn warning, "he spared not the natural branches, take heed lest he also spare not thee." If in the history of the past, we learn from the language of inspiration, that one church has fallen and another *may* fall, the only questions that remain are, what amount of corruption in doctrine and practice must exist before a church is to be reckoned wholly apostate, and has the church of Rome reached this point?

We suppose it safe to affirm, that whatever error renders salvation impossible to an individual, would, if held and propagated by a church for ages, destroy all claims of that church to the appellation of Christian. It will be remembered that where in the Scriptures the sins are enumerated which exclude from heaven, disjunctives are employed, and it is written that "*neither* idolaters nor adulterers, nor thieves, nor drunkards, shall inherit the kingdom of God." In the same way we suppose there are some errors, that are fundamental, which being taught by a church, identify her as apostate, and make her instructions *another gospel*. We presume that there are some nominal Roman Catholics, who are real believers, and who will be saved; just as there are some nominal Protestants, who are really unbelievers, and will consequently be lost. But we trust there are few Protestants, who after looking through the decrees of the Council of Trent, would maintain salvation to be consistent with the adoption of the whole system. With the glaring idolatry of its worship, with the self-righteousness of its spirit, and superstition of its doctrines, true piety can surely never exist. These decrees are a summary of Papal doctrine. But not only is idolatry taught by them, but blasphemy, treason, and murder. These are solemn charges, but an examination of authentick documents will sustain them. The claims and pretensions of the Pope, have ever been accounted blasphemous.* The treatment

* "The portentous doctrine of *infallibility*, as it is employed in the Catholic church, stamps an entirely new character on the Christian religion, substitutes a *new object of faith* and dependence, *deifies what is human*, hides and cancels what is divine, and transfers our allegiance from God to mortals." See Works of Robert Hall, vol. 2. p. 567.

of hereticks by the Catholics is *murder*, as the fires of Smithfield and Constance, the cells of the Inquisition, and the bones that moulder in almost every plain in Christendom can testify. And when they have absolved subjects from their oaths of allegiance, excited insurrection and rebellion, taught that no faith is to be kept with hereticks, what is this but treason? We cannot believe, apart from all error in doctrine, that any body of men, though as ancient in their organization as the leagued army of rebelling angels, have any claim to be recognized as a church of Christ, who have for ages authorized and practised murder.* They have taken away from the word of God,† and we have no doubt God has taken from *them*, as a church, all the blessings of his grace. They have added to it not only the Apocrypha, but their own vain and contradictory traditions and decretals, which they pretend to be equal to the word of God, and God has evidently begun to pour out upon them the plagues that are written in His book, which will doubtless be continued, till they shall be consumed by the spirit of His mouth, and destroyed by the brightness of His coming.

* That we may not be considered as misrepresenting, we invite attention to the following laws extracted from a document called, "the Constitution of Pope Innocent 4th."—It was enacted the 31st of October, 1242, by the *highest authority of the infallible church, which never erred and never changed: That Hereticks are to be taken up everywhere, and consigned to the Inquisitors.*

That the favours and abettors of hereticks are to be punished, as well as hereticks themselves.

That Inquisitors are to be favoured everywhere.

That impenitent hereticks are to be burned alive!

See these, and above twenty more similar laws, in McGavin's Protestant, vol. 2, p. 431.

The following is a specimen of Papal commentary and Papal doctrine on the same subject from the notes in the Rhemish Testament, published by the authority of the church of Rome and for the sole purpose of disseminating her tenets. Rev. 17:6; "And I saw the woman drunken of the blood of saints." Annotations. "The Protestants foolishly expound it of Rome, for that *there* they put hereticks to death, and allow of their punishment in other countries. But *THIS* blood is not called 'the blood of saints,' no more than the blood of thieves, man-killers, and other malefactors; for the shedding of which by order of justice no commonwealth shall answer."—Matt. 13. 29. "Lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you may root up the wheat also together with it." Annotations. "The good must tolerate the evil, *when it is so strong* that it cannot be redressed without danger and disturbance of the whole church, and commit the matter to God's judgement in the latter day. Otherwise where ill men, be they *hereticks or other malefactors*, may be punished or suppressed without disturbance and hazard of the good, *they may and ought* by publick authority, either spiritual or temporal, to be chastised or executed."—Nothing can more fully teach the right to persecute unto death than the notes upon each of these passages of Scripture, while those upon the last inform us, why toleration is ever practised. It is simply and *confessedly* because they have not always, and in every place, power to persecute.

† The second commandment, because it condemned their image worship; see catechism of the Council of Trent.

The Apostle informs us, that the Jews were broken off for unbelief; and as the iniquity of the Catholic communion has accumulated far beyond the single crime of unbelief, so is the evidence of their apostacy increasingly strengthened.* We know that it is affirmed that they still hold to the fundamental doctrines of the gospel, and ought on this account to be recognized as a church. But if they hold the truth, they hold it in unrighteousness which is open and manifest to all men. But their profession of holding fundamental truth, is a mockery. They profess to believe there is one God, and yet they worship many,—the mother, and Ann, the grandmother of God, besides saints and angels, idols and images innumerable, with the same apology for the worship which was rendered by the ancient heathen. They hold, it may be, to one Mediator between God and man. Yet they add a Mediatrix in whose name more petitions are probably offered in one day, than are offered in ten days through Jesus Christ. They also add ten thousand mediatory saints and angels. They hold, it may be, *professedly* to justification through the merits of Christ; yet they add the daily sacrifice of the mass, works of supererogation, penance, purgatorial salvation and other traditions by which the doctrine of justification is not merely obscured, but utterly superseded. The same may be said of all the principal articles. Where, therefore, are their fundamental doctrines?—stated, and then perverted; adopted, and then contradicted; written in their standards, and then made void by their traditions, and absolutely nullified by equally authentic documents.

Of the *sacraments* which Christ instituted as seals of covenant mercy, and external signs of covenant union, *they have none*. They speak indeed of seven, but five of them are *superstitions*, and the others *perversions*. The first part of this proposition no Protestant will ask us to prove; nor do we think any person who follows the word of God, will on examination doubt that the other two which *they call sacraments*, are justly denominated *perversions*. The Apostle Paul, addressing the Corinthians, says, “as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do show forth the

* John Knox frequently declared and proposed openly to prove, that the Church of Rome in his day was more corrupt than the Jewish Church, when they consented to the crucifixion of Christ.

Lord's death till He come." Now the Romanists never *even profess* to eat this bread and drink this cup. They profess that while the priests drink some blood, they worship; and then eat flesh, receiving into their mouths not the flesh only, but the soul and divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ, and this not in remembrance of the death of Christ on Calvary "*once for all*;" they compel him to suffer and die every day. *Thus every priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins.** But surely this is not the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. None who have learned the design and import of this simple, but affecting memorial of divine love, as found in the word of God, can fail to see that the institution is *radically changed*, and the ceremony they have substituted in its place an *utter perversion*. Further to justify our remark concerning what they denominate sacraments, we submit the following account of their ceremony, called *Baptism*, extracted from a report made upon this subject to the last General Synod of the Reformed Dutch Church.

"In opposition to the simple Scriptural form, the Papists have enacted a great variety of absurd and superstitious customs. The first is the *Exorcism* to drive the devil out of the person baptised. To effect which expulsion, the priest breathes three times upon the subject's face, as they say, to blow Satan away, and, most impious fallacy! to iuflate the child or adult with the Holy Ghost, instead of the devil, whom they have expelled. The priest then makes the sign of the cross with his dry thumb both on the forehead and breast; then he puts some salt into the mouth, commands Satan to come out, and makes another sign of the cross on the forehead. After which superstitious observances, the priest again exorcises the evil spirit, and next rubs the mouth, ears and nostrils with his saliva. The priest then proceeds to the font, and taking up the consecrated water, as it is called, pours it on the head three times in the form of a cross: which is followed by making a cross with oil on the top of the head; and placing a lighted taper in the hand of an adult, or into the hand of the infant's sponsors. These acts are a little varied in reference to a person of mature age; for he receives the sign of the cross, which is the apocalyptick mark of the Roman priest, on his forehead, ears, eyes, nostrils, mouth, breast, shoulders, and three others

also over his whole person." When in connexion with this, we take into view their teaching concerning the meaning of this ceremony, the premised subjection to the Pope implied in it, and the necessary intention of the priest, we may see the truth of the statement in the report above quoted, that "it is an obvious fact, cognizable by the eyes and ears, that neither in spirit, letter, form, element, meaning or design, of the Popish superstitious ritual, is the appointment of our Lord Jesus Christ exemplified."

We ask them concerning these ordinances of the church of Rome, whence are they? from heaven or of men? If from heaven, why do Protestants dare to secede from legitimate authority? If of men, why are they recognized? But there are other difficulties in adopting the theory, that the Papal communion is the church of Christ. If it is, then the church of Christ has persecuted unto death her own people; for surely no Protestants will doubt, that the Latimers and Ridleys and Cranmers, the Waldenses and Albigenses, and the thousands who have died for their faith in France and other Papal countries, were true followers of Christ. When Christianity has been accused as the cause of bloodshed, we have been accustomed to vindicate it, by denying this to be Christianity;—we have affirmed that Gospel weapons are not carnal, but spiritual;—that it requires us *to bless and curse* not, and that these crimes belong to an apostate body who claim the name, while they have lost both the spirit and doctrines of the Gospel. Upon the other hypothesis this difficulty seems to us insurmountable. If the Romish communion is the church of Christ, then it has, by its highest authority, and through a long succession of ages, by precept and practice, persecuted unto death the followers of Jesus. The Saviour identifies his people with himself, and says "inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these, ye have done it unto me."—If the Jewish Sanhedrim could no longer be the judicature of the church of God, when it condemned Christ to the cross, neither do we think the Roman Hierarchy can be, when it sits in judgement upon His followers, and condemns them to torture and to flames.

But the opinion we are opposing brings, as it seems to us, a heavy reproach upon the martyrs themselves. They contended about unessential matters, and resisted legitimate authority. They might have thrown away their Bibles and consciences, prayed to Mary and Ann, ascribed divine attributes to a man, worshipped the Crucifix, bowed down to

the wheaten God, and received the mark of the beast. If these are essential and fundamental errors, then the body that enjoins and maintains them have established another gospel, and is not the church of Christ. If otherwise, and the Romish communion is the church of Christ, then the martyrs are chargeable with disobedience, and all Protestants with schism.

With regard to the question of succession, it can be explained in various ways, the least plausible of which would be attended with fewer difficulties, than the supposition that would make this body a part of the church of Christ.—It is the opinion of many, and is sustained by much elaborate investigation, that there has been a succession of witnesses, through the Waldenses, Albigenses, &c., in a line without the pale of the Papal dominion, and extending back to the age of the Apostles. This position preserves the principle of succession, without any dependence upon the Roman Hierarchy.

It is the opinion of others, that as the corruption of the Romish church was gradual, we are not to consider its apostacy consummated until after the era of the Reformation. Many substantial reasons can be assigned for this. A standard for the truth had been lifted up. Those who were willing to renounce human teaching, idolatry, and superstition, had been invited to join it. Thousands had complied. A reformation among the Romanists had been called for by the more candid and conscientious of that body. All attempts of this kind had been resisted, while great numbers who had laboured for it, forfeited their lives. To settle all contested questions, and professedly to reform abuses, the Council of Trent was summoned. In this council the climax of error was attained, and if never before, *now* at least the “man of sin” stood revealed,—the mystery of iniquity, and the abomination of the whole earth. But if we take the decisions of that council for the crowning act of their apostacy, we have no difficulty with regard to the question of succession, as the Protestant churches were then regularly organized in many parts of Europe.*

* In maintaining that the Romanists have utterly apostatized, we do not suppose it necessary to settle the precise time when this took place. We do not imagine that the day or the hour when the Jewish church apostatized can be settled. In both cases it is unnecessary. It has been replied to this difficulty, that we may not be able in a cloudy evening to ascertain the moment that the sun sets; but a few hours of subsequent darkness is enough to prove that it is night.

There are others again who maintain the impossibility of tracing legitimate succession back to the days of the Apostles even upon the principles held by the Romanists themselves, as (to say nothing of their doctrine of *intention* by which all their ordinances may have been nullified,) there have been schisms and contentions agitating that body, and even three Popes at the same time claiming supremacy.— But while this class of persons maintain that the thread of succession is imaginary and untraceable, they maintain also that it is unimportant. They further hold that any community of Christians, were they without officers and without organization, and were they so situated that access to these was impossible, are competent to originate them for themselves—“For where two or three are gathered in the name of Christ, he is there;” and that sustained by His presence and guided by His word, they might set apart men for the sacred office, upon whom would thenceforward be devolved the duty of executing and perpetuating their office.

We suggest these several ways of meeting the supposed difficulty concerning succession, only observing that the position which fixes the era of the total apostacy of the Catholic church at the meeting of the council of Trent, unites (as far as we are able to learn) the greatest number of minds.

It has been asked, and should be asked often by those who profess the truth and desire its prevalence, why have the triumphs of the Reformation ceased? Is that system so despotick in its power, so debasing to man in his present condition, so blighting to his future hopes, to prevail forever? We may magnify the point under consideration, but we are inclined to think that much of this want of success is owing to the erroneous ground taken by Protestants. We fear that with the hand of mistaken liberality, they have held a shield over a body, that has apostatized from God, trampled upon his word, established idolatry, lifted the arm of rebellion against the Lord's anointed, and bathed the sword of persecution in the blood of saints;—and this, too, while they have received the word of God as their guide, and while they profess to have found this apostacy clearly announced, and announced, too, as the mystery of iniquity, the man of sin, and son of perdition. We fear that there has been here no remote approximation to the sin of calling *evil, good*.

And we are confounded when we think, that these posi-

tions are maintained, too, by men in our own times, who are worthy of being ranked as defenders of the truth with Calvin, and Luther, and Melancthon. We may be asked, whether our positions do not condemn the course pursued by these early reformers? We answer, that when these reformers entered upon their conflicts with Popery, nominal Christendom was in a state of transition. A separation between the followers of the gospel of Christ and the gospel of Rome, had not then taken place, nor had the scenes of Trent been enacted. But the circumstances of the church have changed, and the condition and creed of her most untiring foe is now known, or may be known, to the whole world.

We have no great hopes for the prevalence of truth until the whole Protestant world, walking in the light of divine revelation, moved by that charity which "rejoiceth in the truth," and cherishing opposition only against sin and error, shall cease to recognize as the church of Christ, those who have a *new rule of faith, a new Lord for their conscience, a new foundation on which they build, new objects of worship, and a new way of salvation.*

We believe that Jesus Christ, and he only, has power to enact laws for the government of the church, and we can, therefore, receive no other, not even the decrees of him who is profanely styled "our Lord God, the Pope." We will not make unto ourselves any graven image, nor any likeness of *any thing*, not even of the *crucifix*, nor of Mary, Ann, or Winefrede; nor will we render either to them or any of the saints, their bones, or relics, any kind of worship superiour, inferiour, or mixed. Nor can we recognize as Christians those that do. And as there are many among those who are nominally Roman Catholics, especially in enlightened countries, who affirm that they do not adopt these errors, but that they do, with us, reverse the word of God, and trust alone in Christ for salvation, with no other feelings but those of love to the truth, and regard for the salvation of men, we would entreat them to examine the system with which they stand connected, in the light of revelation; for to them do we most firmly believe, is the voice from heaven now addressed: "*Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues.*"

ART. V. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

By LEONARD WOODS, D. D.

NUMBER IV.

IN the last Article on the Philosophy of the Mind, I enquired what influence the *acts of the will* have over the *affections*. If the distinction which I have made between the acts of the will and the affections, is kept in mind, this enquiry is intelligible and important. If not, what does it amount to? If the affections are considered as acts of the will, then the influence the acts of the will have over the affections, is the influence which some acts of the will have over other acts of the will; and the influence which the *will* itself has over the affections, is the influence which a faculty has over its own acts. And what is the influence which a faculty has over its own acts, but simply its putting forth acts? And what is putting forth acts, but acting? To say then, that the will exerts an influence over its own acts, is the same as to say, that the will *acts*. If it is any thing more, what is it?

This way of considering the affections as acts of *the will*, is, as we have seen, attended with a manifest inconvenience. For if you call the affections, as well as volitions, acts of the will, then you include under the same head two classes of mental acts which are essentially different, one class being in themselves morally good or evil, and the other not. And you yourself recognize the distinction, when you speak of the affections being influenced by the acts of the will. For surely you do not mean to speak of the influence of one thing over another, when both of them are of the same kind. And if they are not of the same kind, how can we discourse about them without confusion, if we include them both under the same name? Those who call the affections acts of the *will* are obliged to divide the acts of the will into two classes, and to mark these classes by distinct epithets, one class as *immanent* or *generic* acts of the will, and the other as *emanent*, or *imperative* acts of the will. Now the constant use of these epithets would be cumbersome. But if you omit them, and call both classes *acts of the will*

merely, how can you discourse about them with clearness? I speak particularly of philosophical discourse, in which precision and exactness are necessary. The same as to *voluntary*. If you make it include not only those bodily and mental acts which follow a volition, but the volitions or acts of the will themselves; you must say in each case in which sense you use it, or you will expose others to mistake by using a word ambiguously. Suppose you say the moral affections are *voluntary*. I enquire for your meaning. Do you mean, that the moral affections are *consequent* upon a *volition*? You reply, no. Why then, I ask, do you use an expression, which, according to its ordinary meaning, would convey that sense? If you mean merely, that the affections belong to the *moral faculty*, which has generally been called *the will*, and if, when you say the affections are voluntary, you mean, that they are of a moral nature, and that we are answerable for them; I acknowledge that this may be well enough for the purposes of common discourse among those who understand the word *voluntary* as you do. But as most men would understand you to mean, that the affections move *in obedience to a volition*, the expression would generally occasion a mistake.

The reason why it is supposed by many, that we can be accountable for nothing except what is *voluntary*, has already been suggested. In regard to our external, visible actions, and certain mental actions, it is true, that we are accountable for them only as they are voluntary, that is, subject to the controul of the will. From these we get an impression that *all* the actions which we are accountable for, are voluntary, and under the influence of this impression, we frame our language, and then apply it to quite another kind of actions, that is, the affections, and call *them voluntary*, not indeed to denote that they are controuled by a volition, but merely that they are of a moral nature; and that we are accountable for them, *as we are for those bodily and mental actions which depend on a volition*. I am far from wishing to be strenuous about a particular word. But it is certainly important to avoid ambiguity in our language, and to mark those things which are different by different words. And as I have often noticed, and even lately, the confusion of thought which arises from using the words, *will*, *volition*, and *voluntary*, in a loose indefinite manner, I shall adhere to the sense in which these words are used by Locke, Aber-

crombie, and others ; and shall do it with the more satisfaction, because there is a manifest leaning to this sense in the minds of common people.

No doubt some readers have had a difficulty arise in their minds respecting the position which I have taken. *If it be so that our affections are not under the direct influence of the will, and often not under even its indirect influence, then how are we accountable either for the one or the other ?*

If, as an objector, you propose this enquiry to me, my reply is, that I am under no more obligation to answer it, than you are. My business is to show what is *the fact* in regard to the influence of the will over the affections. Is it true, that we exercise our affections because we *will* to exercise them, and *as* we will to do it ? If we find it to be the case, that our affections are thus controuled by a volition, then we will admit the fact, and make it a part of our system of mental philosophy. But suppose the history of our mental operations proves, that our affections are not governed by an act of the will. Is not this to be admitted ? is it not to make a part of our system of philosophy ? Or will you say, that it cannot be so, and that, if we are accountable for our affections, we must be able to controul them by an act of the will ? Examine the subject then thoroughly, and make experiments upon yourself, till you are fully satisfied. If after all, you find the fact to be as I have stated, will you still say, *it cannot be, and if we are accountable for our affections, we must be able to govern them by a volition ?* But suppose you find that your saying this, will not make it so, and the stubborn fact still comes out to view, that our affections are not under the controul of volition. What will you do now ? Will you turn caviler, and say, *why doth he yet find fault ?*

While you are contemplating the fact, that the affections are not controuled by volition, take care not to overlook another fact, which is attended with the highest kind of evidence,—the fact that you are a moral and accountable being, and that you are good or bad, praiseworthy or blameworthy, according as your affections are. You know this intuitively. You are conscious of it. Unless your moral nature is perverted, you are as certain of it, as of existence. And it would be no more unreasonable and foolish for you to doubt your own existence, than to doubt your

moral and accountable agency. It is a fact, that you are a moral agent, and that you are accountable for your affections, whatever may be the manner in which they are excited. The constitution which God has given to the mind, must be perfectly right, and the very fact above stated, which is sometimes thought inconsistent with moral agency, is doubtless essential to it. If the affections, instead of being excited by suitable objects, were governed by a mere act of the will, there would be an end of rational and accountable agency. The ground-work of moral good and evil would be taken away.

My present purpose requires this one point to be settled, namely; that, in making out a system of mental philosophy, our single enquiry must be, *what is matter of fact?* How that which we find to be fact, can be reconciled with moral agency, is another question, and no more belongs to us, than the question, how the magnetick power can be reconciled with gravitation. If, however, any one takes upon him to assert, that the fact which I have insisted upon in regard to the affections, is inconsistent with moral agency, it will be incumbent on him to prove his assertion. And I should hope, that an attempt to do this, would convince him of his mistake. Every man is most certainly chargeable with a mistake, who supposes that perfect moral agency is inconsistent with any thing which we find to be a fact in the constitution of the mind. The laws of the mind are not only consistent with moral agency, but essential to it. These laws it is our object, as philosophers, to discover. And if we would be successful in our enquiries, we must proceed without any shackles. We must be governed by no prepossession. We must have no such impression as this, that the affections *must* be governed by the will, or we cannot be moral agents. An impression like this would certainly prove an embarrassment to us, and would prevent an impartial attention to evidence.

The supposition, that we are more accountable for our volitions, than for our affections, is, I think, wholly unwarrantable. It rests on the assumption, that our volitions are in themselves, moral acts, and that our affections are not so. But, in truth, what is there in the class of mental acts called volitions, which leads you to consider them morally good or bad, more than the other class, called the affections? Do you say volitions are more properly our own acts

than the affections? But how does this appear? Are not loving and hating as much our own acts, as willing and choosing? Do we not exercise as high a degree of activity, in the former, as in the latter? Is there any thing in ourselves or in others, which we more spontaneously pronounce to be right or wrong, praiseworthy or blameworthy, than the affections? What can be more obvious, than that the affections are in themselves of a moral nature, and have no need to borrow a morality from volition? Some appear to think, that if we only give the name of *volitions*, or *acts of the will*, to the affections, the difficulty is relieved at once. But does it alter the nature of mental acts, or make us more accountable for them, to call them by a particular name? Are not the mental acts referred to, perfectly the same, when you call them *affections*, as when you call them *acts of the will*?

But I come to the chief object of the present number; which is to show, that instead of the affections being under the direct influence of the volitions, just the opposite is true, namely, *that the volitions are under the influence of the affections*; and that, instead of the affections deriving their moral character from any acts of the will, *all acts of the will derive their moral character, so far as they have any, from the affections*.

To illustrate the first of these points, I shall adduce a few examples. And a few examples will be sufficient; because, if we find what the laws of the mind are in a few instances, we know what they are in all instances of the same kind.

I ask then, why does a Christian *will* or *determine*, to devote a part of his property to the cause of missions? And why does a pious youth *choose* or *determine* to quit his secular business, and prepare for the ministry? And why does a Christian, when duty requires, *choose* to suffer persecution for the name of Christ? What is it, in each of these cases, that *influences* or *determines* a Christian thus to *will* or *choose*, and thus to act? Obviously he does it under the influence of his pious *affections*. He does it, because he loves Christ and the souls of men. He is conscious that this is the *motive*, which leads him to such a volition or choice. It is equally evident, that a wicked man's volitions or determinations, arise from his affections. Why did Judas *will* to betray Christ? Because he had a selfish, avaricious,

resentful heart. It was *fear*, which influenced Peter to deny his Lord. *Ambition* prompts a Cæsar and a Napoleon to engage in war. The same in other cases. It is universally acknowledged, it is a fact perfectly familiar to us, that the particular acts or determinations of the will, whether right or wrong, are influenced by the affections. The affections, including the emotions and passions, are eminently *the principles of action*. Without these, how could we act at all? And without *moral* affections, how could we perform moral acts, or have any volitions or determinations which are of a moral nature? If the acts of the will do not flow from the affections, why may it not be, that a man who has no love to God, will choose to labour and suffer for God just as much as if he had love? And why may it not be, that a person whose heart is full of benevolence towards his fellow men, will choose and determine to treat them, and actually treat them, with unkindness and cruelty, just as though he had the opposite affection of hatred and revenge? If the affections do not govern the acts of the will, you can never anticipate what your voluntary conduct will be, from your knowledge of your own heart. For example: if you are a parent, and have a strong and tender affection for your children, you cannot conclude from this, that your treatment of them will be different from what it would be, if your heart were full of spite towards them. Is it not perfectly clear, that all our expectations as to the voluntary acts of men, proceed on the principle, that their determinations and consequent actions will be influenced by their affections? And do not all our attempts to influence their determinations and acts proceed on the same principle? Do we not always endeavour to move their affections, in order to influence their determinations or choices? The volitions or acts of the will, and the conduct resulting from them, are the natural utterance of the heart. They are the way in which the affections act themselves out. And without this efficacy of the affections, there is no conceivable way in which we can put forth acts of will. If any man will watch the operations of his own mind, and attend carefully to those maxims of practical wisdom which flow from experience and observation, he will find abundant evidence of the principle, *that the affections govern the acts of the will*. Whatever external objects are presented before us, our affections are the real, ultimate motives which influence us in our volitions. That

we have a motive or a reason for our choices, is implied in the fact, that we are rational; as it will be seen on a moment's reflection, that our choosing or willing any thing without a motive, (if such an absurdity can be conceived of,) would imply the want of rationality. This subject is treated particularly by Edwards in his treatise of the Will; and his main position in opposition to the notion of a self-determining power of the will, is supported by arguments, unanswered, and unanswerable. The principle which I maintain, is clearly implied in our moral and accountable agency. For we could never regard a volition or choice, which should take place without any motive, as either morally good or evil. An essential condition of a moral act would be wanting. If you require proof of this, I produce the fact, that there never was a moral agent, whose will was self-determined in the sense above suggested. And that this is a fact, I show by appealing to every man's experience and consciousness. If you deny the fact, I shall require you to produce some instance, in which a moral agent put forth a volition or determination of will, without any motive. And if you produce yourself, as the moral agent who has done this; I shall regret that you think so meanly of yourself, and shall do you the honour to say, you are mistaken.

If it is necessary to consider this matter farther, I would ask the reader, whether he would think it a desirable thing to be able to put forth acts of will which should be wholly uninfluenced by the affections. Would you regard it as a privilege to will and to do what is contrary to every affection and disposition of your heart? Would it gratify you to be so constituted that, while all your affections move towards God, and delightfully rest in him, your *will* might put forth choices in opposition to him, and so lead you to open disobedience? Such might be the result, if your will should break loose from the controul of the affections, and put forth its acts in some other way. What distraction would be so dreadful as this? To reduce man to such a condition, his rational and moral constitution must have a tremendous and unheard of shock. Happily for us, our intellectual and spiritual constitution is secured against such a calamity as this, by the appointment and ever-present agency of the being who made us.

The other point mentioned above, namely, that *the character of every volition depends on the character of the*

affection from which it proceeds, is equally evident. If our volitions are the result of a *moral affection*, we necessarily consider them as of a *moral nature*, whatever may be the outward object acting on the mind. For the outward object can get access to the will and influence its acts, only through the affections. It is the affection which comes in contact with the will, and determines the character of its acts. If the affection which prompts the volitions, is right, *they* are right, that is relatively; and a relative rightness is all they can have. If the affection is wrong, the volitions flowing from it are also wrong. And when I speak of volitions in this way, as flowing from the affections, I mean to include the mental and bodily acts which are connected with the volitions, and which are, on that account, called voluntary. And on the other hand, when I speak of these mental and bodily acts, I mean to speak of them as implying a volition, and as resulting directly from it.

The principle which I here advance, that the character of our volitions is according to the character of our affections, is nothing different in meaning from the common maxim, that our conduct is right or wrong according to our *motives*. For the motives of our conduct ultimately consist in the affections. This principle is acted upon continually and instinctively, whether men judge of their own conduct, or that of others. You see a man give money to a benevolent Society. You immediately approve of the act. You say it is a good deed. Why? Because, as the appearance is, you naturally ascribe it to a good motive, that is, to a benevolent and pious affection. But suppose you find that the action, which appeared so benevolent and pious, really proceeded from a selfish, base motive. You now change your mind as to the action, and the choice of the will to perform it. You cannot but judge of these according to the inward motive that prompted them; or, to speak more exactly, you cannot but judge of the *person* according to the affection which he exhibits in his conduct. Take another case. Suppose your first impression is, that a man *wills* and *acts* from a bad motive. You accordingly feel disapprobation. But suppose you afterwards discover that you made a mistake, and that his motive was good. You at once change your mind as to the character of the volition and act, or rather, as to the character of *the man*.

The judgement which we form in such a case, is found-

ed on the immutable principles of our intelligent and moral nature. We cannot judge our own volitions, or the volitions of others, to be either praise-worthy or blame-worthy, without referring to the governing affection, or motive. Every sentiment of approval or disapproval in regard to the acts of the will looks ultimately to the inward motive from which they spring. The Scripture confirms the truth of our position, when it represents *love* to be the whole of what is required of us as duty. Various voluntary actions are indeed required, but they are required as expressions or fruits of love. If any volitions or voluntary acts of ours could be morally right, separate from affection, how could it be true, that all the law is comprised in the precepts requiring love?

There are some important points of a practical nature, resulting from the foregoing discussion.

First. In our addresses to our fellow men, we should avoid every mode of expression which implies, that their affections depend on a volition, or spring directly from it. This, as we have seen, would be inverting the established order of mental operations. We have seen, too, that the goodness of our volitions, which is only a relative goodness, presupposes the goodness of an affection, and flows from it; and we should avoid every representation which implies the contrary. If we teach, that a sinner's loving God depends on his *willing* or *resolving* to love, or if we exhort him to *will*, *resolve*, or *determine* to love, as the way in which he is to exercise love; we violate the order which the Author of our being has established, and attempt to put a kind of force upon the mind, and to bring it to act contrary to its own unchangeable laws. It is under the influence of this mistake, that persons awakened to serious and anxious reflection, so often waste their time, and misapply their faculties, in striving to bring themselves to love God, and to believe in Christ, by *willing* or *resolving* to do it. They erroneously suppose, that they can produce the affection by an act of the will.

If you ask, then, what shall sinners be directed to do? I answer, *just what God requires*. His commands are perfectly reasonable and right. Nothing can be more so. They require that, and that only, which it is right for men to do. These commands are to be the matter of our directions. If God commands sinners to believe in Christ, we are to announce this command to them, and to direct and

urge them to perform this important duty. If he requires them to love him with all the heart, we, who are his messengers, are to require them to do the same. What should we direct them to do, if not to obey the divine commands? Now, if God does not direct sinners to *will* or *determine* to love him, as something distinct from actually loving him, why should we? Do you ask, how they can love without first *willing* or *resolving* to love? It would be more to the purpose to ask, how they can do it *by* willing or resolving to do it, seeing the affection is not excited by the power of a volition. If we wish to bring men to exercise holy affections, we must exhibit the proper objects, or present the proper motives of such affections. And if men are convinced of the importance of right affections in themselves, and really wish to exercise them, let them fix their minds intensely upon the proper *objects*, and diligently contemplate the proper *motives*, instead of relying upon the direct influence of an act of the will to excite the affections. If we have a clear view of spiritual objects, if our attention is duly awakened, and directed to the great motives to holy love which the word of God presents, and the moral state of our minds is right; there will be no occasion for an act of the *will* to intervene, in order to excite our love. A perception of the objects is all that is necessary. As soon as we see the glorious character of God, we love him. The affection flows forth spontaneously in view of that object. If, when we contemplate such an object, no love is kindled, and we resort to an act of the will to excite the affection, we give conclusive proof that our heart is not right. And we know it would be totally unsafe to rely for the renewal of the heart either on external motives, or on the power of a volition, as that great work is effected, not by "the will of the flesh, nor by the will of man," but by the Spirit of God.

You may say then, the efforts of ministers to exhibit divine truth and to persuade sinners to repent, and the efforts of unregenerate men to bring themselves to repent, are, according to this view, wholly in vain, and all are reduced to a state of inaction and despair. The objection seems to amount to this; unless ministers can convert sinners by instruction and persuasion, *without the effectual operation of God*, their labours are in vain; and unless sinners can convert themselves, or bring themselves to repent, by their own voluntary efforts, *without the special influence of the Spirit*,

they are reduced to a state of inaction and despair: Now, as to ministers, one word will be sufficient. If they have received the testimony of the sacred writers, they know and feel, that "neither he that planteth, nor he that watereth, is any thing;" that they cannot, of themselves, turn sinners to God, and that their labours would forever be in vain, were it not for the promised influence of the Holy Spirit to render their labours successful. It is their dependence on the special operation of God, that encourages and animates them in their work, and fills them with hope that their labours will not be in vain in the Lord. As to the tendency of the views which I have exhibited to reduce sinners to a state of despair, I have but a few things to say here. First, the requisitions of the law and the gospel are all right, and sinners ought immediately to comply with them. Secondly, those who refuse to comply, are wholly without excuse, as there is nothing which hinders their compliance, but the obstinate wickedness of their hearts. Thirdly, if instead of requiring holy love, we should require of them a *volition* or *resolution* to love, and if instead of requiring cordial and holy obedience, we should require a *resolution* or *determination* to obey; this would be taking upon ourselves the fearful responsibility of essentially varying the divine requisitions; inasmuch as a volition or resolution of sinners to love and obey is entirely a different act from loving and obeying, and neither implies love and obedience, nor produces it. If we direct sinners to such a volition or resolution to love, as the means of exciting love, we commit an obvious mistake, and involve them in the danger of spending their time in fruitless efforts to do what they ought to do at once, without any such efforts. If their hearts are right, they will love God, without trying to love. But if we direct sinners to a volition or determination to love God, as a *substitute* for love, and as that which will answer the divine requisition, for a time at least, without love; we commit a still greater mistake, and expose them to still greater danger.

As to the despair of impenitent sinners, what is it but an obstinate refusal to obey the holy command which God gives them, and to accept the gracious offer of eternal life which he makes? They despair, because God will not be pleased with any thing short of what is right, that is, holy love, and faith, and obedience. They say, require any thing of us which we can do in our unregenerate state, and we

will do it. With such a heart as we have, and from a regard to our own happiness, we can wish, and resolve, and determine to love God. And this we do. But if you say, this will not answer, and insist upon our exercising holy affection, which we cannot do in our unregenerate state ; you reduce us to a desperate condition, and we know not what course to pursue. Permit me to say in reply, that the condition of sinners, is in fact a dreadful one, and so far as relates to any thing which they, of themselves, will ever do to obtain salvation, it is *desperate*. And the sooner they are made sensible of this, the better ; so that they may give up every hope, except in the sovereign mercy of God, and may find rest to their souls by trusting in an almighty Saviour. We cannot vary the directions which Christ and his Apostles give to sinners, and which require them to love God and obey his word, without any delay. We cannot accommodate our instructions to the depraved hearts of men ; nor can we admit, that their depravity is any kind of excuse for their refusing to repent and obey the gospel. And we cannot substitute any volition or resolution arising from a selfish heart, in the place of that love which God requires. Instead of contenting ourselves with requiring of sinners any act which is destitute of holiness, because *they* are destitute of holiness, we must in the name of God, enjoin upon them the duty of *becoming holy* ; not the duty of *resolving* to love God, and believe in Christ, but the duty of actually *loving* and *believing* ; and must charge them with being highly criminal, and altogether inexcusable, if they do not immediately perform this duty. And we must tell them, and endeavour to make them feel, that just so far as they find it difficult or hard to love the all-perfect God, or to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, they show themselves to be exceedingly sinful, and deserving of the divine displeasure. And it seems to me unquestionable, that what we do, by giving instruction, and by urging gospel motives, for the direct purpose of bringing sinners to *repent*, to *believe*, and to *love*, will be much better adapted to do them good, and much more likely to accomplish the great object aimed at, than any efforts we might make to excite them to the performance of those acts which fall short of repentance, faith and love.

Secondly. The principle which I have maintained respecting the influence of the affections over the acts of the

will, furnishes an easy and satisfactory explanation of what the Scripture says as to the bondage of sinners, and what the old writers say as to the *slavery* of the will. The sacred writers represent, that the wicked are in a state of *servitude*, and that none are *free*, but those who belong to the kingdom of holiness. To be in a state of *servitude* or *bondage* in the Scripture sense, is to be under the dominion of sin, to be governed by depraved affection. To be *free* in the Scripture sense, is to be free from the bondage of *sin*, and be under the dominion of holiness. The old divines spoke of the freedom and bondage of the will in the same sense. And unless you keep this in mind, you will be liable to mistake the meaning of many of the best writers of former days. When they asserted that since the fall, the human will is deprived of its *freedom*, and is under *bondage*, they meant something very different from what is meant at the present day, when it is asserted that *free will* belongs to all men alike, whether good or bad. *Freedom of will*, as now commonly understood, is an essential property of a moral agent, and denotes a freedom from physical force. But freedom of will was formerly understood to be the property of those only, who are the followers of Christ, and denoted freedom from the dominion of corrupt affection. In the controversy which took place respecting *free will* in the time of Luther and Calvin, and afterwards, those who maintained the freedom of the will, denied the natural and entire depravity of man. They held that the will is not wholly subject to a sinful heart. Those who denied the freedom of the will, held that man is by nature wholly depraved, that all the acts of his will, while unregenerate, are influenced by his corrupt heart, and that none enjoy freedom from the slavery of sin, but those who are brought into "the liberty of the sons of God." According to this use of the words, which fully corresponds with the Scripture use, our saying that the will of every natural man is *enslaved*, would mean, not that his will is governed by his *affections*, (which is common to all, whether good or bad,) but that it is governed by *sinful* affections. And our saying that the will of those who are holy is *free*, would mean, not that their will is free from the dominion of the affections, (which is not the case with any,) but that it is free from the dominion of *sinful* affections. And it is certainly with very good reason, that the degraded state of those who are in subjection to depraved

affection, is called *bondage* and *slavery* ; and that the happy state of those who are delivered from the dominion of depraved affection, and whose will is brought under the dominion of holiness, is called *freedom* and *liberty*.

Finally ; as it appears that the determinations of the will, and of course all the voluntary actions, are governed by the affections, and as the state of the affections is the basis and the substance of the character ; we see how important, how absolutely indispensable it is, that we should have *the renewing of the Holy Ghost*. The great and essential work of the Spirit is, *to rectify the state of the affections, to renew the heart*. This work is not effected by any efforts of our fellow-men, nor by any acts of our own will. It is specially, pre-eminently the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus we see that the philosophy of the mind, rightly understood, teaches the same humiliating truth with the Scriptures,—that we are in a state of moral ruin, utterly lost, and that there is no help for us but in God.

ART. VI. ANALOGY OF REVELATION TO NATURE.

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THERE are two opposite faults often committed at the present day in reasoning about religion. The first is, the fault of those who object to receiving any thing as taught by revelation, unless it is made out, that nature also teaches the same thing ; who insist, that every doctrine of revealed religion, must be confirmed by some analogy found in nature, or it wants its full proof, and must be denied, or held as of very little account. There are three objections against trying religion by such a test.

First. It is presumptuous in us to say, that God shall reveal nothing of which he has not given previous intimations in the works of creation and providence. It is sufficient that by these works, his eternal power and godhead are fully proved, and distinctly seen by the willing enquirer ; that a miraculous revelation has been sufficiently

attested, the religion of which the most devoted worshippers of human reason will allow to be more reasonable, than any which has ever been devised without its light. To object to a doctrine of revelation, that it wants analogies in nature, is to say in effect, that God shall tell us nothing by direct revelation, unless he tell us the same thing by natural works—a presumption, of which we may well beware.

A second objection against this reasoning is, that we understand nature so imperfectly, and advance in natural science so gradually, that we should be extremely cautious of determining, what is the language of nature on any given point,—what are its indications or analogies. They have been very differently understood in different ages. It was once held as an undoubted truth, that this earth was the centre of the universe, all the heavenly bodies revolving round it once in twenty-four hours. Now, on the principle, that we must find for every doctrine of revelation analogies in our knowledge of nature, the men of a former age might have objected against the wise and benevolent purposes of God, that this great central world, around which all others revolve, and for which all others were created, is filled with vice and misery, and unworthy the complacent regard of infinite benevolence and perfect holiness. We know how justly one might have replied, Be not hasty in judging; future discoveries may correct our impressions of what nature teaches. Why should we doubt that future discoveries may also convict us of haste and ignorance, when we presume to say, that this or that doctrine of revelation finds no analogy in nature?

Unbelievers have objected to miracles recorded in Scripture, that they are contrary to the regularity of nature, which we never see interrupted, and have never heard to be interrupted in any other history allowed to be credible. But the investigations of late years have brought to light a history of indisputable authority, which plainly declares, that the regular order of nature has been repeatedly interrupted, and miraculous power repeatedly exercised on this globe. This history is found in the strata of the earth. For the researches of modern geologists have fully proved, that this earth has repeatedly undergone violent revolutions, which have destroyed its inhabitants, after each of which, it has been restored to a more perfect form, and new races of animals have been created upon it, more perfect than the

former. Thus natural science clearly proves a direct miraculous interference of God, in the affairs of this world. Thus it refutes the dream of infidels, that man and the other animal races have existed eternally, or have been through many ages advancing to their present improved organization. The animal remains found in the earth prove, that there has been no such gradual change, but that after each great revolution, new races have been created as perfect as they have ever come to be.* These discoveries do not contradict the account given by Moses of the creation. We have only to suppose, that having simply stated the creation of all things "in the beginning," he passes over long intervals of creation and destruction, of which it was not necessary for his readers to be informed, and comes at once to an account of the last restoration of the earth from universal destruction, when man and the present race of animals and plants were created.

The fact proved by natural science, that the earth has often been desolated, sometimes by water, and sometimes by fire still existing probably in its central parts, and that a new and fairer world has each time arisen on the ruins of the old, confirms the credibility of Peter's declaration, that "the heaven and the earth which are now, are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgement and perdition of ungodly men? Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."

A third objection to this mode of reasoning is, that even when the facts are well known to us, we may mistake their language, or may fail to make a just application of them; and thus while we are objecting that a doctrine of revelation is not in accordance with nature it may yet accord perfectly with facts, the import of which had been overlooked by us. Thus supposing the facts before alluded to directly proving a miraculous creating power to have been repeatedly exerted on this earth, to be unknown, there is another class of facts well known, which, though often made use of to disprove all miracles, do really afford a strong presumption in their favour. In the words of a modern fine writer: "I maintain, that the multiplicity of false miracles, far from disproving, gives support to those on which Christianity rests. For first, there is generally some foundation for

* Hitchcock's Geology of Mass.

falsehood, especially when it obtains general belief. The love of truth is an essential principle of human nature: men generally embrace error on account of some precious ingredient of truth mixed with it, and for the time inseparable from it. The universal belief of past ages in miraculous interpositions, is to me a presumption, that miracles have entered into human history. Will the unbeliever say, that it only shows the insatiable thirst of the human mind for the supernatural? I reply that in this reasoning, he furnishes a weapon against himself: for a strong principle in the human mind, impelling men to seek for and cling to miraculous agency, affords a presumption that the Author of our being, by whom this thirst for the supernatural was given, intended to furnish objects for it, and assign it a place in the education of the race.”*

Thus the objection, that miracles are discordant with nature, overlooks the consideration, that the human mind is a part of God's works,—as much so, as the visible creation. The natural tendencies and expectations of the human mind ought certainly to be taken into account, when we undertake to determine what God will probably do, and how he will teach us his will and our duty.

The other and opposite fault to which I alluded, I consider as much less dangerous. It is reasoning as if it were of no importance, to find the declarations of revelation illustrated and confirmed by analogies in nature. True, the simple declaration of God's word is sufficient. But in matters of so much moment, we may well be allowed to find a satisfaction in making “assurance doubly sure;” in hearing the heavens, and other parts of creation, declaring the glory of God in strains accordant with those of revelation. Paul himself did not hesitate to appeal to the things which are made, and to the law written in natural conscience, in confirmation of revealed truths.

Few doctrines of revelation have been oftener assailed with the objections in question, than those involved in the Incarnation of the Word of God. The apostle evidently regarded these as holding a prominent place in the Christian system, when he urged upon believers the propriety of coming boldly to the throne of grace, from the consideration, that he who sits on the throne, to whom we make our confessions and address our prayers, is capable of human sym-

* Channing's Discourses, pp. 75, 76.

pathies—one who can be touched with a feeling of our infirmities (Heb. 4: 15, 16). He had before shown, that the high priest there seated, was justly addressed in such language as this : “Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever.” “Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hand. They shall perish, but thou remainest; and they all shall wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail.”

The apostle proceeds to show how He of whom these things were spoken, became a little lower than the angels, and took part of flesh and blood, that is, assumed human nature. For this assumption, two reasons are given; first, that through death he might destroy him that hath the power of death. He was made lower than the angels for the suffering of death, and this death was designed to make reconciliation for the sins of the people (Heb. 2: 9, 15, 17). It is implied, that in his original nature, he was incapable of such suffering, and that in order to it he must become man. A second reason assigned for his becoming man, is, that having suffered himself, being tempted, he might be able to succour them who are tempted; that from his own experience, he might know the sorrows which men endure, and thus, that they might approach him with a fuller conviction that he sympathizes with their sufferings, and is ready to afford all needed aid. What the apostle had stated in the conclusion of the second chapter, he repeats in a different form at the conclusion of the fourth. “For we have not an high priest who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.” The inference to be drawn from such promises, is immediately added: “Let us, therefore, come boldly to the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need.”

One might think, that the apostle had thus made it sufficiently plain, what is the meaning and the design of the mystery, “God manifest in the flesh.” But the obvious sense of his language has been a thousand times set aside, on the plea, that it is too abhorrent to all our natural notions of propriety, and wanting of all confirmation from the language of nature. It has been sufficiently replied a thousand times, that the plain, and positive, and repeated declarations of revelation are enough for our faith, even though nature

should withhold her testimony. But I intend to show here, that nature does not withhold her testimony ; that it is decidedly in favour of the doctrine of the Incarnation ; that if we hear it not, it is because we overlook the meaning of well known and accumulated facts.

Now all nations have invested their deities with human properties and passions. The Hindoos hold to the incarnations of their Vishnu. The gods of the Greeks and Romans were but men ennobled in *some* of their properties, acting always like men, and under the influence of human passions. All imagined divinities have essentially agreed in this respect. The supreme god of the Hindoos, is indeed represented as without passions or any conceivable properties, all absorbed in the contemplation of his own nameless, numberless perfections. But to relieve the difficulty of holding intercourse with such a being, they have imagined inferior deities of a different character, with whom all their intercourse is held. So strong is the tendency of the human mind thus brought to view, that it has introduced into Christianity some of its greatest abuses. It has originated the idolatrous respect paid by many professed Christians to the Virgin Mary, who, in many countries called *Christian*, is addressed with much more ardour and frequency than God himself, or the only Mediator between God and man. A host of saints have been canonized, and made objects of adoration, from the same cause.

Now, what shall we infer from such facts ? That all allegations of God manifest in the flesh are fabulous ? Such is the hasty manner in which men often pass from one extreme to another. To my mind, they speak a very different language. As I reason in behalf of miracles from the strong principle in the human mind, impelling men to seek for, and cling to miraculous agency ; so I reason from the equally strong and universal principle of the human mind to find deity and humanity united, that the Author of our being intended to furnish an object for it, and to assign the Incarnation of the Deity a place in the moral education of our race. I find here a presumption, that a religion intended to be universal, must contain something to meet the universal apprehension of God revealed in human form and endowed with the essential passions and sympathies of the human soul. It is true, indeed, that heathen nations by assimilating their gods to men, have made them partakers of

man's moral infirmities, and often monsters of wickedness. But how could such falsehood have obtained currency but for the precious ingredient of truth mixed with it, or for its faint resemblance of the truth revealed by Christianity, that the Word, who in the beginning was with God, and was God, became manifest in the flesh?

"I see, then, a foundation for the Christian revelation" of God manifest in the flesh, "in the human mind; and when I consider that the mind is God's noblest work, I ought to look to this as the interpreter of his designs."* I cannot, therefore, but regard it as one of the strangest inconsistencies of science, falsely so called, that men who make the loudest profession of honouring the human mind as the noblest of God's works, object the most strongly to the belief of the great majority of Christians of every age, in the doctrine of God manifest in the flesh, in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. They here at least fail to recognize the human mind as part of God's works, or its universal tendencies as affording any presumption of what revelation may be expected to teach.

I mean not, of course, that the Christian doctrine of God manifest in the flesh is proved by the natural tendencies of the human mind, or by any other indications of nature. It is sufficient to show, that such indications render it so probable, or at least not so very improbable, that we need not reject a revelation because it contains such a doctrine, or put it to the torture, to make it speak a different language.

We might apply similar remarks to the declaration, that one object of Christ's becoming like unto his brethren, in partaking of flesh and blood, was, "to make reconciliation for the sins of the people." It has been objected to the literal and obvious understanding of such declarations, that they teach an *unnatural* doctrine, and are therefore incredible. On the contrary, to my mind, the almost universal prevalence of sacrifices for sin, in all ages and among all people, affords a presumption that the Creator of all minds, intended to lay hold on this universal apprehension, and reconcile the world unto himself by setting forth one sacrifice once offered for the sins of the world.

I find a strong confirmation of these views in the passing events of the Christian world. I need not say, that Christianity has been stripped of the mystery of "God mani-

* Channing's Discourses, p. 70.

fest in the flesh" under the pretence of rendering it more rational,—a more efficient instrument of converting unbelievers, and reforming the vicious, by being divested of dark mysteries and useless incumbrances. Much fine and laboured argument has been expended to prove the superiour adaptation of Christianity thus amended, to meet the wants of all mankind. But plain fact plainly contradicts the argument. That Christianity thus altered takes no strong hold of the minds of men, with exceptions found almost entirely among some of a speculative turn, and others while captivated by the novelty of the thing, or excited by party disputation, is a fact becoming so notorious, as hardly to require proof, or admit contradiction. We enquire in vain for its trophies in marked moral improvements, extensively, multiplied in heathen or in Christian lands. We enquire in vain for the superiour steadfastness of its adherents against falling away to the most degraded forms of nominal Christianity, or to absolute infidelity. I allude to such facts, not to reproach any body of men, but as well known facts important to be considered in forming a true philosophy of religion. I believe such facts are developing themselves in the providence of God, to throw a brighter lustre on the religion of the gospel understood in all simplicity, unamended by philosophical speculations,—on the mystery of God manifest in the flesh, and on salvation through Him who hath loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood : to show, that he who rejects these from his religion, is no less unphilosophical as an enquirer into the operations of the human mind than he is defective as a believer in revelation.

ART. VII. REVIEW OF GOETHE'S WORKS.

By THE EDITOR.

Goethe's Werke, Bande I—LV. Stuttgart, 1834.

It has been justly remarked of the writings of Goethe and Schiller, that the former are more idiomatic and better suited to the taste of the writer's own age and nation,—the latter, more general, and adapted to the spirit of modern Europe. And it has been hence inferred, that the popularity of the former, though high at home, and among his contemporaries, would be more circumscribed in duration and extent, than that of the latter. It is undoubtedly true, that during his own life time, Goethe held the highest place in the estimation of his fellow-citizens. Far, far did he outstrip all rivalry, on an arena where literary competition has been more eager than in any other portion or period of the world. Until an extreme old age, he swayed an undisputed sceptre over the tastes of his nation, which he had in a great measure formed by his writings.*

But it does not follow of course from his unusual local and contemporaneous popularity, that he will be less admired in other parts of the literary world, and in after times. Although Shakspeare, in thought, expression, and spirit, is the most idiomatic of English poets, and consequently the peculiar favourite of the English people, he has yet long been, and will long continue to be, admired over the whole continent of Europe. In the case of Shakspeare, the ground of this wide and lasting popularity is obvious. It is not mainly for vigorous and original conception, for rich and varied illustration, for a splendid and elegant diction, that he is read with universal and unfailing delight; but because he knows the secret way to the human heart, and evinces not only a thorough acquaintance, but a lively sympathy with its inmost workings.

In these qualifications, as in many other points, Goethe nearly resembles Shakspeare. In proof of that fellow-feeling with all the conditions and interests of humanity, which

* It is said that when, during the last years of his life, he occasionally visited the theatre at Saxe Weimar, it was customary for the assembly to refrain from applauding the performances, until he gave some signal in token of his approbation.

is at the foundation of all true popularity, we might cite innumerable passages from his works; but shall content ourselves with referring the reader to the early scenes in *Faustus*, so often quoted. As the desponding Doctor *Faustus* is about to drink a fatal poison, he suddenly hears the sound of bells and the singing of choristers, on the morning of Easter day.

CHORUS OF WOMEN.

With richest spices we had drest
His body, ere 'twas laid to rest;
And many a cloth and bandage round
His limbs with faithful hands had wound.
But ah! what sorrow fills our mind,
Since Christ no longer here we find!

CHORUS OF ANGELS.

Christ has risen again!
Oh blessed be the love
Such trials did prove
So gracious, so hard to sustain!

FAUSTUS.

Ye heavenly tones, so powerful and sweet,
Why seek me, lowly grovelling in the dust.

Accustomed to those notes from infancy,
They still have power to call me back to life.

Ah me! Sweet childhood's feelings crowding fast
Upon my memory, from the last dread step
Withhold me. Oh! sound on, ye heavenly strains!
My tears drop fast—the earth has won me back.

CHORUS OF YOUNG PERSONS.

To realms above,
Has he, who lately lay
Within the tomb
Now, living, winged his way.
He dwells in midst
Of bliss which knows no end,
While we on earth
Our days in sorrow spend.

His own he leaves,
Oppressed in sad estate.
Ah Lord, we weep
To share thy blessed fate!

CHORUS OF ANGELS.

Out of foul corruption's lap
Christ our Lord has risen to-day;
Joyfully your fetters break,
Joyful cast your bands away.
Ye who by your steadfast love,
And your works his praise proclaim,
Ye who promised blessings teach
And preach through every land his name.
To you our Lord is ever nigh,
For you he leaves his seat on high.

The next scene is before the town gate in the after part of the same day. A motley multitude are seen issuing from it, bent on enjoying the festival. The poet throws himself into the crowd, and enables us to hear the passing words of the lively procession. Citizens, soldiers, students, mechanics, peasants, beggars, old beldames, young ladies, servant girls,—all sorts and descriptions of persons pass in succession before us. As Faustus, with his companion Wagner, witnesses the scene, he says :

* * * "What though
The landscape fail as yet in varied flowers
It takes the gay-clad multitude instead.
Now turn thee round, and from this lofty spot
Cast thine eyes back upon the city. Look,
From out the hollow gate-way's gloomy jaws,
What motley multitudes are pouring forth!
This day with joy each suns himself. They keep
The resurrection of our blessed Lord,
While their own resurrection they achieve.
From the unwholesome rooms of houses mean,
From trade and handicraft's oppressive bonds,
From the dense weight of gables and of roofs,
From narrow streets with stifling numbers thronged,
From the old church's venerable gloom,
Are all this day brought forth to heaven's pure light.
Look, prithee, look, how rapidly the crowd
Throughout the fields and gardens spreads itself;
See what a numerous train of merry boats,
Borne on the surface of the river glides
In all directions. And that little bark,
With numbers laden till it almost sinks,
Last of them all now pushes from the shore.
Even from mountain paths the most remote,
The many coloured garments meet the eye.
And hark! the merry din salutes my ear.
Now are the people in their very heaven.
Now young and old delighted shout with joy.
Here, *here I am a man*, here dare be one."

It is this *homo sum*, this identifying himself with the interests and feelings of his fellow-men, so conspicuous in the writings of Goethe, which is to us an evidence that they will be immortal. There is a more irresistible attraction in a page which is pervaded by this humane, philanthropic spirit, than in one which is illumined with the keenest flashes of wit, or the brightest splendours of genius. Commanding talents, unaccompanied by benevolent dispositions, may extort a reluctant homage for a season. But this will soon cease to be paid, like the forced duty to a tyrant; while men of distant times and other lands will bring their affectionate tributes to the shrine of those who have sympathized with human feelings, and loved and honoured human kind.

It was therefore a needless, though not unnatural feeling which Goethe so often and so pathetically expressed in his old age, that he had become a stranger in the world, and could no longer expect to find that warm and approving welcome, with which he had been at first received.

"Those friendly souls to whom my earliest song
Was chanted, may not hear the present lay;
Those dear ones, long dispersed, alas, how long,—
The echo even has wholly died away!
My griefs are uttered to an unknown throng.
Their very plaudits fill me with dismay.
And they to whom my song did pleasure give,
Roam scattered through the world, if still they live."*

But human nature, in its essential principles, is always the same. And the writer who, at the same time that he meets the accidental tastes of his age, has successfully appealed to these general principles, will always find an answering chord in the human soul. He has a hold upon the hearts of men, which cannot be easily relaxed. Such a writer is Goethe; and he may accordingly be ranked with Homer and Shakspeare, as belonging not to an age or a nation, but to the race.

The first thing which strikes us in looking over the works of Goethe is their almost unexampled variety. There is scarcely a species of elegant literature in which he has not written, nor a mode of verse through which his harp has not freely and sweetly run. In philosophy and science he has also left many monuments. It is nothing uncommon, however, for authors to attempt all the various kinds of composition. But of those who do so, almost all palpably fail somewhere. But to this remark, our author is one of a very few exceptions. Some of his works have been severely criticised; but when was it said by any respectable critic, that Goethe had absolutely failed? His healthy and versatile powers seemed to execute, as easily as his daring fancy designed. When his whole soul had appeared to be cast into some fixed form of imagination, it instantly assumed other attitudes, equally perfect, though wholly unlike. We can think of many who might perhaps have written the 'Sorrows of Werther.' But, judging from what is usually

* Dedication to Faustus, written many years after the tragedy. The same feeling is frequently expressed by Goethe.

The circle where my youthful rhymes
With loud applause were spoken,
Is changed with the changing times,
Is broken, ah! is broken.

observed, their other works would have come forth 'sicklied over with the pale cast' of a diseased and wasted imagination. The later works of Goethe, however, bear not a trace of this early excess of passion. His vigorous mental constitution survived the indiscretions, which would have ruined a weaklier frame. He recovered at once the natural tone of his mind; and while the works of most authors bear a striking family resemblance, no two of his are alike.

The inventors of an art are rarely its greatest masters: the labours of others are generally needed to bring it to perfection. But although the 'Sorrows of Werther' Egmont, Faust, Meister's Apprenticeship and many other works of Goethe, had no example in Germany, he yet gave them a perfection which none of his numerous imitators have been able to attain. The 'Wanderungen Sternbald' of Tieck, and the 'Heinrich von Ofterdingen' of Novalis, are excellent imitations of the work now in review. But both of them, though very popular, are allowed, on all hands, to be inferior to the original. What Paterclus said of Homer, may therefore justly be said of Goethe: 'In quo hoc maximum est, quod neque ante illum, quem ille imitaretur, neque post illum qui eum imitari posset, inventus est.'

It would be in vain to attempt, in the brief limits allowed us here, to bestow a particular examination upon the master-pieces of Goethe in all these various kinds of composition. We have preferred to select a work in which his characteristic beauties and faults are conspicuous, and to make this the particular subject of review, deducing from it such general observations respecting the style and manner of our author, as may be necessary to present him justly before our readers. The work selected for this purpose, is *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre*, "the Apprenticeship of William Meister," about which the minds of critics have been very much divided.*

This work is styled by its author *a romance*; but this word covers writings so dissimilar, that it does not sufficiently designate the specific nature or object of any production to which it is applied. What are the principal classes included under this general division of polite literature? and to which of these classes does Meister's Apprenticeship belong?

* Some views respecting this work were published by the writer of these pages, in the American Monthly Magazine, of 1829, and will be adopted into the present critique, with some modifications.

There are three great objects of romantic writing, viz. *action, passion, and character*; and romances may be called according as one or the other of these is the specific object, *romances of chivalry, of sentiment, and of character*. These kinds are often blended in the same work. But even where this is the case, there is generally one prominent object, to the attainment of which the other kinds are made subservient.

The romance of chivalry aims at the interest of action. It requires rapidity, variety and complexity of incident, dramatic plot and catastrophe. In the wonders and terrors of its scenes, human passion and human character find but little place, and truth to nature is intentionally violated. The writer of the romance of chivalry must possess a strong inventive imagination; but may easily dispense with knowledge of man, observation of society, taste, reason, and almost every quality which is requisite in other composition. Familiar examples in this kind are the *Arabian Nights*, the *Orlando of Ariosto*, the *Oberon of Wieland*, the romances of *Mrs. Radcliff*, and a thousand more of less note.

The romance of sentiment has an entirely different object. Here the great theme is passion. The incidents, at the basis of the work, are few and unimportant. Deep, single, overwhelming passion forms the all-absorbing interest. The '*Sorrows of Werther*,' and the '*Nouvelle Héloïse*,' may be mentioned as illustrations of this class.

The third kind, the romance of character, aims at displaying human character in all the circumstances of life. Here every thing depends upon the faithfulness of the picture to the real world. Both incidents and passions are of course involved. Passions, however, are represented with less unity, and with more abatements, than in tragedy and the romance of sentiment; and incidents occur in a more just proportion of great and small, and in a more broken order, and less artificial arrangement, than in the romance of chivalry.

The works belonging to this class may be conveniently subdivided. Those which have subjects of historical importance, which are less faithful in their representation of real life, which lay their scenes in distant countries and past times, compose one class. A second contains those which exhibit the plain realities of common and present life, and which, while they enliven and embellish the scene, are

strictly faithful to nature. The historical novels of Scott and Cooper fall into the former class, while *Don Quixote*, *Gil Blas*, *Sir Charles Grandison*, *Tom Jones*, though differing widely among themselves, are prominent examples of the latter.

The Apprenticeship of William Meister belongs to the second division of the third class of romantic writing. It leads us through no scenes of supernatural, or even of historical incident,—it overwhelms us with no tempests of uncontrollable emotion. Destitute alike of the interest of action and of passion, its simple object is the display of human character in the ordinary circumstances of everyday life.

It would be impossible to give any just impression of this work, in the usual method of making extracts. Finished productions always sustain an injury when represented in this way. Splendid passages are oftenest found, where they are most needed, in the midst of dreary pages; like light-houses on desolate coasts. They are no part of the object of Goethe, who aims at the perfection of the whole, and at the general impression.* We must, therefore, content ourselves with a brief outline of the story, and pass on to some general observations suggested by these volumes.

The hero of William Meister, is the son of a merchant. His history may be told in a few words. With genuine German enthusiasm, he answers the sober arguments of Werner, his partner in trade, throws off the bondage of an employment in which he feels himself unhappy, and surrenders himself to the impulses of youthful feeling. He becomes connected with a company of stage actors,—a class of men, comprising in Germany a large number of critics, virtuosi, writers and artists. In following the fortunes of this company, he passes through every variety of condition, from the village inn to the magnificent palace. Wherever he goes, he excites attention and inspires love. His generosity attaches to his person a number of singular beings, among whom the most interesting is Mignon, the prototype of the celebrated Fenella of Scott. With the most disinte-

* "Goethe's greatest merit is in the complement of every thing which he produces. There are no points which are strong, whilst others are weak. There is no part fully painted, whilst the other is only sketched. Every character in his romances and dramas, where it occurs, as if it were the principal character. It is so with Homer, so with Shakspeare."—Heine.

rested benevolence, he befriends these helpless outcasts. In the mean time, his manners are cultivated, his knowledge of men is increased, his mind enlarged, and his whole person accomplished. Near the close of the work he meets with his old friend Werner, who, all this time, had been neglecting the cultivation of his nature, and unfitting himself for the enjoyment of the wealth which he had been accumulating. The scene of their meeting exhibits one of the interesting morals of the work.

"Jarno and the Abbé returned at night, and brought a friend along with them. William could hardly believe his own eyes. It was Werner. They greeted each other very cordially; but could neither of them conceal their surprise at the alterations which they noticed in each other. Werner declared that William had grown larger, more erect, finished and agreeable in his whole deportment.

"The impression which Werner made upon William was far less favourable. The good man seemed to have gone backwards rather than forwards. He was even more spare than formerly. His face, naturally thin, appeared still thinner. His nose was longer, and his forehead and crown were quite bald. His voice was high-toned, strong and screeching. His sunken chest, impending shoulders, and colourless cheeks, gave sure signs that he had become a plodding hypochondriac.

"William's modesty led him to speak very moderately about those great changes in his friend. But Werner gave full vent to his surprise. 'In fact,' said he, 'I must acknowledge that you are a fine fellow, although you have wasted your time, and earned little or nothing. With such a person you may still make your fortune, if you don't throw yourself away again. This figure might win you a beautiful heiress.'

"Werner went round and round his friend, turned him this way and that, until he almost provoked him. 'No! no! I never saw any thing like it,' he exclaimed; 'and yet I'm sure I am not mistaken. Your eyes are more full. Your forehead is broader, your nose finer and your mouth richer. Just see how he stands! There's symmetry and proportion for you! How this idleness thrives! While I, poor devil, (he turned to the looking-glass,)—if I hadn't got rich in the meantime,—I should have but little to boast of.'"

This sketch, though very meagre, may be sufficient to show that this work answers one principal condition in the romance of character; viz. the representation of life in all its variety. To follow a strolling company, which to-day amuses the village under a shed, and to-morrow the baron in his castle, must of course afford sufficient diversity of scenes and personages. Without further illustrating this particular, we will mention, in this connexion, a trait in the character of Goethe which is exemplified in all his writings, and especially in the Apprenticeship of William Meister. It is, his generality of view and feeling—his freedom from the spirit of caste. He describes every grade in society, and every condition and profession of man with perfect impartiality. There is nothing in his writings which would

enable us to assign him to any even of the greater divisions into which civil society is necessarily portioned ; much less to any of those arbitrary divisions, which owe their origin to prejudice of opinion. He is neither nobleman, statesman, ecclesiastic, scholar, mechanic or peasant. He respects the employments, understands the interests, and enters into the feelings of all. Most men who engage at all in the active business of life, contract a local or professional prejudice, which spoils the symmetry of character, as much as the crooked fingers and knees of the artisan, the symmetry of person. We sometimes, indeed, find those who stand aloof from others, and, without any enlargement of heart, possess a proud generality of reason. But it is neither very difficult nor very praiseworthy to avoid partiality for any, by cherishing contempt for all. The quality which we admire in Goethe is not so much an unbiassed judgement, as a large liberality of heart.*

Truth to nature is another requisite in the kind of romance to which this work belongs. That nature is not outraged is merely a negative merit. Truth to nature is opposite not only to extravagance but also to vagueness of description. It is not sufficient that men, women and children occupy the scene, instead of giants, witches, centaurs, calibans, and all the non-descript births of fancy : these human personages must be distinguished from all others of their own kind. How perfectly is this condition answered in these volumes ! Who, like Goethe, knows how to separate the colours which are blended into human character as imperceptibly as the rays of the sun into the light of heaven ? He describes all his personages with a distinctness, which shows that he is not only the student of man, but the observer of men. He has that quick eye for individuality which distinguishes true genius. 'Plus on a d'esprit,' says Pascal, with great truth, 'plus on voit d'hommes originaux.' Every body is an original to a man who observes intelligently. The superficial see every thing vaguely, and give only the general outline in description. Goethe strikes the characteristic feature. Hence the strong expression of his persons, and the dramatic life of his scenes. What he himself says of the characters of Shakspeare, may well be

* The readers of the *Memoirs of Goethe* have seen this trait in formation, in that innate propensity, which he confesses, to identify himself with the feelings and notions of others, and to interest himself in every mode of existence.

said of his own : they are like a clock with a crystal dial-plate, which discloses all the machinery within.

The readers of Goethe always feel that they are reading themselves. We frequently stop at some passage with the same wonder with which we come upon the traces of a dream. The early presentiments of life, which we had quite forgotten,—the little fits of feeling of which we had been hardly conscious, are noted down in this faithful chronicle of the heart.

We cannot forbear remarking the peculiar justice and delicacy of his description of female character. Judging from the frequent failures here of those who have succeeded well elsewhere, we should argue, either that the power to discern the nicer shades of female character is very rare, or that there must be in them something so intense, or so varying and evanescent, as to baffle the pencil even of those by whom they may be discerned. Female frailties have indeed had ample justice done them in comedy, and the stronger traits of female passion in tragedy and romantic fiction ; but still how little should we know of those more subtle and interesting varieties of temperament by which female character is so endlessly diversified had we known only the buskined maid of the drama and the romance ? To the eye of some of our most popular novelists, feminine life has seemed to present no other modification but that of the *pensive* and the *sportive*, and in each new work we are introduced to the same couple,—the grave and the gay—slightly altered in their attire. But Goethe dooms his readers to no such wearisome monotony of company. His Gallery of Art is richer in nothing than in its specimens of the varieties of female character, gathered by observation from all the grades of society and walks of life,—the figure, air, costume, in perfect preservation, and glowing with tints of vitality. His Autobiography contains many examples of the peculiar felicity of his manner in this department of description. With what purity of feeling, and enchanting simplicity of taste, does he there tell the tale of his loves ? And we are bold in saying, that the dignity and charms of female virtue, the inimitable grace of her kindness, the meekness and heavenliness of her submission, the sublimity of her heroism in danger, the terrors of her just indignation, the tenderness and power of her love,—the depth and fervour of her devotion, have never been better represented than in the persons of Mariane, Philena,

Mignon, Aurelia, Theresa, Natalie, and others, who seem, in very deed, to live and breathe in the volumes before us !

In no one respect has Goethe been more commended, than for the correctness and classic elegance of his style. The rudeness of his native dialect assumes under his hand a chaste simplicity which vies with the finest specimens of Grecian and Roman taste. The elaborate, involved, and cumbersome construction common in German writers, is exchanged by him, for a flowing movement, which still is nervous and energetic. This graceful ease is preserved in the expression of the most elevated thoughts. His words are oracles in the mouth of a child. The style of Goethe has the rare excellence of being a perfect vehicle of thought, from which it never diverts the attention of the reader, either by coarseness or finery of expression. So well is his language adapted to the sentiment it conveys, that the sign and the thing signified seem quite blended into one. His conceptions are as little hindered in their freeness, by their material dress, as the viewless spirit is by the thin air in which it veils itself in order to strike the sense of men.

But we wish to notice more particularly the *composure* or *reserve* of his manner ; because this, though the prevailing manner of the ancient classics, is seen, in modern times, only in a few rare instances of eminent genius. Schiller remarks, that when he first became acquainted with the works of Shakspeare, he was displeased with a certain insensibility which allowed the author to trifle in the midst of his most heart-rending scenes in Hamlet, King Lear, and Macbeth. The custom of modern writers had led him to expect, that the author would mingle his own reflections and sympathies with those of his readers. It was not till after a deeper study of the principles of taste as developed in the ancient classics, and especially in Homer, that he became reconciled with what he called the distance and reserve of Shakspeare, and finally indeed delighted with it. Some examples will show best the difference we are endeavouring to point out in this respect between ancient and modern writers. In the midst of a severe contest, in the sixth book of the Iliad, Glaucus and Diomedes discover that an ancestor of one of them had been hospitably entertained by an ancestor of the other, whence, by an ancient right, they were themselves friends. They immediately throw down their arms and exchange presents. The reader stops to contem-

plate this beautiful act of piety. But Homer passes on with the narrative as if he had no heart in his bosom. Now see the modern style. In the first canto of Orlando Furioso, a scene of the same kind occurs, at which Ariosto steps forth from his position as author, and breaks out into the well known exclamation,

"O noble minds, by knights of old possessed!" etc.

We will mention but one instance among a hundred, of this species of reserve, in the volumes before us. Philena had cherished William with the most tender care during his sickness. One morning Mignon came to his bed-side with the news that Philena had gone away in the night. The reader is prepared for a burst of grief. 'William felt the loss of his kind nurse and companion,' says the undisturbed narrator, 'but Mignon soon supplied her place!'

Without illustrating this particular farther, we will only beg the reader to mark the effect of such an abrupt reserve of manner, and to compare it with the unbecoming interest which secondary writers take in their own scenes. As if any exercise of imagination in their readers, in supplying the abruptness of thought, must of course be disagreeable, they amplify every sentiment and detail every circumstance. By applying so many slight conductors, they dissipate the collected interest and prevent the electric effect. They leave about as much impression as the tragedian would, who after the catastrophe should feel it important to acquaint the weeping assembly with the farther fortunes of the *dramatis personæ*. How opposite to this is the manner of Goethe! He says less than the occasion warrants. He merely kindles the imagination of his reader, allowing it to burn on of itself. He leaves us something to think of, which answers the description which Longinus gives of the sublime. He means more than he says,—by a kind of aposiopesis;—a figure of speech which Cæsar used, when he said to the frightened boatman, '*Cæsarem vehis!*'

This reserve of manner betokens a high order of greatness. The tranquillity with which Homer describes the doubtful battle, opens to view the same elevation of soul as is displayed by the cool self-possession with which Agamemnon directs the onset and retreat. The heavenly composure with which the Evangelists describe the sufferings of their

Master, show something of the magnanimity with which he himself endured them.

The object of the work now under examination, it has been already said, is to *exhibit human character in all the circumstances of common life*. Whether this is a proper or worthy object, has been, and still is, one of the great questions which divide the critics. The whole force of the argument against that class of fictions which derives its materials from common life, is summed up in the question of an objector introduced by Rousseau, in his preface to the 'Nouvelle Heloise.' "Est ce la peine de tenir registre de ce que chacun peut voir tous les jours dans sa maison, ou dans celle de son voisin?"* Is it worth while to keep a register of that which every body may see every day in his own, or in his neighbour's house? This is the point where English and German taste commonly separates. The English taste requires scenes of historical interest and dignity, and is disgusted with the faithful representation of the details of common life. While in Germany, those works are most popular in which the minutiae of our daily existence are fully portrayed. The volumes before us have accordingly been most severely criticised in England for those very things for which they are most admired in Germany. William Meister steals sweetmeats from the pantry,—closes a letter to Mariane by telling her "he is half-asleep and must stop," etc., etc. "Such circumstances," says the fastidious Edinburgh Reviewer, "are carefully kept out of view in the best descriptions of life." And principally on this account he proceeds to characterize the work "as eminently absurd, puerile, incongruous, vulgar, and affected,"†—a criticism which deserves no other notice, than to be labelled with its own epithets.

Might we venture an opinion, on a point so much contested, it would be, that the simple material in which the artist works, as it is never the object of taste, should never be the object of criticism. The sole merit of the work of art consists in the manner in which the material is treated. A common and grovelling manner makes the *Alfred* of Amos Cottle an intolerable poem, in spite of its lofty theme; while even a battle of frogs and mice, or the stealing of a loek of

* Oeuvres Complètes de Rousseau, Paris, 1826, p. 520.

† See Edinburgh Review, Vol. XLII. p. 414.

hair, are raised to importance, and invested with interest, by the genius of Homer and of Pope. Indeed the merit of the work of art is often in the inverse ratio of the rudeness of the material. "Plus les choses sont seches," says Boileau, the justest of modern critics, "plus elles frappent quand ils sont dit noblement." Genius never shows itself more visibly than in conquering the difficulties of a low, dry, or intractable subject. That power is genuine which can stamp a tasteless object with a foreign beauty, which can extract meaning from what is insignificant, and cast a brilliant illumination over what is common place.

There is much truth in the following remarks of Henry Heine, a spirited writer on the recent German belles-letters.* "Nothing is sillier than the depreciation of Goethe in favour of Schiller. Are people really ignorant, that those high-renowned, high-ideal forms, those altar pieces of youth and morality which Schiller set up, were far easier to produce, than those sinful creatures of the little world, of which Goethe gives us glances in his works? Can they be ignorant that mediocre painters for the most part paint the figures of saints as large as life; but that many a great master makes it his study to paint with natural truth, and artist-like propriety, possibly a Spanish beggar boy, a low country boor, or an ugly old woman, as we see in small Dutch cabinet pictures? The great and fearful is much more easily represented in art, than the little and complete.—Rail as you will against the vulgarities in Faust, against the scenes on the Brochen, in Auerbach's Cellar;—rail against the irregularities in Wilhelm Meister;—all that, however, is precisely what you cannot imitate."

A comparison of the different kinds of romantic writing, as to the degree of talent required in their production, must result, we think, in favour of that which we have styled the romance of character. As to the romance of chivalry, it may be executed by talent of the humblest order. To conduct fantastic forms through enchanted regions, beyond the province of reason and nature, is no very difficult task. Any one who will give the reins to his fancy will soon find himself matching the wildest extravagances of which he has ever read. Inventive imagination, the great requisite in this species of composition, is the least attribute of genius. It

* Zur Geschichte der Neueren schoenen Literatur in Deutschland, von Henri Heine, Paris und Leipzig, 1833.

always prevails in barbarous ages, and declines as cultivation advances.—Creating monsters and heaping up prodigies are the most vulgar exploits of the mind, bearing the same relation to the species of composition confined to the representation of nature, which the antic feats of the juggler sustain to the arts of polished life.

In depicting human passion, both skill and genius are indeed requisite; but not, we think, in so high a degree as in displaying human character. The stronger passions, which are the common subject of tragedy and of romances of sentiment, are distinct in their features, violent in their movements, visible in their effects, and supreme in their dominion over the mind. The writer who undertakes to describe them has the advantage of having marked, prominent, and single objects of representation. Consider too how easy it is for him to excite interest in the reader, in describing the violent passions. Let him utter but one tone of feeling, and the whole soul murmurs in secret sympathy. Let him evoke but one passion, and others come trooping at the call, like spirits at the summons of a wizard. The human mind is constituted so favourably for the purposes of excitement and impression, that the writer or orator needs but one portion of inspiration in order to fill it with the most tumultuous and varied emotions.

How much more difficult is the work of one who would portray human character in common life! His field is boundless. The objects of his art are covert and complex. He needs therefore a wide and minute observation of society, and a nice analysis of mental phenomena. Instead of connecting events, at pleasure, into striking combinations, or concentrating the emotions of the soul into one burning focus, he must follow the path of nature, and violate none of the fixed laws of feeling and acting. As common men and things, which are in themselves uninteresting to the great mass of readers, must constitute his principal material, he must supply the want of inherent interest by the riches of his own mind. He must ennoble the common subject by his manner of treating it. He must suffuse his faithful picture with the glowing tints of genius.

While, therefore, we agree with a writer in the last number of the *North American Review*,* that, as a matter of fact, "our own lighter literature of the present century is no

* *North American Review*, No. LXXXVII. for April, 1835.

longer much occupied in describing the common and social features of human life, and appeals more to feeling under various and novel forms of excitement," we are not prepared to join with him in approving the turn which English and American literature has thus taken. Whatever temporary interest may attach itself to the high-wrought creations of a Byron's and a Bulwer's genius, as expressive of certain transient modes of artificial sentiment and life, the public taste will doubtless revert again to those models in which our common feelings and daily walks, the great staple of humanity, are represented in all simplicity and faithfulness. And not only in romantic writings may it be anticipated, that truth to unsophisticated nature will come into vogue again, but also in dramatic literature, and even in tragedy. The *Egmont* of Goethe has illustriously demonstrated, that a fair representation of character, in natural circumstances, is not inconsistent with the excitement of grief, pity, and all those sympathies which it is the object of tragedy to produce. The rising popularity of Wordsworth's poetry, the chief merit of which lies in its minute and faithful picturing of common life, proves, that even now, perverted as the public judgement may be, an appeal to the original and universal tastes of men cannot be in vain.

The name of the last writer suggests the necessity of caution against an extreme into which he, and some of his followers, as well as their German contemporaries, have sometimes been betrayed through their love of nature and simplicity. It has chanced to them, often, that in avoiding the artificial, the high-wrought and the exciting, they have fallen into the *vulgar*, the *insipid*, and the *flat*,—that in aiming at the *naïve* and *childlike*, they have become *childish*. They have been amusingly compared in this respect to an aged dame, who took from her mistress' toilet a phial containing an elixir, which she knew had the property of restoring youth. But instead of sipping a few drops, she drank so deep a draught, that she not only became young, but was changed into a perfect child. Something like this has often happened to those who had returned, parched, through the artificial excitements of modern literature, to the forsaken fountains of simplicity and nature. They have drunk so deeply, that they have not merely been refreshed and renovated, but have become perfect

children. But this faulty extreme has been sufficiently reprobated by the critics of the day. It has, indeed, been the constant object of pleasantry among the heartless wittings, who are unable to appreciate the excellence of which it is the mere excess.

But the considerations already adduced, however weighty they may be, are not those by which we are principally determined in preferring, above the other kinds, those fictions which are founded on common life. They not only call into exercise a higher order of intellectual powers, but their moral tendency is better; or, to speak more properly, they are not so necessarily and inherently injurious in their moral influence, as fictions of high-wrought action and sentiment. The former, though often perverted to worse ends, may be easily turned to the account of social virtue; the latter appear from their nature to be subversive of it. By enlisting the hearts of their readers in heroic exploits, and in extravagant joys and sorrows, they create disgust for common life. They substitute all the sickly growth of sentimentality, for the substantial excellencies of character. Affected delicacy, morbid sensibility, ungoverned passion, eccentric behaviour,—such are the virtues of these romantic scenes, while strictness of moral principle, sober judgment, good sense, steady habits, reason and religion, are held up to contempt. The readers of these seductive pages soon forget their friends and relative duties, to take the spear, in imagination at least, with some mad Orlando, or to echo the laments with which a forlorn Silvander makes all Arcadia resound.

On this point we cannot forbear referring to the opinions of Rousseau, who, with the same inconsistency by which he rejected Christianity after proving its divinity, and by which he composed operas after writing against theatric exhibitions, has prefaced his *Nouvelle Heloise* with an eloquent argument against romances whose incidents are laid in high life, or which overstep the sobriety of common feeling. "These romances," he says, "by holding up before those that read them, the pretended charms of a state which is not theirs, seduce them, and lead them to hold their own estate in disdain, and to exchange it, in imagination, for that which they are made to love. Wishing to be what they are not, they come at length to believe themselves different from what they are, and thus their brains are turned." So far

from offering to the great mass of their readers any thing suited to their condition, these romances serve only to render it the more bitter to them. They change their retreat into a frightful desert, and in return for some hours of entertainment which they afford them, prepare for them months of discontent and vain regrets. What effect must scenes of this nature have upon the country gentleman, who sees the frankness with which he receives his guests turned into ridicule, and the joy which he diffuses through his neighbourhood, regarded as a brutal orgy? What effect must they have upon his wife, who learns from them that the cares of the mother of a family are beneath ladies of her rank? upon their daughter, whom the artificial airs, and the jargon of the city, inspire contempt for the honest rustic she was to have married?"

When we consider how much of human happiness depends upon the domestic relation, and how directly the integrity of this relation is invaded by the false ideas inculcated in chivalrous and sentimental fictions, we must regard them as among the greatest scourges of society. Let the public institutions under which men live be ever so oppressive; let misfortunes befall them in all their public enterprizes; let persecution from without follow them to their very doors; if the peace within is left inviolate, they may still be happy! But if they are driven from their homes, either by their own distaste for their quiet pleasures and humble duties, or by the disorders which prevail within them, how unavailing to them will be the best public institutions, or the greatest outward prosperity! At home are treasured all the objects over which the affections of the heart expand, and to which they most cling. There is gathered every thing which nearly concerns man, either as a mortal or immortal being. There he finds an asylum from the wrongs of the world, repose from labour, an altar for his religion, a tender ministry for his wants both in the day of prosperity, and on the bed of sickness and death! With what vigilance, then, should he guard its threshold against every thing which threatens to disturb its sacred peace, or to tarnish the lustre of its virtues? And how can he admit those fictions which by holding up to envy the dazzling scenes of an unattainable fortune, produce in their readers discontent with their actual state, and restless longings for something better; teach them to regard their simplicity as grossness, their

appropriate pleasures as insipid, their appropriate duties as irksome; and thus cast a poison into the very fountain-head of human happiness? If the *Iliad* was banished by Plato from his Ideal Republic, by a far stronger reason should fictions of this sort be banished by every wise man from his dwelling.

The objection here alleged against this species of romance, relates in its full force only to the middle and lower classes of society. But it is precisely in these, whatever may be thought of the assertion, that such works are most read, and produce the most effect. In the higher circles of worldly fashion, there is a variety of outward amusements which conspire with light reading, to dissipate the ennui of life,—amusements generally more attractive than fictitious scenes. The want of these outward pleasures confines those who live in comparative solitude and poverty, to amusing books, and leaves them to their undisturbed effect. Observation would doubtless confirm what has been said by a recent writer, that romances are far more read in the country than in the city, and that they make there a much stronger impression.

Now it is obvious, that if any utility is to be expected from works of imagination, finding their way as they do into every village library, and into the book-case of every cottage, it must be from their aiming at exactly an opposite end from what is proposed in those which have been last described. They must seek to inspire their readers with the love of duty and religion, of nature and of simple life; to cure them of the errors of opinion; to strip off the false glare of high rank and station; to show, that worth and happiness are not confined within any particular circles, and are often wholly wanting in those where they are supposed to have their firmest seat.

To teach these lessons, is the true object of that species of romance, to which we have given our preference. Works descriptive of common life, may be so written as to produce effects exactly the reverse of those just deplored, resulting necessarily from works whose scenes are laid in luxurious magnificence,—in the bustle of high emprise,—in passionate excitements,—the hanging gardens of an envied but inaccessible grandeur. The romance of character and of common life, when true to its design, presents the reader with such persons only as actually exist

around him, such pleasures as belong to his condition, such duties as he himself is called to perform. It unfolds to his eye the nicer varieties of character, and teaches him to observe their complicated play in human intercourse. It detects those minute springs of action, from which, in the wonderful economy of society, the greatest movements proceed, and the concealment of which leaves human life an enigma, so dark, as to be uninteresting. It thus opens to him a world of variety and interest, beneath the monotonous superficies, in which society presents itself to the common observer. Keeping the moral good of the reader prominently in view, it every where gives honour to the established orders, and fixed relations among men, commending the public virtues of love to country, veneration for official rank, deferential respect to superiours, and also the household graces of obedience to parents, affection for relatives, fidelity to friends, and hospitality to strangers.

We are far from affirming that such is the character of all the works, which belong in general to the kind of fiction here considered. It is rather the ideal of this kind of writers,—what it should be,—that we have exhibited. Among the works which approach this standard most nearly the ‘*Vicar of Wakefield*,’ and the ‘*Man of Feeling*,’ and other tales of Mackenzie, occur to us as examples. Many other works, and among them the ‘*Apprenticeship of William Meister*,’ might be mentioned as answering, in lower degrees, and with some qualifications, to this ideal of excellence, in fictitious composition. And so far as they do so, they will be allowed, by the most scrupulous, to exert a beneficial influence. By contributing to the reader’s insight into human nature, they contribute to his interest in man. By detecting the evils latent beneath an estate outwardly fair, they repress the risings of envy, and check immoderateness of desire. By spreading the hues of fancy over our daily occupation, they hide its grossness, and render it attractive. By unfolding the pleasures within every man’s reach,—by holding up to love and admiration the worthy actors in the humble offices of relative duty, they promote contentment, cast a charm over the real world, and make the way of duty a way of pleasantness. From the fancied scene, when it is laid in such a sphere, and occupied with such actors, the reader returns cheerfully to his own station, whatever it may be; and his affections having been moved by a healthful excitement, looks on those

around him with a kindlier eye than before, and performs his allotted works with new vigour and constancy.

We regard these writings as especially beneficial in counteracting the misanthropic tendencies of much of the literature of the present day. Byron leads us to wildernesses 'where none intrude,' and sentences us to an artificial fellowship with mountains and lakes, where, like the puppet man, one is compelled to carry on all the dialogue himself; or, at best, will only be answered by an echo. Against these unsocial tendencies, these writings are an excellent antidote. This preferring of inanimate nature to sentient and rational being, as the object of description, betokens not only degenerate feeling, but second rate talent. True genius, like Wisdom in the Proverbs, finds her delights among the sons of men. The opinions of Goethe on this subject will be interesting to our readers. William Meister and Philena were in an agreeable *tete a tete* in a wood.

"A young man of their acquaintance came stealing along, and joined himself to their company. He immediately began to praise the beauties of the place. He called their attention to the gurgling of the brook, the motion of the branches, the falling of the light, and the singing of the birds. But he took affront at a little song about a cuckoo, which Philena sung, and soon left them.

'I should be glad never to hear another syllable about nature and natural scenery,' said Philena, as soon as he was gone. 'There is nothing more provoking than to have one always accounting for the pleasure which we enjoy. We go to walk when the weather is fine, just as we dance when we hear music. But who cares either for the music or the weather? It is not the violin, but the dancer that interests us.'

'You are right,' answered William. 'Man is the most interesting object to man, and it is doubtful whether anything else should interest him at all. Everything else around us is either the element only in which we live, or the instruments which we make use of. The more concern we take in inanimate nature, the less is the feeling of our own worth, and the feeling of society. Men who think a great deal about gardens, buildings, dress, ornament, or possessions of any kind, are less social and agreeable than others.* Man disappears from their view.' "

In conceding even these advantages to any work of the imagination, we are well aware that we are crossing the prejudices of some of the sterner moralists and more ascetic Christians, who condemn romantic writing in the gross, and will tolerate nothing which bears the name of fiction. Against these prejudices it may be fairly urged, that they not only exclude by far the richest portion of modern literature; but that they aim a deadly blow at one of the noblest powers of our nature, the *imagination*. This power holds a prominent place

* Schiller has ingeniously traced this tendency to interest in inanimate nature, (which is so observable in modern literature, though it is entirely wanting in the early writers,) to its proper source in his 'Naive and sentimentalische Dichtung.'

with reason, memory, and the other leading attributes of the soul. To say that its exercises are innocent, is to speak truly, but feebly. They are commendable and honourable. Of these exercises, *fiction*, in all its varied forms, is the product, as much as *logic* is the product of reason. A work then cannot be condemned merely because it is *fictitious*, without reflecting upon the faculty by the exercise of which it is produced. Being generically approved, it must be judged of, like other works, from its specific nature and tendencies. And here a good rule for judgement is, that fictitious writings, like every thing intended for amusement, should be of such a nature as to fit, rather than disqualify us for the sober realities and proper duties of life.

In behalf of these views we are happy to cite the testimony of so eminent a divine as Rev. Dr. Andrew Reed.—In his letter to the Editor of the British Review, we find the following remarks: p. 60. "Let the novel be wisely devoted to the illustration of good habits, good opinions, and good principles, and I see in it no evil, but much benefit." Again; "Many benevolent and pious persons, in their jealousy for the safety and welfare of youth, have under the impulse of fear, formed wrong opinions on this subject. Anxious to save the unsuspecting from the snare of some fictitious writings, as well they might be, they have hastily exclaimed against all productions of the same class; and such persons would now be disposed eagerly to enquire, If we once admit that works of fiction are lawful and good, what means have we of protecting the reading community against that large mass of licentious novels, which would affect the whole of it like contagion? I reply, let them be condemned, severely condemned; yet let them be condemned not as fictions, but on their own separate offences. If they are extravagant or silly; if they encourage morbid feeling, or false sentiment; if they apologize for vice, while they compliment virtue; if they sophisticate the plain maxims of morality, or trifle with and impugn the sacred principles of religion; let the head of offending be shown, and let them suffer for the crimes of which they are guilty. Admitting the principle without limitation, that no work of imagination is to be condemned because it is imaginative; we shall at once bring all works of imagination to a higher standard, and try each of them by its own peculiar claims and character. Corrupted as this portion of our literature unquestionably is, it still con-

tains more of genius, more of philosophy too, than any other ; and from the popular character of its productions, it has exerted, and will exert, beyond any other, an influence on the general mind. It is of the last importance therefore to a people, that the character of their polite literature should be salutary and good. The mass of a nation will be neither moral nor religious until its literature becomes so ; and its literature can never be sanative and pious, while scorned and abandoned by the friends of purity and religion."

As to the particular work here under consideration, while we freely concede to it, in common with other works of the same class, that benign influence already described, upon the social dispositions, we cannot be blinded to the serious charges which lie against it, in the court of conscience. It is not that it contains descriptions of moral obliquity and degeneracy, that it is censured. The Fairy Queen of Spenser, the Annals of Tacitus, the Holy Scriptures themselves, contain such descriptions. But the writers of these works, while they point to scenes of moral pollution, betray no sympathy with them. Their genius, like a hovering angel, girt with snowy pinions, and bearing an avenging rod, while it describes these scenes from a distance, hangs above the reach of their contagion, in the pure airs of its own elevation, or if it comes into contact with them, frowns upon them, and scourges them, and stamps them with the warning seal of Heaven's reprobation. Unlike these writers, the author of "Meister's Apprenticeship" enters with all his heart into the descriptions he gives of his hero's aberrations. He shows, too plainly, that his residence in Italy had effaced the impressions made upon him by his earlier residence among the Moravian Brethren. His mind, affected by the corrupt habits of Italian life, seems, like Byron's, to luxuriate in scenes of gross and vulgar wickedness, from which, natively, it would have shrunk with horror. His works written after his visit to Italy, while they show that his sense of what is beautiful in composition and art, had been there cultivated and improved, prove also that his moral sense, his perception of right and wrong, had been dulled and perverted. He refers every thing, unconsciously almost, to the standard of taste, instead of the bar of conscience. His estimate of objects is founded upon their agreeableness or disagreeableness,—their external appearance, not upon their *right* or *wrong*,—their internal reality.

The difference between the judgements passed in the courts of taste and of conscience, cannot have escaped any reflecting mind. The midnight assassin, judged at the bar of conscience, is more criminal than the petty thief. But while taste turns with disgust from the latter, it looks on the former with unaverted interest. And hence it comes to pass, that persons of the purest sentiments, and the highest regard for public morals, deceived by this false light, often find themselves applauding the hero in the novel, whom they would apprehend as a villain, should they meet him in the street. Now it is a fact to be deplored, that in by far the greater portion of our elegant literature, we are taught to estimate objects by this erroneous standard. And it is one of the chief dangers resulting from this kind of reading, that, under its influence, the severer principles of moral judgement, placed in our natures by their very author, will be insensibly supplanted by the lighter maxims of a refined literary taste, and that the *moral* goodness of things will be less thought of, than their agreeableness. Against this danger, the youthful reader ought to be seriously warned. The highest delights ever derived from literary pursuits, the most exquisite refinement of taste and social feeling ever produced by them, are but a poor equivalent for that delicate moral sensibility, which is so often abused and deadened under their influence!

We should be far from contending, that *one definite moral* should be pursued in works of fiction, and that this should every where be pressed upon the reader's attention. To do this, would be inconsistent with that faithful imitation of nature for which we have contended. Events as they occur in the real world, never speak that explicit and distinct language, which they are made to utter in the tales of Voltaire, in Rasselas, and in most of the so called moral and religious fictions. The voice of Providence is many-toned, not breaking, like thunder, in concentrated and intermitted peals, but uttered like the language of the firmament from day to day, and from night to night; like that, too, it is inaudible by the unattentive ear, though full of meaning and rich instruction, to those that ponder it. And hence we prefer, that the course of events should be so adjusted in fictitious writing, as to suggest moral lessons at every turn, to be drawn out by the reader himself, rather than that they should be designed for the illustration of some one moral

truth, which is to be every where obtruded upon our notice. This cannot but strike the reader as unnatural; and as the lesson thus taught loses in verisimilitude, it must also lose in effect.

With these views, we must dissent from the censure passed upon Shakspeare by Dr. Johnson, where he complains, that although "a system of social duty may be drawn from his writings," yet "he seems to write without any definite moral purpose;" that "his precepts and axioms drop casually from him," and that "he leaves the examples of his personages to operate by chance." Has not Shakspeare here proved himself, as in other things, the faithful imitator of nature?

But in dispensing with this single and definite moral, we would earnestly contend, that every writer is responsible for the general moral tendency of his works, is forbidden to indulge in an allusion derogatory to purity, and bound every where to recommend religion and virtue.

These obligations, which no one would venture to disown, were not always properly regarded by Goethe. He did not, indeed, scoff at the idea of an overruling Providence, or treat man with insulting contempt, as the vile sport of fate. His humanity forbade him to do this. Still he writes like an Epicurean philosopher, more than like a Christian. "Enjoy while you may the pleasures within your reach, and when misfortune comes, endure it as an unavoidable evil"—such is the doctrine learned from his pages. They are pervaded by a skepticism, which is only the more dangerous from being dissociated from its usual attribute of malignity, and invested with a humane and benignant aspect.

Of Goethe, then, as of so many others, the melancholy monuments of perverted powers! it must be said, "*Quo melior, eo deterior!*" Those very attributes by which he seemed designated for some eminent service to mankind, being perverted, render him only the more to be dreaded. That a nature like his, endued with warm affections, and filled with noble aspirations, could have been content without a resting place in religious faith, is matter no less for wonder than regret. Cold-hearted speculators may be satisfied with their doubts and negations. Uncertainty is the native element of feeble and vulgar minds. But of genius, it is expected, that eagle-like, it will break through the clouds, and soar into the region of perpetual day. For what is genius

bestowed, if it be not for the discovery of truth, the guardianship and patronage of the high and sacred interests of humanity? There is an important sense in which genius is *divine*, and in which those who possess it are the messengers of heaven. When will they recognize their high commission, and employ their gifts, not in enhancing the charms of sense, but in unfolding the objects of faith, and in teaching man the great lesson of living on earth as an heir of immortality?

ART. VIII. A SCRIPTURAL AND PRACTICAL VIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION.

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THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION has, for so many ages, been the theme of earnest and even violent controversy; been found so difficult to explain to the apprehension of common minds, and been perverted to the moral injury of so many, who either could not or would not believe it; that the minister of Christ who aims chiefly at practical effect in his preaching, is strongly tempted to leave out the discussion of it from his public discourses. But if such a doctrine is contained in the Scriptures, we must presume it is important to be understood and believed, of great practical utility, honourable to God, and that therefore it is the duty of ministers to preach it to their hearers.

I. In our investigation of this subject, we propose, before laying down any proposition, or giving any definition of the doctrine, to turn to the Scriptures, for the purpose of learning what they contain respecting it.

The word *election* is derived from the Greek verb *ἐκλέγω*, which literally means to *select*, to *choose*; from this is formed the adjective *ἐκλεκτός*, *elect*, and the noun *ἐκλογή*, *election*. As these several words in Scripture have given the name to the doctrine under consideration, it may be useful to class together the several passages in which they are used, that so we may distinctly perceive their scriptural meaning.

1. First, the word *ἐλέγω*, (used in the New Testament only in the first aorist tense, middle, with the exception of Luke 14: 7, and translated *chose* or *chosen*;) is (a) applied to *men*, to denote simple choice or preference; Luke 14: 7. 10: 42. Acts 6: 5. 15: 22, 25. (b) It expresses the choice which Christ made of persons to be his apostles; Luke 6: 13. John 6: 70: 13: 18. 15: 16. 15: 19. Acts 1: 2. 1: 24. These passages all relate to Christ's choice of persons to the office of apostles, and not to the subjects of personal holiness and future salvation. Judas was one of the twelve whom he *chose*, of whom it is said, 'he is a devil,' an evil-minded man, a traitor. John 6: 70, 71.

(c.) The word is applied to God, to denote his choice; Mark 13: 20. Acts 13: 17. 15: 7. 1 Cor. 1: 27. Eph. 1: 24. James 2: 5.

In regard to the meaning of these passages we are scarcely liable to err. One relates to God's favour to the Jews, in distinction from other nations, Acts 13: 17, comp. Deut. 4: 7, 8, 37. Isa. 41: 9. 44: 1. One, to the appointment or commission of the Apostle Peter, to preach the gospel, first to the Gentiles, Acts 15: 7. comp. 10: 9—23. The texts 1 Cor. 1: 27, 28, and James 2: 5, exhibit the fact that the poor, the ignorant and despised of this world are more commonly partakers of the grace of the gospel, than the rich, the learned, and the noble. In this way, God abases human pride, secures glory to himself (comp. v. 23—31), and presents a powerful argument against the invidious distinctions which even good men are apt to make between the rich and the poor, James 2: 1—6. But Eph. 1: 4, ascribes the 'spiritual blessings' which 'the saints and faithful in Christ Jesus' at Ephesus enjoyed, to the choice or antecedent purpose of God:—'according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world.' With this passage, agrees 2 Th. 2: 13, where the word rendered *chosen* is derived from *αἵρω*, to lay hold of, to take. 'We are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning *chosen* you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth.' See same word, Phil. 1: 22. Heb. 11: 25.

2. Let us next examine the scriptural use of the word *ἐλεκτός*, *elect*.

(a) Christ is called elect; Luke 23: 35. 1 Pet. 2: 4. 1 Pet. 2: 6.

(b) Angels are called elect; 1 Tim. 5: 21, 'I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels'—that is, holy angels, in distinction from those 'that sinned and kept not their first estate.' Comp. Matt. 25: 31. 2 Pet. 2: 4. Jude 6. Rev. 12: 7—9.

(c) Good men, Christians, are called elect, either simply as approved and beloved of God, or as those whom he purposes to distinguish with peculiar favour; Matt. 20: 16. Matt. 24: 22. Matt. 24: 24. Matt. 24: 31. Luke 18: 7. Rom. 8: 33. 16: 13. Col. 3: 12. 2 Tim. 2: 10. Titus 1: 1. 1 Pet. 1: 1. 2: 9. 2 John 1. Rev. 17: 14.

These are all the instances in which the word *ἐλεκτός*, *elect*, is used in the New Testament. With the exception of those cases in which the word is applied to Christ, and one to angels, it is appropriated to men who are objects of divine approbation, the true worshippers of God, Christians. It was evidently an *adjective of quality*, distinguishing those who are approved and beloved of God from those who are not; but not decisive, of itself, that they were antecedently, or from eternity, the objects of God's choice. That question is determined by other passages.

3. Let us, then, next examine into the use of the substantive *ἐκλογή*, *election*.

Acts 9: 15. Of Paul it is said, 'He is a *chosen* vessel, *σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς*, a vessel of election, to show my name before the Gentiles.'—He was a chosen and approved instrument for that purpose. See also, Rom. 9: 11, 12. 11: 5. 11: 7. 11: 28. 1 Thes. 1: 4. 2 Pet. 1: 10.

On examination of the foregoing passages, we find (a) the word *election* used to denote Christ's choice of Paul, as a fit instrument to preach the gospel to the Gentiles. (b) The selection which God made of Jacob, or of the Jewish nation, rather than of Esau to be his peculiar people. (c) The distinguishing mercy of God in justifying some through faith, in opposition to those who trust to the merit of works. (d) The mercy which he still has in store for the Jewish nation, especially on account of their pious ancestors: (e) and lastly, it expresses that beneficent purpose, or special grace of God, by which persons were led to embrace the religion of Christ, and to enjoy its privileges, hopes, and consolations.

4. Passing now from the texts of Scripture in which the verb *ἐκλογαί*, *to elect*, and its derivatives, *ἐλεκτός*, *elect* and, *ἐκλογή* *election*, are used; let us examine other passa-

ges which have an important bearing on the subject. Rom. 8: 28—31; 'We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called *according to his purpose*. For whom he did foreknow, he also did *predestinate* to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did *predestinate*, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us?' Eph. 1: 5.—'Having *predestinated* us to the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will.' Eph. 1: 11.—'In whom [Christ] we have obtained an inheritance, being *predestinated* according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.' 2 Tim. 1: 9.—'Who hath saved us and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to *his own purpose and grace*, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.'

To PREDESTINATE, in the New Testament usage, is *to determine beforehand*; and it is used only in respect to the purposes or determinations of the Supreme Being. Thus Acts 4: 28, "Against Jesus, Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, were gathered together to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before—*predestinated*—to be done." 1 Cor. 2: 7, "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom which God ordained—*predestinated*—before the world unto our glory." In the same sense, manifestly, the word is used in the texts above cited, Rom. 8: 29, 30. Eph. 1: 5, 11. Hence, plainly, the Apostle in these passages, ascribes the Christian character and privileges of those whom he addressed, to the predetermination of God; to "*a purpose*" formed "before the foundation of the world." Comp. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Eph. 1: 11. 3: 11. Rom. 8: 28.

Who now, after reading the passages which have been adduced, can deny, or at all hesitate to admit, that ELECTION is in some sense taught in the Scriptures? That it is there in some form, is so palpable, that to deny it would be equivalent to the rejection of divine testimony. But the grand question is, *what is the doctrine?* What does it teach and imply? This question becomes one of amazing interest and importance when we consider the bearing which a decision

of it has both upon the character of God, and the destiny of man. The only question, I repeat, is—What is the scriptural doctrine?

Keeping steadily in view the passages which have been quoted, I trust that all will agree in the following propositions:

1. Those texts in which the term *chosen* or *elect* is applied to Christ, have reference both to his appointment to the office of Messiah, and to his being approved and beloved of the Father in that office. Luke, 23: 35. 1 Pet. 2: 4, 6. Comp. Matt. 3: 17. 12: 18.

2. The Apostles, including Paul, were selected, *chosen* to their office, by the Lord Jesus Christ. Luke 6: 13. John 6: 70. 15: 16. Acts 1: 24. 9: 15, &c.

3. All the privileges which the Jews formerly enjoyed as a nation, in distinction from others, were in accordance with, or the effect of, God's *choice*. He chose them to all their national privileges. Acts 13: 17. 15: 7. Rom. 9: 11. Comp. Deut. 4: 37. Isa. 41: 9. 44: 1.

4. Real Christians, whom God now loves, and to whom the promises of future felicity are made, are, in distinction from wicked men, denominated *elect*, *chosen*. Matt. 20: 16; 22: 14. (24: 22. 24: 24, 31.) Rom. 8: 33. Col. 3: 12. 2 Tim. 2: 10. Tit. 1: 1. 1 Pet. 1: 1. Rev. 19: 14. [Also good angels are called *elect*. 1 Tim. 5: 21.]

5. *The present character and privileges, and also the final salvation of all true Christians, are ascribed in Scripture to the undeserved favour and eternal purpose of God.*

If this last proposition, which contains what may emphatically be called **THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION**, does not receive the unhesitating assent of all who read it; it will, I trust, only be necessary to refresh their minds with a repetition of the principal texts which fully and unequivocally teach its truth.

Let me request the reader, then, to turn back and carefully read over the passages in Rom. 8: 29—31. Eph. 1: 4, 11. 2 Th. 2: 13. 1 Pet. 1: 2. Also Rom. 11: 4—7. 1 Th. 1: 3—6. 2 Pet. 1: 10.

Whatever difficulty there may be in other respects in these changes, can it for a moment be questioned, that they connect the character, privileges, and final glory of believers in Christ, with the benignant and eternal purpose of God? For observe (a) the persons spoken of; "them that love

God." Rom. 8: 28. "Saints and faithful in Christ Jesus," "blessed with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ," who had received "the adoption of children," "accepted in the beloved," Eph. 1: 1—11. They are "brethren, beloved of the Lord," 2 Th. 2: 13, "sanctified by the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkled with the blood of Jesus Christ." 1 Pet. 1: 2. Can any terms or description more fully exhibit the character of true Christians? But this character including the present privileges and the prospective felicity of those who possessed it, was not (b) the result of chance or accident, nor of man's independent agency, but of God's *purpose*. They were 'called according to his purpose;' as such 'foreknown,*' 'predestinated,' 'adopted according to the good pleasure of his will,' 'chosen to salvation;' and (c) this purpose was not a purpose formed in time; not a new thought that sprung up in the divine mind immediately antecedent to the execution of it; but formed 'from the beginning,' 'before the foundation of the world,' Eph. 1: 4. 2 Thes. 2: 13,—phrases which used in relation to the acts of God are equivalent to eternal. Comp. Matt. 25: 34. John 17: 24. Eph. 1: 4. 1 Pet. 1: 20. 2 Tim. 19: 1. John 1: 1. (d) It was, moreover, a gracious or benignant purpose, opposed to human merit or desert. It was a purpose that originated in the heart of everlasting love; Jer. 31: 3, and not an *arbitrary* act of the Divine mind. Hence it is called 'the good pleasure of his will,' κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος, kind, benevolent intention, and a 'predestination in love,' ἐν ἀγάπῃ. Eph. 1: 4, 5. which redounds 'to the praise of the glory of his grace.' v. 6. (e) Finally it was a purpose connected with the whole plan of redeeming mercy through Jesus Christ; including in it the offer of pardon to sinners through Christ; their voluntary reception of it; sanctification by the Spirit; justification by faith, obedience and final glorification. Hence the golden chain of the Apostle—in Rom. 8: 28—30, 'They that love God, were first called according to his purpose,—conformed to the image of his Son—justified—glorified.' See also 1 Thes. 1: 3—6. 2 Thes. 2: 13—16. 1 Pet. 1: 1, 2.

Is it possible now, that the opinion can be maintained, that, after all, the purpose of God respecting the holiness and salvation of men, is founded on a foresight of their

* Looked upon or regarded with favour beforehand, even from eternity. Comp. Rom. 11: 2. 1 Pet. 1: 2.

good works, or of their personal merit and worthiness of such blessings? In other words, that men without God attain a Christian character and become qualified for his kingdom, and that he then purposes to save them? How different this from the apostle! "Called *according* to his purpose; predestinated *to be conformed* to the image of his Son; chosen in Christ, that *we should be* holy; chosen *to* salvation." If these passages are not sufficient to decide this point, look at the whole tenour of Scripture. Is it any where said or represented that *native* goodness or holiness is the originating cause or ground of God's saving mercy to sinners? or that *acquired* goodness, independently of his grace, is the cause of it? Neither of these will be pretended. But it is said, God foresaw or foreknew who would embrace the gospel offer and become holy, and his purpose in the order of nature followed that foreknowledge, and in this sense is founded on it? Now, leaving out of view entirely the metaphysical question, whether the *certain* foreknowledge of a future event, does not imply the previous existence of a cause or determination that will secure that event, I ask again what say the Scriptures? Do they any where teach or imply, that sinners of themselves, independently of God's choice or agency, become holy and fit subjects of his kingdom? Or on the contrary do they not every where teach, that the holiness in men which is connected with salvation, is an *EFFECT*, not the *cause* of divine grace?

If the question does not carry its own answer with it, let the voice of inspiration again be heard: "Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." 2 Tim. 1: 9. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost," Tit. 3: 9. "Even when we were dead in sins, he hath quickened us together with Christ—by grace ye are saved," Eph. 2: 5. "We love him, because he *first* loved us," 1 John 4: 19. "Yea, I have loved thee with an everlasting love, therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee," Jer. 31: 3. See also Rom. 5: 5—10. 11: 6, 7, &c., &c.

The Scriptures being thus full and decisive in ascribing the character, privileges, and final salvation of true Christians, to the gracious and eternal purpose of God; I would

conclude the discussion with a few remarks designed further to confirm the doctrine, and apply it for our practical improvement.

1. In the first place *this doctrine accords with human reason*. Unless we maintain that Christians are entirely independent of God, we must admit that he has an agency in the formation of their character, and in their future salvation. But that agency, whatever it is, must be in accordance with his own purpose; for no rational being, especially not one who is infinite in knowledge and wisdom, can be supposed to exert a blind or fortuitous agency. In other words, if God acts at all, reason declares that he acts freely, of his own choice; and we say this choice of his is gracious or benignant, because of the blessed effects of it; and that it is eternal, because it is inconsistent with his known perfections—his infinite knowledge and immutability—to suppose such a succession of acts in his mind, as a purpose formed in time implies. ‘He is of one mind—without variableness or shadow of turning.’

Let it here be observed, that as to any objection from reason which can be urged against this doctrine, it makes no difference as to the point in which you place the divine agency. Only admit that Christians do not attain their character, privileges, and salvation in absolute independence of God; and then any objection urged against the fact that he bestows these blessings on them according to his gracious and eternal purpose, will essentially lie against his doing it at all. Suppose for example, we say with some, that God only chose men to *privileges*, and left them with these to form their own character and attain salvation without any additional aid from him;—then why, an objector might ask, did he choose some to such privileges and not others? Or suppose we say, that God’s purpose was not *eternal*, but formed in time, just antecedent to the bestowment of the blessings;—then why did he form such a purpose at all? If an *eternal* purpose to produce a given effect is objectionable, why not a purpose formed *in time*, to produce the same effect? If it be said, that under the gospel dispensation God gives equal or at least sufficient grace to all men, but purposes to save only such as improve the grace bestowed; then the question is, why he limited this grace to those who live under the gospel—but withheld it from the heathen—why he gave it to men and not to fallen angels?

Whatever difficulties then pertain to this subject, in the view of human reason, they are not to be removed, by denying the plain Scripture testimony which has been adduced. We must either deny the grace and mercy of God in the present holiness and salvation of Christians, or admit in substance the doctrine which we maintain.*

2. This doctrine *accords with Christian experience*. It is indeed delightful to find, that however Christians differ in speculation respecting the divine purposes; however difficult they find it to explain how men are perfectly free and accountable, and yet dependent on the Supreme Being;—yet when the law of God is applied to the conscience, and conviction of sin is produced; when the heart of the sinner is humbled, and the justice of God distinctly apprehended; when the way of pardon through the atoning blood of Christ is opened to the mind, and the love of God is shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost:—then the instinctive feeling, and the cheerful language is, ‘By the grace of God, I am what I am.’ ‘Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy hath he saved us.’ ‘We love him, because he first loved us.’ ‘Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us; but unto thy name be the glory.’ On this point there is no difference in Christian experience. Every humbled, penitent believer is taught by the Spirit to ascribe not only his privileges, but his first holy exercises, his pardon, hopes, comforts, and whole salvation to the undeserved favour and benignant purpose of God. He may not, at once, trace these blessings back to the *eternal* purpose of God, and there fix his heart in adoration and thanksgiving; but the feeling is—these blessings come from God, free, unmerited, gracious—and to Him belongs all the praise and glory! Could we gather into one vast assembly all the real Christians on earth, of whatever name and denomination, and add to them all the saints made perfect in heaven; they would with one heart, if not with one voice, ascribe their salvation from first to last, to the unmerited grace and everlasting love of God.

And here, I humbly conceive, the advocates of this

*We must here enter our solemn protestation against the manner usually adopted by those who oppose the doctrine of election. Instead of drawing from it inferences to make it appear absurd or ridiculous; of representing it as making God unjust, tyrannical, &c., and men mere machines; let them calmly meet the Scripture testimony; let them show that we have misinterpreted the passages above quoted; in short let them, if they can, prove, that God has no agency in the holiness of his regenerate and sanctified people.

doctrine have sometimes made an erroneous impression by their manner of stating and illustrating it. In our reasoning upon it, we have usually started with the attributes of God; having thence deduced the eternity of his purposes, and fixed the mind upon him, as decreeing who should, and who should not be saved; we have gained to the doctrine, it may be, the reluctant assent of the understanding that it must be so; and yet have repelled from it the warm affections of the heart. We have sometimes left the impression, that the purpose of God respecting the salvation of men is arbitrary, irrespective of conditions and character, and have made it more a matter of speculation and controversy, than of devout and grateful feeling. But as the Scriptures present this doctrine, the heart has more to do with it than the head. It is no where exhibited as an abstract truth—a naked decree. The mind is not so much fixed on the *eternity* of the purpose, as upon the grace and glory manifested in the results. Whenever the apostles speak of it—and indeed it is every where implied, and wrought into the very texture of all their writings—they do it with emotions of gratitude, thanksgiving and love. ‘We are bound to give thanks to God alway for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord; because God hath from the beginning, chosen you to salvation;’—‘Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ—according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world.’ And in the eighth chapter of Romans, the doctrine is introduced for the comfort of ‘those who love God,’ amid the distresses and persecutions to which they were then subject. Thus every where in Scripture the doctrine is contemplated in a devotional spirit—it has chiefly to do with the hearts of believers. If the unbelieving Jews attempt to reason against it, and to assert their worthiness of God’s favour in distinction from the Gentiles; then the apostle silences them with the abrupt reply, ‘Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God,’—the only answer, I may observe, which can be given to a wicked objector to God’s discriminating grace! Let Christians, then, in their seasons of most hallowed devotion—in their times of sweetest communion with God, alone—in their approaches to the sacramental table—and in the days of affliction when their cup of sorrow is sweetened by the

consolations of hope and the anticipations of heaven ;—let them then reflect on the grace which they humbly trust has renewed, pardoned, and sanctified them ; and let them look up through mingled tears of humility and gratitude to the God of all grace, and trace their hopes and comforts back to his purposes of everlasting love in Jesus Christ !

3. To this doctrine, which is 'based on the triple foundation of Scripture, reason, and Christian experience,' *no one has good reason to be opposed.* For what does it contain that is not both honourable to God and beneficial to man ? It ascribes Christian holiness and salvation, with all intermediate blessings and privileges, not to chance or accident, not to human merit or independent agency ; but to the gracious and eternal will of God : thus laying the foundation for humility and gratitude on the part of those who are saved, and bringing a revenue of thanksgiving and glory to God. What then is there in the doctrine objectionable ? Is it the *character* of Christians ? their repentance for sin, their faith in the Redeemer, their cheerful obedience ? Is it the graces of the Spirit that adorn their lives—their 'love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, fidelity, meekness, temperance ?' Is it their precious privileges, their worship, ordinances, and seasons of communion with God ? Is it the happiness which they experience in the duties of religion ? Who would say, these are the things to which I object—these are what I hate ? Surely the worst manifestation of human depravity is hardly equal to this. Do you then object to the *final salvation* of Christians ? Would you rob them of their dying consolations, and infix the sting of death in their souls ? Would you hinder their resurrection unto life, and stop their ascent to meet their coming Lord ? When the Judge shall say, 'Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world,' would you remand them to the left hand, and bid them depart from his presence accursed ? Would you strike from their heads their crowns of glory, and snatch from their hands their harps of gold, and bid them be silent amid the anthems and hallelujahs of heaven ! If not, why are you opposed to the doctrine which ensures them this complete and eternal salvation ? Do you then object to the *purpose* itself which secures this immense and everlasting good ? But consider, it is a gracious purpose, that originated in

the heart of Everlasting Love ; and does not a purpose which aims at such glorious results render God the more worthy of the confidence and love of his creatures ? Shall I then ask, do you object to the *eternity* of this purpose ? But surely this cannot be with good reason ; for if the purpose is good in itself, if its aims and results are good ;—then we should say, the older the purpose is, the better. It shows on the part of him who made it, an infinitude of benevolence and an unchangeableness of love, that no other view can present. Were God to determine on the pardon and salvation of a sinner, a single hour or day before the blessing was imparted, could you object to such a gracious determination ? would it not be good and worthy of all praise in him thus to do ? How then does it even magnify our view of the riches of his grace, to know that such a purpose has always been in his infinitely benevolent heart,—that it is coetaneous with his own eternity ! I ask then further, can you object to the doctrine because you do not know the *reasons* for God's choice ? But you do know the glorious results of it ; and it ought to be enough to satisfy such short-sighted creatures as we are, to know that He who is infinitely wise and perfect, does nothing in his universal kingdom, but for reasons which his own infinite benevolence approves. Besides, this objection cannot be a good one, till you shall have ascended the throne of God ; thence surveyed immensity, and darted your vision through eternity—not till your mind shall have been expanded to the infinitude of Jehovah's, and your wisdom and benevolence shall have become competent to decide on the greatest possible happiness of all created intelligences, and the greatest possible aggregate of glory, that can redound to the Maker and Governour of all. Will you then object to the doctrine on the ground, that perchance it may not secure these precious and infinite blessings *to you* ? But, fix your mind on the results of God's purpose, then on the known character of him who secures such results ; and let me ask, 'Is thine eye evil, because he is good ?' In blessing others, does He injure thee ? Is it in thy heart to find fault with God, because he pardons the repentant sinner, and saves with an everlasting salvation ? or even because he graciously purposes to lead the sinner to repentance ? Does his grace towards others at all affect thy character ; increase thy voluntary wickedness, or will it at

all aggravate thy just condemnation? If this is the real ground of your objection to the doctrine, I beseech you, candidly consider the form and substance of it:—you are unwilling that the merciful God of heaven should save *any* of the guilty race of man, because he does not first pledge himself to save *you*. ‘YOUR EYE IS EVIL BECAUSE HE IS GOOD.’

4. We learn from the view which we have taken of this doctrine, *how persons may ascertain their election of God*. It is plainly impossible for us to know any thing of the purposes of God, any farther than he is pleased to reveal them. And we are not to expect, that he will make a revelation from heaven, informing us on the subject of our particular election. It is indeed within the compass of his power, to let down from his throne the book of life, and permit us to examine whether our names are written there; he might, by the inspiration of his Spirit, communicate to us the interesting fact, and thus ascertain to us our safety, or overwhelm us with despair. But in this, as in other matters, “secret things belong to God.” Still, however, there is one satisfactory method by which we can ascertain whether we are chosen of God unto salvation. Observe on this point the language of St. Paul to the Thessalonians: “We give thanks to God always for you all, making mention of you in our prayers, remembering without ceasing your work of faith, and labour of love, and patience of hope, in our Lord Jesus Christ, in the sight of God and our Father; knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God. For our gospel came not to you in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance.” 1 Th. 1: 3—5. Comp. 2 Th. 2: 13, 14. Here the Apostle knew God’s gracious purpose towards them, from their having actually embraced the gospel. Their “faith, patience and love,” were the evidence of their election. So in Rom. 8: 28—29. *They that love God* are “the called according to his purpose;” and in various passages where the adjective *elect*, is used, it denotes those who are professedly, and so far as evidence is had, really good men, *Christians*. In 1 Pet. 1: 1, 2: “The elect strangers of the dispersion,” were so not only “according to the foreknowledge of God;” but “sanctified by the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkled with the blood of Jesus Christ.” They are described as “begotten again unto a lively hope, by the resurrection of Christ from

the dead ; as "believing in Christ whom they had not seen, and rejoicing in him with joy unspeakable and full of glory." V. 3—8. And in his second epistle, Peter exhorts Christians "to give all diligence, and add to their faith virtue, knowledge, temperance, patience, godliness, brotherly kindness, and charity ;"—thus doing, they would "make their calling and election sure ;" i. e. they would in this way fully ascertain, and confirm themselves in the evidence of their election by God.

Christian reader, is your mind ever troubled on this subject? Do you sometimes wish for a messenger from the eternal world, to open the counsels of the Divine will, and tell you whether you are one of the elect of God, or not? Behold, I show you a more scriptural way. Read your election to eternal life in the devout exercises of your own heart, and in the conformity of your life to the commands of God. "We are not," says Archbishop Leighton,* "to pry immediately into the decree, but to read it in the performance. If Christians can read the characters of God's image in their own souls, those are the counterpart of the golden characters of his love, in which their names are written in the book of life. Their *believing*, writes their names under the promises of the revealed book of life, and so ascertains them that the same names are in the secret book of life, which God hath by himself from eternity.—He that loves, may be sure he was loved first; and he that chooses God for his delight and portion, may conclude confidently, that God hath chosen him to be one of those that shall enjoy him, and be happy in him forever ; for that our love and electing of him is but the return and repercussion of the beams of his love shining upon us."

5. As the purpose of God to save men, is carried into effect only by their actually complying with the proposed terms of salvation, *we see the propriety and consistency of urging them to an immediate repentance of all their sins, and to faith in the Lord Jesus Christ.*

It is obvious to the most superficial reader of the Scriptures, that while the Apostles ascribed every instance of conversion under their preaching to the gracious and eternal purpose of God, in opposition to accident and all human merit ; they seem never to have had a thought that their doctrine at all interfered with human freedom or accounta-

* Commentary on Pet. 1: 1, 2.

bleness. They went forth and preached every where, that men should repent; they urged the claims of the law to produce conviction of sin; and held forth Christ crucified, as the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. They besought sinners to be reconciled to God, urging at one time, as motives, the goodness, and at another, the terrours of the Lord. Yet when they saw converts, either from among Jews or Gentiles, embracing the truths which they thus zealously inculcated; they gave the glory to God, accounting it a fruit and token of his eternal purpose of mercy. This was perfectly consistent: For God's purposes respecting human salvation are all harmonious;—they have respect to the nature and circumstances of men.* It is one property of man, that he is a free, rational, and accountable agent: he acts only under the influence of motives. His sins are all freely committed; his repentance, faith, and obedience are also the free exercises of his mind. He does nothing for which he is accountable, but what is in perfect accordance with his own free choice. How then can a sinner become a subject of God's unmerited grace, repent, believe and obey, without knowing his duty and being urged by proper motives to do it? In other words, how is it consistent with the nature of man, for a purpose of God to take effect in changing a sinner's heart, without the truth being presented to his mind, and the sinner of his own choice in view of proper motives, embracing it?

Hence, in point of fact, there is an admirable correspondence between God's gracious purposes and the use of the means of grace, where the institutions of the Gospel are established, where the Sabbath is sacredly observed, the Scriptures diligently read; where Christians are faithful in duty and fervent in prayer, and where ministers, full of faith

*On this subject President Edwards very justly says, "God decrees all things harmoniously and in excellent order, one thing harmonizes with another, and there is such a relation between all the decrees as makes the most excellent order. When God decrees to give the blessing of rain, he decrees the prayers of his people; and when he decrees the prayers of his people for rain, he very commonly decrees rain; and thereby there is an harmony between these two decrees, of rain and the prayers of God's people. Thus also when he decrees diligence and industry, he decrees riches and prosperity; when he decrees striving, then he often decrees the obtaining of the kingdom; when he decrees the preaching of the gospel, then he decrees the bringing home of souls to Christ; when he decrees conformity to his Son, then he decrees calling; when he decrees calling, then he decrees justification; and when he decrees justification, then he decrees everlasting glory. Thus all the decrees of God are harmonious." *Obs. on Decrees and Election*. Vol. 5. pp. 353—4. ed. 1608.

and of the Holy Ghost, preach the truths of the Gospel with all fidelity;—there converts are multiplied. The purpose of God is thus not only consonant with the use of means, but essentially connected with them. Such is the nature of man, that without these moral means, there can be neither ‘sanctification of the Spirit nor belief of the truth.’ Hence I would urge the importance of sending the Gospel to all heathen nations; to the destitute portions of our own country; and of bringing directly within its influence every family and every individual of our whole community. Let Christian parents be faithful in training up their children for God;—let children and youth all be gathered into classes for biblical instruction;—let every person have his seat in the sanctuary;—let Christians be exemplary, and prayerful;—let ministers preach as Paul did, ‘publicly and from house to house, with tears, warning every man and teaching every man in all wisdom; that they may present them all perfect in Christ Jesus;’ and then God’s gracious purposes will be developed in the conversion of great multitudes.

6. But still further, this subject shows, *that those who persist in unbelief and impenitence, and finally perish, are justly chargeable with the guilt of being their own destroyers!* On this point, our safest appeal is to CONSCIENCE. I would then ask those who know that they are living in impenitence and disobedience to God, whether they are not conscious of being guilty in his sight? Have you not thus far persisted in the ways of sin, in opposition to your own conscience and the authority of God? Do you not, therefore, at present justly lie under condemnation? Suppose then you continue in the same course—repeat your sinful acts—cherish an impenitent spirit—neglect and reject Jesus Christ—live without prayer—and, until the last day of life, “without God in the world!” How will your account at that dread moment, stand with your Judge? How will your own conscience view it? Will not your dying agonies be increased by the deep consciousness of criminality in God’s sight? And when you meet him in the Judgement, without the robe of the Saviour’s righteousness, will you not be “speechless?” As to the fact of your guilt, it matters not whether the doctrine of election is true or false. You are a sinner, now impenitent; and if you persevere in this state of impenitence; if you continue to reject the Saviour that died for you; the mea-

sure of your iniquity will ere long be full ; your day of probation closed, and your eternal doom sealed. But no purpose of God will be the cause or occasion of your ruin. Your own sins alone, freely indulged and persisted in, in opposition to God's authority and entreaties, will be the only and just cause of your final misery. You will thus be the executor of your own destruction !

This practical view of the doctrine of election, places every impenitent man in a very critical and alarming condition. In the expressive words of Archbishop Leighton, "They that are *children of disobedience* can conclude no otherwise of themselves, but that they are *children of wrath*. Although from present unsanctification, a man cannot infer that he is not elected ; for the decree may, for a part of a man's life, run (as it were) under ground, yet this is sure, that the estate leads to death, and unless it be broken, will prove the black line of reprobation ! A man hath no portion amongst the children of God, nor can read one word of comfort in all the promises that belong to them, while he remains unholy." What use then shall those who are conscious of present impenitence and unfitness for the kingdom of God, make of this doctrine ? You may abuse it, by saying, you will wait without concern for God to accomplish his own purpose towards you ;—but ought you not rather to say, "Henceforth, it shall be my endeavour, to ascertain whether God has mercy to bestow on me or not. The course which I am now pursuing, leads inevitably to destruction ! I know that my sins are inexcusable—that I have no claim on that holy and just God whose law I have violated ! I know too it is written 'Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy on him. Like the penitent prodigal then, ready to perish, would I return : I will arise and go unto my Father, and say, Father, I have sinned against heaven and in thy sight ; I am no more worthy to be called thy son, make me as one of thy hired servants.'—I plead for mercy in the name of that Saviour who shed his blood for the remission of sins ; and in reliance upon the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, I do here solemnly devote and dedicate myself to the service of God while I live. His unmerited mercy is my only hope !" Thus do, and you shall not long remain in doubt of your "election of God."

"He will lift up upon you the light of his countenance, and show unto you the joys of his salvation."

I add in conclusion, *this doctrine warrants us joyfully to anticipate the glorious developements of God's purposes of mercy in future time.* How many of the guilty race of Adam have heretofore embraced the Saviour, borne the divine image on earth, and been translated to immortal glory, it is impossible to tell. The beloved apostle in vision saw a great multitude, which no man could number, gathered from all nations, standing before the throne and before the Lamb. We know from the records of revelation, that there was a bright and glorious galaxy of holy men, whose faith and works shone amid the comparative darkness of God's ancient dispensation. Under the new dispensation, the number of his visible elect has been greatly multiplied. In apostolic times they were 'scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia;' they resided at Jerusalem, Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, Colosse and Thessalonica, and even in nearly all the inhabited regions of the world. A goodly number lived amid the darkness of the middle ages. They were multiplied by thousands when the light of the reformation burst forth, and have been increasing from that period till the present time. Oh! how rejoicing would it be to the sight of our eyes, to behold "the sacramental host of God's elect" now peopling the four quarters of the globe, gathered into one vast and harmonious assemblage, to send up their supplications and to shout their anthems of praise to the God of all grace! But what has been, is only an earnest of what will be. If there is truth in prophecy, there are yet to come seasons of refreshing from the presence of the Lord, such as the church in her best estate has never experienced—such as the world has never seen. Revivals of religion, which within twenty years past, have probably gathered in hundreds of thousands of God's elect, are destined to increase in power, and multiply in their blessed results, and extend their sanctifying influences till they shall give place to one universal revival that shall pervade the habitable globe, and constitute the Millennial period of the church. If the angels of God rejoice over one sinner that repenteth; if the hearts of Christians are dilated with gladness when the mercy of God is unfolded in one short season of refreshing; if the tidings

which we are now receiving from distant Pagan nations and from the islands of the sea, respecting the success of the gospel, awaken such raptures of joy ;—Oh, what will be the emotions of gladness which will fill all hearts, and go up in loud thanksgiving to heaven, when it shall be proclaimed, ‘ *The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ ; and he shall reign forever and ever.* ’ Then, even then, the developed purposes of God’s eternal mercy will be the theme of joy and praise through all his holy universe ! Yes, delightful thought ! the last redeemed and sanctified soul that shall live on earth, will be the fruit of a gracious purpose that was in the heart of Everlasting Love. The whole multitude that shall stand before the throne, clothed in white robes, with palms in their hands, and that shall shout SALVATION to Him that sitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb—will be the ‘ called, chosen and faithful.’ As from the summits of glory on which they will stand, they shall survey their rich, incorruptible, everlasting inheritance ; they will look back, and ascribe all that they enjoy, and all that they anticipate, to the gracious and eternal purpose of God. And when ages of ages shall have rolled away, and borne them onward into the immeasurable depths of eternity ; they will still look far back to the gracious purpose of God, as the source of their eternal felicity !—And they will sing, as everlasting ages roll on—‘ *Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto THY NAME, give glory.* ’

ART. IX. REVIEW OF COUSIN'S REPORT ON EDUCATION IN PRUSSIA.

By THEODORE DWIGHT, JUN., New-York.

"*Report on the state of public instruction in Prussia ; addressed to the Count de Montalivet, Peer of France, Minister of Public Instruction and Ecclesiastical Affairs ; by Victor Cousin, Peer of France, Counsellor of State, Professor of Philosophy, Member of the Institute and of the Royal Council of Public instruction. With plans of school houses. Translated by Sarah Austin. New-York : Wiley & Long, 1835.*"

"*Manuel Generale, ou Journal de l'Instruction Primaire, destiné a guider les Instituteurs dans le choix de méthodes, et de repandre dans toutes les communes de France les melleurs d'education, publié sous la direction d'un inspecteur general des études, et de plusieurs autres membres de l'université. Paris.*"

THESE works present numerous and interesting subjects to an American reader. A French copy of Cousin's report which has been in our hands for some time, had led our minds to some of those grave reflections, to which we hope this abridged translation, now becoming diffused through the United States, may conduct many of our countrymen. The work addresses itself to persons of every class : for what individual is there, whatever may be his condition or opinions on the subject, whose real interests are not closely identified with those of general and sound education ? It is one of the great objects in which every inhabitant of the land is personally interested ; and the fact that this volume professes to offer a mass of information relating to common education, ought to secure it a large circulation, a general and attentive perusal.

It is a most happy thing for us, that, just at the period when there is a general disposition in our country, not only to enquire, but to act on the subject of education, and to lay the foundations of broad, liberal, and permanent systems, so much valuable information concerning the systems of Europe should be thrown in our way, by foreign publications, and particularly those which have appeared in France. It is between two and three years since the new national system of education in that country commenced operation ; and since that period, as well as for some time before, the pens and minds of some of the most distinguished philanthopists of that kingdom have been employed in diffusing knowledge relating to it.

However much the late revolution in France may have disappointed the expectations of some in its results on public education, its influence has been more salutary and speedy than could have been reasonably anticipated. A complete system has been put into operation, embracing many of the best principles of teaching and discipline, and founded upon religious instruction as its very basis. We must naturally wish to learn the grounds on which such measures have been introduced, in a country where infidelity and vice, on the one hand, and the Jesuits on the other, within the recollection of living men, have been allowed such full opportunity to try their various plans. France has had awful and bloody experience; and if we are wise, we shall endeavour to draw from her some salutary lessons. That devoted friend of education in New Granada, Joaquin Mosquera, imbibed new interest in the object to which he is now devoting his life, from personal intercourse with the patriots of France during the deliberations in which they engaged while laying the foundations of their new system in that kingdom; and surely the example they have set is one most worthy of imitation in our own country.

The "Report" made by Cousin on the state of the Prussian schools, doubtless had much influence on the minds of those who gave direction to the French system; but it does not embrace every thing which an American friend of education should wish to see; and it is to be hoped that its publication in this country may create a demand for other works relating to education in Europe. The "*Manuel Generale*," which we mention at the head of this article, may serve as a kind of practical commentary on the "Report;" for it shows in detail the progress of the system now in operation in France, founded on such views as the latter work contains. To this may be added a number of other papers and books which proceed from the French press in abundance, showing that many and intelligent minds are now ardently devoted to that branch of literature. The "*Journal de l'instruction elementale*," and the school books of every sort, teacher's guides, cards, charts, &c., &c. are already sufficient to form a considerable library. In many of these are to be seen embodied the old methods long practised in one or another quarter of Europe, together with the new and sometimes fanciful theories of active but inex-

perienced minds. There are also manuals corrected by able and successful instructors, works translated from foreign languages, perhaps modified for the use of French schools, with specimens of maps, drawings, cards, &c. to illustrate the views of writers, or to aid in teaching the young. In the journals we find the laws and ordinances of the government, instructions to teachers, inspectors and committees, hints on education, schoolmasters' meetings, biographical sketches, practical catechisms on different branches of instruction, notices of new works, reports of schools, examinations, &c., &c. In short, abundant materials are thus furnished, which ought to be brought before the eyes of all our teachers, by American journals of education.

While, however, the importance of knowing the state of education in Europe is urged upon our countrymen, we ought, with at least equal emphasis, to warn them against blindly following any European examples, or embracing foreign views without proper examination. The danger is, that persons acquainted with foreign systems, the Prussian for example, may think they have prepared themselves to act in favour of education at home, when in truth, unless they have first formed definite American views, their work of preparation is but half done. Much independent reflection is necessary, combined with an intimate acquaintance with the nature of our government, the character and condition of our people, and the history of education among us.

In the history and condition of common education in different parts of our Union, we may read the effects of a variety of causes, the operation and results of a number of principles. As has been generally allowed, our systems of common education have been unfortunate; and to such a degree, that not one exists, which is free from great and glaring defects. An attentive observer will see in Massachusetts the favourable influence of long established and general habits of education upon society, required but unaided by law; and in New-York, the salutary effects of legislation, accompanied with pecuniary aid from the State, upon a population until recently, in a great degree, inattentive to schools. In Connecticut are displayed many of the evils of a school fund injudiciously applied; while in New-Jersey worse effects have been produced, and more rapidly, by a still more objectionable arrangement. In a few districts, we have opportunity to observe the influence

of judicious measures pursued by intelligent and patriotic individuals and associations, in the promotion of education ; while in many more are displayed the waste and desolation that succeed the entire neglect of it by our citizens and the government.

If an American reader, then, keeps constantly in view the difference between ends proposed, and means for their accomplishment, he cannot peruse such works as we have mentioned, without interest and profit. He will find facts to confirm or contradict his own opinions, and light thrown upon subjects which want light in our country. Some of us need to be convinced, that a common school can possibly be materially improved, so that children may be taught good manners, morality and religion, and two or three times as much useful knowledge, as they now acquire. Others, who believe such improvement to be within the bounds of possibility, need to be convinced, that such a change may be effected, in any considerable degree, within a short time. To some it may appear an unfounded idea, that school-masters can be a respected class in society, or that their situation can be rendered a pleasant and desirable one. Such impressions as these will be counteracted by the facts presented to the reader of these works:

There are several general prejudices in relation to common education, which must be overcome,—prejudices whose influence is far more important and calamitous than we have been accustomed to imagine. And foremost of all must be placed the extensive prejudice against connecting religious and moral with intellectual instruction. To separate these, is to tear sound education limb from limb. They cannot be divided with impunity. We must present sound and consistent principles to the young, or they will never form sound and consistent characters. It is in vain to say that schools are designed exclusively to enlighten the mind. How easy is it to overthrow the fallacious system which is often founded on this (so called) liberal doctrine ! How easy is it to overwhelm its advocate on his own ground ! Admitting for a moment that the cultivation of the intellect is the great, or even the only proper object of common education ; can any system be said to accomplish that object which is calculated to pervert the mind ? And who can pretend, that the mind is not exposed to perversion, when trained by a deist, an immoral man, or a teacher who passes

for either? Some men speak as if there were a negative course possible, and assert that a negative influence would be the result. All reason, however, and all experience prove the contrary. Even without taking into the account the direct injury done by an infidel or a vicious man to the character of his pupils, it must be allowed, that the idea of God, his perfections and relations to us, cannot be kept out of sight in the process of education, without removing from the mind of a youth some of the most important influences. We should seek to surround our youth in the school with all the influences which bear favourably upon the mind; and who can doubt for a moment, that the most indispensable are those which are connected with just views of religion? There is no negative course, and can be none. The want of religion, is irreligion: silence about it is a practical denial of its reality. See the grand conclusions to which M. Cousin's enquiries have led him. He says:

"Without neglecting physical science, and the knowledge applicable to the arts of life, we must make moral science, which is of far higher importance, our main object. The mind and the character are what the master ought to fashion. We must lay the foundation of moral life in the souls of our young masters, and therefore we must place religious instruction—that is, to speak distinctly, Christian instruction—in the first rank in the education of our normal schools. Leaving to the curate, or to the pastor of the place, the care of instilling the doctrines peculiar to each communion, we must constitute religion a special object of instruction, which must have its place in each year of the normal course; so that, at the end of the entire course, the young masters, without being theologians, may have a clear and precise knowledge of the history, doctrines, and, above all, the moral precepts of Christianity. Without this, the pupils, when they become masters, would be incapable of giving any other religious instruction, than the mechanical repetition of the catechism, which would be quite insufficient. I would particularly urge this point, sir, which is the most important and the most delicate of all.

"Before we can decide on what should constitute a true primary normal school, we must determine what ought to be the character of a simple elementary school; that is, a humble village school. The popular schools of a nation ought to be imbued with the spirit of that nation. Now, without going into the question of diversities of doctrine, is Christianity, or is it not, the religion of the people of France? It cannot be denied, that it is. I ask then, is our object to respect the religion of a people, or to destroy it? If we mean to set about destroying it, then, I allow, we ought by no means to have it taught in the people's schools. But if the object we propose to ourselves is totally different, we must teach our children that religion which civilized our fathers; that religion whose liberal spirit prepared, and can alone sustain, all the great institutions of modern times."

* * * "The less we desire our schools to be ecclesiastical, the more ought they to be Christian. It necessarily follows, that there must be a course of religious instruction in our normal schools. Religion is, in my eyes, the best—the only basis of popular education. I know something of Europe; and never have I seen good schools where the spirit of Christianity is wanting. Primary instruction flourishes in three countries, Holland, Scotland, and Germany: in all it is profoundly religious."

* * * "I am not ignorant, sir, that this advice will grate on the ears of many

persons, and that I shall be thought extremely devout at Paris. Yet it is not from Rome, but from Berlin, that I address you. The man who holds this language is a philosopher, formerly disliked, and even persecuted by the priesthood; but this philosopher has a mind too little affected by the recollection of his own insults, and is too well acquainted with human nature and with history, not to regard religion as an indestructible power—genuine Christianity as a means of civilization for the people, and a necessary support for those on whom society imposes irksome and humble duties, without the slightest prospect of fortune, without the least gratification of self-love.”*

This view will be questioned or discarded by some among us: but we hesitate not to say, that wherever it is practically carried into effect, the result must establish its soundness; and whatever class or community in our country, shall most intelligently and carefully connect sound religious and moral with intellectual instruction, will lead the way in education. Let any one of our religious sects, any state in the Union, or even any portion of a state, at once, and with a vigour becoming the cause, place their schools on a high-toned, religious, moral, and intellectual basis, and they will speedily be rewarded with a success which will be wanting to others, and they will be sure to have many imitators. A kind of necessity will be created, by which others will be driven to imitate their course. It will be seen, that they attain results which others do not, and that their youth rise, while others sink in the scale of society.

Without pursuing the ramifications of our fertile subject into as many remarks as we might be tempted to indulge in, we will now turn to state what appear to us to be the outlines of a system of public education applicable to our country. These we shall view under two aspects: first, legislative provisions, and second, popular co-operation.

Had there been fewer experiments made with legal provisions for education than we have had, there might, and certainly would have been more doubt as to what can, and what cannot be done by the hand of law. Had we not, on the other side, numerous precedents to appeal to, we might feel at a loss to determine, in many cases, what might and what might not be safely or prudently left to be performed by our citizens without accountability to the government. As things are, we know that legislatures can attain certain objects in certain ways, and that certain other points may be gained by calling on the people to accomplish them. In the following general sketch, therefore, it is far from the design to offer a mere theory for the contemplation of the

* Cousin's Report.

reader. It is designed to suggest only measures whose practicability has been rendered probable by experiments already made, and to aim at results which appear to be warranted by precedents that may be quoted.

If we consider the condition of any single school district in any part of the country, we shall find that two sorts of influences are necessary to render it what a common school should be :

1st. A good general system established by law ; and 2d. The active support of the people.

The following we regard as the grand points necessary to be established by law, in every State of the Union.

I. A *Superintendent of Common Schools*, elected on account of his fitness for the office, morally and intellectually, adequately paid, and with the prospect of retaining his situation during good conduct. He should not, as in New-York, be entrusted with the management of this department, merely in consequence of his being elected to an office of a totally different nature ; nor be expected to pay his chief attention to other objects ; nor be liable to give place to a successor every year. It should be an object of primary interest with every one of our legislatures, to procure immediately a superintendent of common schools, who, if not more expressly trained for his station, than the teachers whom he is to superintend, should at least be made to regard his office as a permanent one. It is solemnly declared in our legislature almost every year, that it is an object of prime importance, to render the teacher's profession a permanent one : and yet it never seems to have occurred to the mind of any body, what a figure a *biennial* or *annual* superintendent would make, in directing permanent teachers.

It would be a salutary example, if we could see one good superintendent, elected on account of his qualifications for that office, and expected to exercise it during good conduct, actively and exclusively devoted to its duties. We may imagine such an officer as is wanted. Although we could not reasonably expect to find a man at once fully qualified in every respect for this highly important station (for there is no seminary for their education) ; we may suppose one of our ardent and intelligent friends of education addressing himself to his task, and annually improving by experience. He would soon have in his possession all the facts and opinions most worthy of notice, now scattered over the face

of our country. His tours of inspection would yield him a rich harvest, fresh from living society; and his correspondence would open channels in every direction, through which would be freely poured the knowledge deposited in many liberal and philanthropic minds, and accumulating year by year. Between such minds he would promote an intercourse favourable to the great ends of learning. During his annual visits to different parts of his state, what an amount of salutary influences might he dispense? His first call on arriving in a village, would perhaps be on the now humble and often despised school-master, whose lonely retreat he would dignify by his presence, whose heart he would cheer by his expressions of interest and respect. He would open the eyes of good men to see their duties, and show the steps to be taken in performing them; while his personal presence would effect much in many ways, in every district, town and county.

II. The annual appropriations from a school fund should be made on conditions something like these: 1st. That every district should have a school-house erected and furnished according to a given plan (so far as circumstances would permit); 2d. That the school should be kept at least a certain number of months, by a teacher regularly licensed, and according to certain principles; 3d. That regular reports should be made, and proper evidence furnished of the above-mentioned particulars, and of the average attendance of pupils, which should be drawn from the daily or weekly attendance. The sum appropriated to the district should then be, in whole or in part proportioned to the average attendance, or to the amount raised by voluntary contributions during the year.

There would have been room to doubt, had we been without experience, whether the mere prospect of a moderate sum of money annually, would have excited sufficient interest among the districts, to induce them to exertion. But since the trial has been made in the state of New-York, there seems room to hope, that this means will prove generally successful. It is well known, that the hope of a small sum of money each year, has induced each district, before destitute of a school-house, to erect one at its own expense, to procure a teacher regularly examined, to collect as large a number of children as possible into the school, to raise an amount equal to that offered them by the state,

and to make annual reports, embracing a considerable amount of information. Seeing the influence of a distribution on this principle, the legislatures of Massachusetts and Illinois have this very year practically expressed their confidence in the apparent result of the experiment. They have also made material improvements in its application, by devising laws calculated to secure important advantages not contemplated by those of New-York. Illinois, by requiring the returns of attendance to be founded on the daily number of pupils present, has rendered it an object of public interest to keep the children regularly at school, instead of offering motives, as in our state, only for their appearance a single time ; and Massachusetts, by apportioning half the annual dividend according to the amount of money raised during the year, in the districts, for the support of schools, has presented a powerful stimulus to private liberality. This stimulus will not be limited, like that offered by the New-York system, within narrow bounds. Suppose a district in New-York, after complying with all the other conditions of the law, raises an amount of money equal to that which falls to her share out of the income of the school fund for that year. All has now been done which is necessary to secure the utmost advantage she can derive from the state ; and of course the same motive which has induced the people to tax themselves, now inclines them to refuse a dollar more. But turn to Massachusetts. If the proposed plan should go into operation, and prove effectual, as seems highly probable, the motive to be liberal to the schools will never be diminished by any thing done. Each district in the state will be brought into competition with every other ; and it is yet to be seen what may be the result of such a competition.

It may perhaps at first strike some minds, that the bounty offered by that state will prove too small to excite the people ; and indeed it must be small at first. But it will soon be discovered, that the fewer the competitors, the greater the incitement to competition : for if half or three quarters of the districts should make no exertion this year to obtain any of the public money, the exertions of those who enter the lists will be rewarded double or three-fold.

And here we may stop a moment, to drop a few ideas concerning the mode in which the money offered by the State operates, and may operate, in the districts, for the benefit of

education. It may be objected to it, that it appeals to motives of mere selfishness, and does not directly claim the attention and labours of citizens in favour of the schools, on account of their value to the country. How far such an objection may be well founded, we have not at this moment time to examine. It is evident, however, at the first glance, that the motives presented are not personal ; it is the pecuniary advantage of a community, not that of a single individual, which is consulted. In certain ways, too, it is calculated to counteract and overcome that narrow selfishness, which is so extensively the enemy of public spirit and good education.

In the first place, the distribution of public money on such conditions as have been mentioned, organizes a number of citizens in every district, as a corps of education. One of the first objects to be aimed at every where, is to have an association formed for the direction of schools. In a region where no schools exist, how important an era must it be, when a meeting of influential individuals first begins to consider their importance, and the means of forming them ! It is to that region something like the appearance of Cadmus to Greece. And if the meeting is held by the authority of the State, and the members sit as public officers, with a circular detailing their duties and powers, with how much additional importance is it invested ! And what superiour opportunities are offered for the success of its proceedings ! When men undertake an office gratuitously, they are generally more disposed to perform it well than ill. They will give it at least some thought and attention ; and a little is better than none. A mind which has thought at all on public education, must think of it again and again ; and we shall find almost every person who has acted as a school trustee, commissioner, inspector, or committee-man, in possession of at least one or two good ideas on the subject. What we ourselves have accomplished, also, appears to us of some consequence ; and therefore it is, that through school officers chiefly, public education is brought up to the attention of those around them.

Again the jealousies of neighbouring districts are turned to good account, by the stimulus excited by public money ; for instead of rendering the people parsimonious, it requires them to be liberal ; and, as has been before intimated on the plan proposed in Massachusetts, competition may lead to a

degree of liberality in favour of education hitherto unknown.

Perhaps one of the most important effects of the judicious distribution of school money, may prove to be its tendency to make politicians the avowed friends of learning. It is generally allowed, that the mass of our countrymen feel where their pecuniary interests are touched. In whatever town or district, therefore, a portion of the school money is thought to be worth obtaining, those persons who are most useful in securing it, will obtain some degree of popularity. At least, it may be considered certain, that no man who desires popularity, will ever openly appear as an enemy to public education. Without giving any more time here to the consideration of this point, let us turn, on the one hand, to the State of New-York ; and, after having seen how generally and punctiliously the conditions required of the districts are annually complied with, in order that the offered money may be obtained, ask ourselves whether, in every village, the interests of the public schools are not connected with those of aspirants to office ? Let us then anticipate the period, when Pennsylvania shall offer similar inducements to her citizens to build and occupy school houses, appoint trustees, &c., &c. ; and enquire whether, on the principles of human nature, it will not be reasonable to expect the excitement of a spirit there, such as her best friends would wish to see ?

III. Provision should be made for the preparation of teachers. As to the importance of this object, there has been a general agreement, but there is a diversity of opinion concerning the means for attaining it, and particularly in relation to the first step. A large and respectable institution, chiefly designed for the education of teachers of common schools, has been in active operation at Andover for several years ; and in several legislatures expressions have been made, decidedly favourable to the foundation of others under State authority. It is well known also, that a number of academies, in different parts of the Union, annually furnish some degree of preparation to a few instructors. It is to be confessed, however, that only loose and unsettled ideas are as yet generally entertained in relation to the subject.

Some of the friends of education seem to suppose, that nothing is to be desired for our schools, beyond a supply of young collegians as teachers ; and that such a connexion

between colleges and schools as exists to a considerable extent, in the temporary employment of the pupils or graduates of the one as teachers of the other, is all that could be desired. Nothing can be more crude than such a notion as this. The power of acquiring knowledge and that of communicating it, are not as generally distinguished by the public as they should be, and as they must be before education can become thoroughly improved.

Some persons advocate the formation of teachers' seminaries, (or normal schools, as they are called in Europe,) at once, all over our country; while others are in favour of merely adding a new branch to the principal academies, for the instruction of teachers. In the State of New-York the latter course has been adopted, and is now spoken of as the settled plan. Eight academies, one in each senatorial district, have been designated for this purpose; and the Regents of the University have given a plan of instruction, as well as a list of studies to be pursued. Much credit is due to the State for its activity and energy on this subject. Good will be effected by this plan, and the small sum to be annually appropriated for it out of the literary fund, will so far be well invested: for any thing that raises the standard of common instruction is of incalculable value; and an advance in one State will of necessity in some degree influence others. This plan, however, as we understand, meets an obstacle at the very outset. The proper men to conduct the teachers' departments are not easily to be found. Application was made from two of the academies, to the teachers' seminary at Andover, for men to fill the places recently formed; and they were not to be obtained. Enough has not yet been done or said in the country to lead to deep reflection and mature views on the proper principles of national education. What, therefore, may be attempted in our academies, it is to be feared, will be very imperfect, if not decidedly erroneous. Which of the eight academies designated, with the few pupils it will probably have in the teachers' department, the novelty of the experiment to be tried, and the backwardness of public opinion as to the qualifications of a teacher, will be likely to fill up the details of the plan of instruction which has been sketched by the Regents of the University? How long will it probably be, also, before the serious defects in that plan shall be supplied; and what security can we have, that ill

success in the experiment, may not render unpopular even some of the important excellencies it embraces?

One of the first objects to be secured, in relation to the education of teachers, is the promulgation of a well-digested plan of instruction. For this, it seems, a central seminary for teachers is necessary. Let a state or an association of the friends of knowledge found an institution on a liberal plan, and secure the labours of a few of the most competent men in the country. Probably not one person is yet to be found, whose views are fully matured on the subject. The most intelligent would need some further time for enquiry, reflection or experiment; and such an institution as might be formed in a central situation would afford him the requisite opportunity. With a model school on the one hand, a class of young teachers on the other, with the proper apparatus, library, professors, &c., he would be able to draw out a system in all its details, which, when published would prove of great value. With such a plan, then, teachers, in all parts of the country, might in some degree fit themselves for their duties, while it would serve as a guide for instructors in all the seminaries that might be established. One capable man, in such a situation, aided by competent assistants, would probably do more in a single year to bring up the country to just conceptions on the subject of common education, than could be accomplished by many, otherwise placed, in a long course of years.

Under the second general head of our remarks, we are now to mention some of the measures to be effected by the people themselves.

I. Private associations for the promotion of common education. Suppose the objects already enumerated to have been attained, either in a part, or in all of our states: abundant opportunity would be offered for the useful operation of such associations. Even if we suppose a single state, with a school fund judiciously appropriated, with a superintendent properly placed, and some good provision made for the education of teachers, how powerful would be the influence of such a society, acting at once as the voluntary assistant, and the independent overseer of the whole! Would not such an arrangement combine the advantages of the European system, with those we have reason to expect from the nature of our republican institutions? Would not

the public thus be sure of being well informed, and be put in a condition to watch against every encroachment and perversion, from whatever quarter it might be threatened? Now let us suppose each state in the whole Union even partially organized by the legislatures in the manner proposed, some with well-applied school funds, others with such superintendents, or such means of preparing teachers as might be desired, and how salutary would be the influence of a single good education society, even if it gave employment only to one good agent! The facts he would obtain from the different superintendents, with his more general knowledge, would soon render him virtually superintendent of them all; and his correspondence with legislatures, and his visits to different states, would produce something like the impression excited by the periodical pilgrimages of the superintendents through their own districts and counties. Enlightened discussions would then be held by our legislatures, their committees being furnished with well ascertained facts and digested plans; and in case of the avowal of such crude or dangerous ideas as are now boldly maintained every year in some of our states, the public eye would be upon them from one end of the country to the other.

When we contemplate the results likely to be produced by such means as have been mentioned, in almost any of the forms and degrees in which they may be resorted to, we have reason to think that our own circumstances and institutions are not necessarily adverse to the general prevalence of education, even on highly improved principles. On the contrary, unless we have fallen into some capital error, there is ground to believe that if proper experiments were tried, we should find in our own land a congenial soil, and a climate propitious to that plant which is indispensable to our happiness, and of prime necessity to our very existence.

If even one feature only of a good system were adopted in one state, another in another, and still a different one in a third, while in a fourth, experiments were made with two or three, experience would soon show results instructive to all, and highly favourable to the ultimate adoption of an uniform system throughout the whole country.

Other objects might have been mentioned, in our enumeration of desirable measures: but as we have chiefly limited ourselves to those which are more particularly of a legislative

character, we shall advert but briefly to a few others which are of scarcely less importance, but of such a nature as to be most naturally left to the influence of good laws and an active public interest. Among these is a supply of improved books. The defects of those with which the majority of our schools are supplied, are too striking and numerous to require of us here an attempt at their enumeration. Good books, in all respects adapted to our circumstances, necessities and convenience, would doubtless prove one of the most powerful means of improving common education. They might indeed alone afford no inconsiderable remedy to most of the deficiencies under which our schools now extensively suffer. We desperately need, also, a general and active interest in favour of education, not of schools merely, but of popular intellectual improvement in its widest sense.

Village or District libraries, if formed and conducted with intelligent views, might become highly useful. Our country generally is not well supplied with books. While our cities and larger towns present the appearance of a surplus, a little attention to the state of the country at large, it is to be feared, would convince any one that the abundant fountain speedily sinks into the sand; and certain it is that a large proportion of the books which find their way to the remoter and more retired neighbourhoods are of an useless or pernicious character. Almost while we are writing, the legislature of New-York have published a law authorizing districts to tax themselves annually for the foundation and support of libraries; and this measure may well invite both public and private imitation. How easy would it be in this, as in many other cases, for good citizens to supply the deficiencies of laws, by contributing a few dollars, or even a few of their good, but unused books for the public benefit! The experiment has been often tried with success: but how many neighbourhoods remain destitute of this cheap, but important means of intellectual and moral improvement! In Scotland travelling libraries have been, to some extent, brought into use; but circulating libraries would probably be better adapted to our own country, while books are so cheap and time so dear. The interchange of libraries between the towns or districts of a county, might often be productive of general benefit.

The general cultivation of vocal music we hesitate not to enumerate among the important means of public educa-

tion. The voice powerfully influences the mind and heart; and to what purpose should the refinements of art be applied unless to the cause of Christianity and national liberty?

The most important mode of popular co-operation in favour of common education, remains, however, to be mentioned—that is family instruction in the Scriptures. The parent should be the daily teacher of his children and servants in the sacred volume. And to do this effectually he must use their history, geography, biography, &c., as the mnemonics designed to be subservient to their great end. But this he must not expect to do by the mere reading of a chapter or two a day in the hearing of his family. He must proceed with deliberation, and multiply answers, questions, now concerning the words of the text, now concerning the places mentioned, the periods, the personages, the coincidences, the inferences to be drawn, the instructions to be derived for practice in life, and for the use of *to-day*. Question books, those of the Sunday School for instance, may be resorted to by persons who feel any embarrassment in the task. Commentaries may be at hand, and maps hung upon the walls; and the time devoted to the daily lesson should be made the occasion of all others when the minds of small and great shall find most active occupation, and that most appropriate to their nature, and the affections such sympathetic exercise as the Scriptures are evidently designed by their author to afford. To do this well, the father must be the most interested, humble and open to instruction.

The truth is, that we have in the Bible, the great instrument of education. The family is the school established by the same authority from which this volume proceeded. It must be the text and class book; and the parent, in whose hands it is placed, must be the teacher. He need not content himself with complaining of bad schools or of no schools. He is appointed as a school-master, and must not overlook his own duty, so indispensable to the preparation of pupils for every other species of instruction. Say what we please of laws and institutions, here is the place for truly *primary* instruction, and for an important part of education from the cradle to the grave. Schools can never flourish without it; with it the want of schools may be in some important respect supplied. The mind is thus brought to its great guide, is early taught to acquire knowledge and the practical use of its powers, for the want of which no qualifications in a mas-

ter can atone. And, what is of more importance, the affections are trained by means, for which all heathen literature and all mere human science might be ransacked in vain. To each of our readers we would say, simply try this plan, and then you will be able to pronounce upon its merits. It is free from all the objections which may be urged against the preceeding. It demands neither extraordinary leisure, nor learning, and requires no exposure to public notice. Other means are good : but here are centered our chief hopes for American education.

Whether all the suggestions we have made be correct or not, each reader must determine for himself. Concerning the importance of the great object, no man in his senses can be in doubt. Every class and every individual in the country should be taught, and taught well, and as much as possible; and that, not for his own advantage alone or chiefly, but for the common good.

It is not for the real interest of any one of the millions in the United States, that the minds around him should be neglected. Neither can it be said to be an object of mere philanthropy to any of us, that intelligence and virtue should be promoted. We are bound by a decent respect to consistency, to be the decided advocates of learning. Our form of government requires it. But this is not all : we are personally interested. Our dearest privileges, our most necessary enjoyments, are dependent on the general diffusion of knowledge ; and not the diffusion of knowledge alone, but on the education of mind. We have all a great personal stake, in having the minds of men trained by proper and assiduous exercise on the best plan, and exerted on the best subjects. The mere propagation of facts or opinions, the suppression of false doctrines, and the public and undenied proclamation of truth by the voice of authority and under the sanction of law, are not sufficient ; they must be promulged to minds in possession of their powers, able to exert them and accustomed to use them. Wherever there is a virtuous and intelligent man, there is a pillar of society, there is a prop of order and law, of good principles and habits, a friend of the country, and of course our friend, a friend of our children, and of all who shall come after us. Whatever views we may entertain on any subject, we cannot ask that others should be compelled to receive the same, either by force or through ignorance. Minds compelled to act under such influences are necessarily

public enemies; it is dangerous to have them around us. They are canker worms in our system. The chief consolation is, that they are not likely to have much influence in such a community as ours; but they will always present encouragement to bad men to resort to debasing and dangerous arts, and always will stand ready, like so many foreign emissaries, to rise against the liberties of the country, and to overthrow our institutions. It is not, it cannot be for the interest of any of us to have a single uninformed mind in the United States. Whoever thinks it is, misjudges. Ignorance is not the friend of happiness, security, or strength, any more than it is the mother of devotion. It is quite the opposite of all this; and the great hope of our country lies in the fact, that we are bound to cultivate the mind and heart of man by the very necessities of our situation. Providence has placed us so, that this is as clearly our interest, as it is that of a tyrant to chain and cripple the nobler part of man. We would not lie like Spain or Italy, under a mental paralysis. We are not ambitious to reduce ourselves to the condition of those miserable wrecks of nations. It is enough, or at least should be enough, for us to look upon a giant frame, thrown prostrate and motionless upon the earth, the avenues to thought cut off, and with none of its nerves left alive, except those of motion and sensation. We who witness his writhings can never be ambitious to lie by his side, dead to action, and sensible only to suffering. Yet there are men who seem almost ready to consign us to a system which would inevitably render us fit for such companionship. Though we are Christians, and adopt the principles of freedom inculcated in the Gospel, freedom not only of government, but of the heart and the intellect, we are often invited to depart from our standard, and to leave the real grounds on which we ought to place the foundations of public education.

With such views as we entertain on the subject to which we have now devoted a few pages, we have much to encourage our hopes for the safety, happiness, and perpetuity of our country. Here is a career still left open to us, through the mercy of God, by which we may hope to secure what we have feared we might irretrievably lose.

ART. X. ON POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL REFORM.

BY THE EDITOR.

"May no such storm
Fall on our times, where ruin must reform."

THE actual condition of the world has never answered to the conceptions of a perfect state formed by the mind, nor to the aspirings after it cherished by the heart. By a just appointment of God, man is brought into being, not only physically and morally depraved himself, but encompassed by natural and moral evils. Out of the earth have sprung thorns and briars, poisons and deadly damps,—out of the heart, tyrannies, anarchies, and every species of violence and wrong. So that, when we would find a state at all correspondent with that perfection of which we conceive, and after which we long, we must escape from the oppressive consciousness of the present, and dwell in the reminiscences of Paradise or the hopes of Heaven.

Among the ends contemplated by the Sovereign Disposer of all events, in permitting these evils, and casting our lot among them, it is one of the most obvious, that he would hereby summon our powers to those vigorous efforts necessary to their highest improvement. He places us in the school of hardship and difficulty, that the faculties of our nature, which might otherwise lie dormant, may, under the spur of necessity, and the excitement of conflict, be exercised, strengthened, and fully developed.

We are not, therefore, to infer from the fact, that natural and moral evils are permitted by God, that they are to be passively endured or idly deplored by us. On the contrary, they are to be regarded as occasions for the employment of our powers in surmounting and removing them. And although it is not to be expected, that imperfections and evils will ever cease to be mingled in earthly things and in human works; yet much may be done to improve our condition here. The earth, once the bleak abode of savages, may be, and is, progressively transformed into the convenient and beautiful home of a refined, virtuous,

and happy race. So that, while the necessity for exertion is urgent, its rewards are ample and inspiring. By means of human diligence, crowned with the promised blessing of Heaven, the harsh contrast now existing between the *actual* and the *ideal* state, may be gradually softened down, and will finally be lost sight of, in the full establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven upon the earth.

It is especially true of the fundamental institutions of government and religion, upon which the whole fabric of society is reared, that they need the constant exercise of the best human powers for their correction and improvement. Partaking at first of the imperfections belonging to all human contrivances, they require, in order to the ends for which they were established, that improvements should be made in them, from time to time, either by additions, alterations, or omissions, as experience or a riper wisdom may suggest. The public good, for which alone they are intended, while it demands the conservation of their essential elements from age to age, demands also that they should be carefully adapted to the rising wants, and advancing stages of human society. Arrangements suited to the infancy of the world, are unfit for its maturity. And so, unless these fundamental establishments are to be continually *revolutionized*, and institutions new from the very basis, are to be erected by each successive age for itself, (an alternative to be greatly deprecated,) they must be continually *reformed*.

Besides, there is a proclivity in both civil and religious institutions, through the depravity of those by whom and for whom they are administered, to run into various abuses, by which they become scourges, instead of blessings. The evils which man has suffered, and continues to suffer, from the abuse of the civil and ecclesiastical powers ordained for his benefit, are immeasurably greater than those which have befallen him from any other source; and the call for their correction is, therefore, proportionably loud.

These remarks are intended as a vindication of the proper work of *reform*, in its application to the great social establishments, in opposition to the servile endurance, the obstinate maintenance, or the bigoted apotheosis of their abuses. This work has its occasion in the original imperfection of these secular and sacred institutions, in the obsolescence into which many of their earlier provisions will

necessarily fall in the progress of society, and in the degeneracy and corruption which, as human institutions, they cannot be expected to escape. It has its motives in the genial and benevolent impulses of the human breast. It has its aim and standard in that blissful state which we are taught to hope for, and in which nothing shall hurt or molest. Few works can be compared in usefulness and dignity, with that of modeling the plastic, social constitution, purging it of principles and usages, once just and salutary, but now antiquated, correcting its abuses, grafting upon it the results of experience, and adapting it to the wants of the age,—all without infringing upon its essential powers, or endangering its stability. To a wise, political or ecclesiastical reform, we are disposed to assign the highest place among all the departments of human beneficence. Indeed, in a state of imperfection like ours, the business of doing good seems of necessity to take, for the most part, the shape of reform. It is not, as is often supposed, a work to be done at once, in rare emergencies, and then intermitted. It needs to be as incessant as are the insidious encroachments of corruption,—as constantly recurrent as are the changes which are brought along by the lapse of time. “If time of course alter all things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end?”* It is the intermission of the work of reform which produces, by and by, the necessity of revolution; and it is therefore to the enemies of seasonable and needful changes, the obstinate conservatives of every abuse, that the horrors of revolution are to be charged, more than to the infatuated multitude who are its immediate agents and victims.

But at the present age of the world, and especially in that portion of it which we inhabit, the work of reform is less in danger of being unduly resisted, than of being unduly propelled. There is far less occasion among us for urging the propriety of reform, in opposition to the friends of antiquity, than for urging the dangers attendant upon its abuse, in opposition to the friends of change. We have less reason to fear that reform will proceed too tardily, than that it will be too much accelerated,—that it will cease in a stagnant immobility, than run into restless innovation. Our institutions are less likely to become overgrown with unmedicated abuses,

* Bacon's Essays,—innovations.

than to be fretted away and subverted by perpetual emendations. The excess of reform—not its defect—is what we have to fear.

If it is true, as we believe, that after the immediate offices of religion, there is no function on earth higher or more sacred than that of the true reformer, it follows, that after sacrilege, there is nothing more profane, than with rash and unbidden hands to meddle with the fundamental institutions of civil government and of religion. The nature and relations of these institutions, while they reflect honour upon the art of reforming them, impose upon it peculiar restraints, and make it as difficult as it is honourable. It is in paying a just regard to the inherent sacredness of these institutions, and to the complicated relations they sustain, that *true reform* is distinguished from *radicalism*. The latter, according to the most general acceptance of the term, is a mode of proceeding with these establishments, unqualified by any regard to their grandeur, their complexity, their importance, and their countless connexions and dependencies. It goes about the correction, or more commonly the demolition, of these venerable fabrics, based in human wants, reared by human wisdom and skill, and crowned by the seal of Heaven, with more levity, despatch, and heedlessness, than a husbandman shows in pruning his trees, ploughing the earth, or pulling down his barns. It tries its random experiments on these vital organs in the social structure, where the least injury sends convulsive agony, if not instant death, through great organized masses of sentient being, with less tenderness and solicitude, than a humane surgeon would display in the most trivial operations.

It is sometimes said, that the excellence of our institutions—their recency, and comparative uncorruptness,—remove every pretext for radicalism, so that if they do not preclude its existence, they must disarm it of its power. But the security into which many persons allow themselves thus to be lulled, is founded on a superficial view both of the nature of radicalism, and of the institutions under which we live. Radicalism is not a reasonable spirit awakened only by real defects or abuses. It is a bad, fault-finding temper, which makes occasions for its exercise where they do not exist. Hence the excellencies of a public institution can no more secure it from radicalism, than integrity of personal character can prevent calumny. Were our institutions,

therefore, absolutely perfect, they would not be out of reach or out of danger from this self-moving and mischief-seeking system;—how much less so, when, with all their soundness, they yet offer so many corruptions for its corrosive tooth to feed upon!

There is doubtless less occasion or apology for radicalism, in the New World, than in the Old; but then there is also less to resist it, and therefore more danger to be apprehended from it. There is here nothing of that salutary prejudice in behalf of a settled course of things,—nothing of that impregnable fortification of authority,—nothing of that mighty conservative interest, which elsewhere enable the powers that be to withstand the assaults made upon them. Every institution among us,—the State,—the Church, and all their departments, are laid open with unsuspecting frankness, not only to the view, but to the touch, of the whole nation, and move pliantly, hither and thither, with every blast of the popular will. And how obvious is it, that these honourable and commendable peculiarities of our institutions which render Radicalism inexcusable, may yet serve, being basely taken advantage of against them, to deliver them over as an easy conquest to this Destroyer!

It should not be overlooked, in estimating our exposure to Radicalism, that there is a yearly influx into this country of at least 100,000 foreign emigrants,—for the most part the victims of misrule, who bring with them the hostility to government which they have learned abroad, transfer to our institutions the ideas they have derived from despotic authorities, mutter sullenly in America the revolutionary cant of Europe, and prolong on our level shores, those thunders of popular discontent which are rolling so terrifically over the distant thrones of arbitrary power.

The leading attributes of our national character,—impatience of delay,—love of change,—ardency of enterprise,—impetuosity of movement and execution, easily coalesce with this imported element, even if they do not of themselves engender a similar principle. So that, although Radicalism may be exotic as to its native and most congenial seat, it has found the American soil not unfriendly, and may now be reckoned as indigenous.

It thus appears, that so far from being protected against Radicalism by the advantages of our public institutions, we are on many accounts peculiarly exposed to it. Let

one reflect upon the attributes of this system of operation, its lofty pretensions, its contemptuous bearing towards other modes of action, its mighty machinery of excitements, the rapidity and energy with which it produces its results, the plausible simplicity of the arguments by which it is defended :—let him then cast a look upon the attributes of our national character, our prejudice against the past, and for the future, our love of excitement, our impatience of all delay, and demand for immediate effect, our far reaching and impetuous enterprize ;—and then glance at our institutions, unfortified by the common defences of power, and made dependent in their very principle upon the fluctuating dispositions of the people :—let him consider too that our country is yearly inundated with emigrants, in whose minds the idea of government is indissolubly associated with that of oppression :—and he must be obstinate indeed in his security, if he still doubts, either that Radicalism can exist here, or that, supposing it to exist, it is to be regarded as formidable.

But why should we reason from *probabilities*, when we may appeal to *facts*? One cannot open his eyes without seeing unequivocal indications of a levelling and disorganizing spirit, both in the political and religious world. This spirit is the life of many of the most powerful unions and combinations which exist among us. Its features stand out in many of our newspapers and periodicals, both secular and religious. It has entered many of our Colleges and Theological Seminaries, driving out before it those dispositions which become all students, especially students of divinity. It has crossed the track of many of our benevolent enterprizes, disturbing their counsels, dividing their friends, and putting a stop to the good they were doing. It has invaded even the hallowed precincts of the church, and enlisted many of the professors, and even of the ministers of the peaceful religion of the gospel, under its warlike banner. It is continually tearing away the stronger features of our established governments,—placing new checks upon the exercise of legitimate authority, and displacing the old restraints upon popular license.* So that the times begin to answer to those predicted by the Israelitish seer, when “the people should be oppressed

* The invasion of senatorial independence on the one hand, and the gradual extension, in all of the States, of the right of suffrage, on the other, may serve as examples.

every one by another, and every one by his neighbour; the child should behave himself proudly against the ancient, and the base against the honourable.”*

But we are more immediately concerned in the manifestations of this spirit, in the *religious* world. From a state of low declension and death-like torpor, a portion of the Church has started into a wild, spasmodic activity, in which the peculiar traits of Christian enterprise will be sought in vain. Struck with the evils of monkish seclusion and inactivity, and bent upon action, the zealots to whom we refer are careless as to the mode in which their energies are exerted, and the objects to which they are directed. To be doing something, is more their concern, than that what they do should be right,—that their motives and objects, their methods and plans should be consonant with religion. It thus happens that many efforts which are now made under the colour of religion, are directly and most strikingly at variance, in their whole temper, design and carriage, with the genius of Christianity.

Once did Religion, in a lazy cell,
With empty, airy contemplation dwell;
And, like a block, unmoved lay; but ours,
As much too active, like a stork, devours.†

The effect thus produced by the force of recoil from the extreme of inertness, has been favoured by the recent prevalence of certain Pelagian conceptions of religion. Many are taught to regard Christianity more as a preceptive system, claiming an external morality, than as an overture of mercy, affecting the inner life of disposition and feeling; and they accordingly make personal religion to consist more in the conformity of the life to the will of God, than in the feelings of the heart towards him. Of those entertaining such views, it might be expected, that they would be withdrawn by them from the only work appropriate to them as Christians, that of bringing men, through faith in Christ, to the love of God, and would devote themselves chiefly to the correction of the outward conduct and state of individuals and communities,—to the moral discipline and external reform of society. It would also be expected of them, from their views, that in promoting this reform they would forsake the route which Christianity prescribes through the heart, to the life, as being

* Isaiah 3: 5.

† Sir John Denham.

tedious and circuitous, and would engage in summary and violent procedures against the several instances of outward immorality. And so it is found in fact, that those who are known to have imbibed Pelagian sentiments most deeply, are the most engaged in these spurious and degenerate species of religious effort.

The peculiar mode and direction of Christian activity here alluded to, is justly regarded as among the most threatening evils of the times. By many of those most experienced and eminent in the Christian cause, the radicalism of the day is esteemed more injurious to the interests and prospects of Christianity, than all the opposition of avowed infidelity. It is not, however, our object here, to describe the features or prognosticate the effects of this system; but to suggest, in contradistinction from it, some of the principles on which a wise and Christian reform is conducted. It was a happy idea of Thomas Fuller, in his *Holy State*, to describe one who is good in all the relations of life,—the good father, the good statesman, the good divine. In humble imitation of this example, we shall here endeavour to give some of *the traits of the true or good Reformer*, and to present some of the maxims by which he is governed.

The assertion may seem paradoxical, and yet it may be justly made that the true Reformer acts, in the first case, on the defensive with regard to any proposed reform. He does not accede to it of course, or presume that it is desirable, because it comes under the pretext of improvement. On the contrary, he regards it with doubt, and leaves it in suspense, until its necessity is made out to his satisfaction. According to the Scriptures, he makes his stand upon the ancient way; thence he looks about, to discover what is the right way, and so walks in it. It was one of the favourite sayings of Lord Bacon, himself an ardent reformer, that “there is a great difference between arts and civil affairs; arts and sciences should be like mines, resounding on all sides with new works and further progress; but it is not good to try experiments in states, except the necessity be urgent, and the utility be evident.”

In the view of the true reformer, the institutions of government and religion are invested with an aspect of sacredness and majesty; and he feels towards them an affectionate veneration. This feeling, which has a place in every noble and unperverted mind, makes him quick to per-

ceive the excellencies, and slow and reluctant to discern the faults, of the civil and ecclesiastical institutions under which he lives. And when these faults are too obvious to be concealed, it prevents his disaffection towards them, from extending to the institutions themselves, in which they inhere. This veneration for the public institutions of his country, makes the thought of their subversion and overthrow dreadful to his mind. Revolution is a last resort which the philanthropist never chooses, and adopts only as it is forced upon him, by the unwelcome conviction of the incurable corruption and central rottenness of the whole system. In all ordinary cases, his care to preserve the essential elements of the public constitution, is equal to his zeal to remove its incidental abuses. He seeks change, if at all, not *in aliud*, but *in melius*. In the precincts of that august temple, where law and religion sit enthroned, the true reformer proceeds not less with reverence for the place, than with indignant energy against its pollutions and profanations; after the example of the great Reformer, who, on entering the Jewish temple, overturned and drove the men and things by which it was desecrated, but of whom none but his perjured enemies could testify that he spoke against the temple itself.

Whenever it is proposed to correct particular evils, the wise and practical reformer wishes first to know, whether they are any thing more than the imperfections necessarily belonging to all earthly things. There is a large class of apparent evils and disorders, such as the inequalities of human condition, the limitation of personal rights, the collision between individual freedom and social order, which are the occasion of perpetual uneasiness to the political sophister, because they are at variance with his abstract conceptions of a perfect state; but which are patiently endured by the sober and practical philanthropist, because he knows them to be necessary to the existence of human society. It is not enough, therefore, to enlist him in opposition to any existing arrangements, that the Utopia of some visionary theorist is conducted without them. He is aware of the difference between an ideal and real republic, and that it is far easier to adjust the plastic and aerial elements of the former to fine spun theories, than the grosser and intractable materials of the latter.

But allowing the evils which it is proposed to correct, to

be in their own nature separable from the constitution of human society; the true reformer next enquires, whether they have not, by long connexion with it, become so interlaced with its fibres, and seated in its most vital parts, that their sudden removal might be unsafe. Much as he may deplore these evils, and desire their removal, he prefers, in such a case, to endure them for a season, rather than to endanger the existence of a constitution mainly good, by their hasty correction. A considerate benevolence leads him to withhold from the distempered body of the state the amputating knife of reform, when there is reason to fear it might prove the instrument of death. If, in pulling up the tares thickly sown over the field of the world, he must pull up the wheat with them, he judges it better to let them both grow together until the harvest.

But again; allowing that the proposed reform is not only possible, but in itself considered safe, the true reformer enquires yet farther, "Whether it is the reformation which draweth on the change, or the desire of change which pretendeth the reformation." If the desire of change is the motive, he often judges it best to resist the reformation which is pretended, though in itself good, knowing that a spirit of innovation is the worst enemy of a commonwealth, that where it prevails every thing is insecure, and that it waxes stronger by every concession, until at last, being fed by constant indulgence and success, it becomes as insatiable, restless and levelling as the grave.

It is said of that great man, to whose authority we love to refer by his biographer, Basil Montagu, "that he always regarded the desire to change with great jealousy. He knew that in its worst form, it is the tool by which demagogues delude and mislead; and in its best form, when it originates in benevolence and a love of truth, it is a passion by which kind intention has rushed on with such fearless impetuosity, and wisdom been hurried into such lamentable excess; it is so nearly allied to a contempt of authority, and so frequently accompanied by a presumptuous confidence in private judgement, a dislike of all established forms, merely because they are established, and of the old paths merely because they are old; it has such a tendency to go too far, rather than not far enough, that this great man, conscious of the blessings of society, and of the many perplexities which accompany even the most benefi-

cial alterations, always looked with suspicion upon the love of change, whether it existed in himself or in others. In his advice to Sir George Villiers, he said, "Merit the admonition of the wisest of men ; My son, fear God and the king, and meddle not with those who are given to change."

If after duly weighing these general considerations, he decides for the proposed reform, he will furthermore enquire whether the providential juncture for attempting it has fairly arrived, whether he himself is called upon by the relations in which he stands, to have any particular agency in its accomplishment, and whether he is possessed of means which give promise of success. Such questions, and many more of the same kind, which are the scorn of the headlong zealot, are always revolved by the true philanthropist before he applies his hand to the work of public reform. While he feels equally with the most impetuous reformers, the impulses of pity, of indignancy, of benevolent desire, he does not surrender himself to their controul, but at every stage of his work, takes counsel of reason, which is the chief excellency of our nature, and without which the passions are sure to blind and mislead us. It is his maxim, to use Argus' hundred eyes, before he raises one of Briareus' hundred hands. He prefers to be reproached by the over-zealous for too much deliberation before commencing an enterprize, than by and by to be reproached by the wise for precipitancy in an ill-advised undertaking. Nor is this deliberation the dictate of worldly wisdom alone. "Which of you," saith the Scripture, "intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it. Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him, saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish. Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand ; or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an embassy, and desireth conditions of peace."

But being at length convinced of the desirableness and practicability of the proposed reform, in itself considered, and in all its relations, and of his own duty with respect to it, our reformer now addresses himself to his work, with a purpose strong and settled, in proportion to the deliberation

and caution with which it has been formed. And as he was not ashamed to make question with his judgement whether reformation should be at all undertaken, while it was decided upon by others as soon as proposed ; so neither is he now ashamed to enquire, by what means it can best be accomplished, while others are rushing blindly to the execution of their purposes.

Corruptions and abuses in public institutions have their origin in the depraved dispositions of the human heart. To pride, ambition, the lust of power or pleasure, may they all be traced. To assail them is, therefore, to provoke an explosion of human passion. The business of correcting them is not like that of the husbandman who breaks up the inert clods, or like that of the potter who moulds the unresisting clay. It is more like that of the philosopher, who draws lightning from the clouds, or bursts open the door where the powers of nature are held confined. The passions, from which public vices and legalized immoralities have sprung, and in whose fertile soil they have often grown to an overshadowing greatness, will be enlisted in their defence, and prove as a flaming sword, turning every way, to guard them from assault.

This is borne in mind by the true Reformer in computing the difficulties of his task ; and his knowledge of the derivation of public evils from the depravity of our nature, is at the foundation of a maxim by which he is always governed in his efforts, and in the observance of which he is most widely distinguished from the whole tribe of radical innovators and revolutionists. The maxim is this, to begin his efforts, and employ them chiefly, in correcting the dispositions in which the particular evil to be removed has originated, rather than in a direct attack upon the evil itself. To one of the least reflection it must be obvious, that even were it possible for a particular evil to be removed, while the dispositions or principles in which it originated, remained unchanged, it would be of no avail ; since similar evils must soon be produced by the same causes. Well was it said by Lord Bacon, that "he who in the cure of politic or natural disorders shall rest himself contented with second causes, without setting forth in diligent travel to search for the original source of the evil, doth resemble the slothful husbandman, who moweth down the heads of noisome weeds,

when he should carefully pull up the roots ; and the work shall ever be to do again."

But even this superficial and outward reform cannot be anticipated from a direct attack upon a public abuse or disorder, except by resort to forceful means, and in those rare instances in which the friends of virtue are able numerically and physically to overmaster its enemies. Will a proud and ambitious man, remaining such, quietly behold the prostration of a system to which he owes his rank and his honours? Is it to be expected that an avaricious man, remaining such, will peaceably submit to encroachments upon a business from which he derives his wealth? Will the lover of pleasure calmly allow the lovers of righteousness to interfere with those customs and arrangements which bring them their dear indulgences? Or rather is it not inevitable, that all the ferocity of the selfish passions will be roused against those who assail the corruptions in which they find their gratification? And now, upon what can the reformer of public abuses rely, except upon a physical force, superiour to that which can be commanded in their defence, and which has rarely in this world been at the bidding of virtue? Shall he trust to the dictates of reason, the convictions of right, the voice of conscience? But these are drowned in the tumult of the excited passions. The objects which have been cherished by wicked men, and in which their passions have found indulgence, can be removed, now that opposition has been excited, only by the same means which would be necessary to wrench its prey from a voracious tiger.

And if the direct attack thus made be fruitless, as may be expected, how manifestly must it tend to establish the evils against which it was directed upon a deeper basis, to concentrate the forces, and strengthen the attachment of their adherents, and thus make their removal almost hopeless? And to what peril of personal destruction do those expose themselves, who thus awake the angry elements of the human breast, and then rush within their cruel and unsparing sweep? How many, alas! have fallen victims to this mistaken method of reform, whom a better judgement might have saved to the cause of truth and virtue!

A view of these difficulties and dangers prevents in most cases the true reformer from engaging in violent aggression upon the corruptions or abuses of public institutions,

and puts him upon a method less exciting, but more effective. Believing with Thomas Fuller, "that men, contrary to iron, are worse to be wrought upon when hot, and are far more tractable in cold blood,"* he shuns the vulgar policy of producing public excitements, in order to reform. And if, through these excitements, the passions of men are now in spring tide, he waits until ebbing-water before he crosses them. If by the lash of opposition the friends of abuse have been united, he tries by gentleness and concession to relax the band of union, knowing that when the faggot is untied, its several sticks may be broken, while they may defy his efforts, as long as they are bound together. Abstaining, therefore, on these grounds from violent and irritating operations, as directly injurious to his cause, he seeks, even with reference to particular reform, to multiply and strengthen all those general influences of example, law, education, arts, and religion, by which the moral dispositions of mankind are regulated and improved. It is in plying these general influences more diligently, and bringing them to bear more directly and powerfully upon the public mind, that he expects to gain his object, and not by suspending them, or substituting for them an artificial machinery of reform. Here is the point at which even the political reformer discovers his dependence upon religion. In attempting to correct those dispositions which he sees to be the source of public evils, and to promote those principles and feelings which he knows must precede every change for the better in public institutions, and furnish the basis of social order and happiness, he presently finds that he has undertaken a task which surpasses human power, and that, in order to its accomplishment, he must call to his aid, those powers of religion by which alone the hearts of men are radically changed.

In proportion as the reformer understands his mission, and has just conceptions of what is involved in public reform, does he repose on the *Christian religion* as the grand instrument of effecting it. On taking a general survey of the history of the world, he perceives, that during the whole ante-Christian period, the cause of righteousness, in spite of the efforts of its friends, was uniformly and rapidly retrograde, and was becoming, age by age, more desperate, until desponding philanthropy was at length inspired by *Christian motives*, enlightened by *Christian wisdom*, and

* Fuller's *Holy State*, Camb. Edit. p. 2.

armed with the power of Christian doctrine. The introduction of the New dispensation, he perceives to have been a crisis in the moral history of the world, from which time forward the cause of truth and righteousness has been as steadily progressive, as before it was retrograde. In this divine religion, then,—in its inherent energies, and in the succours provided for it from the infinite resources of its Author,—he recognizes the grand remedy for the disorders of the world, and the grand instrument of universal reform.

The noiseless simplicity of the agency of the gospel, causes it to be overlooked, often despised, by men of worldly principles, who are easily imposed upon by the ostentatious pretensions and movements of a secular philanthropy. But it is from the gospel, that the true reformer derives the internal spring, the external motive, and the rules and methods of all which he does. Thence he has drawn the grace of charity, by which he is sweetly, though powerfully impelled to every good work, and without which the most unwearied efforts, the most costly sacrifices, the most splendid services for the public good, are inherently worthless. It is not from the love of power or of glory, that he serves his country, those inconstant principles ! which consign the false patriot, disappointed of his personal ends, to inactivity in the cause he had espoused, if not to hostility against it. These earthly passions have been supplanted in his heart by principles purer and more enduring. As he has contemplated the tenderness and intensity of the divine love, manifested in the gift of Christ, a new flame has been kindled in his soul, by which the chains of selfishness have been dissolved. He now yields himself to be the servant of God in the cause of righteousness. And having consecrated himself to this service from the most disinterested impulses, he continues patiently in well-doing, through discouragements and reverses, which would prove fatal to an earth-born philanthropy.

From the Gospel, too, does the reformer derive the chief external motives for his efforts. It is thence alone that he learns to believe in the possibility and certainty of the complete redemption of man. In the pangs and throbs of a travailing creation, he is taught by the gospel to see, not the symptoms of its dissolution, but the harbingers of a fairer world. This coming state of happiness, is presented distinctly to his view. He is taught that it is decreed by an

eternal purpose of God, and by him pledged to Christ in an eternal covenant, and that the energies of Almighty power are enlisted for its accomplishment. Knowing, therefore, that his labours are not expended upon a failing or doubtful cause, he girds up the loins of his mind, and under the inspirations of hope, does with his might whatsoever his hand finds to do.

But while the Gospel reveals this grand consummation, it also furnishes the means by which it is to be brought about. Passing by the outward forms of evil, which it regards only as the outbreakings of internal distemper, it applies its remedy to the seat of the disease, the dispositions of the heart, anticipating that if health be restored there, it will return to the whole body. Aware of the indomitable resistance, by which the heart is able to hold out against opposition, it avoids, while seeking its conquest, any direct and violent hostility. But recognizing in it a principle of generosity,—a susceptibility of being moved by kindness,—a sentiment of gratitude,—as among the most powerful, though latent springs of its action; it makes its appeal to these. To a race revolted from God, standing in dark and sullen defiance against him, and expecting to be transfixed with the bolts of his wrath, the Gospel shows the portals of heaven opening, the Son of God appearing, not in terror, but in love,—not to condemn, but to save,—heralded by the shout of peace and good will,—approaching with the olive branch of reconciliation, in meek and humble guise, with a countenance of benignity, and words of peace, and at last laying down his life for the sins of the world. By this wonderful exhibition, it gains the hearts of men to God. Its conquering power is in its love. By the affecting display which it makes of the divine mercy, it captivates the feelings, and through them possesses itself of the whole man for the service of God. It thus casts its purifying salt into the deep fountains of life, knowing that the issues will then be pure. It lays its axe at the root of the tree of evil, instead of lopping off its limbs. Not satisfied with destroying the pestilent offspring of sin, the Gospel strikes a deadly dart into the prolific womb from whence they proceed. In short, it aims to reform the world, by destroying the seminal principle of evil in the human heart, and by implanting there, in its place, a principle of universal obedience to the will of God.

It has been often said of late years, that some of the evils in our social state have become so enormous, as wholly to surpass the corrective power of Christianity, and must be swept off by some destroying agency, before the Gospel can be introduced into the districts which they have occupied. Those who have adopted this notion, have accordingly withheld their support from institutions whose direct object was the dissemination of religious knowledge in these districts, and have given their countenance to those exclusively whose object has been to effect reform by exciting discussion and passion, and the other means upon which they place such confident reliance. With regard to this preposterous doctrine, it is hard to say, whether it betrays greater ignorance of human nature itself, and the way in which it is to be affected, or of the design, the tendency, and real efficacy of, Christianity in its relation to the evils of the world. Let those who hold this unchristian sentiment be enquired of, whether by their own acknowledgment the evils at which they launch their flaming, but powerless bolts, have not had their origin in the depraved dispositions of the human heart; whether therefore they can be effectually and finally suppressed except by the correction of these dispositions; and whether they have the presumption to pretend, that these dispositions of the heart can be better overcome and changed, by their scheme of terrific excitement and disgusting repellantcy, unsanctioned and unblest of Heaven, than by that system of blended majesty and condescension, grace and truth, which came by Jesus Christ, and is evermore attended and made effectual by his promised Spirit!

It is then upon the Christian religion, that the true reformer reposes. From its silent and noiseless agency he confidently anticipates the grandest results. He remembers that Christ did not cry, nor lift up his voice in the streets; and yet he "brought forth judgement unto victory;"—that the Gospel was whispered to us in a still voice, from Mount Zion, and yet that its sound went quickly through all the earth;—that it came down upon the world gently and softly, like the dew on Gideon's fleece, and yet quickly pervaded it with its refreshing influence. When he would convince men of error, he accordingly first pours the sweet balm of love upon their heads, and thus convinces them

sooner than by the clearest light of truth, dispensed with passion, sourness and severity; as the soft billow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble.*

These views of the true reformer respecting the nature of his work repress the visionary expectation of *sudden* and *immediate change*, and lead him even to prefer, that improvement should be made *gradually*. As it is first of all in the dispositions of individual minds towards an existing evil, that a change is to be produced, and as these altered dispositions must then be united into an effective public sentiment; it is obvious, from the known laws of human feeling, that a deep-going, thorough reform must be the work of time. It is not to be expected, that those whose interests are connected with an existing abuse, will be able to discern its evil, as readily as those who view it abstractly and from a distance. Who does not know, however invincible truth may be, that it takes time for it to make its way, through the legions of prejudice to the throne of the mind!

That tender sense of justice too, which distinguishes the true reformer from the radical revolutionist, leads him to seek the general good with the least possible sacrifice of private rights, and therefore to allow time for the escape of those most nearly interested in the devoted system, and who would be overwhelmed with ruin, should its subversion be immediate. The annals of tyranny do not afford examples of more outrageous violation of private rights, than have been often perpetrated by the heartless instigators of immediate reform. In the French revolution, the fortunes and happiness of whole classes of society which might have been protected in a gradual reform, were wantonly sacrificed, through the rapidity with which the new order of things was introduced.† The cause of the Reformation too, was disgraced in many countries of Europe, by its turning unprovided upon the world, whole orders of ecclesiastics, whose personal rights might have been secured, had the zeal of the Protestants been less impatient, and their general benevolence been better attempered with a sense of particular justice.‡

Should it be said, that public reform cannot advance except by the infringement of private rights, this is true only

* See Cudworth's Sermon on the Knowledge of Christ, Henry's ed. p. 112.

† Burke's Reflections.

‡ See Hume, Lingard, and other historians of the Reformation.

when the reform is driven forward too rapidly. The system of feudal vassalage under which the whole of Europe formerly groaned, was removed in a manner perfectly consistent with the interests of the master, of the country, and of the serf.*—The Prussian Government at the present moment, by the energetic, but *gradual* reform which it is prosecuting, affords a signal demonstration of the possibility of effecting the most important changes, without trampling on individual interests.† History is replete with evidence respecting the advantages of gradual improvements, and the evils inevitable upon reform, however desirable in itself, when hastily accomplished. With this evidence the judgements of the most enlightened statesmen and divines have always concurred. It is admirably said by Bodin, an eminent French lawyer of the sixteenth century, "that in the government of a well ordered state, we ought to imitate the Great God of Nature, who in all things proceedeth easily and by little and little ;—who of a little seed causeth to grow a tree, for height and greatness right admirable, and yet for all that insensibly ; and still by *means* conjoining the extremities of nature, as by putting the spring between the winter and summer, and autumn betwixt summer and winter, moderating the extremities of the seasons with the self-same wisdom which it useth in all other things, and that in such sort, that no violent force therein appeareth."‡ The same opinion was illustrated by Bacon in a still more beautiful comparison ;—the reform of a corrupt state, he said, should be, "like the continual running of a living spring into stagnant waters." And Burke, with his characteristic energy, says, "If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom when we work only on inanimate matter ; surely they become a part of duty too, when the subject of our demolition and construction, is not brick and mortar, but sentient beings, by the sudden alteration of whose state, condition, and habits, multitudes may be rendered miserable."

* See an interesting account of this by C. L. de Sismondi, one of the first historians of the age, published in the London *New Monthly Magazine* of July. "When our ancestors enfranchized their slaves," says Sismondi, "they did not displace them, they did not cast them on an unknown futurity, they did not demand from them combinations of prudence and foresight for which they were wholly unprepared."

† Vide Foreign Quarterly Review for December, 1834, p. 226.

‡ *De La Republique*, Book IV. Chap. III. as quoted by Dugald Stewart, *Hist. of Philos.*

Such are some of the principles by which the true reformer is governed. Let us imagine him placed in our circumstances. What course would he pursue in reference to American institutions in the nineteenth century? Without concerning himself to enquire what institutions he should prefer, were they now to be for the first time introduced, he would take his stand upon those already existing, and enquire how these might be made to contribute most to the public weal. In the spirit of the noble maxim, *Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna*, he would give himself to the service of the country that had given him birth. Casting his eyes around he would see order, peace and plenty reigning through all our borders,—knowledge diffused through all classes of society,—and the spirit of religion more and more prevailing, bidding the wealth of the nation to flow in channels of beneficence, sanctifying learning to its proper ends, and suspending the hum of industry for the hallowed repose of the Sabbath day. As he witnessed these effects, he could not forbear to love and venerate the civil and religious institutions, from which they proceed, and to count himself happy in being an American. As to the essential and original elements of these institutions, he would jealously watch and guard them, and labour to transmit them unimpaired and unaltered. He would not however, be opposed to their being improved, but would be ready to supply their deficiencies and correct their abuses. In undertaking this work of reform, he would be impelled, not by visionary theories, not by sour malignity, not by the love of change, but by the motions of a heaven-born charity. In prosecuting it he would appeal, not to passion and prejudice, but to reason and conscience. He would employ, not forceful, ostentatious, violent, and irritating means, but gentle, silent, conciliatory and persuasive influences, above all, the influences of religion. He would evince, not a childish and fevered impatience for immediate results, regardless alike of public faith and private rights; but a manly composure, a serene confidence in the ultimate prevalence of right over wrong, and scrupulous justice as to the means by which his ends are pursued. With a benevolence unabated by reverses, surviving long the boastful zeal by which it might be for a season eclipsed, he would proceed in a well-sustained progress, watching the effect of every change, compensating for advantages lost, reconciling the new with the old, until he should at length

see the most important improvements effected in a manner almost unobserved.

Reform conducted on these principles, is our true interest and only safety. If through our indifference, obstinacy, or excessive fear of change, our institutions should exist awhile unreformed, they would become incurably corrupt, and inevitably fall, or be overthrown. If on the other hand, they should be surrendered to the power of a wild, theorizing, stormy, reckless, unsparing radicalism, their destruction would be equally certain, and more immediate and dreadful. But if they may be subjected to a vigorous, though temperate reform, equally interested to preserve, as to amend, they may not only be perpetuated, but improved to an excellence as yet hardly conceived of.

Let reform, therefore, on the principles here described, be zealously prosecuted ; but let it be carefully distinguished from its counterfeits :

False patriotism, till it gain its end,
Is as the true in many semblances.
Like that it takes upon it to reform
Oppressive judgements and injurious laws,
That bear too hard upon the common weal ;
Cries out upon abuses, seems to weep
Over the country's wrongs ; and by this face
Of seeming zeal and justice craftily
It wins those hearts for which its bait is thrown :—
But when its end is gained, 'tis flattering, cruel,
Pompous, and full of sound, and stupid rage ;
Of faith neglectful ; heaping wrong on wrong ;
Ambitious, selfish ;—while the true is calm,
Firm, persevering, more in act than show.

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LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. VII.—SEPTEMBER, 1835.

ART. I. EXISTING STATE OF THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE DEAF AND DUMB.

By Prof. FREDERICK A. P. BARNARD, of the New-York Institution for the Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb.

1. *Institution des sourds et muets par la voie des signes méthodiques ; ouvrage qui contient le projet d'une langue universelle, par l'entremise des signes naturels, assujettis à une méthode. Par M. l'Abbé de L'Epée. Paris, 1776.*
2. *Le sourd-muet entendant par les yeux, ou triple moyen de communication avec ces infortunés, par des procédés abbreviatifs de l'écriture ; suivi d'un projet d'imprimerie syllabique. Par le Père d'un sourd-muet. Paris, 1829.*
3. *Vocabulary for the instruction of the deaf and dumb, upon the principles established in the Manchester school. By William Vaughan. London and Manchester, 1828.*
4. *Erster, zweiter, dritter und vierter Berichte des Verwaltungs-Ausschusses der am 28 May 1827, gestifteten Taub-stimmen-Schule für Hamburg und das Hamburger Gebiet. Hamburg, 1828—1834.*

FROM the comparative frequency with which the periodical press has been made, in the course of the past few years, the instrument of conveying information to the public relative to the instruction of the deaf and dumb, the principal facts connected with the history of this art, at least in our own country, may be considered as generally known. It will hardly be expected, therefore, that, in treating the subject proposed at the head of this article, the writer should task himself with again repeating incidents, which, if not familiar to all, are probably so to most, and respecting which information may be elsewhere easily obtained.

Every institution erected for the humane purpose of ministering relief to those unhappy beings, whom Providence, in its inscrutable decrees, has condemned to endure the misery of perpetual silence, must be an object both of interest and of admiration to the philanthropist. To his eye every such institution, isolated amid the broad expanse of human selfishness, seems a gentle star, shedding abroad a lustre not of this world, the brightness of that heavenly charity, which breathes itself in the precept, "As ye would that men should do to

you, do ye even so unto them, for this is the law and the prophets."

But as all such luminaries, like those which lend to the sky above us its variety and its beauty, possess a common charm, so they have each their peculiar claims to admiration. "There is one glory of the sun, another of the moon and another of the stars; and one star differeth from another star in glory." In giving an account, therefore, of the art of deaf-mute instruction as it exists, it will be necessary to describe the methods which have characterized different schools, and which have not even yet become blended into one.

We need not take the trouble to inform our readers, that the practicability of instructing the deaf and dumb is a discovery comparatively modern. Within the scope of authentic history, we find no notice of any attempt to remove the obstacles, which nature seems to have interposed between these helpless beings and the knowledge of that world in which, surrounded by darkness and mystery, they live a kind of dreamy and unreal life, till the sixteenth century of the Christian era had more than half passed away. To the philosophers of Greece and Rome, in the brightest days of those republics, the condition of the miserable deaf-mute seemed utterly desperate. The same view of the case has been taken by distinguished men, in times very near to our own; and in all ages, not even our own entirely excepted, this, our wretched fellow-man, has been made more wretched still, by a thousand popular prejudices; some having their origin merely in a sentiment of disgust, like that which we experience in the contemplation of any monstrous existence; and others, yet more injurious, in a creed, which, strange as it may seem, presumed the deaf-mute, on the evidence of his misfortune, to be labouring under the curse of Heaven, and carrying about with him, like Cain, the perpetual witness of God's displeasure. Thus it was for century after century. The wretched, so far from receiving commiseration or relief, were unrelentingly persecuted, or shunned as those who bore upon them the mark of the beast. To them the world was indeed a vale of tears.

The first instructor, so far as we know, Peter Ponce, a Benedictine of Oghna in Spain, died in the year 1584. After him sprang up, in various parts of Europe, including the British islands, isolated individuals labouring in the same

cause, and in general believing, each for himself, that the art had originated with him. But the light which thus broke forth from time to time, at points too widely separated to allow the radiance to blend, was a brightness without a nucleus, and was speedily swallowed up in the general darkness. No instructor founded a permanent school, until the year 1760, when the Abbé De l'Epée established at Paris, at his own expense, an institution which he continued to conduct during a period of twenty-nine years, and which, after his death, was adopted and perpetuated by the government of France. Before that event, however, viz: in the year 1778, an institution under the patronage of the Elector of Saxony, had come into existence at Leipzig, with Samuel Heinicke, a kind of universal genius, a man previously of various occupations, and subsequently of considerable celebrity, at its head.

From this period, the history of the art is blended with that of institutions; earlier than this, it is little else than an account of the doings and of the opinions of individual men. Those who desire more particular information on this subject, will find it in the *Encyclopedia Americana*, Article, *Dumb and Deaf*, or in the *North American Review*, for April, 1834. Our present purpose is merely to state, in few words, the views which have been entertained from time to time, regarding methods of instruction, and those which, at the present day, are most extensively approved. In order to do this, it will be convenient to name, and briefly to describe, the principal instruments of communication employed with the deaf, and which constitute the medium through which they receive instruction.

The first of these instruments consists of those signs, by which deaf-mutes, though uneducated, contrive to make themselves understood. It would hardly be possible, on paper, to explain precisely what these signs are; hardly possible, at least without exceeding the limits we propose to ourselves here. Much has been said and written of them, in France especially; and much, that has been said and written, has been in a tone of eulogy so extravagant, and often so contradictory to the plainest teachings of common sense, as to be much better fitted to mystify than to enlighten the mind of the tyro. They have been denominated a natural and universal language, intelligible to all men at sight. And this proposition has been set forth in so strong a light,

and in so unqualified a form, as to convey an impression little in accordance with the fact. Very sagacious men have been led to believe in the existence of a natural and universally intelligible language, of which, notwithstanding its natural character, its inherent intelligibility, and the absence of all necessity of learning it, they have grown up in absolute unconsciousness, not to say mere ignorance. No one indeed doubts his own ability to make many gestures, which shall have a meaning for another person: nevertheless, I believe I speak the opinions of common men, when I say, that these are not esteemed to be a language—or rather *the* language so highly extolled by writers on the deaf and dumb. Few men are conscious of the power to conduct a connected discourse, without the use of words; and people in general do not recognize as a language, an instrument, which does not confer upon them this ability.

That the writer may not be accused of charging too great extravagance upon the eulogists of the natural language of gestures, let the following sentence from a French writer, be taken as characteristic of the class: "There is not a sentiment of the heart, there is not an idea of the understanding, which is not reflected in this language as in a faithful mirror." The present writer has heard, in conversation, precisely the same assertion, in almost precisely the same words, from more than one instructor of the deaf and dumb. Thus there seems claimed for this language of action, a copiousness and an adaptation to the purposes of communication, equal to those of the comparatively perfect spoken and written languages in use among men. Thus too those who receive their information entirely at second hand, fall naturally into the belief, that through the medium of the sign-language, any idea or combination of ideas, can be expressed, with as much clearness and promptness as by means of words. Allow the sign-language of the schools to be thus potential. It by no means follows that any natural and universally intelligible language is so too; for it is a great mistake to suppose, that the signs which constitute the dialect found in a given institution, are either, as a general rule, natural, or of universal use, or even universally intelligible among the deaf and dumb themselves; much less, then, are they so to others. In proof of this, the writer may appeal to the observation of the great numbers of intelligent persons who have visited our American institutions, and to the testimony of

M. Degerando, who says, that having been thirteen years engaged, as a member of the administration of the Royal Institution, during which time he was much in the schools, he had never been able to understand the signs there used at all.

It is well to inquire, therefore, how far the language of gestures is a natural language. Thus far, if it be also universal, it is not, of course, peculiar to the deaf and dumb. It is well, nevertheless, to make the enquiry, because, as will appear in another place, many instructors are disposed rigorously to exclude from their systems, every thing in the form of signs, beyond the first and simplest suggestions of nature.

Not to go into a nice examination of all the successive stages of change, through which the sign-language passes, in proportion as it is cherished and cultivated, it will be sufficient to describe those forms under which it appears interesting to the instructor of the deaf and dumb. These are three in number. The first is the real dialect of nature: the second, that which is the result, to a good degree, of reflection, and is found in its perfection in communities of the deaf and dumb. This is, in great part, an expansion of the former, with an abridgment or *reduction* of its elements, to a degree in which they cease to be self-explanatory. It is also, to some extent, composed of signs purely conventional. The third is a still higher expansion of the second; methodized and subjected to the laws of artificial syntax. It is not adapted to colloquial use, but is intended, as will hereafter be explained, to serve as a stepping-stone to alphabetic language.

These forms of the sign-language will be best understood by example. Let a deaf-mute desire to call the attention of another person to some object in view; for instance, to a kite floating in the air. He will use such signs precisely, as would be chosen by a person possessed of speech, supposing any obstacle to prevent the use of his tongue. He will touch the individual and point to the kite, following the direction of his finger with his eye. This, then, is a sign natural, and universally intelligible. It is one of the simplest character, and for convenience is denominated a sign of *indication*.

On the following day, let the same deaf-mute desire to recall the kite to the mind of his companion. He will slowly describe before him the outline of the object, with the index

fingers of both hands. He will seem to attach to the extremity of the figure thus delineated, the ornament called the tail, imitating its flexibility, and designating its length. He will next busy himself with the string, which he will seem properly to fasten, and then to pass along through his hands. At length he will launch his imaginary kite into the air, and mimic the action of the boy engaged in managing the play-thing. Should there be *paper* in sight, he will, in the early part of this process, point it out, and signify, by spreading his hands over the figure of the kite, that the filling-up is of that material. . Otherwise, he may dispense with this part of the sign, unless his efforts to make himself understood should be fruitless without it. In this case, he must undertake a separate labour to recall the idea of paper to the mind of his friend. The means of doing this will be determined by circumstances. Reference to some place where paper is known to be deposited ; allusion to a book or newspaper by describing its form, and seeming to open or unfold and read ; imitating the flexibility of the substance ; or, with those who have seen the process of manufacture, calling to mind the paper-mill, and the operations going on within it ; these are some of the practicable means of arriving at the desired result. To make the description of the kite more complete, the fingers should be passed along the situation of the wooden part or frame ; and the material of which it is composed, should be signified in some manner analogous to the foregoing. Thus we have at length the *natural* sign for a kite. It belongs to a class called *descriptive*.

But such a mass of gestures to denote a single thing, must, obviously, very much obstruct rapidity of communication. Signs *truly* natural are, therefore, only occasionally used by deaf-mutes, in their intercourse with each other, and with their friends. Those which do really serve them as the instrument of communication, belong to the second of the classes named above. Out of the whole picture of the kite but a single feature will probably be retained, to stand as the representative of the object. In the institution with which the writer is connected, the attitude and manner of the boy holding the string is that in most common use.

This is no longer a natural sign. It is called by Sicard, a *sign of reduction*. It has lost the property of universal intelligibility ; and if it has not become, to appearance, quite as arbitrary as a word, it is no longer, to say the least, self-

explanatory. Of signs similar to this consists, chiefly, the colloquial language found in institutions for the deaf and dumb, so far as it relates to material things.

In the intellectual and moral world, the power of the *truly* natural language is considerably more limited than we have shown it to be in the material. It is in fact restricted to the designation of the stronger passions and emotions, and of those mental operations, which are usually accompanied by peculiar expressions of the countenance. Such expressions, combined with suitable attitude and gesture, constitute the corresponding natural signs.

But the colloquial language of the institutions is not so feeble in its resources. It resorts to metaphor and allegory, and resting partly upon these helps, and partly upon tacit convention, it accumulates a very copious vocabulary. By metaphor, the straight line is put for rectitude: by allegory, the equal scale is put for justice. By metaphor, physical is put for moral feeling, the speaker pointing to his heart. By allegory, the circle, formed rapidly and repeatedly, represents eternity. These specimens are characteristic of a large class. Any one is competent to judge, how universally such signs are likely to be understood.

But, beside the elements thus far described, the common colloquial language of the deaf and dumb often admits signs totally arbitrary. Some of these seem to have been adopted unconsciously: indeed it is difficult to trace their origin. Others, as for instance many proper names, both of persons and places, are the offspring of necessity. Signs of this class usually originate in little individual peculiarities; but, in large communities, such peculiarities are not sufficiently numerous or striking, to furnish a strongly distinctive sign for every individual. The sign by which the writer is known among the deaf and dumb, is purely arbitrary. It is formed by closing the hand, so as to represent the letter A of the manual alphabet, and placing the thumb-nail of the hand thus closed, against the chin.

It was probably owing, originally, to the existence of a class of rational beings without an audible language, that the discovery was made, of a means of communication to a certain extent copious, universally intelligible among men. Otherwise, we might look with surprise upon the chaos of gestures, (for so it seems to a stranger,) employed by deaf-mutes, when we recollect how often this has been named

to us, as that very language which all mankind are to understand at sight.

The extent to which the language of action may be perfected is almost limitless. As it is, after all, in the countenance, that the chief significance of its signs exists, continued practice may render the use of the hands almost wholly unnecessary. To this extent did Mr. Gallaudet, the late accomplished principal of the American Asylum, succeed in carrying it; as he has stated in a former number of this magazine. But this success, however it may demonstrate the power and variety of expression of which the human countenance is capable, cannot be received as evidence of the power of *natural signs*. It is now more than three years, since the writer, then connected with the American Asylum, borrowing the felicitous idea of Mr. Gallaudet, himself attempted numerous and satisfactory experiments of a similar description. He became convinced, however, that the expressions of the countenance, and the slight motions of the head and body, necessary in this mode of communication, serve to recall common colloquial signs, of which they are, in fact, a kind of *reduction of the second degree*, a partial, or exceedingly abridged imitation; and, moreover, that certain independent conventions, unknown to the common dialect, are absolutely essential to success. He has seen experiments of the same kind conducted by another gentleman, very expert in the use of the sign-language, with the same result. Thus a stranger, though himself deaf and dumb, and acquainted with the common dialect, prevalent where the experiment is made, would probably find this species of sign-making unintelligible.

In this connection, the writer is reminded of another of Mr. Gallaudet's beautiful ideas, which, with the assistance of one of his associates, he has endeavoured to reduce to practice. From the vocabulary of the English language are selected a number of words, of which the initial letters are designedly the several letters of the alphabet. These words are the names of passions, emotions, or mental operations; and their corresponding expressions in the countenance are regarded as signs of the initial letters merely; thus forming *an alphabet of the countenance*, or *an alphabet of expression*. A few letters are, of necessity, arbitrarily supplied. By means of this alphabet, any word whatever may be spelled to a deaf-mute to whom it is familiar, slowly, it is true, but

as certainly, as with the manual alphabet. It is, of course, mere matter of curiosity and amusement, being susceptible of no useful application in practice.

The language of an institution, once established, commonly remains tolerably constant. Each pupil brings with him, on his arrival, the signs of reduction which he has been accustomed to employ among his friends. But he readily lays aside his own signs for those of the community; nor, in doing this, is his memory burthened with a load, like that of a new vocabulary to a person possessing speech. For the signs of reduction which stand for the same idea, come usually from the same extended description, however they may appear to differ; and the new comer has merely to substitute one form of abbreviation for another. Until he has thus fallen into the use of the prevalent dialect, it will be necessary to employ, in his instruction, only those signs which are purely natural.

Having endeavoured to explain, in some degree, the nature of the elements, which make up the language of action under the second form, our attention is next directed to the law of combination, according to which these elements may be made to enunciate propositions. This is very simple. The language of action, when so comprehensive as to be really self-explanatory, being little else than the portraying of objects and incidents in the air, as a painter would represent them on canvass; we must forget that it is a *language* which we are considering, we must cast utterly aside the notions of syntax stereotyped in our minds, and regard simply the question, "Were I a painter, how should I depict this thing, in order most satisfactorily to exhibit, at once, the relations of its parts, and the progress of events." This is the key to the whole matter. Suppose I should wish actually to paint a proposition of this simplicity: "A man kicks a dog." I should begin naturally with the dog, and afterwards represent the man in the act of kicking. To paint first this act, to exhibit a man kicking the air, would be unnatural. So in the language of action: I must first make the *sign* of the dog, and assign to it a location. I must then make the sign of a man, giving it also a suitable location, and finally represent the action (by actually performing it) as passing in the proper direction between the two. With this illustration, we will leave the sign-language under the second or colloquial form.

Under the first form, this language is, as we have seen, natural. Under the second, it exhibits a combination of nature and of art. Under the third, it appears to have passed entirely over to the opposite extreme, and is wholly artificial. From the first to the second form, the change on the part of the deaf-mute is spontaneous; nay, rather, he is forced into it by strong necessity. His progress exhibits the ordinary and natural march of improvement. But that from the second to the third is unnecessary, unnatural and forced. Were the deaf-mute left to himself, it would never be made, and wherever it is found, it is invariably the work of his teacher. The following is an account of its origin.

The syntax of the sign-language being one of the points in which that mode of communication differs most widely from ours, and its vocabulary being likewise comparatively slender; it occurred to the estimable Abbé De l'Epée, that if these two circumstances could be done away,—if the number of signs could be made equal to the number of words, and if they could be reduced to an order of arrangement, corresponding to that of words in speech; the deaf and dumb might be instructed by a mere process of translation. He addressed himself to the task, therefore, of affecting this desirable improvement. His labours, greatly amplified by his successor, Sicard, gave rise to a species of signs denominated *methodical*. This system contained, or was intended to contain, a sign to represent every spoken word; together with auxiliaries, indicative of tense, mode, &c., and of the parts of speech. Further notice will be taken of this species of signs in another place. We will pause here only to remark, that these methodical signs were, of necessity, in good part not colloquial; and that, though they presented a language having a syntax like ours, such a syntax continued to be quite as unnatural, and quite as unintelligible to the deaf and dumb, as before.

Some instructors have endeavoured to make of signs a written, as well as a colloquial language. In order to accomplish this, they have represented the various members of the body, and the several features of the countenance, concerned in pantomime, by characters on paper. By another set of marks they have contrived to indicate all the varieties of motion; and by a third, the most striking expressions of the countenance. By the combination of these characters they are able to express in writing any sign of action, very much

as spoken words are spelled by means of alphabetic characters. Mimography is the name given to this mode of writing signs. It is not known to be at present in use in any school, excepting in that of M. Piroux at Nancy in France, if even it is still employed there. Most instructors have been disposed to regard it as rather curious than useful.

The art of designing is an important auxiliary to the instruction of the deaf and dumb. In teaching even the simple nomenclature of visible objects, a vast amount of time may often be saved by the help of pictures. For it is not of every object of which there is occasion to speak, that a sign of reduction is to be found in the dialect of the institutions. In such a case, if the object be not itself present, nor any picture representing it, it is necessary to resort to the process of description, illustrated when speaking of the sign-language under the first form. This process will of course be less tedious, in proportion as there exist other signs of reduction to contract its parts; nevertheless it will consume time, which the presence of a picture might save. But design is not of use merely in this way. It may serve to explain phrases and sentences; or to throw light upon difficult subjects, by an allegorical use. Hardly any limit can be assigned to its utility.

There is another auxiliary in use in the school-rooms of our institutions, employed to illustrate the laws of grammar. It consists of certain symbols, devised to represent the parts of speech, and undergoing systematic modifications, to correspond to the grammatical inflections of words. The idea of such symbols originated with Sicard. There are now in possession of the writer, certain old model lessons, once used in the Royal Institution, in which the symbols of the noun and adjective appear, in form closely resembling those now in use in the New-York Institution. The instructors on this continent have expanded the idea of the distinguished inventor, and have given to grammatical symbols a much higher degree of utility, than they could have possessed in his day. Mere description would hardly enable the public to estimate the merits of this method of illustrating grammar to the eye. There is, however, now in a process of stereotyping for publication in this city, a small volume, which will contain the whole system, as at present in use in the New-York Institution, adapted to the purposes of instruction in ordinary schools.

The language of action, design and grammatical symbols are instruments of instruction unconnected with words. As means of exhibiting or using words, we have also writing, the manual alphabet, and articulation.

Of the first, viz: writing, it is unnecessary to speak.

Of the second, indifferently denominated the finger alphabet, the manual alphabet, and dactylogy, the public have, also, in general, some notion sufficiently definite. They are aware that its elements are certain positions of the fingers, representing the letters of the alphabet; and that its use is to spell words *literatim*. There are two species of dactylogy in use, the first employs but a single hand, and prevails over this country and the continent of Europe. The other employs both, and is confined to the British Isles.

Beside simple alphabetic dactylogy, instructors have, at times, devised systems of finger-spelling by syllables. Pereiré, a distinguished contemporary of De l'Épée in Paris, employed such an one with eminent success. Mr. J. R. Burnet, a meritorious young man of Livingston, N. J., deaf since the age of seven, but remarkably intelligent and well informed, and the author of a volume of poems, and papers on the deaf and dumb, about a year since planned out a system of syllabic dactylogy, adapted to the English language, which evinced considerable ingenuity, and promised to be practically useful: but it has not yet been submitted to the test of experiment.

Articulation comes next. Little explanation is necessary in reference to this. For the deaf it means precisely what it means for others, the actual utterance of words.

Accompanying articulation, it is attempted usually to teach the power of reading words in the motion of the lips. Both these accomplishments have been actually taught to the profoundly deaf; though necessarily at the expense of much time and patient labour. There are many who hear partially, and are, on that account, more fit subjects for this species of instruction.

With this is completed our survey of the instruments of instruction. We pass next to the matter. This consists, first, of alphabetic language; and, secondly, of all the various subjects of knowledge, which constitute the substance of instruction to those who hear. To teach the first presents the great and peculiar task. It is true that language cannot be

taught apart from that knowledge of which it is the nomenclature. It is therefore undoubtedly true, that fully to understand all the terms of any given language, is fully to understand every subject of knowledge which the language is sufficiently copious to treat of. Nevertheless, to acquire the use of a language is a labour as specifically different from that of accumulating knowledge, as to acquire the use of a tool is different from the study of the principles on which the tool is constructed.

In the execution of his task, the instructor is at liberty to choose between the two courses following. He may aim only to convey to his pupil a practical knowledge of language, like that which children acquire, as they grow up; or he may desire to make him also acquainted with the principles of grammar. If the latter be his choice, he may follow out the two branches simultaneously; or he may postpone grammar as a science, until language is practically taught. The simplicity of the latter course recommends it; and it is therefore the one most popular, and most generally pursued.

There are still two ramifications, into which the labour of teaching language subdivides itself. To teach the nomenclature of ideas simply, is not to impart the power of communicating those judgements, which result from the comparison of ideas. The laws which govern discourse, or connected language, constitute, therefore, a distinct division of the subject, requiring the most careful and unwearied attention.

Language being, then, the chief matter of instruction, by what processes shall we expound its difficulties, and simplify its mysteries, to the narrow comprehension of an uneducated deaf-mute? The limits of this paper of course forbid our descending to those minute practical details, which would be necessary to guide a novice in the school-room. We may nevertheless be able to afford some illustration of what would be their nature.

The first ramification of the subject is that of teaching words or nomenclature. We need not remark that words will be of no value to the pupil, unless their corresponding ideas are first clearly and distinctly apprehended. It is the business of the instructor, therefore, to develope in the mind of the learner, a series of ideas, parallel to the words of alphabetic language, and as extensive as the vocabulary to be taught. For this purpose he will avail himself of a variety of processes.

Among these, the simplest are mere *indication* and *description*, which, as employed in teaching the names of visible objects, have been already exemplified. These two suffice for the nomenclature of the material world. In regard to description, it should be remarked, that it avails itself of the forms, qualities, and characteristic motions of material things, of their origin or production, of their purpose or uses, of their habits (if living), and of the fate which overtakes them at last. Any circumstance, which might come into a detailed written account of the object, are brought out if necessary, in the pantomimic scene.

In overstepping the confines of matter, if our resources are separately weaker, they are nevertheless more numerous. The first is *illustration*, a word which means here precisely what it does elsewhere. Suppose I desire my pupil to understand what I understand, when I hear the word *pity*. I represent a miserable woman thinly clad, and shivering with her babe at midnight in midwinter, on the marble step of some stately mansion in Broadway. I describe the tears that chase each other down her care-worn cheeks. I paint her mournful gaze through the gloom of the deserted street, and the blank look of despair, with which at last she suffers her head to fall upon her aching bosom; and, as I regard the image, I have thus created before me, I point to my heart, and throw into my countenance an expression characteristic of the emotion I assume to feel. In view of the circumstances, it can hardly be misunderstood.

The next process is *metaphor*. Let the same word, *pity*, be the subject. I represent the earth, parched by the heat of summer. I point to the sun, pouring down a most intolerable radiance. I seem, here and there, to see animals panting under the oppressive influence, and men melting in perspiration. The herbage is shrivelled, brown and dry. The soil is baked and intersected with cracks in a thousand directions. Suddenly I see a cloud arise in the west. It expands itself over the surface of the whole heaven. I endow it with animation and thought. I perceive it regarding from the sky the pitiable condition of all the lower creation. I see it dissolving away to tears, and pouring out its pitying moisture, in showers, to re-animate and refresh the drooping world.

Metaphoric illustration must be used with caution. When so used, it diversifies the teacher's labour and the

learner's toil, with an agreeable variety; and often presents ideas in a very striking light. It is peculiarly useful in cases where simple illustrations, adapted to the learner's capacity, are not easily to be found.

The processes thus far enumerated are of a kind usually called *familiar*, in opposition to others denominated *philosophic*, which we shall proceed to consider.

Of these, the first is *induction*. By this word is meant a mental operation on the part of the pupil himself; a species of analysis into which he is led by the teacher, and in the course of which, he arrives independently at notions, not before distinctly recognized. I have, for example, a pupil, who has never contemplated edifices, or buildings as a class. Making the usual sign for that in which we live, I enquire (a question easily asked in the sign-language), if my pupil has ever seen a similar object. He answers yes, and I require him to describe it, and to tell its use. I ask then for another, and another, and another, until his stock is exhausted. But I shall not find it necessary to repeat my interrogatory so often. I shall be anticipated. The characteristic of this class of objects will be brought by my questions before the pupil's mind, and he will run on from one thing to another, until there remain no more. I have succeeded in bringing him to contemplate as a class, a number of objects, which he had been accustomed to consider only as individuals. I proceed to give a name to this newly acquired notion.

The second of these processes is *exposition*; a kind of analysis precisely like the former in kind, but differing in the mode of conducting it. In the former case the pupil unconsciously passes through the requisite steps; in the latter the teacher does the same with design; the learner remaining a passive spectator. The process is more rapid than induction, and at the same time less certain. It is, hence, better adapted to a later period of instruction, while the former can only, with safety, be depended on, while the mind is yet for the most part undisciplined. As an example, let us take the correlative personal nouns, *superiour* and *inferiour*. I enumerate all the particulars which may be supposed to render one individual superiour to another, such as superiour power, superiour wisdom, superiour virtue, superiour ingenuity, superiour strength, superiour agility, &c., and intimate that of two individuals, he who possesses all or any one of

these, is entitled to the more honourable appellation. The process is simply definition *a posteriori*.

The third method is that of *definition indirect*. This is of two kinds, *definition by exclusion*, and *definition by contrast*. Both may very well be employed together, for the contrast or direct opposite of an idea is, of course, excluded from the idea itself. Suppose I wish to define *liberality* or *generosity*. By the contrast I may say, in the beginning, that it is the reverse of a niggardly, hoarding disposition. Nevertheless, it is not prodigality, or wasteful expenditure. Neither is it the disbursement of sums, however vast, which one ought to pay. Nor is it the free use of money, from a mean-spirited fear of the imputation of stinginess; nor, for the sake of acquiring the name of a good companionable fellow; nor, in order to compass some secret end; nor, for any reason, in short, but the spontaneous promptings of a noble heart, that despises the lucre of gain, but loves its fellows, and desires to impart to them of its means of enjoyment. This process is one of frequent use, and is one of the most efficient known to the art.

There remains only *definition by synthesis*, or, as it is commonly called, *direct definition*. According to this method, a particular idea is defined by referring to its genus, and pointing out its specific characteristics. Such a method is not adapted to the circumstances of the deaf and dumb, unless at a late period in the course of their instruction.

These being the processes, logically classified, of developing the ideas of deaf-mutes, preparatory to teaching nomenclature, it would be in order to enquire here, what precautions are taken to insure thoroughness in the other branch of instruction, viz: that which embraces the principles of construction or connected discourse. The few remarks we have to make on this topic, will find a place when we come to consider that which peculiarly characterizes the history of the art in modern times.

We are now in a state to understand the wide differences, which have distinguished the systems pursued by different instructors and different institutions. These differences have arisen from the unequal prominence given by different men, to some of the instruments of communication, and the total exclusion of others from their methods. Of simple homogeneous systems, there are four essentially dissimilar, still in practice. In past times, there have not been wanting others,

as we shall presently see. From combinations of the homogeneous systems, there arise others, differing according to the nature of their component parts.

The first and simplest system is that which rests upon the truly natural, unexpanded and unmethodized dialect of the deaf-mute, and aims only to teach language under a written form. It rejects all those contractions, denominated signs of reduction, and dispenses with the use of gestures entirely, as soon as possible. This was, for a long time, the method of the distinguished Dr. John Wallis, Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford, and almost, if not quite, the earliest of English labourers in behalf of the deaf and dumb.

The second system differs only from the first, in employing the language of action under the second form ; or that in which it is no longer universally intelligible, but, by reason of conventions and abbreviations, has become a prompt and easy means of communication. This is the system at present existing in the New-York Institution.

The third is that employed in the sixteenth century by Ponce, the earliest of all instructors, and by great numbers since his time. Its principal instrument is articulation.

The fourth is that which originated with De l'Epée in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and was perfected by Sicard in the beginning of the present, at the Royal Institution of Paris. This, as has been already intimated, depends chiefly upon methodical signs. The celebrity of its originators, and the individual success especially of Sicard, contributed to render this method highly popular in France, and in this country, when the art was new among us. Very little, however, was generally known, at the time, of the systems prevalent on the rest of the European continent, and in the British islands. Greater experience has since induced the Royal Institution to abandon wholly the method of Sicard, and to embrace a mixed method, formed by combining the second and the third, named above.

The methods we have described, except that of De l'Epée and Sicard, are as will be perceived, as old as the art itself. That which depends on articulation was, nevertheless, almost universally the favourite, during the two hundred years which preceded the invention of methodical signs. We have mentioned that Ponce preferred this ; and we may add that his pupils are said to have been accomplished articulators. After him, Bonet in Spain ; Wallis and Holder in England ;

Van Helmont and Amman in Holland ; Kerger, Wild, Niederoff, Raphel, Lichwitz, Arnoldi and Heinicke in Germany ; and Pereiré, Ernaud, Desehamps, and even the Abbé De l'Epée himself in France, are known to have attached themselves to this method. One of these, Professor Wild, engaged a celebrated mechanist of Frankfort, named Henry Louis Muth, to construct a machine, which should imitate all the movements of the vocal organs ; in order that the deaf-mute might have an opportunity to see distinctly the positions he was required to copy. Another, viz : Heinicke, pretended to avail himself of the sense of taste in teaching articulation. The truth of this pretence has been doubted ; nevertheless, he is known to have endeavoured to regulate the positions of the vocal organs, by introducing instruments into the mouth.

Sicard, too, so late as the year 1819, republished a little treatise of De l'Epée, called "The Art of Speaking," with a preface, in which he says, "The deaf-mute is not wholly restored to society, till he has learned to express himself *viva voce*, and to read speech in the movement of the lips. It is only then that his education can be said to be complete." These facts are worth remembering on the part of those, who devour, with astonishment, the accounts, which find their way occasionally into the public prints, of the wonderful success, attained by some modern experimenter, in instructing the deaf to speak.

But though the majority of suffrages were early, as we see, in favour of articulation, the simpler form of the art had its disciples. Wallis transferred himself to this class. Beside him, appeared, in England, Bulwer and Dalgarno ; and in Germany, Lasius, and probably others, whose names we know, without being particularly acquainted with their practice.

In France, among the first essays attempted in this art, were those of Father Vanin and of Pereiré, whose methods were both sufficiently remarkable to deserve separate mention. The minute details of neither have come down to us, but we know that Father Vanin made design the great instrument of instruction and the basis of his system. By means of this alone, he sought to explain every thing, even to the mysteries of religion.

Pereiré, on the other hand, depended chiefly on a method of syllabic dactylogy, lost with him, by means of which words could be very rapidly produced. The language of

action he rigorously excluded. Articulation was his ultimate aim, it is true, but the channel through which he sought to approach it was peculiar to himself.

Design and the manual alphabet, are, at this day, peculiar to no system. The utility of the first is universally acknowledged, though little has been done toward developing the extensive resources it presents. The second is tolerated every where, on account of its convenience, in producing words without the aid of writing-materials. It is, however, to be feared, that a too early and too constant use of this instrument, may lead to the habit of conceiving words as exhibited by the tedious process of *literatim* spelling on the fingers, rather than as they appear on paper, in which form the mind will speedily become accustomed to regard them as units.

The aim of modern instructors has not been so much to strike out paths new and untrodden, as to remove obstacles from the old. The search for a method radically different from any yet tried, would probably be a fruitless labour, inasmuch as methods are characterized, as we have seen, by the combinations and the applications which they admit, of the instruments of communication; and as these instruments are few and known. Modern industry and modern investigation have been busy with theory, as well as with practice. They have called in the light of philosophy, to aid in discovering a touchstone for the practitioner, by which to test the genuineness of his methods. They have turned their attention to a branch of the subject, independent of what are called systems, and equally important to all, viz: the order in which the details of that vast subject, language, should be unfolded to the mind of the learner; embracing a consideration, first, of the principles which should guide in determining the due succession of difficulties, presented in the various forms of connected discourse; and, secondly, of the means of facilitating the development of ideas, by so arranging their nomenclature for the purposes of instruction, as to make each step in advance, a natural guide to the one succeeding.

These are complicated and difficult questions. They are still employing the ingenuity of distinguished individuals. For, though the general and fundamental principles which they involve, are obvious and easy of comprehension, yet the extent of the subject renders their perfect application in practice, a matter of great difficulty.

In speaking of the actual state of the art, at the present day, we should say that it is characterized by most vigorous efforts, to introduce philosophical method into the teaching of language. Half a century ago, and even later, the instruments of instruction, and the means of perfecting them, seemed principally to absorb the minds of instructors. In our own time these, in the estimation of intelligent men, have found their true level; and the best methods of simplifying the task, which these instruments are to be the means of performing, are now the grand object of study.

After this account of existing methods, the writer may be expected to express a preference for some one in particular. There are certain principles, admitted by the ablest writers on the subject, at the present day, to be in accordance with sound philosophy, which may serve as a guide in the formation of such a preference. These are,

1st. That it is expedient for the instructor to borrow the entire language of action in possession of his pupil, as being the earliest available instrument of communication.

2d. That the pupil should be taught to associate his ideas directly with the visible forms of written words.

In proposing to the pupil to receive words as the immediate signs of his ideas, we aim, of course, to subvert his long standing habit, of conducting mental operations by means of pantomimic signs. Every expansion of his natural language, therefore, whatever advantages it may bring with it, is attended with at least one important evil, viz: that it strengthens the pupil's attachment to his old habits of thought and his accustomed modes of communication. It renders the task of supplanting signs of action by words, greater; and the disposition on the part of the pupil to aid in the execution of that task, less. The sagacious instructor, therefore, especially if he have but few pupils, will spend very little labour in correcting and improving, and much less in developing, the meagre dialect they bring him. Whatever expansion it acquires in their intercourse with each other, he will turn to the best advantage he can, in the prosecution of his task. Existing in an expanded state, it may be made of use; but its utility is hardly sufficient to justify its cultivation for this specific object. Indeed, the use of the sign-language, from the earliest period of instruction, should be daily more and more discouraged; and, as the course of education approaches its termination, it should be, if not rigidly

prohibited, at least barely tolerated, and never suffered to appear, save when alphabetic language fails. No teacher can be too watchful in this respect. So copious and so convenient has become the language of the schools, and so elegant and picturesque does it appear in practice, that there is a constant propensity to indulge in its employment; when the less showy and more difficult, but at the same time more useful, language, common to the rest of the world, ought to be substituted; and on occasions most valuable for practical instruction. The ordinary conversations between master and pupil, out of school, too frequently, I should say constantly, go on in the language of action; and the great purpose, for which the community are assembled together, seems wholly forgotten. On this subject M. Recoing, a late luminous writer and able instructor of France, whose volume "by the father of a deaf-mute" is cited at the head of this article, has given us some forcible remarks.

"It is certain," he says, "that the fondness of the deaf and dumb for signs, will turn them away from the habitual use of language: and if the master, on every occasion, instead of giving the conventional word to recal such or such an object, make a natural sign to express his thought, he will doubtless be understood, but the French word will not be learned; or, if known, will not be engraven anew upon the memory. It is undoubtedly true, that he may be able to communicate many simple ideas, as promptly by natural signs, as by the most abridged form of writing; or even more so. But it will be more useful, nevertheless, to say these things, even down to the most simple, in French; because we shall thus form our pupils to the use of that language, which we cannot too constantly inculcate upon them." Again, "since the master cannot cause the words of his mother tongue continually to resound in the ears of his pupil, he must be so much the more careful to write them unceasingly before the eyes; and *never to express himself but in this language*, save to take advantage of a gesture to help out his meaning. The gesture which paints the object, may thus be a useful auxiliary. *But it will never do to reverse the order*, to make of the gesture the capital object, and of the French word, *which ought always to remain in the mind*, a mere accessory."

Such, likewise, is the language of Degerando. "Let us recal the principle unceasingly: the deaf-mute must enter

our ranks ; he must become one of us. It is the language of his country which we desire him to acquire. This should become to him what it is to the ordinary child, what it is to us, his mother tongue. But the adoption of the language of his country can never be perfect and sincere, *if he continues to see in it only the translation of his own signs*: it will not be his mother tongue. It will remain for him, what the learned languages are for us." Again he says, "The deaf-mute *must* have the resolution often to interdict to himself the language which he has constructed ; for the moment to forget it, if he will be truly initiated into that, which is in circulation among his kind. To familiarize him with our language, *it is necessary to familiarize him with our mode of conceiving it* ; from which he is distracted by the language peculiarly his own."

In commenting upon this passage, M. Recoing remarks, that the words "*often*" and "*for the moment*," are "a concession too indulgent, made to ancient prejudices."

In illustration of the evils resulting from the existence of too copious a dialect of the language of action, Degerando cites the example of the company of young Egyptians, sent to Paris by the Pacha of their country, to acquire a knowledge of the arts and the learning of Europe. Having been placed together in the same school, they made, for a long time, little progress in the acquisition of French ; because like the deaf and dumb, they conversed continually in a language of their own. On this account they were separated, and distributed among different schools ; when, immediately, the advantageous effect of denying them the use of their mother tongue, became manifest in the remarkable rapidity of their improvement.

If, then, even that degree of expansion, which in large institutions, seems, in the nature of things, inevitable, is to say the least, not to be desired ; what shall we say of the system of instruction, of which the first great dogma is, expansion to the highest possible degree : nay, more than this, expansion beyond even the limit, within which signs are of colloquial use ; and expansion, which is not expansion merely, but rather the destruction of all that is natural in the language of action, and the erection of a stupendous artificial structure upon its ruins ; artificial in its materials, and artificial in the mode of their combination. We have already said, that the dialect of the institutions is not properly

a natural language. This is true ; nevertheless it retains one characteristic of that from which it springs, and which is in fact natural, and that is its syntax. This at least continues to be truly natural, after the individual signs have forfeited their claim to that character ; and this last trace of nature it is, which the principle of methodical signs comes to destroy. For, in place of a collocation of signs which the deaf-mute comprehends, it proposes to substitute one which he does not comprehend ; and thus to present him with a set of unintelligible elements, arranged in an unintelligible order. I say unintelligible elements. Such they are, of course, whenever without the circle of colloquial signs ; or, more accurately perhaps, when standing as the representatives of ideas, as yet beyond the limit of the pupil's intellectual range. But may not the corresponding ideas be defined ? True, they may : but then, again, of what manner of use is the sign ? To what end is it adopted, if not to serve as an auxiliary in defining the idea ? The purpose of the school is not to teach signs, but words ; and the labour thus spent in defining a *sign*, is the very labour, and no other, required to teach a *word*. Now, were it the fact, that each methodical sign brought with it to the pupil its corresponding idea, and thus saved us the labour of developing the same in his mind ; then we would, with pleasure, accept the freight and dismiss the vehicle. But the truth is quite otherwise. We are asked to accept the vehicle, and to furnish it with its freight ; in order that we may, the next moment, undo our labour. Truly the system of methodical signs is an unwieldy and cumbrous machine, and a dead weight upon the system of instruction in which it is recognized.

This system is, moreover, exceedingly deceitful. It deceives both instructor and pupil, by affording to the latter a mechanical guide to the construction of sentences, which he does not understand. It is, still further, even at the present day, practically imperfect. Not all the labours of Sicard, and they were Herculean, with those of De l'Epée to aid him in starting, nor all those of his numerous disciples, have yet brought the system to that perfection which its theory demands, or filled up its limitless vocabulary of signs.

M. Recoing, whose writings have been already quoted, and who is distinguished for his glowing zeal in the cause of the deaf and dumb, has taken the trouble to collect a list of distinguished names, behind which to intrench himself, in

fulminating anathemas upon the system of methodical signs ; and it is a fact in no small degree remarkable, that since the days of De l'Epée, excepting his great disciple Sicard, all Europe has produced no single individual of note, to advocate this mischievous system ; while its opponents have been numerous, zealous, and able. Its latest champions in France, M. Jamet of Caen, and M. Dudésert of Condé, are only remarkable, the former for his singular inaccuracy of information, and the latter for a spirit of ultraism never dreamed of even by Sicard. He admits no signs which are not wholly arbitrary ; rejects, of course, all natural signs, in the most decided and peremptory manner, and prohibits the use of such, in the mutual intercourse of the pupils themselves. The systems of Jamet and of Dudésert, are not indeed identical with that of Sicard. These gentlemen have some notions peculiar to themselves. They say, for example, that as we possess ideas, words, and also pronunciation ; the deaf and dumb should have the same, or something equivalent. Their methodical signs stand therefore for *pronunciation* ; they stand, unvaried, for the words they represent, whatever changes of meaning the latter may undergo ; and they stand strictly for single words, and not indifferently for synonymous terms. By deviating then from the system of Sicard, these instructors do not seem to have become more philosophical in theory, or more felicitous in practice.

The radical evil lies here. In all its forms, the methodical sign system rests upon an erroneous theory. Its supporters claim that the deaf and dumb must always, of necessity, think by the instrumentality of their language of pantomime. This doctrine is absurd upon the face of it, and may be met and confuted by arguments of precisely a similar character to those, once successfully employed to combat the assertions of the early teachers of articulation. For be it remembered that these men denied even to pantomime, what more recent teachers have denied to written words, the power or fitness to serve as the instrument of thought : a prerogative which they claimed in behalf of the voice alone. But these doctrines have both alike been long since exploded, and are now quietly inured among the rubbish of the past.*

*The writer has observed with regret, in one of his own countrymen, a new advocate, at this late day, of the several absurdities exposed in the text. With still greater regret has he noticed the lack of courtesy on the part of the same gentleman, toward one, who had certainly intended him no disrespect ;

Methodical signs, therefore, remain without a plausible excuse for their continued existence ; and are probably destined to disappear with the next generation.

Some instructors, in whose methods this artificial system has held a prominent place, have expressed a conviction, unaccompanied by argument, that signs of this description cannot be entirely abandoned. Methodical signs have been abandoned already. In fact they never had an existence, until about half a century ago, and two entire centuries after the time of Ponce. They have no existence, now, in those schools which have never received the method of De l'Épée. They never, of course, had an existence in the numerous articulating schools, which have overspread Great Britain and the continent of Europe, even to the heart of France itself: yet, without their aid, multitudes of pupils have even learned to talk. They have no existence at the present time, except as matter of memory, in those institutions, which have once employed, and subsequently abandoned them ; among which may be mentioned that with which the writer is connected, and the Royal Institution of Paris.

It is too late to express a conviction that methodical signs cannot be abandoned. This should have been done before the abandonment took place, at least before it took place in the school of Sicard. Were the writer to express a conviction, that there is no such place as Paris, the Parisians would, questionless, remain living entities, in spite of his doubts. So is it in this case. Whoever may withhold his belief from the assertion, the deaf and dumb will, nevertheless, continue to be instructed without the use of methodical signs ; as they have been already, for more than two centuries and a half.

The writer cannot help believing, that those who deny the practicability of this, make the denial, because practice has not taught them to modify their school-room processes, to meet the new exigency introduced by the change. They

and who, in giving his own views to the public, through the pages of the North American, was totally unconscious that he was assailing any pet doctrines of Mr. Jacobs of Kentucky. His views, for which he prefers no claim to originality, he conceives, are likely to stand : for even when Mr. Jacobs shall have succeeded in exterminating them here, and he seems to flatter himself that time is not far distant, he will find all Europe on his hands after all ; as, indeed, he may be early apprised, on the appearance of the fourth circular from Paris, now due, but delayed by the press of matter. The man, who seems to make a merit of reading no French, should speak in these matters with less confidence ; for the French and the German instructors *think* profoundly before *they* write ; and they *read*, if Mr. Jacobs does not, the productions of their brethren, though in foreign tongues.

would speak with more accuracy, were they to assert the impossibility of discarding methodical signs, and of still continuing to instruct *as though methodical signs were still in use*. A knight of the twelfth century, divested of his mail, and accoutred as a modern warrior, might be supposed to say, "I cannot dispense with that massive armour. I am convinced that such weapons and such defences are essential to the noble art of war. They can never be laid aside." And why? Because he conceives that he must always do battle, with lance in rest, as a mailed knight should.

If the objectors, along with methodical signs, will abandon the unwise method of *verbatim* dictation; if they will throw their pupils a little more upon their own resources, and force them to *think*, as often as they *write*; if they will start from a point no higher than that at which the pupil is fully competent to begin with them, and be sure never to advance with so impatient speed as to leave him behind; if, finally, they will themselves *write a great deal*, and make signs comparatively little, before the eyes of their classes in the school-room, and in their conversations with individuals out; they will shortly see whether the artificial and mischievous system of methodical signs cannot be abandoned. In view of the comparative labour imposed upon the instructor by the two methods proposed, severally considered, a sluggish man may prefer that which exacts the least thought, which affords him a mechanical means of *teaching against time*, which involves the necessity of little preparation for his daily task, and of quite as little scrutiny into the *actual* progress of his pupils. But a wise man, a benevolent man, I might almost say a conscientious man, will choose rather a method, which admits of no such perversion, and one of which it is a characteristic to verify the completeness of its results as it proceeds; in spite of the labour which such a method imposes, and in spite of the time which it exhausts.

In reference to articulation, the writer expresses, as he believes, the opinion of the vast majority of teachers and others, when he says, that, in the cases of those whose organs of speech are flexible, whose voices are agreeable, and whose sense of hearing is not entirely extinct, it seems highly desirable that this accomplishment should be taught. How much more desirable, then, is it, when the individuals, though deaf from an early age, have not become absolutely dumb, but only *silent*; and when they may yet be easily induced to

utter words from memory. To teach such persons to recognize written or printed words, as the same they have been accustomed to pronounce, only under a different form, is still something of a task, unless they have been made acquainted with alphabetic characters, before losing their hearing. But the power of correct articulation exists, and this it is, which, in ordinary cases, it constitutes the great labour to impart. The class of persons here spoken of, is not so small as is commonly believed. There are ten, at least, out of one hundred and forty pupils now present in the New-York Institution, capable of speaking, several of them fluently, and two or three of the number quite competent to conduct, on their own part, a conversation in words, reading replies on the lips, with the help of an occasional explanatory sign.

The preference of the writer would therefore be for a mixed method, combining, as does that of the Institution at Paris, at the present time, the second and the third of the homogeneous methods, and rejecting methodical signs. It is this method, which, in large institutions, will doubtless ultimately prevail. But in a case, in which an instructor is able to confine his whole attention to an individual pupil, or to two or three, *apart from a community of deaf-mutes*, the first or the third pure method, uncombined with any other, seems rather to be chosen.

A few remarks will be superadded, in reference to that, which has been already mentioned, as constituting, in this art, the peculiar labour of modern times, viz : the perfection of a philosophical method of teaching language. It is now a principle, regarded as fundamental in the art, that deaf-mutes must acquire a knowledge of alphabetic language, by means essentially the same as those, by which ordinary children learn to speak.

Starting from this principle, the first enquiry naturally is, what is it which ordinary children acquire in learning a language? Not words merely, for words are not valuable for their own sake, but for that of their significancy. As the signs of ideas, words *are* valuable ; for they enable their possessor at any moment to awaken in the mind of another, the precise notion which exists in his own ; and thus constitute a palpable evidence, that both have before them, at once, the same object of contemplation.

The child, in learning language, has, then, to make an

acquisition much more important than that of words—the acquisition of ideas. It is, furthermore, essential that his ideas should be identical with those of other men, and that, for both, they should attach themselves to the same words. These conditions are equally essential to the utility of language. Unless they exist, no one can be certain that he is understood; nor will words supply the evidence, they are usually supposed to do, that two minds are, at the same moment, occupied with the same idea.

In this remark, it may not be amiss here to observe, we have a probable clue to the origin of much of the misunderstanding and controversy, which interrupts the harmony of those, whose real opinions are not materially at variance, and who would else be friends. Whole folios of polemics spring into existence, because an unfortunate word represents one thing for one man, and another thing, differing from the former “but in the estimation of a hair,” for another.

Such differences are evils in some degree necessary, and resulting from the constitution of things. For while the child, in early life, is engaged unconsciously in acquiring ideas, he is, so to speak, his own teacher: or rather he is learning without a teacher at all; he is carrying on a series of inductions upon the language of his fellow-men. The same may be said in reference to much of what he gains in later years. The number of ideas thus independently acquired may be loosely estimated, by considering, how great a part of the words, any individual believes himself to understand, have been unconsciously treasured up. Corresponding to each of these, the individual must, also unconsciously, have imbibed one or more ideas, right or wrong. Years of attentive observation are often necessary to perfect the notion associated in his mind with a single word. He is, in the meantime, conscious in many cases, of the successive modifications which this notion undergoes, in its transition from stage to stage of gradually diminishing error. He is ultimately assured of its correctness, by observing its uniform fitness for the circumstances, in which he finds the corresponding word introduced among men.

Merely words, then, are but a subordinate part of the knowledge, which ordinary children gather up in early life; since they exist only in consequence of the pre-existence of the ideas, of which they are the registers and the instruments.

The idea and the word stand to each other in the relation of soul and body. The one manifests itself through the other; the former is the essence, the latter, the abiding-place and organ.

But the mere possession of ideas, even with corresponding signs, is not all that is necessary to the intercommunication of minds. The objects of our knowledge exist in certain states, they present themselves to our judgements in certain relations, and they often act upon and affect each other's modes of existence, or their own. All these circumstances are variable. For every possible variation, there must be either a new nomenclature, or a single given set of words must be made to assume corresponding variations, either by the aid of auxiliaries, or by a change of form, or of position, or of both. Hence originates the science of grammar.

The circumstances just enumerated constitute a class of general notions, many of which have to represent them, no particular words; but rather a certain order of collocation, or certain inflections, of whatever words may be before the mind. These notions are laws of construction: they constitute the syntax of a language.

Though a part of our ideas, they are not, in general, distinctly abstracted, or made the prominent objects of our contemplation: they are nevertheless recognized in each individual case, and thus they render us a constant and silent service, indispensable to the power of communicating our thoughts. They enable us, by combination in phrases and sentences, to supply the deficiencies of our vocabularies; and it is, in fact, but a wide extension of the principle of generalization to say, that all sentences whatever, are but individual, though complex signs, in lieu of which, a perfect nomenclature, were such a creation possible, would possess only single words, and would constitute a language, in which the necessity of syntax would no longer be felt. Could we suppose the infinite mind to employ signs like our own as the instrument of thought, instead of grasping all things by the power of intuition, we might presume it to avail itself of precisely such a nomenclature. The supposition, however, implies an absurdity; and to a finite mind, moreover, were it otherwise, the construction and the attainment of a language so boundless, would be alike impossible. Syntax is, therefore, a necessary part of every conventional mode of

expressing ideas among men. A practical acquaintance with it is attained by speaking children, quite as imperceptibly as any other part of their knowledge, and almost simultaneously with words.

Children, then, in learning language, are making three distinct acquisitions, viz: (naming them in the order of their relative importance) ideas, the laws of construction, and words. These attainments are made so nearly together that, in practice, they may be regarded as really simultaneous. In strict truth, however, ideas must be allowed to take precedence of words in the order of time, and words of the principles of construction. Still this precedence is but momentary, and, in the case of a speaking child, after the very earliest essays at utterance, is hardly perceptible. The sooner, in fact, an idea is attached to its name, and the sooner the relations existing and the actions occurring between objects, are associated with corresponding combinations and modifications of words, the lighter in the end will be the burthen imposed upon the memory of the learner, and the earlier, the stronger and clearer will be his perception of the utility of artificial language.

It follows, therefore, as a general rule for the guidance of the instructor of deaf-mutes, that ideas should be first developed, according to the methods heretofore suggested, and then named: and furthermore, that, *from the very beginning*, the laws of construction should be practically taught by the combination of words into sentences.

We have then, here, a definite point of departure. To trace out the course to be thence pursued, across the vast ocean of language, would be to write a practical treatise, which we cannot propose to ourselves in this place. A few principles, exceedingly general, and constituting the extreme outline of the task, only can be named.

Since, then, the instruction of deaf-mutes is assimilated to the process by which the speaking child acquires language, and since the question has been answered, *what* it is which the latter acquires, let us next ask, *how* is this acquisition made. Nothing can be less subject to method, than the succession of words and phrases, that address themselves continually to the ear of the child who hears. He learns, nevertheless, to speak, not in consequence of this want of method, but in spite of it. The same thing is so often reiterated in his hearing, the remembrance of it, when just fading away,

is so constantly revived in all its freshness, that in spite of his inattention and indifference, and in spite of the confused jumble of words, with which it comes accompanied, it effects, at last, a permanent lodgement in his memory.

As the language, which it is the lot of the child to hear, is chosen, for the most part, without reference to the exigencies of his case, vastly many more words are obviously spent upon his ear, than would be necessary, were the principle on which he learns, which is induction, made the basis of a method, and were this method substituted for the chance instruction, he actually receives.

The speaking child can afford to dispense with systematic instruction. Not so with the deaf and dumb. For them all superfluous words and sentences must be retrenched. The time allotted to their instruction in alphabetic language is short; this language is not present to them at all times and in all places, as spoken words are to those who hear; and, finally, no means have yet been devised, and probably none will ever be, for exhibiting words in a visible form, with as much rapidity and as little labour, as accompany speech.

The instructor is, therefore, compelled, by the necessity of the case, to reject from his regular course, every use of language, which is not an essential part of instruction to the speaking child.

In proceeding now to the actual execution of his task, the teacher will, of course, in the outset, fasten upon the simplest form of construction possible. A dozen or twenty well selected words will be an ample vocabulary for a beginning. Much, however, depends on the choice of these words. They should belong all to the class of nouns, excepting a single one, which may best be an active verb. The nouns should be selected with special reference to their fitness to enter into combination with each other, under a variety of forms. To this vocabulary, additions will be made from day to day. Other parts of speech will be introduced, and other forms of construction; and these latter will present a series of difficulties, increasing as gradually as possible.

It will be a principle, also, to present but one new thing at a time; to divide the difficulties, and thus, according to the old saw, to conquer.

At every period of instruction, the precise extent of the circle which bounds the pupil's ideas, will be kept in view. This circle will be continually enlarged, by intrenching upon

the confines of the unknown beyond ; and not by sudden and violent leaps, far over the boundary, and into the midst of darkness.

A great desideratum with instructors, is a vocabulary, containing all the words it is considered expedient to teach, within the period allotted to instruction, arranged in that order, in which each following idea seems to be the immediate offspring of the preceding ; an order which Degerando denominates, that of the genealogy of ideas. In the absence of such a general guide, to prepare which has been found a work of great difficulty, the instructor will form his own vocabularies, with an eye constantly upon this principle.

These are all the explanations, which an article of this kind will admit, respecting the details of practice. They will suffice to show, that, in saying that deaf-mutes must acquire language, very much as ordinary children acquire it, nothing is affirmed derogatory to the pretensions of the art under consideration to a distinguished rank in the intellectual scale. Enough appears, even in this meagre account, to prove, that, in the task set before the instructor, there is ample room for the exercise of all his talent, and all his ingenuity, and all his perseverance.

The principles detailed in this paper, are those of the institution with which the writer is connected. In the reports of that institution, more especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth, they may be found more fully discussed.

ART. II. REVIEW OF WAYLAND'S MORAL SCIENCE.

By Rev. C. S. HENRY, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy,
Bristol College, Pa.

The Elements of Moral Science. By Francis Wayland, D. D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. New-York, Cooke & Co., 1835. 8vo. pp. 448.

THIS is a new work on morals for academical use which has recently made its appearance ; and we welcome it with much satisfaction. It is the result of several years' reflection and experience in teaching, on the part of its justly distinguished author ; and if it is not in every respect perfectly what we could wish, yet, in the most important respects, it supplies a want which has been extensively felt. It is, we think, substantially sound in its fundamental principles ; and being comprehensive and elementary in its plan, and adapted to the purposes of instruction, it will be gladly adopted by those who have for a long time been dissatisfied with existing text-books, particularly the work of Paley. The style is simple and perspicuous, and at the same time, manly and forcible.

In regard to the *general spirit* of the work, we will only remark, that, in our view, it is an eminent merit of the author, that he has made a system of *Christian* morals. President Wayland has not—like too many writers on these subjects—seemed to have felt it necessary to forget that he was a Christian, the moment he sat down to write as a philosopher. In the treatment of these subjects, by many of our writers, there is an almost *Pagan* disavowing of philosophy from Christianity and its distinctive truths. That writers, treating of man's nature, relations and duties, and professing to be believers in a divine revelation, should pursue their enquiries, and construct their systems, with such entire neglect, or such slight and merely formal recognition of the most important, the only authoritative, source of facts, is a method of procedure either infidel or cowardly ; at all events, unphilosophical and inconsistent. We are glad to observe that President Wayland has not followed such examples.

In regard to the *method* of the work, the following passage may be given from the author's preface :

"Being designed for the purposes of instruction, its aim is to be simple, clear, and purely didactic. I have rarely gone into extended discussion, but have contented myself with the attempt to state the moral law and the reason of it, in as few and as comprehensible terms as possible. The illustration of the principles, and the application of them to the cases of ordinary life, I have generally left to be performed by the instructor, or by the student himself. Hence, also, I have omitted every thing which relates to the history of opinions, and have made but little allusion even to the opinions themselves, of those from whom I dissent. To have acted otherwise, would have extended the undertaking greatly beyond the limits which I had assigned to myself; and it seemed to me not to belong to the design which I had in view. A work which should attempt to exhibit what was true, appeared to me more desirable than one which should point out what was exploded, discuss what was doubtful, or disprove what was false."—p. x.

It is obvious that very much is thus left to the teacher; and that the benefit to be derived from the work by the student will very greatly depend on the ability of the teacher. It would, however, be scarcely possible, within tolerable limits, to follow any other general method, in a treatise aiming to be systematic and complete, upon a subject embracing such an extensive range of topics. At the same time it appears to us exceedingly desirable in an elementary work, that some space should be given both to the illustration and application of principles, and to the history and criticism of opinions. A principle, or a position in general terms, to be fully apprehended by students, must commonly be accompanied by instances of illustration and application; and there are few teachers who would not be aided by one or two such instances, to serve as a direction to their minds in the course of illustration. Nor will the present work be found altogether wanting in this respect; on the contrary, some apt and beautiful, and some quite original, illustrations will be met with.

With respect to the history and the criticism of opinions, nothing of the former, and very little of the latter, will be found in this work; and, as the author intimates in the pas-

sage above cited, scarcely any allusion to different or opposite views occurs. On this point we would remark, that although it is very certain, that when one is in possession of the truth in a *positive* form, he has the materials for the criticism of opinions—for the judgement, negatively, of what is *not true* ; yet at the same time, it is equally certain that, on many subjects, the mind never adequately possesses the true *positively*, till it possesses it also *negatively*,—or in other words, till it actually applies it to the discrimination and appreciation of varying or opposite opinions. This may be considered as especially true in regard to the great questions that pertain to the Theory of Morals ; and in treating these subjects, the most desirable method, it seems to us, would be, from an impartial survey of the facts, and all the facts, to construct, in a *positive* form our statements of general truths ; and then, to group around them, in the briefest manner, the varying and opposite principles, just indicating their points of departure and divergence, and their final consequences. The conflicting opinions on these subjects may all be comprehended under a definite and not a large number of general systems, and, with brief references to the principal writers, would not greatly extend the limits of an elementary work ; while such brief *indicia* would be of great service to the student in his future reading and reflections, and in forming those discriminating and critical views of the relations of the positions which he takes to be true to other positions, without which he can scarcely be said to *possess* even the positive system he adopts.

We now proceed to give a brief view of the contents of this work, with such remarks as may occur in passing. It is divided into two parts ; the first treats of Theoretical Ethics, and the second of Practical Ethics. In treating of Theoretical Ethics the first chapter is taken up with the question concerning the origin of our notion of the moral quality of actions.

In discussing the question : *what is a moral action ?* the author adduces several considerations to show that there is an element in the actions of men which does not exist in the actions of brutes ; and he asks what this element is. The solution is brief, but it is sound :

“ If we should ask a child, he would tell us that the man *knows better*. This would be his mode of explaining it.

“ But what is meant by knowing better ? Did not the

brute and the man both know [in the case supposed], that the result of their action would be harm? Did not both intend that it should be harm? In what respect, then, did the one know better than the other?

"I think that a plain man or a child would answer, the man *knew* that he *ought not to do it*, and that the brute did *not know* that he *ought not to do it*; or he might say, the man knew, and the brute did not know, that it was *wrong*; but whatever terms he might employ, they would involve the same idea. I do not know that a philosopher could give a more satisfactory answer. If the question then be asked, what is a moral action? we may answer, it is the voluntary action of an intelligent agent, who is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or of distinguishing what he ought, from what he ought not to do."—p. 9.

This, in our opinion, is the correct view, and it goes to the bottom of the subject; we understand of course that the will and intelligence of the agent are implied in every particular action of which the quality of *moral* is predicated. The ideas of *right* and *wrong*, and of *ought to do*, and *ought not to do*, are immediately and irresistibly connected together. Whenever an action is contemplated as *wrong*, then, inseparable from it, in every moral being, is there a conviction that he *ought not to do it*,—a conviction which is irresistible, immediate and independent of any other consideration whatsoever. Such is our moral constitution.

After showing that the moral quality of acting resides wholly in the intention of the agent, the author next goes on to discuss the question concerning the *origin* of our notion of the moral quality of actions. He here takes up several theories that have been maintained on this point, such as—that the notion of right and wrong is a *modification* of some other idea—that it is derived from an exercise of the *judgement* (in the logical sense of the word)—that it is derived from *association*—and finally, that it is derived from the idea of the *greatest amount of happiness*. These several theories are briefly, but very thoroughly, discussed and refuted. We have not room to exhibit the course of argument on all these topics. We will only briefly notice the last, the theory of the "Greatest Happiness principle," so called, which has within a few years been the subject of a good deal of discussion and controversy.

The author states the question thus: "It is said that our

notion of right and wrong is derived from our idea of the productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness, or in other words, that an action is right or wrong because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness." He then goes on to remark that it must of course be taken for granted in this position, that the ideas of right and wrong, and of productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness, are two distinct ideas; else it would be absurd to speak of the one as derived from the other: and that the word *because*, in this position must be used to signify either, 1st, that the idea of the greatest happiness is the stated *antecedent* to the idea of right or moral obligation,—or 2d, that the idea of moral obligation is an idea comprehended under, and referred to, a *more general* idea, namely, that of the productiveness of the greatest happiness. In the former of these senses, the question is one purely of fact, and the appeal to facts easily refutes the position. So far is the position from being true, that the author might have shown that it is more correct to say, that the idea of the greatest amount of happiness is rather the *consequent* of the idea of conformity to moral obligation.

Taking the question in the other sense, the author reduces the position to the assertion, that the "two ideas are in their nature" merely "co-extensive," that is, "that whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, is right; and that whatever is right, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness." Of course it would be a difficult thing to show which idea is to be referred to the other. The only conceivable meaning, then, he adds, which can be put upon the assertion is this: "that we would not be under moral obligation to perform any action, unless it were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, thus making moral obligation rest upon this other idea, that of the greatest amount of happiness." This position, the author asserts, is not self-evident, and even if it be granted that the two ideas are coincident, that is, that we are always under obligation to do whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness: and that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness,—it would by no means establish the above position. But, he affirms it is impossible for us absolutely to *know*, that the two ideas are coincident. "The government of God *could not be more perfectly right* than it is; but whether it could have involv-

ed less misery, or have produced more happiness, I do not know that we have the means of ascertaining."

We will remark here, that the whole plausibility of the "greatest happiness principle," seems to us to be owing to a confusion of ideas. If it was merely asserted that right doing is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, and that those actions which are productive of the greatest amount of happiness are, on that account, *not made* or *constituted* right, but *proved* or *indicated* to us, to be right,—we do not know that, for ourselves, we should feel any particular interest to refute these assertions; for there would be implied what we contend for as fundamental,—namely, that the idea of right is, in its essence, independent of its consequences, that is, the greatest happiness;—and moreover, these assertions would not deny what we contend for as equally a fundamental principle, that the idea of *obligation* reposes ultimately and solely upon the idea of *right*. Still, we should remark, that both the theory of "general consequences" and of "the greatest amount of happiness," considered merely as the *criterion* or *guide* to us, in the performance of duty, is nothing but *ideal*, at least, from the limitation of our faculties, is any thing but universal and certain in its *practical* application. The *will of God* affords us a rule which is liable to no such objection.

Without going fully into the course of argument pursued by the author on this topic, we will give the reader his concluding remarks :

"For these reasons, I think it is not proved, that an action is right, because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. It may be so, or it may not, but we ought not to believe it to be so without proof; and it may even be doubted whether we are in possession of the media of proof, that is, whether it is a question fairly within the reach of the human faculties; and so far as we can learn from the Scriptures, I think their testimony is decidedly against the supposition. To me, the Scriptures seem explicitly to declare, that the *will of God alone*, is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures; and that this *will*, of itself, precludes every other enquiry."—p. 25.

We give also his general conclusions on the whole subject under discussion :

"It seems to me, therefore, that these explanations of the origin of our moral sentiments, are unsatisfactory. I be-

lieve the idea of a moral quality in actions to be ultimate, to arise under such circumstances as have been appointed by our Creator, and that we can assign for it no other reason, than that such is his will concerning us.

"If this be true, our only business will be to state the circumstances under which our moral notions arise. * * *
* * * The view which I take of this subject is briefly as follows :

"1. It is manifest to every one, that we all stand in various and dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created and uncreated, with which we are acquainted. Among our relations to created beings, are those of man to man, or that of substantial equality, of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, of husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen and citizen, and citizen and magistrate, and a thousand others.

"2. Now, it seems to me, that as soon as a human being comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of moral obligation, connected, by our Creator, with the very conception of this relation. And the fact is the same whether he be one of the parties, or not. The nature of this feeling is, that the one *ought* to exercise certain dispositions towards the others to whom he is thus related ; and to act towards them in a manner corresponding with those dispositions.

"3. The nature of these dispositions varies of course with the relations. Thus, those of a parent to a child are different from those of a child to a parent ; &c. * * But different as these may be from each other, they are all pervaded by the same generic feeling, that of *moral obligation*, that is, *we feel that we ought* to be thus or thus disposed, and to act in this or that manner.

"4. This, I suppose to be our constitution, in regard to created beings, and such, do I suppose, would be our feeling irrespective of any notion of the Deity. That is, immediately upon the conception of these and such like relations, there would immediately arise this feeling of moral obligation, to act towards those sustaining these relations in a particular manner.

"5. But there is an uncreated Being to whom we stand in relations infinitely more intimate, and inconceivably more solemn, than any of those of which we have spoken. It is

that infinite Being, *who stands to us* in the relation of Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Lawgiver, and Judge; and *to whom we stand* in the relation of dependent, helpless, ignorant, and sinful *creatures*. *How much* this relation involves, we cannot possibly know; but so much as this we know, that it involves obligations greater than our intellect can estimate. We cannot contemplate it, without feeling, that from the very fact of its existence, we are under obligations to entertain the disposition of filial love and obedience towards God, and to act precisely as he shall condescend to direct. And this obligation arises simply from the fact of the relation existing between the parties, and irrespective of any other consideration; and if it be not felt when the relations are perceived, it can never be produced by any view of the consequences which would arise to the universe from exercising it.

"6. This relation, and its consequent obligation, *involves, comprehends, and transcends* every other. Hence it places obligation to man on a new foundation. For if we be ourselves thus under illimitable obligations to God, and if, by virtue of the relation which he sustains to the creation, he is the Protector, Ruler and Possessor of all, we are under obligations to obey him in every thing. And as every other being is also his creature, we are bound to treat that creature as he shall direct. Hence we are bound to perform the obligation under which we stand to his creatures, not merely on account of our relations to them, but also on account of the relations in which we and they stand to God.

"And hence, in general, our feeling of moral obligation is a peculiar and instinctive impulse, arising at once by the principles of our constitution, as soon as the relations are perceived in which we stand to the beings, created and uncreated, with whom we are connected."—p. 26—28.

With these views, in the main, we concur, especially with the general conclusion stated in the last paragraph. We believe that the idea of *obligation* reposes on that of *right*, and that this latter is an ultimate idea, arising, by the necessity of our constitution, immediately on the perception of our relations. For this reason, we cannot agree with the assertion made in the first of these passages, "that the *will of God alone* is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience," if the author means thereby to lay it down as a uni-

versal truth, that the will of God is the *last ground* of obligation. We are not certain that such is the meaning; it would certainly contradict some of the most fundamental positions of the work, and which, in our opinion, constitute its distinctive and superiour merit. To us it seems obvious, that the feeling of obligation to obey any particular command of God, supposes such a perception of our relations to him and of his character, as to make it in our view right to obey, and wrong to disobey his commands, and that generally, and antecedently to any particular command. "Right," says the late Dr. Adams of Oxford, "implies *duty* in its idea. To perceive an action to be right, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever; and this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of obligation, that which commands the approbation and binds the conscience of every rational human being."*

We believe this general position to be comprehensive of every particular case of obligation; yet for the sake of elucidation we will here make a distinction between that general class of divine injunctions termed *positive*, and those commonly denominated *moral*. In regard to the former class—including actions which we should not be under obligation to perform, if it were not for the express divine command, as for instance the observance of the Sabbath,—we may indeed say that the command *constitutes* the obligation to perform *the particular action*; but it does so only because of the antecedent and *general* obligation to obey the divine commands. In other words, the obligation to do the particular thing enjoined, resolves itself into a more general obligation, resting upon the idea of right, and springing from the perception of our relations to the Divine Being. In such cases, the obligation to perform any particular action enjoined, implies that the character of God, and our relations to him, are such as give him authority to command, and make it our duty to obey. Hence it is not so correct to say that his command *makes* a thing right, as that it *is* right to obey his commands; his command would not put us under obligation to perform any particular action, if we were not antecedently under the general obligation of obedience to him; and if we should separate the ideas of infinite wisdom

* Sermons on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue.

and rectitude from our conception of the character of God, we cannot conceive it possible that the obligation should be felt in regard to the commands of a mere Omnipotent Sovereign. The consideration that it is our *interest* to obey such a being, is certainly not the sentiment of *moral* obligation; it may be *prudent* so to do, but it is not *virtue* nor *piety*. Nor can the sentiment of gratitude to our Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor, be conceived as the basis of an unlimited obligation to obey his commands, apart from the consideration of his infinite rectitude. In regard to our fellow-beings, we can easily suppose commands imposed upon us by a benefactor, which the most unbounded gratitude would never beget in us the feeling of obligation to obey; and the same would be equally true in regard to God, did not our conception of his character involve, beside the relation of Creator and Benefactor, the idea also of his infinite rectitude,—a conception which precludes the supposition of his ever commanding any thing that is wrong. God being such as we conceive him to be—infinite in wisdom to comprehend, and in rectitude to command, only what is right, we necessarily feel that it is right to obey and wrong to disobey his commands. We necessarily suppose that all God's commands are grounded in rectitude; and this conviction is a necessary condition of that feeling of obligation to submit to the *authority* of God, which is grounded on a perception of the relations in which we stand to him—a perception which necessarily begets in us the conviction that it is *right* that we should submit to the authority of such a Being. Hence it is, that, in regard to certain actions, we may say, the command of God *constitutes* the obligation to do those *particular actions*, because without such an express command we should not be under obligation to do them; though at the same time, we necessarily presume that there is a reason for the command—that it is grounded in rectitude—whether from the limitation of our faculties, we are able to discern it, or not. And in such a case, the reason why we are under obligation to obey a particular command of God, resolves itself into the more general principle, that *on the ground* of God's character and of our relations to him, it is *right* that we should obey his commands.

But in regard to another class of actions, included in the *moral* precepts, as they are sometimes termed in distinction from the positive,—it is impossible to conceive that the com-

mand of God *constitutes* the obligation to perform those actions, even in the sense above stated ; for that would imply that we should not be under obligation to perform them, if they were not expressly commanded, and would generally make the divine command the condition and limit of duty. This, however, would contradict the assertion of St. Paul, who says of the Gentiles "not having a formal law, that they are a law unto themselves." That the command of God does not *constitute* the obligation to perform certain actions, for instance, towards our fellow men, must be considered as expressly admitted in the statement of President Wayland, that the feeling of obligation arises "immediately on the conception of our relations," and "would be our feeling irrespective of any notion of the Deity." Nothing indeed can be more certain, than that our obligation to perform certain actions towards our fellow beings, would be felt, even if they had never been commanded by God. The sentiment of obligation is grounded upon the idea of right, and nothing is necessary to beget it, in rational and free beings, but a perception of the relations in which they stand. When, therefore, the author says that our relation to God "places our obligation to man upon a *new foundation*," we confess we find it difficult to attach any meaning to the assertion, that would not make him inconsistent with himself. To say that our relation to God *removes* the foundation of obligation furnished by our relations to our fellow-men, and *substitutes another*—to wit, the command of God as the *constituting* cause of obligation—in its place, appears contradictory and entirely untrue ; and to say that our relation to God so *modifies* our relations to man, as that his command then comes to *constitute* the obligation to perform certain actions towards our fellow-men, an obligation which by the author's own admission, we feel irrespective of the Deity, appears equally contradictory and untrue. That our relations to the Deity are such that the command of God to us to perform our duties to our fellow-men, should come in to *quicken* or strengthen the original feeling of obligation, we are certainly not disposed to question : and if this be what the author means, we should only remark that the language is unfortunately chosen. So likewise in regard to our moral obligations to the Deity himself, we cannot conceive that the command of God *constitutes* the obligation. We cannot conceive that our obligation to "love the Lord our God with

all our heart" is based upon his command to do so; for then it would follow, that if we had received no such command we should be under no such obligation; and those to whom the command has not been given, are free of the obligation; whereas contrary to this we cannot but feel that we should be under the obligation of supreme love and reverence to God, even if we had not been thus commanded, and that all mankind are under the same obligation, whether they have received the command or not.

It may, perhaps, be said, that by the "will of God" as the constituent of right, and the ground of obligation, it is not necessary to mean exclusively the *express* commands of God, but that the *necessary conviction* of obligation of which we have spoken, arising immediately upon the view of our relations, is also to be considered as the will of God, or expressive of his will. To this it is sufficient to reply, that although these necessary dictations of our moral nature, arising in view of our relations, are unquestionably *conformable to the will of God*, and in a certain and very high sense, we regard them as the *voice of God in us*, yet they are by no means originally conceived of by us as *commands* of God. Analysis never gives us the formula: *it is the will or command of God*, as expressing the ground of the consciousness of obligation felt in view of our moral relations; but always this: *it is right*, or *it is wrong*, to do thus or thus, and therefore *we ought*, or *ought not*, to do it. The instinctive utterance of conscience is not: *God commands you to do thus, or thus*,—but: *do thus, or thus*.

In fine, we cannot admit the general position, that the will of God is the ultimate ground of obligation. The command of God is indeed the *maxim* (maxima regula), the highest *rule* of duty; but not the *ground* of obligation. It is an *authoritative* rule, we allow; for God is the eternal representative and administrator of absolute rectitude and justice. Using the term, Will of God, to denote his moral nature, or the principle of the divine activity, we might indeed say, that his will is forever ONE WITH eternal rectitude, truth, and goodness. But this is a point upon which we do not wish here to enter. We take the term in its more common signification of *command*; and our general position is, that God's command, does not *make* a thing right; he commands it because it *is* right. His command is an infallible criterion of rectitude, though not

the principle of obligation. Nor is this a trivial distinction in speculation. To confound the *criterion* of duty with its *ground*, is to do away the essential difference between right and wrong. But so far is the mere enactment of God from being the *constituting* cause of the difference of actions, and the ground of obligation, that even in taking it as the *exponent* or *rule* of duty, we are compelled to presume a perfection of moral rectitude in God, which determines him to the enactment of that only which is right; and consequently there is such a thing as right and wrong *antecedently* to the consideration of the command of God,—the essentially and immutably right. Of course, so far is the command of God from *constituting* a thing right, and being the ground of our obligation, that we are compelled, by our moral constitution, to suppose the antecedent idea of right to be the *very ground* of the command. Hence, in our view, the assertion, that “the will of God precludes every other enquiry,” is universally true only in regard to the *rule* of duty, meaning thereby, that when we have ascertained the will of God in any case, we are infallibly certain of what is *right*, and consequently of our *duty*.

We have dwelt thus long upon this point, not because we suppose the general views we maintain are contrary to those of the author of this work, nor because we think he intended distinctly to advance the theory we have endeavoured to controvert; else he might have spared himself the trouble of writing the first or theoretical portion of his book; certainly he would not have expressed himself in the manner he has done on many fundamental points. Still we have thought it necessary to express our views in regard to the passages that have been the subject of animadversion, because we think them calculated to mislead the minds of some, especially if taken up without due consideration of the general tenour of the author's positions.

Next follows an admirable chapter on conscience,—on the fact of it, the mode of its decision, its supreme authority, and the general laws to which its action is subject. We do not know that so complete, lucid, and satisfactory a discussion of this subject, is any where to be found within the same compass. In regard to the question, whether conscience be a distinct and special *faculty*, after showing that the same general grounds exist for regarding it as such, which deter-

mine us to assign particular modes of mental action to special faculties, in other cases, the author remarks :

" But after all, this question is, to the moral philosopher, of but comparatively little importance. All that is necessary to his investigations, is, that it be admitted that there is a moral quality in actions, and that men are so constituted as to perceive it, and to be susceptible of certain affections in consequence of that perception. Whether these facts are accounted for, on the supposition of the existence of a single faculty, or of a combination of faculties, will not affect the question of moral obligation. All that is necessary to the prosecution of the science, is, that it be admitted that there is such a quality in actions, and that man is endowed with a constitution capable of bringing him into relation to it." p. 34.

He then takes up the most common objections to the supposition of the existence of such a faculty, and briefly, but sufficiently exposes them, by showing that moral convictions are universal ; that the differences of opinion and practice which have been so often brought forward to disprove it, never deny the distinction between right and wrong, but differ only in the application of the idea ; that no nation or individuals can be found to justify what is wrong, as wrong ; that the utmost reach of the objections from this quarter, only goes to prove an *imperfectly developed* conscience ; and that the same course of objection would prove mankind destitute of taste or understanding, because these faculties are less perfectly unfolded in a savage state. The last objection, he notices, is thus stated :

" It has been objected, that if we suppose this faculty to exist, it is after all useless, for if a man please to violate it, and to suffer the pain, then this is the end of the question, and, as Dr. Paley says, 'the moral instinct of man has nothing more to offer.' To this it may be answered : the objection proceeds upon a mistake respecting the function of conscience. Its use is to teach us to discern our moral obligations, and to impel us towards the corresponding action. It is not pretended, by believers in a moral sense, that man may not, after all, do as he chooses. All that is contended for is, that he is constituted with such a faculty, and that the possession of it is necessary to his moral accountability. It is in his power to obey it, or to disobey it, just as he pleases. The fact that a man obeys or disobeys conscience, no more

proves that it does not exist, than the fact, that he sometimes does, and sometimes does not, obey passion, proves that he is destitute of passion."—p. 38.

We are no advocates for the phrase "*moral sense*," indeed we are averse to the employment of such a term; but that there is that in the moral constitution of man, apart from all the influences of custom, education, &c., which makes the distinction between right and wrong, and the consequent feeling of obligation, to be a *universal* and *necessary* fact of consciousness, we strenuously maintain; and we think the passage above quoted an abundant reply to the shallow sophism of Paley. Indeed we find it difficult to conceive how the utterer of such an objection could have had any notion of the distinction between a moral and a mechanical agent. A law for rational and free beings, a moral law, can, of necessity, be nothing but an obligation; the command of conscience can be nothing but a categorical imperative, which man may violate or obey as he chooses; else, necessarily, all distinction between moral and physical law vanishes, and all responsibility is destroyed. We will here give a passage from Cousin which bears on this point, and in our view is very justly and happily expressed: "The conception of right and wrong instantly gives that of Duty, of Law; and as the one is universal and necessary, the other is equally so. Now a law necessary for the reason in respect to action, is, for a rational but free agent, a simple obligation, but it is an absolute obligation. Duty obliges us, though without forcing us; but at the same time, if we can violate it, we cannot deny it. Accordingly, even when the feebleness of the liberty and the ascendancy of passion, makes the action false to the law, yet reason, independent, asserts the violated law as an inviolable law, and imposes it still with supreme authority upon the wayward conduct as its imprescriptible rule. The sentiment of reason and of moral obligation which reason reveals and imposes, is consciousness in its highest degree and office; it is moral consciousness, or Conscience properly so called."*

After remarking upon one office of conscience, namely, to discern the moral quality of actions, President Wayland goes on to speak of its *impulsive* power. We give the passage, as it contains some things which are equally fundamental and important.

* Elements of Psychology, p. 113.

"Besides this discriminating power, I think we may readily observe a distinct *impulse* to do that which we conceive to be right, and to leave undone that which we conceive to be wrong. This impulse we express by the words *ought*, and *ought not*. Thus, we say it is *right* to tell the truth; and I *ought* to tell it. It is *wrong* to tell a lie; and I *ought not* to tell it. Ought, and ought not, seem to convey the *abstract* idea of right and wrong, together with the other notion of impulsion to do, or not to do, a particular action. Thus, we use it always to DESIGNATE A MOTIVE TO ACTION, as we do passion, or self-love, or any other motive power. If we are asked why we performed any action, we reply, we acted thus, because it *gratified* our desires, or because it *was for our interest* upon the whole, or, because we felt that *we ought to act* thus. Either of them is considered sufficient to account for the fact; that is, either of them explains the motive or impulse, in obedience to which we acted."—p. 39.

The author goes on in the next section to consider the Supremacy of Conscience, as the most authoritative impulse of our nature. This he argues from the very conception which men form of this faculty,—from our feelings when comparing the actions of men with those of brutes,—and from the necessity of such a supremacy, in order to secure the object for which man was created. In our view the demonstration of this point requires but a short argument. It is a fact of universal consciousness, that the command of conscience is never of the nature of a *hypothetical* imperative, that is; *act right for the sake of something else, in order to this or that end*, but always of an *absolute* imperative, that is: *act right, for the sake of right*, or rather *will right for the sake of right*, for morality has to do with the will or intention. We say the analysis of the command of conscience gives this as the universal fact of consciousness; and certainly it is impossible to conceive that any person who has a proper notion of man as a moral being, should intelligently subordinate this impulse to any of the other active principles of human nature. If the highest end of man's existence be not a *moral end*, he is made for no end, worthy of our consideration; and surely that principle of our nature which directs us with absolute authority to the fulfillment of that end, must be regarded as the highest and most imperative principle of action.

The third chapter is taken up with the discussion of the nature of Virtue. We stand in certain relations, apprehended by our intellectual faculties; and by virtue of our moral constitution, we become aware of certain conduct, corresponding to those relations, as *right* and *obligatory*. In a *perfectly constituted* being, President Wayland says, the intellect, under its proper conditions, would necessarily and correctly *discern* those relations, and the conscience would *indicate* and *command all the duties* growing out of them. "Hence," he adds, "in a being perfectly constituted, it is manifest, that virtue, the doing of right, or obedience to conscience, would mean the same thing." He then proceeds, however, to consider the subject in relation to a being whose moral constitution has become disordered. This disorder may be of two kinds—in not correctly perceiving his relations, or in not feeling all the corresponding obligation. In such a case, his responsibility will *not be limited* by the extent and accuracy of his knowledge of his relations, and of the corresponding feeling of obligation, *apart from all other considerations*, but will depend on the *means he had* for knowing his relations, and on the *cause* of the imperfection of his sentiment of obligation, that is, whether it was the result of his own conduct, or not.

We confess, however, we do not see any material ground for insisting particularly on such a distinction between virtue in perfectly constituted, and virtue in imperfect beings. For it is obvious, that virtue is essentially the same in both cases; the conditions of responsibility stated in regard to the latter case, are necessarily presupposed to exist in the former case. The essential principle of virtue, in our view, may be stated as a ruling purpose, intention, or will, to obey the dictates of conscience, or to do whatever we know to be right, and that because it is right.

The subject of the next chapter is Human Happiness. Our limits permit us to state only the general conclusion, which is, that human happiness consists in the exercise of our powers, and in the gratification of our desires, within the limits assigned to them by our Creator.

The fifth chapter treats of self-love. It is the nature of passion to seize upon the present gratification without regard to the consequences. Hence man needs another active principle to direct him in such a manner as to promote his happiness on the whole. "When we act from

simple respect to present gratification," says President Wayland, "we act from passion. When we act from a respect to our whole individual happiness, without regard to the present, only as it is a part of the whole, and without any regard to the happiness of others, only as it will contribute to our own, we are then said to act from self-love."

The rank of self-love, as an active principle, is superiour to that of passion, inasmuch as our happiness, on the whole, is of more consequence than the happiness of any particular portion of our existence; it is inferiour to that of conscience, by as much as moral beings, capable of virtue, are superiour to sensitive beings, capable merely of happiness. And if virtue should be degraded, in our judgement, into a mere instrument of happiness, the superiority of conscience over the impulses of self-love and passion is still apparent.

"Thus," says the author, "suppose I deliberate whether I shall spend a sum of money in self-gratification, or else in an act of benevolence, which is plainly my duty. If I pursue the former course, it is very uncertain whether I actually secure the gratification which I seek, while I lose the pleasure of rectitude, and am saddened by the pains of remorse. The pleasure of gratification is soon over, but the pain of guilt is enduring. Or, again, I may perform the act of benevolence from love of applause, or some modification of self-love. I here obtain with more certainty the reputation which I seek, but I loose the reward of conscious virtue. Or, thirdly, if I do the act without any regard to my own happiness, and simply from love to God and man, I obtain all the rewards which attach to the action by the constitution under which I am placed, and also enjoy the higher rewards of conscious rectitude.

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"If these remarks be true, we see,

"1. That when conscience speaks, the voice of self-love must be silent. That is to say, we have no right to seek our own happiness, in any manner at variance with moral obligation. Nevertheless, from several courses of action, either of which is innocent, we are at liberty to choose that which will most conduce to our own happiness. In such a case the consideration of our happiness is justly ultimate.

"2. The preceding chapter has shown us that man was designed to be made happy by the gratification of his desires.

The present chapter teaches us, that, when the gratification of desire is at variance with virtue, a greater happiness is to be obtained by self-denial. Or, in other words, our *greatest* happiness is to be obtained, not by the various modes of self-gratification, but by simply seeking the good of others, and in doing the will of God, from the heart.

"3. And, hence, we may arrive at the general principle, that every impulse or desire is supreme *within its own assigned limits* ; but that, when a lower comes into competition with a higher impulsion, the inferior accomplishes its own object, by being wholly subject to the superior. Thus, desire, or the love of present gratification, may, within its own limits, be indulged. But, when this present gratification comes into competition with self-love, even passion accomplishes its own object best, that is, a man actually attains to more enjoyment, by submitting present desire implicitly to self-love. And so self-love is ultimate within its proper limits ; but when it comes into competition with conscience, it actually accomplishes its own object best, by being entirely subject to that which the Creator has constituted its superior.

"4. The difference between self-love, as an innocent part of our constitution, and selfishness, a vicious disposition, may be easily seen. Self-love properly directs our choice of objects, where both are equally innocent. Selfishness, is the same disposition to promote our own happiness, upon the whole, but it disposes us to seek it, in objects over which we have no just controul ; that is, which are not innocent, and which we could not enjoy, without violating the rights of our neighbour."

We rejoice at the ground here taken by the author. After the thorough confutation of the grounding principle of the *Selfish System* by Bishop Butler, and the various and convincing lights, in which it has been placed by subsequent writers, it is astonishing that any modification of it should continue to be maintained. Yet we have heard it laid down in express terms from the chair of theology, that "moral obligation is the necessity, which a moral agent feels, of performing certain actions as the indispensable means of his highest happiness;" and that "*a regard to happiness is the only influence that can move a moral being to action.*" The plausibility of this fallacious doctrine unquestionably lies chiefly in the confusion of the principle with its consequence.

Happiness is, indeed, in a certain sense, the invariable concomitant or consequent of virtuous action ; but it is not its object. That the connection between virtue and our highest happiness, discerned by the enlightened reason, may be a subsidiary, quickening influence, we are not disposed to question ; but we deny that it is the ultimate and sole motive of any action, that can properly be denominated virtuous.

The doctrine in question is at variance with the universal consciousness of human nature. In the contemplation of our relations, certain actions are, by the necessity of our constitution, presented to the mind as *right* and *obligatory*. This sentiment of obligation is immediate, springing directly from the contemplation of the actions as right, and is independent of any other consideration whatever. It is a sentiment that is simple, and essentially distinct from any other impulse of our nature. It is a disinterested sentiment, just as pity, love of the beautiful, and of the true, are disinterested sentiments. The sentiment of obligation is never hypothetical, that is, that we ought to do right for the sake of some other object ; such a feeling is not found at all in the analysis of conscience ; it is authoritative and absolute, having for its direct and sole object the action contemplated as right. It is also an *active* principle of our nature, that is, the feeling of obligation to an action, simply as right, is a sufficient reason for the doing of the action ; just as self-love is an active principle, and sufficient to account for actions within its sphere. We maintain that the constitution of our nature is such, that the conviction of *duty*, the feeling of obligation to do any action considered simply as right, is felt by us to be a *motive*. That a thing is right, is recognized by us as a reason for doing it, that it is wrong, as a reason for not doing it, apart from any other consideration. Such is the impulse of our nature—the command of conscience. We may indeed refuse to yield to it, just as we may refuse to yield to other impulses of our nature ; but that does not prove it not to be an active principle, and intended to be an effectual motive. On the contrary, just in proportion as the simple consideration of *duty*, actually prevails with any other person as the motive of his actions, is our estimation of his virtue. If we were to tell a man, he should not do a given action because it is wrong, and he were to reply, that this was *no motive* to him, we should feel either that he was mistaken,

or that he had lost his reason, or that he was a moral monster, who wilfully denied his own nature. So also, in proportion as the simple consideration of an action as wrong, is *insufficient* of itself to deter a man from doing it, and requires other motives, addressed to his self-love, to render it effectual, we feel that his character is *defective* in the essential principle of virtue. That such is the fact, any person may be satisfied who will carefully observe his own consciousness; and it is abundantly illustrated in the current language, in which the criticism of men's motives and characters is expressed in common life.

We have said that the chief plausibility of the doctrine in question arises from confounding the motive, or final object of action, in the fulfillment of duty, with the happiness or satisfaction connected with it. Because the performance of duty is understood to secure our highest happiness, or is accompanied by a certain present inward satisfaction, it is therefore urged, that this happiness or this present satisfaction, either or both, is the final object of the mind, the ultimate motive of the action; and the power of the simple feeling of duty to be itself the motive, is denied. But there is a very clear distinction between the *object* of any of the special impulses of our nature, and the gratification, which, by the constitution of things, is connected with obeying them. This pregnant distinction was first observed and clearly stated by that truly great and original thinker, Bishop Butler, and since his time has been amply illustrated by different writers, among the more recent of whom the reader is referred to the work of Dr. Chalmers, published among the Bridgewater Treatises, and to the view of Ethical Philosophy, by the late Sir James Mackintosh; in these works some valuable contributions to the illustration of this subject may be found. This distinction strikes at the root of the selfish system. This system declares that man's ultimate object, in the performance of his duty, is his own individual advantage. Now in respect to all the special impulses or affections of man's nature, and more particularly in respect to a virtuous affection, it may be shown, that the object is something apart from himself. Chalmers, whose course of thought we now follow, illustrates this by the instance of compassion. Here the feelings are drawn away *from* himself, *to* the sufferer. He is occupied with the object of his affection, not with the pleasure of its indulgence. Yet this

does not prevent the pleasure from being felt, the more felt, indeed, the less it has been pursued for its own sake.

What is thus true in regard to virtuous affection, is also true in regard to many other special impulses of our nature, even of such as have been ranked under the selfish. In point of fact, the only interested affection of our nature is self-love, in the strict sense of the words, that is, an affection whose proper and sole object is the good of self. This is a calm, reflecting, and general regard to our own happiness. But the special impulses of our nature, our appetites and passions, are distinct from self-love; the good of self, or happiness, is not the discriminative object of the affection; but each has its own peculiar object, in which it terminates, without regard even to the pleasure which accompanies the attainment of its object.

On this topic Sir James Mackintosh has the following remarks:

"In contending that the benevolent affections are disinterested, no more is claimed for them, than must be granted to mere animal appetites and to malevolent passions. Each of these principles alike seeks its own object, for the sake simply of obtaining it. Pleasure is the result of the attainment, but no separate part of the aim of the agent. The desire that another person may be gratified, seeks that outward object alone, according to the general course of human desire. Resentment is as disinterested, as gratitude or pity, but not more so. Hunger or thirst may be, as much as the purest benevolence, at variance with self-love. It is absurd to say with some, that the pleasure of benevolence is selfish, because it is felt by self. Understanding and reasoning are acts of self, for no man can think by proxy; but no man can call them *selfish*. Why? Evidently because they do not *regard* self. Precisely the same reason applies to benevolence. Such an argument is a gross confusion of self, as it is a *subject* of feeling or thought, with self considered as the *object* of either. It is no more just to refer the private appetites to self-love, because they commonly promote happiness, than it would be to refer them to self-hatred in those frequent cases where their gratification obstructs it." We cannot forbear adducing also in this place, the following passage from the work of Chalmers, before referred to:

"We have already said that the distinction, so well established by Butler, between the object of our affection, and

its accompanying, nay, inseparable pleasure, was the most effectual argument that could be brought to bear against the selfish system of morals. The virtuous affection that is in a man's breast simply leads him to do what he ought; and in that object he rests and terminates. Like every other affection, there must be a pleasure conjoined with the prosecution of it, and at last a full and final gratification in the attainment of its object. But the object must be distinct from the pleasure, which itself is founded on a prior suitability between the mind and its object. When a man is actuated by a virtuous desire, it is the virtue itself, that he is seeking, and not the gratification that is in it. His single object is, to be or to do rightly—though, the more intent he is upon this object, the greater will, the greater must be, his satisfaction. Nevertheless, it is not the satisfaction which he is seeking: it is the object which yields the satisfaction—the object too for its own sake, and not for the sake of its accompanying or its resulting enjoyment. Nay, the more strongly and therefore the more exclusively set upon virtue for its own sake, the less will he think of its enjoyment, and yet the greater will his actual enjoyment be.”*

After these citations it may be needless to pursue this topic further; but there is one argument, that we are not aware has any where been brought forward, which we cannot forbear briefly to suggest. Its object is to convict the selfish system of a gross paralogism. We take it for granted, that those who maintain the ultimate motive to the performance of duty, to be the agent's own advantage or happiness, would readily reject the *grosser* motives of self-seeking, such as doing the act of duty for the sake of credit, pecuniary advantage, &c. We take it for granted, that they refer to the inward and inherent pleasure or satisfaction, which, by the constitution of our nature, is connected with virtue. We know this is the refined form of the selfish system, held by those whom we have now especially in view. This pleasure, they affirm to be the ultimate motive to virtuous action. Now we maintain that on this ground, the impossibility of virtue is demonstrable. For how can the motive operate, till it exists? How can this inward pleasure be a motive, till it is felt? And how can it be felt, till a virtuous action is done? But how can the first virtuous

* Dr. Chalmers's *Bridgewater Treatise, Adaptation of Nature to the Constitution of Man.*—p. 78.

action be done, before the pleasure of virtue is known, so as to furnish the only available motive? By the selfish theory then—its best and most refined form—a sentiment is constructed as the only possible motive to virtuous action, which sentiment can never be felt or known, except in the doing of duty. In order to give existence to this sentiment, an act of duty must be performed, *without the presence* of the *only* motive, which, by the hypothesis, can render obedience to duty possible. What is this theory but a vicious and suicidal paralogism? The first act of virtue, and by consequence all others, is impossible; unless it be said—as indeed we have understood it to be affirmed, when we have pressed this objection—that the *first* act of duty is done by some *fortunate blunder* of the agent, *without any motive*, and thus the inward pleasure might be discovered, which was thenceforward to constitute the ultimate and availing motive to virtue! This indeed would be destructive to the universality of the theory; but it is the only way, imperfect as it is, to get out of the difficulty.

Contrary to all this, while we believe that inward happiness is the invariable accompaniment and consequence of duty performed, yet it is felt only when duty is done simply as duty,—when the regard fixes upon that as its ultimate object. In this sense it is true of happiness, what the Prophet spake of another subject: “I am found of those that sought me not; I am made manifest unto those that asked not after me.” Happiness is like the *ignis fatuus*—the fireball of the swamp; when we pursue it directly, the breath of our pursuit wafts it from our grasp; but when we follow Duty alone, Happiness will be found at our side, and springing up in our hearts. Happiness is indeed united to Duty, only the duty must be first done as duty—the feeling of obligation must be the motive. The purest happiness is found in the most self-forgetting performance of duty.

We have perhaps dwelt too long upon this subject; but we cannot but regard it as of fundamental importance. The selfish system—in every modification of it—we cannot but regard as utterly at variance with the facts of universal consciousness, and, in its logical consequences, entirely subversive of moral distinctions—making virtue a *mere means* to an end, without intrinsic excellence, destroying all difference, in kind, between Virtue and Prudence, and between Remorse and Regret. In its practical consequences, this sys-

tem, taught in the school of theology, and made the basis of a vicious theory of conversion in popular instruction from the pulpit, has, in this country and in these times, borne the most pernicious fruits. If it be not indeed the *spurious pharisee*, the fundamental and comprehending LIE, yet it is one of the chief and most pestilent of that nest of errors whose influence, in the form of false and fanatical doctrines, fanatical feelings and measures, has, we cannot doubt, occasioned many spurious conversions, dishonoured the venerable name of religion itself, and we fear will appear at a future day to have been ruinous to the souls of multitudes. It is a system which justifies a style of preaching consisting exclusively in appeals to the imagination and the sensibilities, with entire disregard of the conscience properly speaking. It is a system which legitimates conversions, (or the "declaration of a resolution to serve God" which is taken for conversion,) where there is not the least evidence of any proper feeling of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin," nor of the implantation of any new spring of moral action, nor indeed of any thing save a deeper conviction, (often however as transient in its practical influence as it is spurious in its kind,) that it is a man's *interest*, on the score of prudence, to serve the Lord his God—a conviction, too, that is as perfectly compatible with a *heartly regret* that a man *must* give up sin, or be damned, as the trembling faith of the devils (James 2 : 19,) is consistent with entire hostility to the God before whom they tremble.

The next four chapters are taken up with the discussion of the imperfection of conscience—of Natural Religion, as an additional source of light and motives—and its insufficiency without a still further influence. Then comes the consideration of a positive revelation, or of the Holy Scriptures, as the rule of duty. This forms the transition to the second book, which treats of Practical Ethics. In the opening of this part of the work, the author has the following remarks:

"In the preceding pages it has been my design to illustrate the moral constitution of man, and to point out the sources from which that truth emanates, which is addressed to his moral constitution. My design, in the present book, is to classify and explain some of the principal moral laws under which God has placed us, in our present state. We

shall derive these laws from natural, or from revealed religion, or from both, as may be most convenient for our purpose.

"The Scriptures declare that the whole moral law is contained in the single word, LOVE.

"The beings to whom man is related in his present state are, so far as this subject is concerned, God, his Creator, and man, his fellow-creature. Hence, the moral obligations of men are of two kinds; first, LOVE TO GOD, OR PIETY; second, LOVE TO MAN, OR MORALITY.

"This book will, therefore, be divided into two parts, in which these two subjects will be treated of in their order."—p. 153.

It is not our purpose to go into any particular analysis of this portion of the work. Nor is this necessary to the design we had in view, which was briefly to glance at those more general and fundamental principles that give to every such work its distinctive character. We will only observe in regard to the second part of this work, that it embraces a very complete and regular view of human relations and duties. The arrangement is good, the statements and illustrations clear, and the views maintained are, in our opinion, generally sound and just. Our limits will allow us only to refer to a few of the more important topics, and to give a few extracts as a specimen of the manner and spirit of this part of the work.

In regard to the Sabbath the author gives a different view from that of Paley. His course of argument is substantially taken, as he informs us, from the valuable treatise of Mr. J. J. Gurney, on the history, authority, and use of the Sabbath.

The author has treated the present engrossing and agitating subject of Slavery in a manner remarkably sound, temperate and judicious. He shows that the principles on which slavery proceeds violate the personal liberty of man as a physical, intellectual, and moral being; that the influences of slavery are highly injurious to national *wealth*, and to the *morals* of both masters and slaves. He then endeavours to show that the moral precepts of the New Testament—particularly the golden rule, are diametrically opposed to slavery. On this topic he says:

"If any one doubts respecting the bearing of the Scripture precepts upon this case, a few plain questions may throw additional light upon this subject. For instance—

"1. Do the precepts and spirit of the Gospel allow me to derive my support from a system which extorts labour from my fellow-men, without allowing them any voice in the equivalent which they shall receive, and which can only be sustained by keeping them in a state of mental degradation, and by shutting them out in a great degree from the means of salvation?"

"2. Would the master be willing that another person should subject him to slavery, for the same reasons, and on the same grounds, that he holds his slave in bondage?"

"3. Would the Gospel allow us, if it were in our power, to reduce our fellow-citizens of our own colour to slavery? But the Gospel makes no distinction between men on the ground of colour or race. God has made of *one blood all nations that dwell on the earth*. I think that these questions will easily test the Gospel principles on this subject."—p. 224.

He then considers the objection "that the Gospel never forbids slavery, and still more, by prescribing the duties of masters and servants, it tacitly allows it." President Wayland admits the facts assumed in this objection, but denies the inference; on the ground, that the moral *principles* of the Gospel being subversive of slavery, these facts must of course be explained in some other way than as allowing the practice of slavery. He then attempts to show, from the circumstances under which the Gospel was first promulgated, that there is good reason why it should oppose slavery by subverting its *principle*, rather than by a *formal prohibition* of it. Then as to the precepts given for the conduct of slaves, he says, that these precepts do not proceed upon the ground, that the masters had a right to claim such a course of conduct from their slaves, but they are given, because, upon other grounds, such conduct is pleasing to God. Thus, he says, the duty of obedience from the slave to the master "is never urged, like the duty of obedience to parents, *because it is right*; but because the cultivation of meekness, and forbearance under injury, will be well-pleasing unto God. Thus servants are commanded to be obedient to their own masters, 'in singleness of heart *as unto Christ*,' 'doing the *will of God* from the heart, with good will doing service *as to the Lord, and not to men*.'—Eph. vi. 5—7. Servants are commanded to 'count their masters worthy of all honour, that the name of *God and his*

doctrine be not blasphemed.”—1 Tim. 6: 1. ‘Exhort servants to be obedient, &c., that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things.’—Titus 3: 9. The manner in which the duty of servants or slaves is inculcated, therefore, affords no ground for the assertion that the Gospel authorizes one man to hold another in bondage, any more than the command to honour the king, when that king was Nero, authorized the tyranny of the emperor; or than the command to turn the other cheek, when one is smitten, justifies the infliction of violence by an injurious man.”

The author's concluding remarks are so sound, temperate and seasonable, that, though the passage is long, we cannot but indulge ourselves in the pleasure of placing them before our readers.

“Before closing this part of the subject, it may be proper to consider the question, what is the duty of masters and slaves, under a condition of society in which slavery now exists.

“I. As to masters.

“If the system be wrong, as we have endeavoured to show, if it be at variance with our duty both to God and to man, it must be abandoned. If it be asked when, I ask again, when shall a man begin to cease doing wrong? Is not the answer, *immediately*? If a man is injuring us, do we ever doubt as to the *time when* he ought to cease? There is then no doubt in respect to the time when we ought to cease inflicting injury upon others.

“But it may be said, immediate abolition would be the greatest possible injury to slaves themselves. They are not competent to self-government.

“This is a question of fact, which it is not in the province of moral philosophy to decide. It very likely may be so. So far as I know, the facts are not sufficiently known to warrant a full opinion on the subject. We will, therefore, suppose it to be the case, and ask, what is the duty of masters *under these circumstances*?

“1. This situation of the slaves, in which this obstacle consists, is not by their *own act*, but by the *act of their masters*; and, therefore, the *masters are bound to remove it*. The slaves were brought here without their own consent, they have been continued in their present state of degradation without their own consent, and *they* are not responsible for the consequences. If a man have done injustice to his

neighbour, and have also placed impediments in the way of remedying that injustice, he is as much under obligation to remove the impediments in the way of justice as he is to do justice. Were it otherwise, a man might, by the accumulation of injury, at last render the most atrocious injury innocent and right.

"2. But it may be said, this cannot be done unless the slave is held in bondage until the object be accomplished. This is also a question of fact, on which I will not pretend to decide. But suppose it to be so, the question returns, what then is the duty of the master? I answer, supposing such to be the fact, it may be the duty of the master to hold the slave; not, however, *on the ground of right over him*, but of *obligation to him*, and of obligation *to him*, for the *purpose of accomplishing a particular and specified good*. And, of course, he who holds him for any other purpose, holds him wrongfully, and is guilty of the sin of slavery. In the mean while, he is innocent, *in just so far as* he, in the fear of God, holds the slave, not for the good of the master, but for the good of the slave, and with the entire and honest intention of accomplishing the object as soon as he can, and of liberating the slave as soon as the object is accomplished. He thus admits the slave to equality of right. He does unto another as he would that another should do unto him; and, thus acting, though he may in form hold a fellow-creature in bondage, he is in fact, innocent of the crime of violation of liberty. This opinion, however, proceeds upon the supposition that the facts are as above stated. As to the question of fact, I do not feel competent to a decision.

"II. The *duty of slaves* is also explicitly made known in the Bible. They are bound to obedience, fidelity, submission, and respect to their masters, not only to the good and kind, but also to the unkind and froward; not, however, on the ground of *duty to man*, but on the ground of *duty to God*. This obligation extends to every thing but matters of conscience. When a master commands a slave to do wrong, the slave ought not to obey. The Bible does not, as I suppose, authorize resistance to injury, but it commands us to refuse obedience, and suffer the consequences, looking to God alone to whom vengeance belongeth. Acting upon these principles, the slave may attain to the highest grade of virtue, and may exhibit a sublimity and purity of moral character, which, in the condition of the master, is absolutely unattainable.

"Thus, we see, that the Christian religion not only forbids slavery, but that it also provides the only method in which, after it has once been established, it may be abolished, and that with entire safety and benefit to both parties. By instilling the right moral dispositions into the bosom of the master and of the slave, it teaches the one the duty of reciprocity, and the other the duty of submission; and thus, without tumult, without disorder, without revenge, but by the real moral improvement of both parties, restores both to the relation towards each other intended by their Creator."—p. 227—229.

The following judicious remarks are the conclusion of a discussion concerning the liberty of the press:

"I cannot close without remarking, that a most solemn and imperative duty seems to me to rest upon judges, legislators, jurors, and prosecuting officers, in regard to this subject. We hear at the present day very much about the liberty of the press, the freedom of enquiry, and the freedom of the human intellect. All these are precious blessings—by far too precious to be lost. But it is to be remembered, that no liberty can exist without restraint; and the remark is as true of intellectual as of physical liberty. As there could be no physical liberty if every one, both bad and good, did what he will, so there would soon be no liberty, either physical or intellectual, if every man were allowed to publish what he will. The man who publishes what will inflame the licentious passions, or subvert the moral principles of others, is undermining the foundations of the social fabric; and it is kindness, neither to him, nor to society, quietly to look on until both he and we are crushed beneath the ruins. The danger to liberty is pre-eminently greater, at the present day, from the licentiousness than from the restriction of the press. It therefore becomes all civil and judicial officers, to act as the guardians of society, and unawed by popular clamour, and unseduced by popular favour, resolutely to defend the people against their worst enemies. Whatever may be the form of a government, it cannot long continue free, after it has refused to acknowledge the distinction between the liberty and the licentiousness of the press. And much as we may execrate a profligate writer, let us remember, that the civil officer who, from pusillanimity, refuses to exercise the power placed in his hands to restrain abuse, deserves at least an equal share of our execration."—p. 239.

With these citations we must conclude our imperfect no-

tice of this valuable work. There are some points of minor importance, that we might mention, on which we do not entirely coincide with the author's views, and some others, in regard to which we are doubtful whether he has correctly stated the whole truth. But on the whole, as we have said, we consider the work as greatly superiour to any of the books hitherto in use for academical instruction.

ART. III. LETTER ON COLONIZATION.

From Rev. ALEXANDER PROUDFIT, D. D. Secretary of the New-York Young Men's Colonization Society.

To the editor of the Lit. and Theol. Review.

VERY RESPECTED FRIEND,

WHEN any question in science, or politics, or religion, is agitating the public mind, it is the privilege of every citizen, as opportunity offers, to communicate his own views; and, if these are correct, the honest enquirer after truth may be brought to a proper conclusion, the wavering may be confirmed, those who have erred in opinion may be reclaimed, the objections of the caviling may be silenced, and the great interests of society advanced. There is perhaps no question at present of deeper solicitude to the American community, to the patriot, or philanthropist, or Christian, than the interests of our coloured population, and the most eligible mode of promoting them. We all sympathize with them in their present degraded condition; we are all anxious to elevate their intellectual and moral character; but, among their professed friends, it is the great and embarrassing question, by what means this object may be attempted with the greatest probability of success? As I am associated with those who prefer restoring them to the country of their fathers, I will therefore, through the medium of your valuable periodical, give a very cursory view of the history of colonization, in different periods of time, and afterwards contemplate the advantages which would probably result to the coloured people among ourselves, and ultimately to the nations of Africa, by reinstating them, with their own consent, in the homes of their ancestors.

It is obvious from history, both civil and ecclesiastical, that the custom of colonizing is almost coeval with the creation of the world, and is intimately interwoven with the progress of society in every age. Soon after men began to multiply upon the face of the earth, we find different families forming themselves into little groups or associations, and, as adventurers, going abroad into some foreign region for the purpose of promoting their interests by agricultural, or commercial, or other occupations : and it has been noticed by naturalists, that as the animal tribes are frequently improved by a change of local situation, transitions of this nature tend equally to the benefit of man ; that by a change of soil, of climate, of the mode of living, and of other associations the health of the emigrants is promoted, the period of human life is protracted, and other motives for enterprise are presented, which conduce to the greater expansion and improvement of the human mind. By indulging this propensity for migrating from country to country, the various members of the great human family are brought more immediately into contact, and become acquainted with each other ; the bond of union among the different kindreds of the earth is strengthened ; man is led to feel more intimately related to man, and the consideration that we belong to a particular country or tribe is merged in the more generous reflection that the world is our home, that all kindreds are our brethren, and rising superior to sectional considerations, we feel obligated to advance the interests of the whole. I have remarked that this transition, from one country to another frequently conduces to the improvement of health, and to protract the period of human life ; and this fact is confirmed by the history of our own ancestors. Our fathers, who emigrated to this continent from the old world, have probably enjoyed more health, and in many instances have lived to a greater age than their cotemporaries whom they left in their native country.

The history of the world, during a period of four thousand years, consists, in no inconsiderable degree, of a history of colonizing ; of tribes removing from one region to another, actuated by motives of avarice, or ambition, or inspired with a hope of improving their condition, religious or civil. Thus we find a colony of Phenicians, at an early period, leaving Asia, their native residence, pushing their adventures into Africa, under the auspices of Dido their princess, founding the city of Carthage, and soon becoming competitors with

Rome, the mistress of the world. We find the offspring of Abraham colonizing from Canaan to Egypt with Jacob their father, and after the lapse of four hundred years, by the divine direction and with Moses their commander, returning as a colony from Egypt to Canaan. And immediately after the discovery of this continent by Columbus, in the fifteenth century, we find some from almost every kingdom in Europe associating together, and as colonists seeking an asylum in the new world, and in various instances this migratory spirit has been overruled for advantages the most important both to the church and society. The Jewish nation amidst all their wanderings, from the exit of Abraham their ancestor out of Urr of the Chaldees, until their tribes, "multiplied as the stars of heaven," obtained the possession of the promised inheritance, were a "light shining in this benighted world;" they were honoured during a period of more than fifteen hundred years to be the repository of divine truth, diffusing the knowledge of the living God among the nations with whom they sojourned. And who can conceive the benign results to individual happiness, to the improvement of civil society, to the extension of the Christian church, and to the illustration of the rights of man which have been already produced, and will probably through all coming ages be produced, by the enterprize of our pilgrim fathers who came, as colonists, to this western continent? They have introduced a new era in the civil history of our world; they have opened an asylum for the reception and repose of the oppressed from every nation; they have exhibited in a new light the doctrine of the rights of man, and formed a civil constitution which, if preserved by us their offspring, will probably be imitated as a model of free government by other kindreds to the end of time.

But in the whole history of colonization, through all preceding ages, there is perhaps not a solitary instance in which the experiment has incurred less expense, has experienced less disaster, has been less accompanied with the sacrifice of human life, and few which under the continued smiles of a benignant Providence promise more extensive or lasting advantages, than the colonies planted by American philanthropists on the margin of Africa. Although the Jewish nation emigrated from Egypt by the immediate command of Heaven, and had "the pillar of cloud and of fire," the pledge of the Divine presence, to direct them in their journeyings, yet their

history is little else than a history of disaster, of disappointment, and suffering. So grievously were they tried by Pharaoh, at the Red sea, at the waters of Mara, by fiery serpents, by the invasion of the Amalakites, and other enemies, that they "murmured against Moses and against God, asking if there were no graves in Egypt, that they were brought to die in the wilderness;" and of the many thousands who departed "from this their house of bondage," two only survived to reach the land of promise. And all who are acquainted with the origin of the first settlements in this country will acknowledge, that the discouragements hitherto experienced by the Colonization Society, in its benevolent designs, scarcely admit of a comparison with the appalling difficulties encountered by our fathers who, as pioneers, first penetrated the forests of America. "The colony planted at Jamestown, Virginia, in May, 1607, consisted of a hundred persons, and before September of that year was reduced to fifty, and soon after to thirty-eight, when it was reinforced by the arrival of one hundred and twenty. In 1609 a farther addition of one hundred persons was made, and the colony then amounted to five hundred souls, but by imprudence, extravagance, and dissipation they were reduced in six months to sixty persons. In 1611 the colony had increased to two hundred. In 1622 it had become still more populous, when it was attacked by the Indians, and three hundred and forty-seven men, women, and children, were cut off. About one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling had been expended in planting the colony, and more than nine thousand persons had been sent from England; and yet at the expiration of seventeen years it consisted of one thousand and eight hundred persons; while on the coast of Africa, with no governmental patronage and without royal smiles or favour, against wind and tide, against scorn and prejudice, in thirteen years, there are connected with the colonies about four thousand souls."

Probably there has rarely appeared in our world a generation more self-denied and holy; more solicitous to preserve the purity and promote the prosperity of Zion, than the Puritans who first touched the shores of this continent on the rock at Plymouth; and how appalling in their nature and rapid in succession were the difficulties which they were called to endure? Wave of adversity after wave met their little bark, and threatened to overwhelm them at every move-

ment in the execution of their enterprize. Obstacles, insurmountable to the eye of sense, were thrown in their way by the hand of heaven and of earth, as they attempted to retire from England to Holland, afterwards at their embarkation for this country, during their voyage over the Atlantic, and after they reached the shores of America. Many of them died by disease, others fell sacrifices to the severity of the climate, others perished with hunger, and others were cut off by the relentless hand of the savage. They were men of no ordinary resolution, and destined by divine Providence for the execution of no ordinary purposes, or their faith must have failed amidst trials so complicated and long continued. Preferring "the flesh pots of Egypt" to a grave in the desert, they must have abandoned their undertaking, and returned to their native country.

I therefore repeat the assertion, without the apprehension of being charged with extravagance, by any who are acquainted with the history of colonization, either in ancient or modern times, that all the discouragements experienced by us in relation to the colonies in Africa scarcely admit of a comparison with any similar attempt recorded in the annals of the world. And if we can ascertain the favour of God by the smiles of his providence, we may conclude that our purpose has been accepted of him, and has received his benediction. And if our motives are pure, and our measures are pursued with prudence, and patience, and perseverance, why need we doubt of success in the issue? The object of the Society is to relieve the oppressed; and will not this design meet the approbation of Him "whose tender mercies are over all his works;" who has commanded us to "undo the heavy burdens, and let the oppressed go free?" Through these colonies, as a moral light-house erected on the shores of Africa, we wish to pour the radiance of divine truth on her benighted population, and bring another portion of our globe within the sphere of the "Sun of Righteousness;" and can this design fail to enjoy the favour of Him who has "sent his Son to be the Saviour of the world; to be a light to lighten the Gentiles, and for salvation to the ends of the earth."

In a recent communication, I represented the condition of the colonies in their spiritual aspect; the large proportion of them who have come out of the world by a visible profession of religion, and their uniformly exemplary

deportment; I will now exhibit, from sources of information equally authentic, their comforts in a temporal respect, and their prospect of future growth and prosperity. Mr. Wilson, who has resided among them for many years in the capacity of a preacher, gives the following account: "Liberia, for eligibility of situation, is not often excelled, and the facilities held out for a comfortable living, are rarely equalled; industry and economy are sure to be rewarded with a generous competency; for proof of which I refer you to a Williams, a Roberts, a Barber, and others who, a few years ago, possessed very limited means, but are now living in all the affluence and style which characterize the wealthy merchant and gentleman in Virginia." Mr. Elliott, after a long residence in Africa, and enjoying opportunities for extensive observation, remarks, "that the colonists all seem comfortable and contented; they are engaged in getting timber, in building houses, and clearing the country, in which they are making good progress; the land is fine, and a little back from the sea is rich and productive; indigo, coffee, pine-apples and other fruits grow wild. I have visited the coast from Sierra-Leone to a hundred miles leeward from Cape Palmos, and think that Bassa-Cove* is the best spot that could have been selected for a colony; the reports that the slave-trade has been carried on at the old colony are utterly false; very few are intemperate, and the traffic in spirits is much diminished through the influence of temperance societies; some few are discontented, but these are the worthless and the idle." The testimony of another Colonist, dated Monrovia, March 3, 1835, is equally satisfactory. "God in his providence has been pleased to spare my life, and my health is so good, that I intend to open my school soon; I don't think that sickness and mortality have been more common here, since my arrival, than in different parts of the United States; the settlers are generally civil and moral; religion has formed a connexion with temperance, and an intoxicated person is rarely seen; there is a Bible-class and a Sabbath-school at the Cape; taking into consideration the great 'field that is ripe for harvest,' and that there are some to labour therein, we may thank God and take courage." And Dr. McDowal, the colonial

* The Colonies recently established by the Colonization Society of New-York and Pennsylvania, are located at this place.

physician, mentions in a letter dated Edina, near Bassa-Cove, May 26, 1835, and received to-day, "that the men in the colony are busy putting up their houses on their farm lots; in general they say they are contented, and would not go back to America. This is particularly the sentiment of the most intelligent among them."

Such is the situation, both in a temporal and spiritual respect, of these colonies, and with what emotions of pleasure must the Christian philanthropist contemplate these scenes of order and felicity? How is his imagination delighted while it draws a contrast between the former dependent, depressed, degraded condition of the colonists, and their present privileges, and future prospects? How is he animated to go on in the execution of a scheme fraught with blessings incalculable to children of the same family with himself? What pleasure must it afford to all who are co-operating in this scheme of benevolence to learn from testimony not to be questioned, that their beneficiaries appear temperate, industrious, prosperous in their secular pursuits, enjoying all the comforts of life, enjoying also the means of cultivation both mental and moral, and many of them apparently exulting in that liberty with which the sinner is made free by the Son of God!

I intended in this letter to have presented our prospects of sending, through these colonies, the blessings of civilization and Christianity to the tribes of Africa; but that must be reserved as the subject of another communication. That through the divine benediction upon the efforts of the benevolent institutions of our country and world, the earth may be speedily filled with the knowledge of the Lord, is the prayer of

Your fellow labourer in the Gospel,

ALEXANDER PROUDFIT.

REV. LEONARD WOODS, Jun'r.

ART. IV. EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

By REV. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, Salem, Mass.

The Evidences of Christianity, stated in a popular and practical manner. By Daniel Wilson, A. M. Vicar. Boston: Crocker & Brewster; New-York: J. Leavitt, 1829, 1830.

Essays on the nature and uses of the various Evidences of Revealed Religion. By Gulian C. Verplanck, Esq. New-York: Charles Wiley, 1824.

THE work which we place first at the head of this article, seems to be generally regarded, for practical use and a holy influence, as the best of all the works that have been written on the important subject of the Evidences of Christianity. It commands a position which no other work has completely filled. While it occupies thoroughly the ground of the scholar in learned and logical argument, it makes its appeal to the *consciences* of all men, and commends itself especially to the pious feelings of the Christian. It contains an immense mass of information, gathered from every source, and is distinguished likewise for a noble elevation and comprehensiveness of view. It gives prominence to great principles, and pursues them, and in the pursuit, collects and pours in upon the mind a vast multitude of thoughts and observations, cumulative as to the argument, and illustrative of its nature and application.

Among the works to which Bishop Wilson refers, as having come under his notice in the study of the subject, is that volume, the title of which we have placed beneath his own. "To these names," the Bishop observes, after a list of authors whom he has consulted, "he has peculiar satisfaction in adding that of an American writer of singular talent, with a good deal of the mind of our Bishop Butler, Mr. Verplanck, whose work abounds with deep and original thought. A reprint has not yet been made of this masterly work."

This praise is high, and well deserved. We hope to be able, on some future occasion, to present a separate review of the merits of this volume. Meantime, we cannot but express our surprise, that among the multitude of works constantly reprinted in this country from England, a native work, so original and profound as that of Mr. Verplanck, should have been neglected. It contains pages, whose

thoughts might make the subject-matter of volumes ; and yet it is hardly to be found in our book-stores.

It is highly pleasing to recognize in this writer an appeal to a nobler philosophy than that which has so long ruled the general mind ; an appeal to "those mysterious, but certain, first truths and rational instincts, which are implanted in the breasts of all men, and which prepare them to confess the power of a Creator, to apprehend his perfections, and to know the obligation of his laws. The germs and seeds of all intellectual and moral knowledge, they are not the less efficient, because they are not embodied in words, nor sorted and fashioned into systems. If philosophers will not confess them to be of reason, they must then be considered as something nobler and more divine than reason itself. They may lie dormant, in the darkness of ignorance, or the corruption of gross vice ; but when the occasion which is to call them into energy arrives, they develop themselves, we know not how : heaven's beams shine upon them, and they burst into life and power."

This truly eloquent and philosophic passage is extracted from the 69th page of Mr. Verplanck's volume.

While Mr. Verplanck gives a proper place to the "external corroboration" of Christianity, as "well fitted to command attention, and to invite to serious examination, thus giving a more authoritative character to its whole system of doctrines," he at the same time unfolds the superiour power and importance of its internal evidences. "It appears to me to be not less the sound conclusion of reason, than it is the doctrine of revelation itself, that the leading and practical truths of religion are made manifest by their own light, and present themselves to be judged by their own evidence. Like all important truths, not directly cognizable by means of the senses, they must and do require patient attention ; and, like other truths having a moral and practical tendency, they may be shut out from our minds by pride, evil passions and prejudices ; and their reception or rejection will of consequence depend much upon moral causes, external to the mere exercise of the reasoning power : since there is no better ascertained law of our nature, than that in moral enquiries, whether relating to action or opinion, the tendencies of a stubborn will necessarily have a strong controul over the decisions of the understanding."—p. 62.

After an exhibition of the manner in which the Christian

religion addresses itself to man, he observes: "Surely there needs no laboured argument to prove that there are common principles of our nature, rational faculties and moral qualities, for which all this was intended and adapted, so that if the revelation be true, it will be seen and felt to be so, not indeed by every man, and fully and in all its parts, but still quite distinctly by all who give it the reception which it requires. If it be from God, it bears upon its face that it was made for man, since it treats concerning him, and is fitted for his needs and uses; and it cannot be that man should have no witness in himself, which he may question concerning its truth."—p. 65.

"The most unlettered Christian may, independently of all external evidence, found his faith upon proofs, never, it may be, formally brought out in words, and seldom taking in his mind the logical form of argument, or which he is able to unfold with precision to others; but still, upon most strictly rational proofs, drawn from his direct perceptions of the conformity of the doctrines which he believes to his own individual nature and reason, his duties, his weakness, his vices, and his instinctive and irrepressible hopes and fears; of the agreement of the precepts and examples of revelation to whatever his understanding can conceive to be 'true, honest, just, lovely, and of good report;' from the untaught and unuttered testimony which the promptings of his own heart afford to the value of the assistance, the consolation, the pardon, which it offers; from the congruity of what it teaches of his Maker's being and government with his own partial and dim, but not less irresistible convictions of infinity, eternity, omnipotence—of immutable justice, goodness and wisdom; convictions, to which it is probable that no effort of his reason could have ever led him, but which, when once presented to the intellect, and considered without self-willed opposition, are immediately felt and acknowledged. Knowing and feeling all this, he rejoices to find that which was the dark surmise and the anxious wish of his heart, declared by revelation and confirmed by his reason..

"All these views are so congruous to our nature, as rational and moral beings, that I cannot doubt that they do constantly present themselves secretly and silently to the thoughts of thousands of Christians wholly unaccustomed to general speculations, and completely unable to communicate the grounds of their own belief to other minds. Thus is afford

ed an internal evidence of truth, to all who can think or feel ; which requires no previous knowledge but the knowledge of their own hearts, and which the arts and doubts of scepticism cannot shake, because they can never reach it.”—p. 67, 68.

The truth of these reflections finds confirmation in the experience of every attentive mind. The point to which they tend is placed, in the gospel itself, in a blaze of light, and entirely above contradiction. The whole tenor of the Bible is independent and authoritative, and there are single passages of Scripture, in which the ground and duty of faith in Christianity, and the guilt of unbelief, are set forth with great clearness and power. Of this nature is the passage 1 John 5: 10 ; “ *He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God, hath made him a liar ; because he believeth not the record that God gave of His Son.*” Both faith and infidelity are considered not merely as *intellectual*, but peculiarly *moral* exercises of the soul. It is the unequivocal duty of all men to believe : for unbelief springs purely from evil in the heart, not perplexity in the head. Unbelief, according to the inspired Apostle, makes God a liar. It does so, in whatever degree it be indulged ; it is in the highest measure insulting to God ; it is considered by him as the most deadly product of human depravity, and he has affixed to it the seal of his wrath, in curses more awful, than are denounced against any other crime. It is viewed, indeed, as in itself the source and essence of all crime, inevitably leading to all imaginable forms of wickedness.

What are denominated Evidences of Christianity wear a very different aspect in the light of this passage, from that which they have too often been made to assume. Were the heart right with God, no external evidence would be needed. On the other hand, the prevalence of selfishness in an unregenerate man makes the exercise of true belief absolutely impossible. “ *How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour which cometh from God only?*” Our Lord, on another occasion, asserts the necessity of *repentance* in order to belief, thus: “ *Verily, I say unto you, that the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God before you ; for John came unto you in the way of righteousness, and ye believed him not ; but the publicans and harlots believed him ; and ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterwards, that ye might believe him.*”

A parallel passage is that well known one of our Saviour, "He that will do my will, shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." Nor did he ever point out any other mode of knowledge. The Jews were rebuked, because they sought for external evidence. "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign." "This is an evil generation; they seek a sign." Our Lord came unto his own, and his own received him not; it was because of their depraved dispositions. Divinity carries in itself its own proof: it is nothing but depravity, that makes external evidence necessary. Our Lord, even while he condescended to work miracles, as one means of overcoming this depravity, and leading the heart to a spiritual faith, at the same time rebuked the Jews for needing miracles in order to believe.

The value of external evidence, though of great importance in its proper place, has been overrated; for the great body of men, it is, for all practical purposes, of little use. "There are," says Bishop Wilson, "ninety-nine out of every hundred of those for whom the sacred Scriptures were written, who are not capable of any certain or effectual conviction of their divine authority by such arguments as learned men employ. If men brought up in heathenism must wait for a certain conviction of Christianity, till they have learning and acquaintance with the history of polite nations, so as to see clearly the force of such kind of arguments, it would make the evidence of the gospel cumbersome, and its propagation among them infinitely difficult." "The number of those, who can argue and reason, and weigh historical proofs, is very few. The number of those, who can feel the power of the gospel, and discern its glory, is vast as the human race."

Nor is it probable that the Bible would possess any less power over the human race, were its external historical evidence all annihilated. Even *that* evidence, merely intellectual as it is, will never be truly appreciated by a selfish mind. That scepticism, which is the native, genuine product of depravity in the heart, and not the result of want of evidence in the understanding, will still prevail, even amidst the most powerful array of external proof. It is only a benevolent heart, a heart submissive to God, that truly comprehends and deeply feels the power of any portion of the Evidences of Christianity.

• The Bible is a sun, which God has hung up for our illumination, in the midst of the firmament of our moral existence. It is the *Moral Sun*, by which we move about our business, in whose light we see all things as they are, and without which, there would be no clear distinction of moral colours. A humble, benevolent heart *sees* and *feels* the Bible to be true, by spiritual vision, just as the bodily eye beholds the sun, by physical vision. And it would be just as philosophical to doubt the existence of the physical sun above us, till we should find its creation attested in history, as it is to doubt the truth of revelation, till we find historical evidence of the Scriptures. A pure mind has the evidence of consciousness and intuition, and can no more doubt the Bible to be from God, than an affectionate child, who has just received a letter from a beloved parent, would think of doubting whether that parent wrote it.

Historical evidence may be dispensed with. If the history of the creation were annihilated, the sun would not shine less brightly. So, if all the external evidence of revelation were annihilated, the power and glory of the Scriptures would not be diminished. There they shine, and there they will continue to shine, with unabated splendour, a transcript of the glory of God for all ages, uninjured, though a second deluge should roll over the earth, and sweep all other recorded knowledge from existence. "Evidences of Christianity!" says Mr. Coleridge, "I am weary of the word! Make a man feel the *want* of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence,—remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself; 'No man cometh to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him.'"

"Christianity, (says this great writer,) is especially *differentiated* from all other religions, by being *grounded* on *facts*, which all men alike have the means of ascertaining; the same means, with equal facility; and which no man can ascertain for another. Each person must be herein, querist and respondent to himself. Am I sick, and therefore need a physician? Am I in spiritual slavery, and therefore need a ransom? * * * * * To collect, to weigh, and to appreciate historical proofs and presumptions, is *not* equally within the means and opportunities of every man alike. The testimony of books of history is one of the strong and stately pillars of the church of Christ: but it is not the foun-

dation ; nor can it, without loss of essential faith, be mistaken or substituted for the foundation. There is a sect, which, in its scornful pride of antipathy to mysteries, affects to condemn all inward and preliminary experience, as enthusiastic delusion, or fanatic contagion. Historic evidence, on the other hand, these men treat, as the Jews of old treated the brazen serpent, which was the relic and evidence of the miracles worked by Moses in the wilderness. They turned it into an idol : and therefore Hezekiah, (who clave to the Lord, and did right in the sight of the Lord, so that after him arose none like him among all the kings of Judah, nor any that were before him,) not only removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, but likewise brake in pieces the BRAZEN SERPENT that Moses had made ; *for the children of Israel did burn incense to it.*"*

It is a remarkable fact, that a large portion of the Evidences of Christianity, and that the most important, is one, which the very nature of the scheme of Socinianism (alluded to in the preceding extract) compels its adherents to avoid. They might well make an idol of historical evidence, for it is the only evidence to which their scheme permits them to recur. The most valuable class of evidences, those on which experimental religion itself rests, are of such a nature, that while they establish the truth of Christianity, they do at the same time demonstrate the falsehood of that system, which denies the prominent and fundamental doctrines of the Gospel. It may not be unimportant to devote a few pages to the consideration of this point : perhaps its discussion may present the general subject of the Evidences of Christianity in a light somewhat novel ; and should any of our readers be of that class, who deny the Deity of Christ, and the evangelical system of which that doctrinal truth is an essential part, we shall be grateful if they will bestow a few candid moments upon the examination of these views.

Let us just notice, from the class of external evidences, the more remarkable of the prophecies relating to Jesus Christ, and descriptive both of his person and his office. What information, then, is to be obtained concerning the *person* of our Saviour, from the prophetic descriptions of the Old Testament ? The result of the closest and most critical examination is briefly this : it is foretold in the Old Testa-

* Aids to Reflection, p. 369, 370.

ment, that he should be both God and man: this wonderful union is clearly and undeniably pointed out. He is described as the descendant of Adam, Abraham, and David, on the one hand, and at the same time, the prophetic descriptions incontrovertibly ascribe to him with great copiousness and repetition, the names and attributes of God,—the titles and the most peculiar and exalted characters of Supreme Deity.

On a rapid glance at some of the prophecies in detail, we find that he was to be the seed of the woman (*a*), the descendant of Abraham, conferring blessings on the world (*b*), the Prophet like unto Moses (*c*), the Messiah, Son of God, Preserver and Ruler of the world, in whom all that trust are blessed (*d*), the Holy One of God (*e*), the King mighty in majesty, God triumphing and reigning forever (*f*), adored by angels (*g*), the Creator, eternal and unchangeable (*h*), the Lord, the King, infinitely holy, the Lord of Hosts, Jehovah (*i*), he was to be Immanuel, God with us (*j*), Jehovah, the object of trust and reverence (*k*), the wonderful, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace (*l*), he was to be Jehovah, the Saviour, and Shepherd (*m*), he was to be Jehovah, our Righteousness (*n*), the Sovereign, whose goings forth were from eternity (*o*), the Fellow of Jehovah (*p*), the Lord of the temple, the Angel of the Covenant (*q*).

Now, the conclusive result of all this is one, viz: That the promised Messiah should come in the actual possession of two natures,—the human, with its essential properties, and the divine, with its inseparable perfections. No arts of criticism can evade the conclusion that the Messiah is depicted in the prophecies, not only as the Son of David, but as the eternal God. The argument may be thus summed up in the words of Dr. J. Pye Smith; "Jesus of Nazareth, all who are called Christians acknowledge to be the long promised and expected Messiah: therefore, all the properties and characters, by which the records of Divine Prophecy have described the Messiah, must belong to him, in the strictest and most entire signification. Did the Christian Scriptures

(*a*) Gen. 3: 15. (*b*) Gen. 22: 18. (*c*) Deut. 18: 18. (*d*) Psalm 2. (*e*) Ps. 16: 8—11. (*f*) Ps. 45: 2—8. (*g*) Ps. 97: 7. comp. Heb. 1: 6. (*h*) Ps. 102: 25—27, comp. Heb. 1: 10—12. (*i*) Is. 6: 1—5. comp. John 12: 41. (*j*) Is. 7: 14. (*k*) Is. 8: 13, 14. (*l*) Is. 9: 5, 6. (*m*) Is. 40: 3—11. (*n*) Jer. 23: 5, 6. (*o*) Mic. 5: 1—4. (*p*) Zech. 13: 7. (*q*) Mal. 3: 1.

(the Scriptures of the New Testament) do no more than afford satisfactory evidence of the simple proposition, *Jesus is the Messiah*; we should be obliged by necessary inference from the prophetic descriptions, and by all the rules of honest criticism and interpretation, to conclude that his person comprised the unique and mysterious *union* of humanity with DEITY."

What, then, do the Christian Scriptures, (the New Testament Scriptures,) in reality assert? Is there a fulfilment of these prophecies? There is, in the clearest, fullest, most satisfactory manner. He was *to be* the Son of David; and he *was* born of the Virgin Mary. He was likewise to be the Son of God, and Lord of David, the Being, whose goings forth were from eternity, the Creator and the Mighty God; accordingly we find him such,—the true God, and eternal Life, the Maker of all things, the Being who could say, Before Abraham was, I AM, one with God and, in power and glory of declared equality with the Father. His human nature is not more evident than his divine. If the opening of the first Gospel is, "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of Abraham," the opening of the last is also "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, AND THE WORD WAS GOD." In the Old Testament, he is Jehovah our Righteousness; in the New, he is God manifest in the flesh. In the Old Testament, he is the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father; in the New, he is God over all, blessed forever. Our Lord himself, in one remarkable passage, explicitly referred to the union of these two natures in his own person. "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he? They say unto Him, The son of David. He saith unto them, How then doth David in spirit call him Lord, saying, The Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool. If David then call him Lord, how is he his Son? And no man was able to answer him a word." Matt. 22: 42—46. Christ is likewise called in the Apocalypse both the *root* and the *offspring* of David; referring doubtless to the same wonderful union of Deity and humanity.

In his ninth lecture on the Evidences, Bishop Wilson has treated this part of his subject in a short compass, with great excellence. The following extract furnishes a powerful summary of that part of the prophetic argument, to which we have asked the special attention of our readers.

"Such particulars were foretold of the Messiah, as constituted, in connection with those already considered, a character of the most peculiar kind, and uniting qualities and attributes apparently the most contradictory; and therefore, if found in the person of our Lord, proving his Messiahship in a still more decisive manner. For, besides his sufferings already noticed, he was to be a branch from the root of Jesse (*a*), to grow up as a tender plant, and as a root out of dry ground be rejected and despised of men, to be oppressed and afflicted (*b*), to be a worm and no man (*c*), to be the servant of rulers (*d*), to be a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence (*e*), to have no form or comeliness, to be hated without a cause (*f*), to endure shame and reproach (*g*), to be accused by false witnesses (*h*), to have his visage marred more than any man (*i*); in a word, to be emphatically the Son of man (*j*), a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief (*k*).

"And yet, on the other hand, the Messiah was to be the Son of God (*l*), the Shiloh (*m*), the Star out of Jacob (*n*), the Redeemer, the living one (*o*), the chief Corner Stone (*p*), the Lord of David (*q*), the Ruler and King of Israel (*r*), Emanuel, God with us (*s*), Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Father or Possessor of Eternity (*t*), whose goings forth were of old from everlasting (*u*), the Supreme God (*v*), Jehovah (*w*); in a word, the object of adoration, hope, devotion, confidence, love, and religious homage (*x*), the Eternal and Immutable Being (*y*), the Creator of all things (*z*)."

"It is hardly necessary to observe, that these high, and yet humiliating descriptions; these prophecies of depressed mortality and exalted glory; these names of manhood and of deity; of frailty and of power; of the creature and the Creator; were all fulfilled, and fulfilled clearly and plenarily in the person and character of Christ; and fix, *by the apparent contradiction which they involve*, the identity of his person. This Man of Sorrows he was, as well as King of Glory. Nor has there ever appeared a person beside him, during the four or five thousand years, which have elapsed since some of these prophecies were delivered, to whom

(*a*) Is. 11: 1. (*b*) Is. 53: 2, 3, 8. (*c*) Ps. 22: 6. (*d*) Is. 49: 7. (*e*) Is. 8: 14. (*f*) Ps. 69: 4. (*g*) Ps. 69: 7. (*h*) Ps. 35: 11, 20. (*i*) Is. 52: 14. (*j*) Ps. 8: 4-7. (*k*) Is. 53: 3. (*l*) Ps. 2: 7, 12. (*m*) Gen. 49: 10. (*n*) Num. 24: 17. (*o*) Job 19: 23-27. (*p*) Is. 28: 16. (*q*) Ps. 110: 1. (*r*) Is. 6: 1-3. (*s*) Is. 7: 14. (*t*) Is. 9: 5, 6. (*u*) Micah. 5: 2. (*v*) Is. 45: 21-25. (*w*) Jer. 23: 6. (*x*) Ps. 2: 12. 97: 7. (*y*) Ps. 118: 25-29. (*z*) Is. 45: 10, 11.

these wonderful, and varied, and numerous, and apparently contradictory particulars, were ever capable of being applied."

"It may assist the mind in conceiving the force of this part of the argument, to be reminded, that the probability of any number of particular facts occurring in the case of any one person, is exceedingly small, supposing only fifty independent circumstances had been predicted of the Messiah, and that there was an equal chance, to use the language of mathematicians, for the happening or the failure of any one of the supposed particulars, the probability against the occurrence of all the particulars in any way, is that of the fiftieth power of two to unity, that is, greater than eleven hundred and twenty-five millions of millions to one. And this computation is exclusive of the considerations of time and place. It supposes also the affairs of the world to be left to blind chance. I only mention this circumstance in a cursory manner; the argument needs it not."*

The sameness of testimony in the Old and New Testaments in regard to the person of Jesus Christ is a delightful subject of contemplation. In regard to his divine glory, as well as his human nature, it is demonstration. Blinded indeed must that mind be, which can resist it. It is likewise an essentially important part of the evidence for the truth of Christianity. At the same time it is a part, which any system, that denies the Divinity of Jesus, utterly destroys. It "makes God a liar." And a Socinian, if he were perfectly consistent with his own scheme, must inevitably be an infidel. For, here is a long series of the clearest prophecies in the Old Testament, which, according to his hypothesis, have never been fulfilled in any degree. The consequence is clear. Revelation, to him, is contradictory.

To perceive the full force of this argument, we must remember how constantly in the New Testament the testimony of prophecy is appealed to, as a foundation of faith in Christ. It is not miracles; it is the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the prophets in regard to Christ. "Search the Scriptures," said our Saviour, "for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and *they are they, which testify of me.*" Again, "All things, written by the Prophets concerning the Son of

* Wilson's Lectures, Lecture 9.

Man, must be accomplished." Again, "*All things must be fulfilled*, which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me."

To him give all the Prophets witness. The whole Scriptures of the Jewish nation look forward to him, the Desire of all nations, the Glory of the latter temple, God manifest in the flesh. If, now, any prominent part of those predictions remained unfulfilled, it would falsify the whole Gospel. By far the most prominent part would remain unfulfilled, had not the Being, on whom they terminated, appeared invested with the titles, and possessing the attributes of God; making himself equal with God; saying to all the people, I and my Father are One; before Abraham was, I AM; proclaiming himself Lord of the Sabbath; demanding for his words an authority equal to the Law of God; proclaiming himself the forgiver of sins, the Author of Eternal Life, the Redeemer, the Governour, and Judge of mankind; receiving the homage of his disciples as their Lord and their God; and proclaimed by them, after his ascension, as the Creator and Governour of the universe, King of kings, and Lord of lords, GOD OVER ALL, BLESSED FOREVER! We say, the Evidence of Christianity would have been fatally incomplete, if this concurrence with the voice of Prophecy, in the proclaimed fulness of the Godhead bodily, had been wanting. With the infidel it would have been impossible to have contended. He might have taken his stand on the glory of the ancient prophecies, and demanded the proof of their fulfilment, before he could properly be called on to believe. Were the hypothesis of the Socinians true, the infidel would have all the vantage ground, and the believer no position, on which he could make a stand.

Thus far we have spoken of predictions in the Old Testament concerning the *Person* of Jesus, as GOD OVER ALL; the same remarks may be made of the Old Testament predictions concerning the *Office* of Jesus, as the SAVIOUR of all. We need only refer to the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, for a full and affecting exhibition of the great doctrine of Atonement. "Surely, he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was

cut off out of the land of the living : for the transgression of my people was he stricken. It pleased the Lord to bruise him : he hath put him to grief : when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin,—by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many ; for he shall bear their iniquities. He was numbered with the transgressors ; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.” What could be more full, more definite, more incontrovertible, than these expressions ? What more evident, more *out-shining*, than the whole meaning of this remarkable chapter ?

And here again, the hypothesis of those who deny the Scripture doctrine of atonement through the sufferings and sacrifice of the Son of God, destroys the evidence of Christianity, and “makes God a liar.” For God, by the mouth of his holy Prophets, declared that the predicted Messiah should be the world’s atoning Saviour ; and if he was *not* bruised for our iniquities, if he was *not* wounded for our transgressions, if the Lord did *not* make his soul an offering for sin, if he did *not* bear our sins in his own body on the tree, then, the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is one amazing falsehood, and Christianity itself falls to the ground. So completely does the system, which denies the Divinity and atoning sacrifice of Christ, in its manifest, legitimate, and necessary consequences, surrender the whole Gospel, and lay bare its foundations to the attacks of infidelity.

Let it be remembered, that the argument for the truth of Christianity, which arises from the fulfilment of the explicit predictions in regard to the atoning sacrifice, which our Lord was to accomplish in being made an offering for sin, is powerful, perhaps above any other. This is clear from the manner in which the sacred writers make use of it ; and we may refer for a striking instance, to the well-remembered interview of Philip with the eunuch. The place of the Scripture, in which the eunuch was reading, was the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah ; and at the same scripture Philip began, and preached unto him Jesus.

But if the Apostle, instead of preaching Christ from that passage, had resorted to sophistry for evading its force, if he had denied its evident meaning, and attempted to explain it away, the eunuch might well have retorted upon him, and probably would, in words something like the following : “If the prophecies on which your religion is founded, are of

such a nature, that you seek to avoid their direct and manifest meaning, and are ashamed of the conclusions to which they lead, and if, after all their richness, particularity, and mysterious grandeur, you are forced to explain them away, so that they mean absolutely nothing, I may as well dismiss them from my notice, and return to Ethiopia in the faith with which I set out. In their plain signification, they would only lead me astray, and with your interpretation, they are not only worthless, but false." Such, we think, must have been the result, had a modern denier of the Atonement, expounded unto him this scripture. He would have gone on his way in blank infidelity. Such was not the result; for, beginning at this same scripture, the inspired Evangelist preached unto him an atoning SAVIOUR; Christ an offering for sin, the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world: and in Jesus Christ, and him crucified, he went on his way rejoicing. He went to repeat to all around him the wonderful story of the love, the sufferings, the ignominious death upon the cross, the resurrection, ascension, and interceding mercy of the Lord of Life and Glory, made an offering for sin!

There is great poverty in the expedients, by which unbelievers seek to evade the force of passages that prove the Deity and Atonement of Christ. The same difficulty meets them in a thousand shapes. It is not the getting rid of one or two powerful texts, that will strike this doctrine from the Bible; for they are omnipresent and indestructible through every part; not to be separated any more than you can draw the azure from the sky. Take for instance, the means used to avoid the natural and inevitable inference from the worship paid by Thomas to our Saviour, as his Lord and his God. A denier of our Lord's Divinity will argue that it was an exclamation of surprise and ignorance; he makes it, in fact, a sort of modern profaneness. But in other parts of the Scriptures, we find not only the saints on earth invoking and offering divine worship to Jesus Christ, but the saints and angels *in the heavenly world* described as employed in the same acts of adoration before the throne of God and the Lamb. And is there profaneness in *that* world? Are the multitude of the redeemed acting from surprise and ignorance, when represented as worshipping the Lamb in Heaven?

The Scriptures are made both contradictory in their

descriptions, and inevitably idolatrous in their tendencies, by the denial of the supreme Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ. In one page of inspiration, the Sovereign of the Universe declares, "Besides me there is no God, and my glory will I not give to another. I am God, and there is no God with me." In another, we are informed that "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was *with* God, and the Word *was* God." At one time the glory of Jehovah breaks out in jealous denunciation against him, who would transfer that glory to the creature. At another, we are pointed unto Jesus as the AUTHOR and FINISHER of our faith, the Author of Eternal Life, the Creator of the Universe; and all men are commanded to honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." "Cursed be the man, that trusteth in man,"—and "Blessed are all they that put their trust in Him,"—are sentences from the same infallible volume. In one place, we find God vindicating divine honour and divine worship only to himself; in another, commanding the adoration of the universe to be paid to Christ, ("Let all the angels of God worship him,") and sharing with him, in the heavenly world, the adoration of "every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever."

The Bible is a book so wonderfully complicated, yet so divinely harmonious, in the arrangement of its truths; they are so important in themselves, and so essentially connected, and dependent on each other; supporting and supported, and giving and receiving mutual evidence and power; that the denial of any one fundamental doctrine cannot but greatly weaken the evidence of all, and introduces contradiction and absurdity in the place of clearness and harmony. If we pursue this subject a few moments, in the examination of other disputed, but fundamental truths of Scripture, we shall find, in every step of our enquiry, that to deny these truths, is to destroy the evidence of Christianity, and, in the words of the beloved disciple, to "make God a liar."

We have noticed the doctrines of the Deity of Christ and the Atonement. Human depravity, Regeneration by the Holy Ghost, and the endless punishment of the wicked, may properly come next in review.

Mr. Coleridge has said, "It is a strong presumptive

proof against materialism, that there does not exist a language on earth, from the rudest to the most refined, in which a materialist can talk for five minutes together, without involving some contradiction in terms to his own system." A similar remark may be made in regard to that system in religion, which denies the entire depravity of the human heart. We might almost say, the common language of every community affords conviction of its falsehood. How large a portion of the English language is constructed out of crime, crime in the feelings, and crime in the conduct, we are not prepared to say. It would be a curious subject of enquiry. This, we believe, is true, that many of the most common proverbs are no other than a reiteration, in various forms, of the grand Scriptural truth, that *the heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked.*

All history likewise proves the truth of this doctrine; for all history is but a record of human passion and its consequences. All men's consciences prove it true; whatever a man's theory may be on this subject, when conscience rouses up, amidst light from eternity, her voice is one of dreadful, unmingled condemnation. All experience proves it true. Experience on this subject is but an affirmative echo to the declarations of history and the voice of conscience; and all together are a confirmation, in the reality of things, to the truth of the descriptions in the Bible. The Scriptures affirm that all mankind are entirely alienated from God, their hearts supremely selfish, and at enmity against him. This view in the Bible corresponds perfectly with the state of the world; it is the same view, which results from the examination of the human character, in history, experience, and individual consciousness.

Here is another portion of the Evidences of Christianity. We find that men are just such beings in reality, as the Bible has described them. Now we say, it is also a portion, which the system of those who deny the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, destroys. If the character ascribed to man in that system were the character ascribed to him in the Scriptures, then the representations in the Scriptures would be at variance with the actual state of mankind in the world. The voice of the Scriptures would be contrary to the voice of history, of experience, and of conscience; we should no longer find in men such beings as the Bible has described them. We may rely upon it, that on this ground

the infidel would take his stand, if the descriptions in the Bible coincided with the descriptions which those give, who deny the doctrine of human depravity.

One of the grandest branches of the internal evidences of Christianity is this,—the suitableness of the Christian Revelation to the obvious state and wants of man as an ignorant and sinful creature. And in consequence, as Bishop Wilson admirably remarks, “the point of view, from which to behold this object aright is from the midst of human weakness, misery, and sorrow. The Bible professes to be a remedy for sin and guilt, for darkness and fear, for forebodings of futurity, and dissatisfaction at earthly sources of happiness. So long as you think yourself not of this number, the Gospel is not capable of appearing to you in this branch of its evidence, at least in the most striking and important parts of it, as emanating from a Divine Hand.”* This remark is forcibly applicable to our present point. The Bible describing man as ignorant and guilty, and professing to be a remedy for that ignorance and guilt, if, instead of looking upon Christianity from the midst of human selfishness, ignorance and wretchedness, we suppose a state of comparative innocence, and pardonable imperfections, and survey it from that point, Christianity must appear to us a false system, unadapted to the situation of mankind. Deny the Scriptural doctrine of human depravity, and we make Christianity, as exhibited in the Scriptures, a false, confused, and foolish system. We do in fact “make God a liar.”

This difficulty seems to have been felt, at times, by those who deny that doctrine, and in attempting to evade it, they have treated the Scriptures just as we have supposed an infidel would, if the descriptions in the Bible had coincided with the descriptions of those, who reject the evangelical system of truth revealed in the Gospel. They have, in point of fact, denied the applicability of the descriptions in the Bible to the present state of mankind. They have endeavoured to represent the Scriptures as an imperfect revelation, suited only to an early, unenlightened state of the world, and containing a Christianity to be superseded and laid aside, as human perfectibility advances, for a system better adapted to man’s dignity and glory, in the rapid ad-

* Lectures, Vol. II. p. 49.

vance of that perfectibility. This is the legitimate result of the denial of human depravity. It makes the Scriptures for us a false book, and their Author, as speaking to us, a liar. Consequently it destroys our revelation.

From the doctrine of depravity, let us pass for a moment to that of regeneration. Here again, the declarations of the Scriptures are corroborated by evidence from observation and experience. The Bible declares that an entire renovation of the human heart is necessary; that men "*must be born again*," born of the Spirit of God, being naturally destitute of that holiness, without which no man shall see God. It declares that "*the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned*." All this is proved by experience. These are facts of testimony, on the part of thousands of credible witnesses in every age. There are multitudes, who have had experience both of the state of nature, and the state of grace, and have testified as to the infinite difference between them, and the nature of the change from the one to the other.

In this view, both the meaning and truth of the Bible, in regard to Regeneration, is matter of human testimony; and if men believe any fact on human testimony, they must believe in the reality of that change of heart, which the Scriptures declare to be essential. Take a list from the multitude of witnesses in every age, among whom have been men of the strongest minds ever created, and of unwarped integrity, even in the world's confession; men like Luther, Leighton, Usher, Baxter, Hall, Taylor, Howe, Henry, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Robert Boyle, Sir Isaac Newton, Edwards, Pascal, Watts; and we have a great cloud of witnesses, more than we have for the attestation of any truth whatever in all history, declaring that Christianity in experience is that Regeneration which the Bible describes it to be, and asserting, *from experience*, the efficacy of the Scriptures in producing that result, which they declare to be their intended and legitimate operation.

Now it is manifest that a system, which denies both the doctrine of Regeneration in the Scriptures, and the need of it in the heart, destroys all this portion of the evidences of Christianity, and in fact makes the Bible a falsehood. Or rather, it makes it an immense burlesque; an array of means without an object. It exposes it not merely to the contra-

diction, but to the ridicule of infidels, making it a book unworthy to have proceeded from the hands of its Divine Author.

Let us consider, for a moment, the doctrine of the Atonement, in connexion with this view of the doctrine of Regeneration. The Scriptures declare that it is the preaching of that doctrine, which shall convert the world to God. It is *that foolishness*, the Cross of Christ, which shall be the instrument in this mighty work. The nature and marks of this conversion, or regeneration, consequent on the preaching of the Cross of Christ, are also described with too much clearness to admit of mistake. Experience and observation prove this also. It is the very result, which inevitably follows the preaching of an atoning Saviour. No other preaching ever has had the least power. Not the mightiest moral persuasion, without Jesus Christ and him crucified, could turn the wandering, ruined soul, a step towards its God. Men of eloquence have tried, but failed. It is a heartless effort. They might as well shout to the raging waves of ocean. God puts, and will put, that honour only on his own truth, JESUS CHRIST, AND HIM CRUCIFIED; "*unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God.*"

Now, the denial of this doctrine destroys another grand portion of the Evidences of Christianity. For, if that doctrine be not true, then a false doctrine is found possessing that power in the conversion of men, which the Bible declares belongs only to itself, but which the Bible, without that doctrine, never has been known to produce. Who does not see that this leads directly to infidelity? The cheerless result of their system, its failure to produce the result promised in the Scriptures, would be, on the supposition it were the system contained in the Bible, a standing conviction of falsehood in Christianity. Either their system is not true, or the Bible is false. And whether they suppose the atonement cut out from the Bible, or explained away from it, they have a book as the alleged foundation of their Christianity, foretelling certain results from its own exhibition, not one of which ever takes place.

Christianity is a system, which is to be tried personally by every individual, before he is authorized to pass judgement upon it. It is a system professing the most blessed and glo-

rious results, redemption from the pollution and misery of sin, deliverance from the power of depravity, regeneration in the soul, a change into the image of the blessed God, and perfect peace and happiness in him. How then is the trial to be made? This is infinitely important, and on this point the Scriptures are very clear. Take for instance, out of a great number of passages of similar import, the following from the opening verses of the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: "Therefore, *being justified by faith*, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we have access by faith into this grace, wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God." Here it is evident that *justification by faith in Jesus Christ* is the sole ground of that peace, which Christianity promises. It is the only way of access into the grace of the Gospel, the only foundation of hope in God.

Now then, if any one aims at this result *without* justification by faith; if he seeks "the peace of God, which passeth all understanding," in the *rejection* of this fundamental doctrine, the result is rendered impossible, and he seeks, in fact, the destruction of Christianity. He destroys its whole argument, and Christianity to him is a lie. It has promised him peace, but he finds it not, nor can any find it in the way he has taken. Nor does it work in the perishing soul, nor will it, nor can it, any of those results, which it belongs to justification by faith to produce, and which the Bible will not produce without that doctrine. The same may be said of the doctrine of Regeneration. If any man aims at those results without regeneration, he will not find them. But the Bible predicts them. The scheme, therefore, which rejects those doctrines, "makes God a liar."

An admirable illustration, suggested by Bishop Wilson, is peculiarly applicable to this part of our argument. The medicinal preparation which bears the common name of Peruvian bark, is well known to have been increasing in use and reputation up to the present day, as a safe and powerful remedy in various classes of disease. It has the testimony of thousands to its efficiency;—men who, in their restoration from sickness to life, health, and comfort, have experienced the truth of its alleged healing excellence. Now suppose a man to substitute a preparation other than the true bark, though bearing its name, and to make trial of the false preparation, insisting all the while, and persuading himself,

that he is trying the actual medicine. The consequence is, it fails of its efficacy; and if he is consistent, he will declare that the pretended virtue of the bark is false. Just so, the pretended trial of Christianity, when its fundamental doctrines are denied, is the substitution of a false preparation, and must result in unbelief. Christianity is the medicine of the soul diseased with sin; it restores the sinner from spiritual death and condemnation, to spiritual life, health, and pardon. But if the trial be made with any preparation other than the true medicine, its efficacy cannot be experienced. Deny Regeneration and the Atonement, and the results of Christianity to you are impossible. The remedy is no longer efficacious. You have taken away its healthful ingredients; the qualities that constitute its regenerating efficacy; the ingredients that make it the power of God unto salvation.

The same may be said of the solemn doctrine of endless punishment to the wicked. No sinner would be converted from the error of his ways without it. Knowing, therefore, the terrour of the Lord, says the Apostle, we persuade men. Not that this doctrine alone would be effectual; but it is absolutely necessary in connection with the others; the others would be ineffectual without this. If you deny this doctrine, or explain it away from the Scriptures, your power over the conscience is lost; any attempt to produce the result predicted as belonging to the exhibition of truth must inevitably fail. You can never make the lost soul flee from the wrath to come, when you have told him there is no wrath to come. Here also, the system that denies the fundamental doctrines of the gospel "makes God a liar." The results he has promised do not take place. Nor can they take place, nor ever will, unless men will use the doctrines of the Gospel just as he has revealed them.

Let us take a homely illustration. Suppose you should hand a gun to a man that has never seen one, telling him at the same time that it will fire, and explaining, as near as you can without making the experiment for him, what that result is. Suppose now, that he should take the gun, examine it, and take off the *lock* as a useless appendage, and then undertake to shoot with it; asserting, all the while, that the lock is no part of the machinery, and does not belong to it. In this simple illustration we have precisely the manner in which many persons treat the Bible. *They take away the lock, the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel; and then they*

can no more produce conviction or conversion, than they could fire a gun without its lock, or its flint, or its priming.

Here we must close our argument, for our limits do not permit us to pursue it further. We have dwelt upon it long enough, to make evident some instructive lessons. An opinion is too prevalent that the discussion of the Evidences of Christianity does not necessarily involve the consideration of particular truths of Christianity, in regard to which men differ; and that a man may believe in Christianity and defend its Evidences, and yet reject in succession every one of its fundamental tenets. We cannot see that such denial is any thing else than infidelity. Certainly it leads to infidelity, and grows out of its essence in the heart. We have made a rapid survey of the essential truths of revelation, and we find that the rejection of them in every case destroys the Evidences of Christianity, and "makes God a liar." Such rejection is therefore in the highest degree iniquitous, it being a direct insult to the majesty and truth of Jehovah. It could proceed from nothing but a heart that has been living without God in the world, and is utterly in a state of alienation from him. "*Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart.*" Hence the tremendous condemnation with which error is treated in the Scriptures. It proceeds from a wrong state of the heart; it is the inevitable consequence of estrangement from God. Nearness to God is nearness to truth; distance from him is darkness; for God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. And it were an unworthy conception of the character of God, and of his construction of man as a spiritual being, to suppose that he has made the laws and properties of matter, or the principles of pure science, capable of greater certainty than spiritual truth. To a holy being spiritual truth is the brightest of all truth. Error is the result of sin, and makes God a liar. Nor is it any thing but its commonness, that prevents men from feeling this. Every one deems it an insult to have his own word doubted; but to doubt the word of God is so common, that men absolutely cease to behold its moral turpitude.

Errors of one kind and another have so long been maintained, have been rising so perpetually one after another in the world, that the soul has become accustomed to them, and they do not strike it with dread, but even put it upon find-

ing an excuse, and considering the rejection of Scriptural truth an innocent frailty, or, at the uttermost, an intellectual misfortune, rather than a moral depravity. Suppose now, that ever since our blessed Lord tabernacled in the flesh, error had taken its flight from the earth, and that no propositions had been declared or gained credit, but those which he delivered to his disciples, and through them, in their writings, to the world. And suppose that the belief of these truths had been growing stronger, with the accumulated faith of millions, in every successive generation to the present, and the accumulated examination of the multitude of minds employed upon them for more than eighteen hundred years. By this process, all that is essential in the system of Divine truth, would certainly have gathered a brightness to the souls of men above the brightness of the sun, and our spiritual atmosphere would have been of a sparkling clearness, and God's word, as our moral hemisphere, would have shone sweeter in the radiance of its undisputed truths, than the brightest sky of a cloudless winter's night. Let us suppose now, that, for the first time, some daring hand should throw the blot of unbelief over any portion of this fair scene; would it not fill the bosoms of all men with horror and indignation? They would feel with great force the meaning of that remarkable passage, to which we have alluded: "He that believeth not God HATH MADE HIM A LIAR; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son." Error, in its least approach, would be seen in all its deformity. It would be as if we should suddenly have our vision arrested by a patch of black in the cloudless sky above us.

In becoming prevalent, error loses its deformity, like every other sin. It strengthens and grows, and becomes sanctified by age; generation after generation adds to it; millions of minds contribute to its power. It is formed like those great coral reefs, built from the bottom of the ocean, by innumerable animalculæ, and perhaps unknown and undiscovered, till some noble, richly freighted ship perished on its rugged top.

If we will look aright, every thing conspires to teach us, that mere knowledge is not the living truth, nor can give any heartfelt evidence of it. The intellect alone, unassisted by the Spirit of God, will not find this evidence. It discovers only the husk, but not the kernel; sensible things are all it looks at. The great world of spiritual realities it knows

nothing of, and from having no experience of them, it too often proceeds to their denial. The living beauty of the Word of God is neither witnessed nor felt; it is a hidden beauty, hidden, like the life of the saint who feeds upon it, with Christ in God. Hence the necessity of Christian grace in lively exercise, for a discovery or relish of the divine beauty of the Scriptures. Where faith is dim, or the heart worldly, or a besetting sin stands over the soul like a task-master, the Bible to the spiritual vision, is like a dead painting to the eye; there seems in it neither life nor beauty. Let the same passage be read in the exercise of lively faith, when the soul is victorious over sin, when Christ is near, and the heart filled with his love, when heavenly hope is strong, and the view of eternal realities vivid, and then it sparkles with glory; it is a revelation of heaven, a sudden shining out of Jehovah from between the cherubim; every verse, line, word, is instinct with the sacred fire, and condensed with meaning. Selfishness must necessarily cloud the mind to religious truth; just as mists overshadow the beauties of evening. Sweep away those clouds, let the heart be open to the love of God; let it enter, and imbue, and purify the soul, and the stars of truth shall take their place clearly, one after another, in the soul's moral hemisphere, till the expanse is hung with serene orbs, whose light shines sweetly in the path we tread, and whose celestial beauty transports the affections to Heaven.

As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of regenerate man to the light, and power, and glory of God's word. The human heart unregenerate is as a mirror, over which you have hung a long black pall. Hold up that mirror to any object in God's creation, to the trees, or the sky, or the sun at noon-day, and there would be no reflection. Hold it up to the stars at evening, and through the cloth that covers it there is no answering image. Now remove the covering, and hold up the mirror without its veil, and there is the image, clear and bright as the reality. Just so, the pall of sin is on the heart of the sinner. Hold up before it every doctrine of the Bible in succession, with the eloquence of an archangel, and you would not reach it; there could be no experience or reflection of the truth. God in Christ might be exhibited before the mind with great power and glory; all those glorious realities that require a spiritual faith for their discernment, might be displayed in the vividest colour-

ing that language can bear; and still there could be no answering image through the gloomy veil of sin. But now remove that veil. Make the heart submissive to Christ, and then hold up to it the Scriptures; regeneration, the atonement, the punishment of sin, the holiness and sovereignty of God; and what do we see? A clear, sweet, living image of the glory of the Saviour, and the truth of every page. Whatever be the object first presented to the mind, after the veil of selfishness is withdrawn, there will be a calm and delightful reflection of it. The spirit of caviling is gone, objections are done away, and the heart rests upon the Saviour, in grateful obedience to his will, and adoration of his Divine Glory.

Spirit of Love, thou Power Divine, come down;
 And where thou walk'st a sufferer, wear thy crown:
 Bid the vexed sea be still, the tumult cease;
 Prophet, fulfil thy word, reign Prince of Peace!
 O, give that peace the world knows not, and throw,
 Light of the world! thy light on all below;
 Shine through the 'wildered mind, that man may see
 Himself and earth restored, God, all, in Thee!

DANA.

There is nothing in the world, that has such an array of argument in its favour, as the system of evangelical religion revealed in the Gospel. The display of its evidences is one of the brightest tissues of demonstration ever spread out before the admiring mind. The obligations under which we lie with respect to it are infinite; nor is it a matter left to our option, whether we will receive it or not. It comes to us with all the authority of the Author of our being, as a gift from him, and a revelation of his will, to teach us our duty, and to point out the only way by which we can enter heaven; and if, while we profess to receive it, we scorn its medium of mercy, or retain a heart at enmity against God, the enjoyment of its light will only intolerably augment the guilt of disobedience and consequent perdition of the soul.

ART. V. BAXTER'S SAINTS' REST.

By Rev. JOHN WOODBRIDGE, D. D., New-York.

The Saints' Everlasting Rest, by the Rev. Richard Baxter, abridged by Benjamin Fawcett, A. M. New-York, published by the American Tract Society.

THE leading Puritans of the seventeenth century were extraordinary men, from whom, since the peculiar controversies of those times are viewed in the calm light of history, the successors of their most violent enemies will scarcely presume to withhold the eulogium due to distinguished wisdom, intrepidity and piety. They were indeed a race of moral heroes, genuine chevaliers of the cross, whose names, however assailed by the advocates of arbitrary principles on the one hand, and ferocious infidels on the other, will ever be dear alike to the lovers of evangelical truth, and the intelligent friends of civil, political and religious liberty. The memory of no one of these worthies is more precious than that of *Richard Baxter*, the humble pastor of Kidderminster, who watched for souls as one who must give account.

"The proud he tam'd, the penitent he cheer'd,
Nor to rebuke the rich offender fear'd.
His preaching much, but more his practice wrought,
A living sermon of the truths he taught."

We may, with the strictest propriety, apply to him the words of another, descriptive of the pulpit performances of a celebrated preacher in our own country.* "Mount Sinai seemed to thunder from his lips when he denounced the tremendous curses of the law, and sounded the dreadful alarm to secure impenitent sinners. The solemn scenes of the last judgement seemed to rise in view, when he arraigned, tried, and convicted self-deceivers and formal hypocrites. And how did the balm of Gilead distil from his lips, when he exhibited a bleeding, dying Saviour, to sinful mortals as a sovereign remedy for the wounded heart? He spake as on the border of eternity, and as viewing the glories and terrors of an unseen world." For original force

* Character of Rev. S. Davies, by Rev. D. Bostwick.

and activity of mind, high intellectual acquirements, industry, firmness of religious principle, unflinching integrity, simplicity that knows no guile, benevolence, tenderness and ardour of piety, and the consecration of all his powers to the best of causes; Baxter stood pre-eminent among as noble a company of confessors, as the world in later ages has ever witnessed. Had his lot been cast among the early Christians, he would have been not an inferiour associate in the honours of an Ignatius, a Polycarp, a Justin, and a Cyprian. This venerable and apostolic man lived in a very momentous period, when commotions in the social system were casting off ancient abuses, and preparing the world for the permanent establishment of free institutions, and the wide diffusion of the principles of the Gospel. He was born in 1615, five years before the landing of the pilgrims on the rock at Plymouth, and closed his laborious and useful life in 1691; leaving in his numerous writings, all of which treated of subjects worthy of his pen and heart, a rich legacy to future generations.

His SAINTS' REST is one of the most popular, practical and valuable of his publications; and will probably be read with ever increasing interest in proportion as piety advances. It was first written, when he was little more than thirty years of age, being withdrawn from public labours on account of ill health, and in almost continual expectation of the glory which filled his soul, and gave him a pen, dipped in its own soft and radiant colours. He was from home, and had no opportunity of consulting any other books than his Bible and Concordance. He afterwards preached the substance of his treatise, in a course of weekly lectures, to his people in Kidderminster; and he printed it in 1650, it being the first of his practical publications. The following is his own account of the circumstances in which it was composed.

"While I was in health I had not the least thought of writing books, or of serving God in any more public way than preaching, but when I was weakened with great bleeding, and left solitary in my chamber at Sir John Cook's in Derbyshire, without any acquaintance but my servant about me, and was sentenced to death by the physicians, I began to contemplate more seriously on the everlasting rest, which I apprehended myself to be just on the borders of. That my thoughts might not too much scatter in my meditation,

I began to write something on that subject, intending but the quantity of a sermon or two; but being continued long in weakness, where I had no books and no better employment, I followed it on, till it was enlarged to the bulk in which it is published. The first three weeks I spent in it was at Mr. Nowel's house, at Kirby Mallery, in Leicestershire; a quarter of a year more, at the seasons which so great weakness would allow, I bestowed upon it at Sir Thomas Rous' house at Rous Lench, in Worcestershire; and I finished shortly after at Kidderminster.

"The marginal citations I put in after I came home to my books, but almost all the book itself was written when I had no books but a Bible and a Concordance; and I found that the transcript of the heart hath the greatest force on the hearts of others. For the good that I have heard that multitudes have received by that writing, and the benefit which I have again received by their prayers, I here humbly return my thanks to Him that compelled me to write it."^{*}

Baxter aimed at no display. He was above it. He reflected, he reasoned, he felt deeply; he longed to communicate to others the emotions of his own soul; his rhetoric was that of his heart, and of the imagination kindled by the inexpressible interest, attractiveness and grandeur of his subject. In the rapidity and force of his movements, you are reminded of the cataract; in his vehement addresses to the conscience, you seem to hear the thunder's reiterated peals; in the glory of the themes he presents, and the benevolence of his spirit, you are cheered as by the beauty and gladness of nature, in summer's loveliest morning. We have, we think, sometimes heard him called the Demosthenes of the English pulpit. He had the native energy, without the secular aims, the pride, the ambition, the elaborate diction, and the studied point of the illustrious Athenian. Demosthenes lived for the earth; Richard Baxter for heaven. The former sought to serve a state; the latter, a world, alienated from God, and perishing in its guilt. "He was," says Dr. Bates, as quoted in Fawcett's Preface, "animated

^{*} Narrative, as quoted by Rev. L. Bacon, in his life of Baxter, pp. 92, 93. "There are few testimonies," Mr. Bacon very justly observes, "to the great intellectual vigour, and the extraordinary industry of Baxter, more surprising than the fact, that 'The Saints' Everlasting Rest,' which at its first publication was a quarto volume of eight hundred pages, was written in six months while the author stood languishing and fainting between life and death."

with the Holy Spirit, and breathed celestial fire to inspire heat and life into dead sinners, and to melt the obdurate in their frozen tombs.—His books of practical divinity have been effectual for more numerous conversions of sinners to God, than any printed in our time; and while the church continues on earth, will be of continual efficacy to renew lost souls. There is a vigorous pulse in them, that keeps the reader awake and attentive.” Again: “To allure our desires, he unveils the sanctuary above, and discovers the glories and joys of the blessed in the Divine presence, by a light so strong and lively that all the glittering vanities of the world vanish in the comparison, and a sincere believer will despise them, as one of a mature age does the toys and baubles of children.” Dr. Calamy says of *the Saints' Rest*,—“This is a book for which multitudes will have cause to bless God forever.” Though its author has been for nearly a century and a half an inhabitant of heaven, it is still travelling round the globe, speaking in the languages of divers nations, and multiplying its conquests of charity. It awakens the sinner; it sanctifies and comforts the believer. It is cheering to contemplate the glorified spirit of Baxter, hailing from day to day the arrival before the throne of redeemed men, who attribute, under God, their conversion, or more rapid progress in holiness, to *the Saints' Rest*, or other productions, of his benevolent and powerful mind. His reward will not be fully attained, till all the elect shall have been gathered home, nor even till the capacities of the saved shall have reached the ultimate bounds of their improvement. Eternity alone can tell the distinguished felicity and honour awaiting those who turn many to righteousness.

Some nominal Christians have affirmed, that Baxter's heaven existed chiefly in his own fancy, and that his “*Saints' Rest*” is little else than a gaudy picture, adapted to excite and allure weak hearts, not content with simple and more philosophical views of the world of spirits.* No wonder

*The following is the representation given by that eminent Socinian, Dr. Priestly, of the situation and employment of the saved in a future state: “The change of our *condition* by death may not be so great as we are apt to imagine. As our *natures* will not be changed, but only *improved*, we have no reason to think that the *future world* (which will be adapted to our merely improved nature,) will be *materially different from this*.” Let the reader compare this with Rom. 8: 17, 18. 2 Cor. 4: 16—18. 5: 1—8. Rev. 22, &c. &c. “And, indeed, why should we ask or expect any thing more? If we should still be obliged to

that they who boast of their *exclusive rationality* as Christians, should make such an objection to the book, since it assumes, from first to last, that there is no holiness and no happiness without a cordial adherence to the method of salvation by mere grace, through a divine Redeemer. If no atonement has been made for sin, if we may be justified by our works, if no Holy Spirit operates effectually to overcome the resistance of the stubborn heart, then, without doubt, Baxter's notion of the nature of religion, and its reward, is the offspring of erroneous speculation, or of enthusiasm. To the devout Christian, however, who studies his Bible, and knows the plague of his own heart, taken as a whole, Baxter's work will seem as convincing in its arguments, as it is solemn, earnest, and resistless in its eloquence. Fawcett's *Abridgement*, which is now in common use, and which has been republished by the American Tract Society, by excluding much that is foreign and comparatively useless, is almost free from exception, as a work designed for general distribution.

In accordance with Baxter's design, we will offer a few thoughts, adapted, we humbly trust, to impress upon our Christian readers the importance of that contemplation on heaven, to which he most earnestly calls them.

The Bible is explicit and urgent in its inculcations on

provide for our subsistence by exercise or labour, is that a thing to be complained of by those who are supposed to have acquired fixed habits of industry, becoming rational beings, and who have never been able to bear the languor of absolute rest, or indolence? Our future happiness has, with much reason, been supposed to arise from an increase of knowledge. But if we should have nothing more than the *means* of knowledge furnished us, as we have here, but be left to our own labour to find it out; is that to be complained of by those who will have acquired a *love of truth*, and a habit of inquiring after it? To make discoveries ourselves, though the search may require time and labour, is unspeakably more pleasing than to learn every thing by the information of others. If the *immortality* that is promised to us in the Gospel, should not be *necessary*, and *absolute*, and we should only have the *certain means* of making ourselves immortal, we should have much to be thankful for. What the Scriptures inform us concerning a future life, is expressed in general terms, and often in figurative language. A more particular knowledge of it is wisely concealed from us."—*Priestly's Sermon on the death of Mr. Robinson.*

"You see, brethren," says Andrew Fuller in his comment on the above passage, "here is not one word of God, or of Christ, as being the sum and substance of our bliss, and, except that mention is made of our being freed from *imperfections bodily and mental*, the whole consists of mere *natural enjoyments*, differing from the Paradise of Mahometans chiefly in this, that their enjoyments are principally sensual, whereas these are mostly intellectual. Those are adapted to gratify the voluptuary, and these the philosopher. Whether such a heaven will suit a holy mind, or be adapted to draw forth our best affections, judge ye."—*Calvinistic and Socinian Systems examined and compared; Letter XIV.*

this subject. "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." Again, "If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth."

To enforce obedience to such injunctions, the inspired volume exhausts the utmost strength of language, in its descriptions of the future and endless rewards of true believers. It promises them exemption from every disappointment, privation and pain; perpetual and complete emancipation from the tyranny of the passions; perfect moral resemblance to the Saviour; uninterrupted enjoyment of the purest, most exalted society to all eternity; everlasting light; the full vision of God and the Lamb; and the most blissful worship without weariness, and without end. "Our light affliction," says the Apostle, "which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." The Greek phrase expresses the highest degree of intensity. "It is hardly possible," remarks Macnigh on this text, "in any translation, to express the force of the passage as it stands in the original. Stephens says of it, *Nothing greater can be said or imagined*. The Apostle about to describe the happiness of the righteous in heaven, takes fire as it were, at the prospect, and speaks of it in a rapture. He calls it not *glory* simply, but *a weight of glory*, in opposition to the *light things of our affliction*; and *an eternal weight of glory*, in opposition to the *momentary duration of our affliction*; and a *most exceeding eternal weight of glory*, as, beyond comparison, greater than all the dazzling glories of riches, fame, power, pleasure, or any thing which can be possessed in the present life. And after all it is a glory yet to be revealed; it is not yet fully known."

With such a prospect opened to Christians, ought they not, by earnest meditation, to make themselves familiar with those scenes of felicity, triumph and glory, on which it is the pleasure of Him who died to redeem them from sin and hell, that they should soon enter? Ought they not as strangers and pilgrims here, whose rest is beyond the grave, to muse, intensely and joyously, on their everlasting inheritance?

The *advantages* of devout contemplation on heaven are manifold.

We should not wholly overlook its tendency to improve the intellectual faculties of man. The mind dilates or contracts, as the objects on which it most frequently expatiates, are momentous or trivial. The mere sensualist, a child of earth, whose god is his belly, becomes incapable of any lofty flights of reason, or nobleness of purpose. The untiring devotee of wealth immures his high-born powers, by which he is allied to the angels, within the narrow confines of a few acres, mortgages, lands, stocks, and bales of goods. To him, the attractions of the New Jerusalem itself consist rather in its pavement of gold and gates of pearl, than in the manifested glory of the Divine presence, its freedom from all moral pollution, its holy love, its fellowship of kindred minds, and the sweetness, joyousness, eternity, and perfection of its worship. The student of natural philosophy, or the astronomer, on the other hand, by their familiarity with the mightiest works of the creation, may be expected to acquire a certain elevation and grandeur of views, corresponding to the stupendous laws and operations, which they are accustomed to contemplate. Genius catches her noblest inspiration, and seems to tread down every thing grovelling, amidst the beauties and sublimities of nature. Her lip quivers with rapture, and her eye darts celestial fire. But are any subjects so vast and glorious, as those which are presented to the survey of faith, in the accumulated wonders of God's heavenly kingdom? Compared with these subjects, literature, politics, and the various pursuits of mere human science, are but the amusements of childhood, or the unmeaning occupations of idiocy. ●

Earthly scenes appear great because they are near, and are not viewed in contrast with the glories of an eternal state. To unbelieving man, the latter are often like mountain tops, covered and concealed by clouds, or lost by distance in the blue horizon; while the former, like the shrubbery, trees and houses of his daily walks, meet him at every turn, and assume a factitious importance from the associations of neighbourhood and protracted intimacy. Faith is the telescope, and meditation the eye, by which we penetrate the clouds, and gaze on the splendours of God's throne. Then it is, that all below the sun is seen in its true littleness. Then, to use the language of the eloquent and pious Wilberforce, "the praises and the censures of men die away upon the ear, and the still small voice of conscience is no longer

drowned by the din of this nether world. Here the sight is apt to be occupied by earthly objects, and the hearing to be engrossed with earthly sounds; but there thou shalt come within the view of the resplendent and incorruptible crown, which is held forth to thy acceptance in the realms of light, and thine ear shall be regaled with heavenly melody. Here we dwell in a variable atmosphere—the prospect is at one time darkened by the gloom of disgrace, and at another the eye is dazzled by the gleamings of glory; but thou hast now ascended above this inconstant region; no storms agitate; no clouds obscure the air; and the lightnings play and the thunders roll beneath thee.”

“Had I a glimpse of thee, my God,
Kingdoms and men would vanish soon,
Vanish, as though I saw them not,
As a dim candle dies at noon.”

Meditations on everlasting rest will inspire us with holy boldness in resisting the influence of popular error, and in contending for the faith once delivered to the saints. It is to be expected, that an earthly-minded Christian, will have a coward's heart. Loving his own repose and popularity, he has no perception of the preciousness of truth. Yet truth is precious. It cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir, with the precious onyx, or the sapphire. No mention shall be made of coral, or of pearls, for the price of wisdom is above rubies. Hence the divine command is, “Buy the truth, and sell it not; also wisdom, and instruction, and understanding.” One great object of our Saviour's mission into this world, was to bear witness to the *truth*. Truth is the instrumental cause of our sanctification; and a full discovery of truth, in its purity and moral loveliness, is a principal, if not the only source of happiness, to saints and angels in the world of glory. Contemplation brings these objects of faith, which the carnal heart most strongly opposes, into the field of our vision; and while it invests them with superlative brightness and excellency, gives to them the vividness and impressiveness of present scenes. With such views, the Christian can no more be indifferent to revealed truth, than he can be regardless of the honour of God, the glory of the Redeemer, the interests of evangelical virtue, and the promised bliss of heaven. He can say with Edwards, “I have loved the doctrines of the Gospel; they have been to my soul like green pastures. The Gospel has seemed to me the

richest treasure ; the treasure that I have most desired, and longed that it might dwell richly in me." As he looks above, and sees the eternal efficacy of the truth there, he deems no lawful means too expensive in maintaining it against the invidious assaults of its adversaries, and in diffusing its sanctifying influence among his fellow men. It was for such a purpose, that apostles and martyrs incurred the loss of reputation, wealth, ease, all that the world calls great and good ; and, instead of complaining, gloried in the sacrifice. For this, a Luther, a Knox, a Whitefield, counted not their life dear to themselves ; and met, undaunted, the ridicule and the frowns of earth and hell.

A clear view of heavenly glory would at the same time cure all the evils commonly attendant on religious controversy. Argument and discussion, in vindication of evangelical principles, will always be necessary, so long as any of the human race shall continue to pervert, deny, or hate the Gospel. In this indispensable and holy war, the only approved weapons are those which are drawn from the Heavenly armoury, and are wielded by love. Such weapons, however, will be used by none, save those who, casting an eye of faith within the inner sanctuary, the abode of the divine presence, rejoice in hope of the glory of God. Men, whose "conversation is in heaven," must instinctively revolt from all unholy means in defending their religion. They need not the arts of low intrigue ; for their trust is in that God, who is the Author of the Gospel. They cannot fail to temper their zeal with kindness and generosity. Bigotry dies away as she beholds the faithful of different denominations and communions, losing at length all their distinctive prejudices, in the enjoyment of a common good, and the untrammelled interchange of thoughts and affections, forever. The pride of opinion is subdued, in sight of the humility of the glorified ; the meanness of sectarian jealousy and rivalry, is seen as it is, in contrast with the nobleness of the eternal union of all the ransomed in Christ their King ; partizan zeal expires, as the gales of Paradise, perfumed with love, are wafted to her sense ; and the harsh voice of anger and contention is lost, amidst the harmonious songs of cherubic choirs, and of "the spirits of just men made perfect." Ye defenders of the citadel of truth ! look to "the glory which shall be revealed ; so will ye not yield

to discouragement when foes increase, nor be in danger from those worldly passions which mingle and lead in every inferior conflict.

The present is an age distinguished for excitability. We behold a chaos of strange and warring principles. We see nations, smaller political communities, and churches of nearly all denominations, driven from their ancient moorings, and borne along by the resistless force of events, to the very vortex of revolution. As we rejoice in the unprecedented advancement of liberty, arts, sciences, we witness, in connection with all this good, a restlessness, and a combined opposition before unknown, against those doctrines and institutions, which are the very pillars of social order and genuine improvement. Radicalism is regarded as identical with the genius of freedom, reform, and the spirit of the age,—this “*spirit of the age*” often meaning little else than a peculiar kind of pride, the rashness of innovation, and hatred or contempt of all that has been sanctioned by the experience and wisdom of former days. One might infer, from the boastings of many a political and theological sciolist, that the essential characteristics of human nature had been changed within the last half century; or that the ancients, whether inspired or uninspired, knew nothing of the intellectual and moral attributes of their species. *Vox populi est vox Dei*, bursts from myriads of tongues, and rolls over a hundred nations. The entire social fabric seems standing upon the brink of a crater; we hear the subterranean roar, and we feel the ground beneath our feet heaving with portentous convulsions. What crimes, what miseries, what wide ruin, may ensue from the rush of the moral elements, already moved to some fierce encounter, we can hardly conjecture. But let us fix our eye on the country above the skies, that rest of the weary, that haven of the tempest-tossed church; and we shall be prepared to contemplate the most extraordinary developments of Providence, not only without fear, but with triumph. When Luther heard of any events peculiarly unpropitious to the Protestant cause, he was accustomed to say to his friends, “Come, let us sing the forty-sixth Psalm.”

Contemplation on heavenly glory is needful to prepare us for the various dispensations of Providence towards ourselves individually, and our friends. We must suffer; it is

the indispensable condition of our existence in this world of mutation and sin. To meet with Christian firmness what is inevitable, is alike our wisdom and our duty. But what shall we do, that we may bear affliction with becoming patience and dignity? Will pride, will philosophy, will mere stubbornness, avail us? Religion alone can carry us unharm- ed and triumphant, through the billows of temptation and sorrow. Pecuniary losses, disappointments in business, sickness, pains, unmerited disgrace, injuries from mankind, and the ravages of death in the circles of earthly friendship, —*all* these may well be borne without a murmur by him, who, with a steady eye, beholds a crown of life waiting for him in heaven, and anticipates a speedy re-union with lamented kindred that have gone before him to glory. See that widow, desolate, forgotten by the world; yet serene and cheerful. Why is she happy? She loves the hand that hath smitten her; she adores, amidst all his chasten- ings, the wisdom, goodness, and faithfulness of her God. But this is not all. She seems to hear the voice of her sainted husband attuned to the melodies of heaven, and to behold his grave, which she has a thousand times bedewed with her tears, resigning its sacred contents at the bidding of the Judge of all. Her husband lives, adorned with glories unthought of here, to die no more. Oh! with what indescrib- able tenderness and love, does she look on her fatherless chil- dren, dear helpless ones, as she relieves her burdened heart in commending them to the more than paternal kindness and care of their father's God!

In a word, affliction has no sting which faith in the pro- mises of God cannot destroy; no tears which the love and hope of heaven cannot dry. And ought not Christians, amidst the darkness and disquietudes of this world, to prove the superiority of their principles, by being "joyful in tribu- lation?" Is not the exhibition of such an affectionate con- fidence required of them, by the very nature of their profes- sion, and the honour of the Being whom they serve? "If one," says Howe,* "should give a stranger to Christianity an account of the Christian hopes, and tell him what they expect to be and enjoy ere long; he would sure promise himself to find so many angels dwelling in human flesh, and reckon when he came among them he should be in the

* Blessedness of the Righteous.

midst of the heavenly choir: every one full of joy and praise. He would expect to find us living on earth as the inhabitants of heaven, as so many pieces of immortal glory lately dropped down from above, and shortly again returning thither. He would look to find every where in the Christian world incarnate glory sparkling through the overshadowing veil, and wonder how this earthly sphere should be able to contain so many great souls."

Contemplation on everlasting rest will prompt to that fervency of devotion, by which all the Christian graces are strengthened and expressed, and the soul walks continually in connection with her God, and in the sunshine of his favour. True prayer always implies fixedness of thought, strength of emotion, and intenseness of aim; and it derives its character in no small degree, from the nature of the objects which engage its attention, and excite its aspirations. The intrusion of worldly or sordid purposes destroys it; it lives only in the atmosphere of spiritual perceptions.

"In regions mild,
Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot,
Which men call earth."

Of all the various objects which awaken the spirit of prayer, what can be more sweet and ravishing than the glories of the upper world? In the light of these, to live for heaven is seen to be the great concern of man. Here is the region of shadows and of dreams; there, the abode of vast and unchanging realities. A boundless ocean is before us; through the clouds which overspread it, we behold ethereal shapes; amidst the gleamings of a faintly discovered brightness, we hear sounds of music, and voices that are unearthly, whispering to us of a love and blessedness which are eternal. We feel ourselves irresistibly drawn towards God, the absorbing centre of faith, love and holy joy; and we pour out our very hearts before him, in all the freedom and energy of prayer, thanksgiving and praise.

It is our worldliness, our distance in temper, designs, and pursuits, from all that is heavenly, which hinders and paralyzes our devotions, and converts our religion into an unmeaning routine of formality. Let us sever the bonds which attach us so strongly to these clods—these images of unreal bliss—fastening our hands on the skies: and we may hope to feel at once the expansive influence of our immortal-

ity, and rise to the grandeur of fellowship with the Father and His Son, Jesus Christ. So it has ever been with those whose affections were set on things above.

Meditations on future glory will especially excite to zealous efforts for the conversion and salvation of our fellow men. As the Christian thinks of his eternal inheritance, he can hardly forbear reflecting on the misery, as well as the guilt, of those who lose the heavenly rest. He would carry the whole world with him to those realms of purity and peace, which grace has prepared for the faithful. At the same time his bosom is warmed with the cheering hope of success, as he prays and labours to reclaim and save the lost. What, within the limits of the promise, may not be expected from that rich mercy, which has provided an atonement, a sanctifying Spirit, and a heaven, for such as are by nature children of wrath? The mere sense of obligation, and the clamorous demands of conscience, can exact at most but a reluctant obedience. The operation of the principles of natural humanity is irregular and uncertain. But a sight of the "sweet fields beyond the swelling flood," gives to the soul angelic wings, in all its toils of faith, and sacrifices of charity. It was when Stephen saw "the heavens opened and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God," that he kneeled down, and prayed with a loud voice for his persecutors and murderers,—“Lord lay not this sin to their charge.” It was with heaven in his eye, that Paul, contemplating the arduous duties of his ministry, could say, “For which cause we faint not, but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.”

The grave, we know, awaits us all; it may be just before us, ready to devour us without a moment's warning; rather we may say, its monitions are continually breaking upon our ear, “Boast not thyself of to-morrow, for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth.” What is so important as preparation for death? The interests concerned are infinite; the injuries, occasioned by a mistake, can *never* be retrieved. To sport with death, like Hume, or to exclude it from the thoughts, or to contemplate it with indifference, betrays the greater madness. The believer, it is true, has committed his soul to Christ; and Christ will never dishonour the confidence which is reposed in his faithfulness and power. But is there no danger of self-deception? Does not our Lord expressly assure us, that he will disown many who profess

to hope in his merits? The believer knows that his heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. He needs such evidence of his adoption, and such views of eternal glory, as will raise him above fear, amidst the conflicts of nature's last agony. How dreadful is uncertainty in such an hour? Familiarity with heaven invests it with such glory, that all the affections leap forth to embrace it; and the kindlings of love towards the objects of the invisible world, afford to the soul the surest pledge of her title to "the inheritance of the saints in light." The Christian whose thoughts have been in heaven, while an inhabitant of the earth, departs from his mortal tabernacle, but to mingle with scenes and occupations already familiar to his faith and most dear to his heart. Let the Christian muse on that "land of pure delight, where saints immortal reign," and his own inheritance there, till he shall be ready to exclaim with Simeon, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace." Here he is a stranger. He has no continuing city below the sun.

"How should he scorn these clothes of clay,
These fetters and this load!"

Baxter's thoughts are derived from the depths of his experience, no less than from the treasures of his understanding. It is not as a man of a poetical fancy, or as a philosopher merely, that he speaks of an existence of holiness and bliss beyond the tomb. He had himself explored with strong faith, and with the affections of a native inhabitant, the mountains and valleys, the verdant fields and vineyards, the brooks and streams, and gorgeous scenery, of the promised land. He had listened to the sound of its waterfalls, the melody of its groves, and the joyous acclamations of the dwellers in its strong holds. He had tasted of its grapes; and many a cluster from its bowers does he bring, to refresh weary and fainting pilgrims on their way thither.

Were the Church more heavenly in her aims, her achievements for Christ would be proportionably increased; and did she think less of this world, as a place of rest, she would enjoy, in greater measures, the earnest of another. It is pitiable to see her very heart engrossed by momentary acquisitions and pleasures, while she professes to believe, that it is her Father's good pleasure to give her the kingdom. Why should not she, the daughter of the Lord of glory, be

satisfied with his favour, and the ornaments prepared for her, by his own gracious hand? Is it becoming in her to descend to the pageantry, amusements, bustle and competition of earthly scenes? One might think, from looking at the church, that the objects of sense had acquired an importance which they did not once possess; and that the success of Christianity depended on the pursuit of wealth and earthly distinction, by those who bear the Christian name. The warnings of the Saviour on the danger of riches seem to be forgotten, or to be regarded as inapplicable to the present state of the world. "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God? It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Are not these the true sayings of God?

Entertaining these opinions respecting this work of Baxter, and of the importance of the subject on which it treats, we rejoice to see it published in such a form as will adapt it to extensive circulation. And we rejoice in this the more, when we consider how many works are now published and widely scattered through the community, which have a directly opposite tendency, and are fitted only to displace from the mind all thoughts and sentiments, which are worthy of its powers and immortal destination! Can it be denied, that much of the popular reading of the day encourages a shallow understanding, flatters a bad literary taste, and adds incentives to the vicious propensities of the heart?

We are not hostile to polite literature; we appreciate its connection with all that refines and adorns society; and we can have no sympathy with the Vandalism, which would proscribe it as a thing necessarily impious. Yet being no worshippers of either poetry or classic prose, we must say that we regard them with unfeigned abhorrence, when they appear as the caterers of vice, or the patrons of infidelity. Genius shall receive from us little commendation, unless we can add to the account of its creations, that it has been baptised in the name of Christ, or at least, that it does not set itself as an enemy to his cause. We are not willing to honour any book which would dethrone the Bible, and strengthen the natural opposition of men's hearts to evangelical holiness. We will not drink, much less will we spend our breath in extolling, the virtues of a deadly poison, though it be contained in a golden chalice. We remember who it is

that has said, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or, what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"

As an antidote, then, to the poisonous publications which are continually issuing from our press, we would recommend to our readers the "Saints' Rest." It will lead them to the fountain of true wisdom—the Holy Scriptures. It will teach them to seek their supreme happiness in the knowledge and service of Him, under whose just and benevolent government we must ever exist. It would be well could it be found in every student's library, in every mechanic's shop, in every merchant's counting house, on every lady's toilet, in the cabin of every vessel which ploughs our rivers or the ocean. With such a work in their hands, the young would be guarded against the corrupting influence of many of our popular fictions, and of the vain amusements of the world. If those who are in the midst of life would save a few moments from their business, and devote them to this work, it would enable them to rise to a higher sphere, beyond the reach of earthly cares and perturbations. Pointed by this work to an everlasting rest in the heavens, the aged and the dying might witness the decays of nature without dread, and find their descent to the grave marked with tranquillity and glory.

ART. VI. REVIEW OF MATTHIAS.

By Rev. C. S. HENRY, Bristol College, Pa.

Matthias and his Impostures; or the Progress of Fanaticism. Illustrated in the extraordinary case of Robert Mathews and some of his forerunners and disciples. By William L. Stone. New-York. Harper & Brothers, 1835. pp. 347.

THIS is certainly an extraordinary narrative. We learned, two or three years ago, through the newspapers and common report, something about the appearance, in the city of New-York, of the impostor commemorated in these pages—the strange influence he had obtained over the minds of two or three gentlemen of wealth and respectability—and the singular style of pomp and luxury in which he was indulging himself at the expense of his dupes. Subsequently we heard but little about his proceedings, until the death of Mr. Pierson, and the trial of Matthias, brought the matter again before the attention of the public. We confess we were not a little surprised to be informed that Col. Stone was about to put out an account of this impostor; for we could not imagine that his story would furnish materials for any thing better than a shilling pamphlet, coming under the same respectable category in literature, as the edifying narratives of Martin the highwayman, Moon the jail-breaker, and similar choice morsels for the appetite of vulgar curiosity. It therefore puzzled us extremely, that a man like Col. Stone should be employing himself upon such a subject. A perusal, however, of a portion of the proof sheets, while the work was going through the press, convinced us how entirely we were mistaken. Simply as a story it had for us all the interest of a romance; and we waited for the remainder with an eagerness we have not recently felt in regard to half-read books, always excepting, however, the inimitable stories of *Captain Marryatt*, for another portion of whose “*Japhet*” we confess a very impatient yearning.

In truth this is a work of more diversified and far higher interest, than any one would be at all likely to imagine before reading it. It is lively and well written, (though we think Mr. and Mrs. Folger's narrative is somewhat too long,)

—and besides being the developement of an extraordinary train of events, it has the graver merit of being a curious chapter in a much larger work, that yet remains to be fully and philosophically written, we mean a History of Religious Delusions.

Although the author tells us he has aimed simply to give a recital of facts, without pretending to philosophize about them, yet he has furnished a most valuable contribution to the philosophical history of Fanaticism. With one part of this subject, as it relates to the doctrine of Divine influence, our attention has been engaged at intervals for several years. The materials for the illustration of it, though widely scattered, are very rich and we cherish the hope of being able to bring them together, at some future day, in a form that may not be unacceptable or useless to the public.

Our notice of this volume must be very cursory. There seems indeed but little occasion for giving a particular account of the contents of a book, of which seventeen hundred copies were sold on the day of its publication, and of which, we understand, four or five editions have already been disposed of in the few weeks that have since elapsed. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a few brief remarks, with an occasional extract; for those who have read the work it would be needless to repeat here the substance of the narrative; and to those who have not read it, we prefer to recommend the perusal of it, as a volume not only highly interesting in itself, but exceedingly valuable for the instruction which it affords, in these days of religious ultraism, folly, and extravagance.

One of the most remarkable things in this narrative, is the developement of a train of events, commencing in the city of New-York, ten years before the advent of Matthias, and while he was unknown and at a distance, which seem, by the strangest coincidence, to have prepared the way for his appearance on the scene, in the spring of 1832, and for the setting up of his extraordinary pretensions, with all the advantages afforded by the wealth and influence of those who had been his forerunners, and then became his disciples and instruments. For ourselves, we are perfectly free to say, that we look upon the strange details of fanaticism, folly and impiety, displayed in this volume, as only part and parcel of the manifestations of a morbid condition of the religious community, which, commencing about a dozen years

since in the western part of the state of New-York, or at least there first decisively breaking out, has extensively prevailed throughout the country.

Although the impostor Matthias is the central figure, around which the events narrated in this volume are grouped, yet we believe every reader will feel that the main interest of the work by no means depends upon the personal history of the impostor himself, but consists far more in the assemblage and series of the disclosures which are here made, and especially as illustrative of the progress and character of that morbid state of the religious community to which we have adverted. One of the most remarkable things, as we have said, is the developement of events that preceded the advent of the prophet in the city of New-York. We will briefly glance at the progress of these events.

It appears from this volume, that a woman was the *fons et origo malorum*, the head and source of the singular series of events that prepared the way for the prophet, and gathered him a people ready for his coming. About the year 1821—22, this lady, whose education and character placed her in a highly respectable rank, and who had but a short time before become a communicant in one of the Presbyterian churches in the city of New-York, began her singular career, in the usual manner in which the beginnings of fanaticism show themselves, by pretensions to superiour sanctity. This displayed itself in the mode, at this day so common, of exceeding censoriousness in the condemnation of the members of the same church, particularly in the matter of female dress. This was the point to which her *reforming* spirit was first principally directed.

Having gained a small band of proselytes, the conversion of the whole city by a system of female visitation was next projected. These new evangelists, like the seventy of old, were to go forth, two by two, into all the dwellings of the city, not excepting the hotels and public boarding houses, and to pray for the conversion of the inmates. One of the first places visited by Mrs. ***, the lady referred to, and one of her associates, was the house of her pastor, for whose conversion they immediately commenced praying, in his presence and within his dwelling. It may seem astonishing to those who remember the Apostolic injunction to women professing godliness, to be keepers at home, and not be seen praying in public, that these ladies could have supposed such

conduct the proper way to adorn their profession ; but they seem to have preferred to follow the impulses of their own misguided zeal, and the instigations of a certain preacher of the name of TRUAIR, whose pretensions and proceedings made no little stir in some parts of the country several years ago, but who has since been silenced and degraded from the ministry by ecclesiastical authority.

The next step was the formation of an association composed of members of several different churches. It was not, however, as before, confined to the "female brethren," but embraced several gentlemen of considerable standing, and some of them of professional celebrity. The members of this association—which by the profane was sometimes called the *Holy Club*—arrogated to themselves more holiness than was possessed by others, and alleged that they came out from their respective churches because of their comparative lack of piety. Step by step they proceeded in fanaticism, until they laid claim to extraordinary gifts in the interpretation of prophecy—to the power of working miracles through "the prayer of faith." They believed also in dreams and visions, and at their meetings related them for comment and interpretation. They did not believe in the special observance of Sunday ; they disliked the institution of marriage, as unfavourable to entire devotion to the service of God ; and some of them even went so far as to maintain that all marriage bonds were dissolved. They believed in their power to heal the sick, by anointing with oil and the prayer of faith, which they attempted in several instances.

"They did not believe in a final day of judgement, but maintained that mankind were judged for their deeds every day. At one of these meetings, when this tenet was the subject of their devotional meditations, a lady-orator became apparently almost frantic. She screamed wildly—for both sexes "prophesied," and their meetings were sometimes very noisy—and danced back and forth across the room, declaring, "This is the judgement seat of Christ—the Judge is now on the throne, and he is judging every one of you *now*."

"They were also Perfectionists. On one occasion, one of the perfect ladies proclaimed, that she was even then standing on the sea of glass, and holding converse with God. She declared that she held sweet communion with him daily—conversing with him 'face to face.' At another meeting, one of the male members declared that he had not had a

single temptation for ten years—dwelling much upon his own perfection, the strength of his faith," &c.—pp. 41, 42.

Such was the association of enthusiasts formed in 1825, of which Mrs. *** was a conspicuous member. This lady, in addition to her other pretensions, now laid claim to special revelations by the Holy Spirit, in regard both to her own personal concerns and the affairs of the church. At this period Mr. and Mrs. Folger, who subsequently figure in the history of Matthias, appear on the scene. About this period Mrs. Folger, then recently become a Christian communicant, came under the influence of Mrs. ***, who soon obtained entire ascendancy over her mind, and led her to the adoption of all her peculiar views about dress, abstinence, fasting, &c. The house of Mr. Folger then became the centre of her operations, though this gentleman himself did not then come into her views. Her influence through Mrs. Folger was, however, sufficiently strong to lead him, in 1829, to take up his residence at Bowery Hill, in the upper part of the city, whither Mrs. *** had, some time previously, removed, and where also several other families and individuals resided, who were her disciples and followers, among whom was the late Elijah Pierson, subsequently the dupe and victim of the wretched Matthias.

"It was here, and in the same year," says Col. Stone, "that the celebrated '*Retrenchment Society*' was devised by Mrs. ***, and organized under the influence of a tract which she wrote, and under her own immediate auspices." In addition to the obligation of a rigid abstinence from all the luxuries, a great proportion of the commonest comforts of life, the members were to fast two or three whole days every week. "This last rule was most rigidly enforced, even upon the tender pupils of a school taught by one of the ladies, who, it is said, were compelled to fast with her, until they would cry for hours after bread and water, until, in fact, in some instances, they were made sick by their abstinence." This Society was not "confined to the small circle of visionary women in whom it originated. It embraced at one time a considerable number of members. Some of them lived in fine houses, in the most fashionable part of the city." They sold all their costly and fashionable furniture, and in other respects rigidly conformed to the rules of the Society,—apparently unaware, however, that consistency required them likewise to give up their costly and magnificent residences, and betake themselves to more modest dwellings.

Mr. Pierson has been mentioned as one of the band of disciples gathered at Bowery Hill. "Mrs. Pierson was one of the ladies attending the multitudinous female prayer meetings in 1825, under the auspices of Mrs. ***, at the house of Mr. B. H. Folger. But it is not known that she gave any other evidence of religious extravagance until about the year 1828." Mr. Pierson had, however, for some time previous to this date, begun to entertain peculiar and extravagant notions, to the great grief of his pastor and religious friends, by whom he was highly esteemed and loved for the uncommon excellence of his character. Mr. Pierson, it appears, must be regarded as a true Christian and an eminently good man; and there is nothing more afflicting in this whole book, than the story of his progressive delusions, from their small beginnings to the entire derangement of his understanding upon the subject of religion; for it seems his judgement on other matters was never impaired. After mentioning the extravagant opinions which he successively entertained, Col. Stone goes on with his account, from which we here give the following passage:

"Among the unsound and unscriptural notions which Mr. Pierson now held, was that of *direct revelation to him of the will of God through the agency of the Holy Spirit*. This belief, or pretension, it will be recollected, was avowed by Mrs. ***, with whom, it must be borne in mind, Mrs. Pierson had been associated as early as 1825. Mr. Pierson was indeed a man of prayer—of habitual, constant prayer; and after he began to entertain these opinions, it was his daily habit to record his religious exercises,—his prayers, and the answers which he received. These prayers were put up upon all occasions, upon every subject of duty or business, for direction in every undertaking, spiritual or temporal, and for every person with whom he transacted business, or was connected in religious duties."—p. 59.

Many of these prayers, with other pious memoranda, are given by the author, who had access to the private papers of Mr. Pierson; and many of them breathe the spirit of the most unexceptionable devotion, in regard to the matter and language of his petitions, without any other trace of fanaticism, than in the notion of special answers communicated by the immediate teaching of the Holy Spirit.

Mr. Pierson went on increasing in his unhappy delusions, until we find him attempting to raise his wife from the dead by the prayer of faith—then conceiving himself

endued with the power of working miracles—set apart also as preacher,—and as having become, in very truth, Elijah the Tishbite. But our limits forbid us to follow the story of Mr. Pierson. Early in the year 1832, another gentleman, still living, who appears in this volume under the initials M. H. S., and who had for nearly two years previously been exceedingly unsettled in his mind in regard to his spiritual state, became an attendant on the preaching of Mr. Pierson, and soon came to sympathize with him entirely in his feelings and pretensions.

In this state of mind, they were not unprepared for the reception of the impostor MATTHIAS, who, dressed in a singular costume, with a flowing beard, presented himself to them on the fifth of May, 1832, and announced his extraordinary pretensions as the Spirit of Truth, come on the earth in the person of Matthias, the apostle, to establish the personal reign of God the Father, which God the Father he himself was.

These pretensions were immediately admitted by the two gentlemen; their houses were thrown open for his reception, and he entered at once upon the almost entire controul of their wealth, which was very considerable. Subsequently Mr. Folger and his fortune, were also brought under the influence of the impostor.

It is not our purpose to pursue the narrative of events after the appearance of Matthias upon the scene. We must refer the reader to the book itself. We have glanced at the train of events which prepared the way for this new prophet, mainly because we wished to direct the attention of our readers to two or three points, which are very distinctly noticeable in this narrative, and which we consider extremely important to be remarked. It will be perceived that this train of events had their origin in a very sincere, but *misguided religious zeal*—a zeal not according to knowledge. Then we perceive the *arrogation of superiour holiness*, accompanied by the *spirit of censure and denunciation* towards others. The *next step* is a false and *fanatical doctrine* touching special revelations, and the immediate teaching of the Holy Spirit. Now what we wish to say is, that we humbly conceive it is just in these particulars, that we find the commencement of almost all fanatical delusions which have ever prevailed in the world; the wildest and strangest of them, we doubt not, if traced backward, would disclose

the same source. Whenever any person, no matter what may have been his previous excellence of Christian character, comes under the influence of *misguided zeal*, accompanied by *spiritual pride* and a spirit of *ensoriousness*, there is the greatest danger of his taking up with some *false and unscriptural notion of Divine influence*; and when this step is once gained, the road is open to all the follies and impieties of the most boundless fanaticism. The earlier history of Matthias himself, as the reader of this book may perceive, illustrates this point. Though this man, from the time of his appearance in New-York, was, we are inclined to think, a wilful and wicked impostor, yet at the outset of his career, beginning with the excitement of his mind at Albany, we are disposed to believe him an honest and self-deluded fanatic; at least we think that, like Cromwell, a large mixture of real fanaticism mingled with his hypocrisy; and perhaps there was a leaven of it, with, possibly, a touch of *insanity*, throughout his whole career, though we are more inclined to doubt as to this latter particular.

We shall not enlarge here upon the dangers of spiritual pride and censoriousness, to which we have adverted; but we wish to make some further remarks upon the doctrine of Divine influence, the fanatical perversions of it, and the strange things that have, at various times, been referred to the Holy Spirit.

The true doctrine concerning Divine influence, we take to be this: that while there is an immediate and supernatural influence of the Divine Spirit, exerted in man in his conversion and in his moral progress, yet *this influence is a matter neither of direct consciousness, nor (much less) of sensation*. It is not directly perceived in its working, but only to be inferred from its effects, and *those effects only which are described in Scripture, as the "fruits of the Spirit,"* and in no individual case, is any one warranted to ascribe any thing to the influence of the Spirit except those fruits. The effects of the Divine influence are indeed discerned in the consciousness, but the influence itself is not a matter of consciousness.

On the other hand, the essence of fanaticism on this subject, consists in regarding the Divine influence as a matter of *direct consciousness*, or, (as a still grosser form of it,) of *sensible* experience; and in arbitrarily holding certain internal frames, states of emotion, or impressions, or bodily

sensations and affections, as the direct working of the Holy Spirit, or as proofs of his presence,—as a part of the work of conversion, or as evidences of it.

If this distinction be given up, there remains no criterion by which to discriminate between the spurious and the genuine in religious emotions; there is no necessary stopping place; and the wildest conceits of the religious Bedlamite may put in their claim to be recognized as immediate Divine inspiration.

We have often deeply regretted that the bulk of the community, who are so liable to be misled on this important subject, should not be better instructed in regard to some parts of human physiology, particularly the laws of the reciprocal influence of the mind and body. If they were better acquainted with the physical principle of automatic sympathy or involuntary imitation, and with the influence of the imagination and nervous sensibility, it would take away in their minds the basis of a vast amount of religious delusion. They would then perceive that multitudes of those phenomena, which they so piously ascribe to the influence of the Holy Spirit, have necessarily nothing to do with it; but may all be explained by the principles just referred to; and that numberless instances of similar effects have occurred, and are perpetually occurring, without any connection whatever with religion. We are indeed "fearfully and wonderfully made," and the connection of mind and matter, and of the soul and the spirit, in man, is one of the most mysterious depths of our nature. Yet, if we cannot penetrate into the recesses of the frame-work, from which the ceaseless evolutions of life and thought are developping, observation can still take cognizance of the phenomena, and is competent to refer them to some general laws. A vast field of deeply interesting enquiry yet remains to be explored. Still, multitudes of facts have been already established in regard to the reciprocal influence of mind and body, which might, if generally known and understood, be of great service in correcting fanatical notions of Divine influence. We can here only mention a few of this class of facts.

In 1780, at St. Roch, in an assembly of young ladies belonging to a Seminary, one of the number was seized with convulsions. The affection spread with such rapidity, that fifty or sixty of the girls were thrown into the same convulsions. From that time it continued to recur and spread

itself, until it was necessary to separate the girls into different schools, and to permit but very few to meet together at a time. In this way, after several weeks, the affection was subdued. Boerhaave gives an account of a similar contagious spread of convulsions in a school of young ladies, which he at length contrived to put a stop to, by threatening to brand those who should be seized by the affection, with red hot irons, which he showed them ready for the purpose. In this way he overcame the sympathetic imitation by the stronger influence (as it proved in that case) of fear. In the medical books, many cases are related of Hydrophobia produced by the imagination, in many instances, by the mere sight of those who were afflicted with it. Heckers' *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, contains some most remarkable illustrations of the propagation of nervous diseases, as the *Tarantula* in Italy, and the *Dancing Disease* of Germany, which for a long time prevailed in those countries, affecting hundreds and thousands of persons in the most extraordinary manner, fostered indeed by many of the superstitious notions current in those days. We are glad to understand that Dr. Babington's translation of this interesting and instructive work is about to be republished in this country.

The history of Animal Magnetism abounds also with curious illustrations of this subject—whether the phenomenon in question be referred, as by some, to imagination and involuntary imitation, or as by others, to a deeper, mysterious, and special principle of our nature. About the facts themselves there can be no doubt, as is abundantly established by the recent report of the Medical Section of the French Academy. Spasmodic bodily affections, magnetic sleep, somnambulism, *clair-voyance*, or the power of seeing, reading, playing at piquet, &c., &c., in state of perfect somnambulism, and with the eyes perfectly closed and bandaged, together with a great variety of phenomena even more strange, are described by the most impartial and competent witnesses, as produced by the magnetizers, and that by mere gestures and motions, made often without touching their patients.*

* About two or three years since, the Medical Section of the French Academy appointed a Committee, consisting of a large number of the most distinguished members of their body, none of whom were believers in Animal Magnetism, to investigate the subject anew. This committee, under the most favourable circumstances, instituted a prolonged, most able and critical exami-

To the same general class of facts belong the cures effected by Valentine Gretrakes, an Irish gentleman, by touching persons affected with divers diseases; also those performed by the metallic tractors of Perkins, which some years ago excited so much attention in this country and abroad.

The history of Witchcraft is another fruitful source of illustration in respect to the bodily affections that may be produced and propagated through the influence of imagination and involuntary imitation, where the requisite conditions of belief in its reality, &c., exist.

It would be impossible here to go into a particular account of the immense mass of facts that might be brought from these and other sources. Some general conclusions, however, may be stated, which these facts go to establish:

1. The contagious nature of various bodily affections—of the kind of some of those referred to—even apart from any mental passion or emotion.

2. On the other hand, also, the tendency of many *emotions*, felt, or supposed to be felt, by one individual, to spread themselves among other individuals present.

3. Again: when the feelings or emotions of a crowd are in unison, or thought to be so, from any common cause, and when at the same time, these emotions begin to show themselves in bodily agitations, the influence is propagated to an astonishing extent, through the inexplicable contagion of involuntary imitation.

4. There is, besides all this, something in the very sight and contact of a crowd, favourable to the exaltation of the imagination, and to the production of such affections. Eyes speak to eyes, and, as Buffon says, "body speaks to body."—Dugald Stewart has mentioned these general statements with considerable illustrations.

From these facts it will appear that if a crowd can be brought together, in circumstances favourable to the excitement of the imagination, and under the influence of some

action of the matter, using every precaution that habits of scientific investigation could suggest in the conduct of the enquiry. Their report consists of a minute detail of the facts and results, without expressing, however, any opinion on the general question as to the existence of a special principle, except only that they classify all those facts which appeared to be susceptible of explanation from generally recognized physiological principles. This report was never published, but a limited number of copies were lithographed for the use of the members of the Academy. It has however been translated and published in England by Mr. Colqhoun of Edinburgh, with an interesting introduction.

common cause—and most of all in connection with *Religion*, especially if there be any considerable degree of credulity or “faith”—you may produce and propagate, to a greater or less extent, almost any form of nervous affection you wish, from the frenzied whirlings of the dancing dervishes of India, to the unknown tongues of Edward Irving; and that without a grain of Divine intervention in the matter.

That these affections are so extensively connected with religion, is doubtless to be explained from the fact, that the religious principle is one of the strongest in man’s nature. Hence the pages of religious history are full of illustrations of fanatical delusion in regard to the doctrine of Divine influence.

In the earlier history of Methodism, under the exciting preaching of Wesley and his fellow-labourers, acting upon the exalted imaginations and nervous sensibility of his auditors, *brought together in crowded assemblies*, convulsions, hysteric cries, fallings down, trances, extasia, and almost every form of cataleptic affection, were produced. These, *being encouraged by the reference of them to Divine influence*, propagated themselves from one to another to an incredible extent. It is a curious fact, in this connection, and well deserving to be noted, that Whitefield always *doubted* of these affections and discouraged them, *consequently they seldom and but slightly occurred under his preaching*. Wesley himself, at a later period, discouraged them, *with a like result*. We cannot here forbear referring our readers to Southey’s Life of Wesley. It is one of the most remarkable, and, in our opinion, one of the most valuable books which this age has produced—replete with almost every kind of interest, and full of practical instruction; and especially on the subject of which we are speaking, it is rich in food for philosophical reflection. No one can candidly and carefully peruse that most excellent work, without deriving clearer and better views of the nature of true religion, of the religious principle in man, and its connection with the other principles of his constitution. No one can read it without being fortified against fanatical delusions, while at the same time he will find every feeling of scorn or scepticism in regard to the reality of internal religion rebuked; he will rise from the reading of it with a clearer perception, indeed, of the errors of Wesley and of the grounding principles of them, but also with a deeper reverence for that truly

great and good man, and many of his eminent coadjutors. We can scarcely conceive of any thing more desirable, than that a cheap edition of that invaluable work should be brought out, and extensively read throughout our religious community at the present day.

Col. Stone has taken a striking passage from Barclay's Apology for the Quakers, which illustrates the effect of involuntary imitation and imagination upon persons brought together in a close assembly, even where nothing is spoken. After speaking of the Divine influence as coming down upon them, and producing "a trembling and a motion of the body upon most, if not all," Barclay goes on to say: "and from this the name of Quakers or Tremblers was first reproachfully cast upon us, which if it be not of our own choosing, yet we are not ashamed of it, but have rather reason to rejoice, in this respect, even that we are sensible of this POWER that hath *sometimes laid hold on our adversaries*, and made them yield to us, and join with us, and confess to the truth, *before they had any distinct or decisive knowledge of our doctrines*; so that *sometimes many at one meeting have been thus convinced*: and this POWER would also *sometimes reach to, and wonderfully work, even in little children, to the astonishment and admiration of many!*" This passage is indeed a very curious illustration of fanatical delusion, in attributing to the Divine influence effects which are referable only to the principles of imagination, nervous sensibility, or involuntary imitation. The persons thus affected by "*the Power*," had, it appears, little or no knowledge of the doctrines of the Quakers, and some of them were little children who could not be acquainted with them. Nor was it at all necessary that they should. Every physiologist and medical philosopher knows, that this sort of affections propagate themselves not only *without* the concurrence of the *will*, in the person affected, but often in spite of its resistance; though, to be sure, the effects of this involuntary imitation are greatly increased, where the imagination is exalted, and the nervous system predisposed, by respect and credulity, or, as the initiated term it, by *faith*. In some cases indeed this *faith* is one of the necessary requisites for the production of the desired results. Hence this word *faith* has always been a term of great significance in the vocabulary of religious impostors and charlatans. Their votaries are constantly impressed with the im-

portance of their having faith ; and the want of it, in some one or other, is dextrously assigned to cover the retreat of the pretenders, in any case of failure. This the reader will see frequently illustrated in this volume, as when the fanatical confidence of Pierson, and others, or the delusive expectations excited by Matthias, were disappointed.

About forty years ago, there was an extensive revival of religion (so called) in Kentucky, connected with the efforts of a class of pretenders to superiour sanctity, zeal, and spiritual illumination. This revival was characterized by a prodigious assemblage of fanatic and most ludicrous conceits and practices, among which were a great variety of bodily affections, mostly however reducible to certain classes recognized among the people, such as the "*falling exercise*," the "*jerks*" or the "*jerking exercise*," the "*running*," the "*barking*," and the "*climbing*" exercise, in which the subjects of them exhibited the various motions expressed in the names. Col. Stone has given some details of this extraordinary delusion, in the last chapter of his volume ; and we may mention here an account which we received from a gentleman of the highest distinction in the literary and religious world. He described himself as present at a religious meeting in that region, at a period subsequent to the greatest prevalence of those delusions, but still before they had passed away. After the preacher had proceeded for sometime in his harangue, and himself and his auditors had become warmed into a considerable degree of excitement, individuals of the congregation began to drop convulsively upon the floor one after another, under the influence of the "*falling exercise*." The gentleman surveyed the scene for some time with the coolness of an unaffected spectator, and although his judgement was not overmastered by the slightest belief of any Divine influence in the matter, yet from the inexplicable influence of nervous sensibility, he found himself at length, in spite of his will, in danger of following the example of those around. He therefore left the room, and went into the open air, to recover himself. He related the case however of three young men, present at one of the meetings on a different occasion, who having less philosophy than himself, became dupes of the delusion. Going one day to the encampment where the meeting was held, they looked on for some time in the spirit of disbelief and mockery ; when turning to remount their horses, they were seized

with the mysterious "*jerking exercise*," which threw them back with great violence every time they attempted to put foot to stirrup. Finding themselves foiled after repeated attempts to gain their saddles, in their amazement and fright, they yielded to the belief that it was the work of God, and surrendered themselves to the full influence of the scenes around them. All these various "*exercises*" were then piously believed by multitudes to be the work of the Holy Spirit. It would have been held impiety and blasphemy to doubt it. We have no doubt indeed that they were as much the work of the Holy Spirit, as many of the *feelings, impressions, and sensations*, which we have heard described, within the last three years.

The truth is that such phenomena, though occurring in connection with the religious principle, and with religious services, have necessarily nothing to do with the Divine influence, either as parts of its work, or proofs of its presence. They are explicable from those other principles of our nature to which we have referred, and religion and religious services are only one of the conditions under which the imagination, nervous sensibility, and imitation, are excited to the production of such effects.

These principles of our nature, however, precisely because they are real and strong principles, and yet not understood, furnish the strong hold of religious impostors, whether they are mere deceivers, or are themselves also deluded. Here is the secret of their power, and of the effects they produce.

Such facts as these should lead us to a careful discrimination of the true Scriptural doctrine concerning Divine influence from all fanatical perversions of it. They may well justify us, also, in expressing our distrust as to the reality of multitudes of those conversions that have been so rapidly made among us, at the present day, by a system of influences, which, in some essential features, bear so strong a likeness to those above mentioned. Nor can it be justly required that we should, at once and without question, allow that the *effects* which follow the labours of some of our most noted perambulating evangelists—the multitudes, namely, of those who "*declare themselves converts*"—have necessarily any thing to do with Divine influence, or are any certain proofs of God's approbation of that general system of doctrine and procedure under which they take place. These effects, as-

sumed as the tokens of the Divine approbation, are, we know, the strong argument of these people, with which they delude the weak, and overawe also the timid, who might otherwise be disposed to exercise their right of "trying the spirits whether they be of God;"—just as if these effects, because they occur in connection with religion, are therefore truly religious! Such a mode of arguing would almost equally put the stamp of Divine approbation upon all the abominations of the Anabaptists of Munster, the Fifth-monarchy men of England, and in short upon every thing most absurd, monstrous, and impious, in the whole history of religious fanaticism.

We are not in the least disposed to doubt, that many true conversions have taken place under the system referred to; but still solemnly believing, as we do, every thing most distinctive and influential in that system to be in its tendency ruinous to souls, and most baneful to the permanent interests of religion, we heartily pray that its credit and authority may soon cease all over the land. It is indeed, we trust, fast coming to this end; but long and lasting will probably be the evils it involves, in the spiritual deadness and desolation that follow in the reaction. The volcanic fires may expend themselves, but their effects will for years be seen in the barren wastes of lava which rolled over the fields and villages. It is mournful that the Past is so little instructive to the livers in the Present. While the human mind is like the pendulum, perpetually swinging from one extreme to the other, there seems also another law of human history, by which the same strange scenes perpetually re-appear in cyclical recurrence, and the same lessons must be impressed from generation to generation. The errors and heresies, the controversies, impostures and fanaticism of one epoch, are, with only slight and circumstantial modifications, essentially the renewal of those of a preceding epoch, and thus backward through the track of history. The notorious Davenport, who appeared in Connecticut about seventy years ago, and exercised such a prodigious influence in multitudes of churches, in the promotion of revival scenes much like those upon which we have animadverted, was but a prototype of the wandering evangelists of the present day. And though this man lived to see and deplore his errors, yet the mischievous effects of them lived long after him. He left the region where his influence was most decisive, a spiritual

waste ; and to this day traces of desolation are painfully visible in the churches of that section. We have no doubt that more than one generation must pass away before the pernicious influences that have been abroad for several years in our land, shall have exhausted all their effects, or before their true character will be fully and generally seen. The indications, to be sure, are now sufficiently clear to the sober observer. The licentious doctrines of Perfectionism are fast getting hold in many places that have been regarded as the choicest spots in Zion, in having been favoured with outpourings of this latter day spirit ; and if credible report be true, these atrocious doctrines have already borne their legitimate fruits, not only in the denial of the Sabbath, and the renunciation of all the positive institutions of Christianity, but in loathsome scenes of sensual indulgence. Yet these things, together with the disorder and anarchy that are abroad—the almost entire destruction of the official authority and exclusive functions of the ministry—the exaltation of the “spirit of the times” above the spirit of Christ—and the reckless and irreverent assailing of the peculiar institutions of Christ,—all these things, we fear, are but “the beginning of the end.” Indeed there is much, in the tone and spirit, the tenets and feelings, the cant and pretensions, which have fallen under our observation, that reminds us of nothing more strongly, than of the atrocious and loathsome fanaticism of the times of the English Commonwealth. In fact these things are all of one family ; and we could listen with as much sympathy and respect to a *Ranter*, or a *Fifth-monarchy man*, of those times, as to a *Perfectionist*, or a disciple of *Truair* or *Burchard*, of the present day.

ART. VII. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE UTILITY OF MODERN
EVANGELISTS, AND THEIR MEASURES.

By REV. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Rutland, Vt.

CHRISTIANITY in its essential properties is endowed with the immutability of its Author. In its fundamental precepts and doctrines, in its spirit and purity, it was designed to be without variableness or shadow of turning. But it is otherwise in regard to the outward form of Christianity, and the methods by which its ultimate triumphs are to be achieved. A few simple means, most wisely adapted to the end, accordant with the true philosophy of mind, and expressly designed to secure to the rightful proprietor the excellency of the power, are explicitly ordained, and intended to be perpetuated to the end of time. But with these limitations the Gospel was left from the beginning to adjust itself to the civil, literary, and political changes of the world. In this aspect the kingdom of peace may be likened to a floating bridge. It rises and falls with the subjacent waters.

The correctness of this view is manifest from the example of the Master, and his Spirit-taught disciples. They neither commenced their mission with a tirade against the manners and customs of society, nor with an onset upon the powers that be. They did not compel the converted master to manumit his slave, as a condition of discipleship; but demanded only that he should treat him with Christian benevolence. They did not oblige the soldier to quit his post, and incur the penalty of martial law, on becoming a soldier of the cross; but simply required him to carry the spirit of the Gospel into his profession. They looked for the extinction of war only in the subjugation of the passions from which it originated, and regarded peace on earth as the *effect*, and not the *cause* of the prevalence of the Gospel. The weapons of their warfare, mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds, were truth and love, wielded in faith, prayer, and patience; and they held up the mirror of their example for the benefit of all who should succeed them in carrying forward the spiritual kingdom. It is quite apparent that Christ intended to direct the attention of his disciples in every age to the spirit of the Gospel, and to admonish them that their efforts in his service if effectual, must

be characterized by simplicity and godly sincerity, and be aimed chiefly at the renovation of the heart, by the force of truth, and the attendant power and demonstration of the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven.

We can never abandon the position, that the means Divinely instituted—the ordinary preaching of the Word, including the proper administration of its ordinances, and the fulfilment of pastoral duties, combined with prayer, faith, and the zealous co-operation of the churches—are sufficient, under the promised agency of the Spirit, to fill the earth ultimately with the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. If the Roman empire, with idolatry woven into the texture of its literature, philosophy and government, fell before these spiritual weapons, are they not still adequate, to accomplish the end for which they were designed? The fact is, that whenever the means of grace which God has appointed are skillfully and zealously employed, the Gospel still, as at the first, exerts immense power.

But while we affirm, that these means are adequate to the end, are sure from divine appointment and the blessing infallibly connected with their proper use, and that on them must be our main reliance, we readily admit, in view of the genius of the Gospel, the example of inspired teachers, and the ever varying phasis of the world, that some measure of discretionary power was intentionally confided to the church in every age. In the specified means of conducting the Christian enterprise, we find no mention, for instance, of Bible, Missionary, Tract, Temperance, and Sabbath School Societies; and yet has not God set to them the seal of his approbation? I know not what fields of usefulness remain to be explored, and occupied by expanding benevolence. This is a soul-stirring era, and will be so recorded in the annals of time. But of this I am sure, that the spirit and the essential doctrines of the Gospel can never be safely contravened; nor may any measures be adopted which, in the quaint but just observation of an old divine, are not “butted and bounded by the word.” The landmarks set up by the hand of God must remain hallowed and untouched in all time; and the anger of the Lord will visit him who attempts their removal. These things premised, I believe that every individual effort and combination of effort consonant with the spirit and intent of the Gospel may be lawfully employed, to accelerate the latter day glory of the church.

But the fact is as notorious, as it is lamentable, that the discretionary power of which I have spoken has been wantonly abused. The ordinances of the Gospel have been robbed of their simplicity, and buried under the parade of human magnificence. The pure word of truth has been sullied by the bigotry of denunciation, the bitterness of invective, the pride of orthodoxy, and the admixture of carnal philosophy. The constitution of the human mind has suffered violence by irrational and prolonged excitement. Numerous expedients have been set in operation for the furtherance of the Gospel, which find no warrant either in the letter or tenour of the Scriptures. It were well if these evils belonged wholly to the record of the past. But they do not. The present age, in its zeal for improvements, has revived measures and doctrines which former generations proved, discarded, and, but for the benefit of their posterity, would have buried in oblivion. There is no new thing under the sun.

Some of the prominent characteristics of the present times which awaken solicitude, are an over scrutinizing rationalism, love of excitement, and innovation. Principles regarded as settled by the voice of antiquity, are now subjected to unsparing revision : and unless we greatly misjudge, not a few adventurers in the various departments of reformation are pushing on to a hazardous extreme. We anticipate much good from this dominant spirit of enterprize,—this “rush of mind ;” but we forebode also many evils. The van of the troop of mischiefs has already made its appearance in the disorder of the churches, the reveries and immoralities of Perfectionism ; and what may be in reserve, it is impossible to tell. But at all events, it is time, in the judgement of reflecting men, to pause and consider.

*Est modus in rebus; sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra, citraque nequit consistere rectum.*

It has become the decided conviction of many, that the labours of modern Evangelists are among the disturbing forces which threaten the ultimate prosperity of the churches. We beg leave, therefore, to bring the general utility of these labours to the test of a candid and faithful examination.*

* About five years ago this subject was brought before the public, occasioned by the proposition to organize a corps of Evangelists, as “helpers” of the pastors in the older settlements. Had the scheme been effected, we doubt not from the necessity of the case, that these helpers must have become *supplanters* of the pastors. The arguments of the writer who exposed the futility of the plan have

The term *Evangelist*, as denoting a distinct grade of office, has lost its original meaning. The order of men specified by this title is enumerated after prophets and apostles, and they received a temporary appointment to preach the Gospel and administer its ordinances, wherever the Holy Spirit should lead them. They visited destitute places and gathered churches among the heathen; but they were not employed either as promoters or conductors of revivals in the churches over which the Holy Ghost had appointed overseers; nor did they "boast in another man's line of things made ready to their hand." Their office terminated, like that of prophets and apostles, and we have now nothing analogous to it, except the trust committed to the modern missionary, and the labourer in places destitute of settled pastors. (Acts 9: 38; 21: 8; Ephes. 4: 11.)

But we will not press the enquiry, why the title of an office is perpetuated after the office itself has ceased, nor why it should be given to those whose field of operation is so entirely different from that originally occupied by Evangelists. We are concerned rather with *things* than *names*. The main question is, whether the labours of those who now bear the name of Evangelists are, on the whole, either necessary or beneficial to churches supplied with regular pastors. I speak not of occasional aid from this source, if circumstances require it. Such men as Wesley, Whitefield, the elder Tennent, and a few others of recent date, may have been needed to rouse the slumbering churches; and God will provide such extraordinary instruments when they are wanted. I shall direct my attention to Evangelists as organized into a distinct, permanent body, and selecting chiefly for their field of labour churches abundantly supplied with the means of grace.

To bring the general utility of these men and their measures to the proper test, it will be necessary to examine the consistency of their operations with the duties and usefulness of stated pastors. In the beginning, churches were organized and overseers were appointed by the Holy Ghost. They were charged, before the Judge of quick and dead, to feed the flock specially committed to their care,—to preach the Word in the sanctuary, and from house to house,—to in-

since been elucidated by monitory facts. We recommend a re-perusal of this candid and judicious article. Review on the employment of Evangelists in our older settlements. *Christian Spectator*, September, 1829.

struct the ignorant, reclaim the erring, visit the afflicted, and to perform various duties, silent as the dew in their influence, and essential to the fruitfulness of the vineyard, although neither adapted nor designed to excite the admiration of the multitude. I shall not stop to prove, that the benefits arising from this Divine institution are necessary to the prosperity of religion. The experience of every age, from the apostles down to the present hour, and the confusion which has invariably followed the subversion of this arrangement, fully demonstrate its wisdom and necessity. No other means than the unostentatious labours and persevering industry of the stated pastor, have ever been devised by which a due proportion of doctrinal instruction, and the consequent symmetry of Christian character could be at all secured. It is not believed that the churches are willing to exchange the services of the pastor, for the benefit of an itinerant ministry. They are not prepared to sever the bond endeared by so many tender associations. Whatever tends therefore, to produce so disastrous a result should be carefully avoided.

We ask now, if the measures at present pursued by Evangelists have not a direct and powerful tendency to disorganize churches, and to dissolve ultimately the pastoral relation? Look back upon the rise and progress of these measures. A few years since an eminent pioneer commenced the work of an Evangelist, going forth without *purse or scrip*, and we doubt not at the special call of Providence, to render his *invited* aid, where a revival was hoped for, or had already commenced. He, and a few who succeeded him, carefully preserved the unity of the churches, and strengthened the hands of pastors by their co-operation, and by yielding them, in all things, their place, as the constituted guardians of the flock. They performed, in fact, pastoral duties, visiting from house to house, arousing the careless, guiding the ignorant, and directing the anxious sinner. Much good was effected by these harmonious efforts of pastors and evangelists. But the introduction soon after of certain innovations upon established order, injurious chiefly in a prospective view, paved the way for numerous evils.

Among these innovations may be mentioned the *Conference of Churches*. By the consent of pastors, meetings were held, conducted by laymen; and two and two, after the

manner of the seventy disciples, were sent forth to prepare the way for the ensuing convocation. The exercises consisted chiefly of exhortation, prayer, and reports on the state of the churches. A few clergymen usually attended, but they acted a subordinate part. Some beneficial results attended these meetings; but they were also an occasion of evil. Imprudent disclosures respecting churches and individuals were made—young converts exhorted with more zeal than discretion—silent prayer was occasionally substituted for audible—pastors made a public confession of unfaithfulness—and, worse than all—were *re-charged by a deputed layman to apply themselves with new diligence to their vocation*. I well remember, that a sensible man, to whom was committed this mis-named duty, feeling the awkwardness of his position, prefaced his charge to a faithful minister with these significant words: "Suffer it to be so now." The spirit of lay-preaching, productive of so much evil, derived great encouragement from this source. Men, occupying a private station in the churches, suddenly became wiser than their teachers. Ignorant of the toils, trials, duties, and responsibilities of the ministry, they went about denouncing every pastor who did not come up to their standard.

The Conference of churches was ere long succeeded by protracted, or *four-days* meetings, as they were more usually called, from the time of their continuance. These were at first conducted with great caution by neighbouring ministers, subject to the direction of the pastor at whose request they were held, and a preparation was expected in each church by fasting and prayer. These meetings have exerted a salutary influence, and may be beneficial still, if they are wisely conducted, and are not prolonged to the disturbance of public worship on the Sabbath in adjacent congregations; the propriety of which we strongly doubt. Such concentrated efforts, however, are in our judgement, best adapted to the scattered population of new settlements, and regions where there are but few stated pastors. *There*, for a season, the great Pavilion, with its banner, Holiness to the Lord, may perhaps be profitably erected. But one fact in regard to protracted meetings is worthy of special notice. Notwithstanding the caution with which these meetings were at first conducted, and the delay in the admission of converts, many, and it is believed an unusual proportion, have been

added to the churches who mistook a momentary excitement for the renewing power of the Holy Spirit. If a comparison is instituted between those who have been brought into the church by *ordinary* and *extraordinary* means, we are confident that a greater number of the latter will be found to have made shipwreck of their profession. Other prominent evils resulting from this source, might be mentioned, but they are visible to every candid observer. Now in repeated instances of late, the *four-days* meeting has grown to a *forty-days* meeting, and here it is hoped has found its ultimatum. During these exercises, the chief *management* has been either assumed by the Evangelist, or of necessity yielded to him; and he performs, in his own irresponsible way, almost all the services. He has his own measures, proclaims the number of converts, accomplishes their speedy admission to the church, and assigns, for the time being, a subordinate place to the pastor in the care of his own flock.

Five years ago, an ardent advocate of the new system said of Evangelists, that, "their *only commission*, so far as it is to come from this world, must be *the favourable opinion of a Christian community*."* It has come to this. The present system of Evangelism, has become well nigh a hierarchy, with its lords spiritual. It is claimed, I am aware, that pastors and churches concur in inviting these promoters of revivals, and harmonize with their measures. This may be true in general, but in many churches lamentable divisions have grown out of the offer of aid from Evangelists. And many a pastor is obliged to yield from necessity, and patiently witness evils that he cannot prevent. Sustained by a minority in his church, he summons fortitude and hope to his aid; but he feels like the care-worn *Æneas*:

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,
Tendimus in Latium.
Talia voce refert: curisque ingentibus aeger
Spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

What will be the final result of protracted meetings as they are now conducted by Evangelists? What effect will these seasons of intense excitement and mental exhaustion have upon the future interests of the church? These are questions of solemn moment; and we are apprehensive that

* *Christian Spectator*, Sept. 1829, p. 424.

they have not been sufficiently examined. Means not expressly sanctioned by the Word of God, should be viewed in their ultimate bearing, as well as immediate effects. We are confident, that many are deceived by *present appearances*, who will become wiser from experience. It is inspiring to see crowds, day after day, pressing into the house of God. Converts, real or apparent, multiply like the drops of the morning. Sinners, callous under the ordinary means of grace, are awakened. Christians are full of faith and joy; and the preacher holds the vast assembly in admiration by his bold and novel manner of exhibiting the truth, and the skilfulness of his movements. Painful doubts, indeed, are revolved in many a mind concerning the *machinery*; but the sensibilities become accustomed to the shock, and fear subsides into the belief that the Spirit of grace is present, and that the *end* will sanctify the *means*. This is the bright side of the scene. But it has also a dark side. How many will lose their zeal when the exciting causes are withdrawn? How many will make a hasty and vain profession? How many adjacent congregations will be broken up on the Sabbath, during the *twenty* or *forty days* convocation? How many will improve the occasion, to violate the Lord's day? How many churches will be prepared for disorganization, and the dismissal of their pastors, from the demand for the so called "revival preaching?" The long meeting at last closes. The chief agent retires. The crowd of strangers disperses. The sick and the exhausted seek for rest. The great congregation has dwindled away to its former size. The children born and cradled in the tempest grow languid in the calm. They have little relish for ordinary food, and crave the absent stimulus. What now is to be done? The *pastor*, if it were possible, must not imitate his *exemplar*. This would be fatal. The Evangelist himself, had he sufficient mental and physical strength, could not pursue his own measures in one congregation for a twelve-month. And if the common means of grace are not adequate to *procure* the reviving influence of the Spirit, they are not adequate to *preserve* its reviving influence when procured by special means. We ask then, what next? Who shall calculate on the benefit of ordinary medicine, after the most powerful has been exhausted?

After revolving these thoughts, we must be permitted to doubt the expediency of committing the churches at all to

the spiritual guidance of an Evangelist. He is under the pressure of constant excitement. He is followed by a throng of admiring hearers, is subject to little responsibility, and probably receives a greater compensation for his services, than three ordinary pastors.* Is he likely under all these disadvantages, to be more spiritually minded than those who are set apart to feed the flock, and better qualified than they are to direct the enquiring, of whose previous character and habits he knows almost nothing? He is like a transient physician in a crowded hospital.

Stated pastors "certainly can impart that systematic instruction—that knowledge of all essential doctrines and duties, which a transient preacher cannot. Acquainted with individuals of the parish and with the community, they can be seasonable, pertinent, and judicious in regard to the amount and kind of ministrations which the occasion requires. But what is the preaching, the counsel, the efficiency, of the passing Evangelist? 'A bow drawn at a venture.' What is his whole ministration? If nothing worse, it too often is a vapour, which appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away."

Look again at the means and measures employed and authorised by the errant Evangelist—the bold and reckless strain of preaching—the scores of requests for prayers for persons and places, presented by males and females—praying for individuals by name, in an irreverent manner—the urging of *immediate* choice, and the immediate public announcement of it—the unmeasured bitterness of opposers—the entering and retiring crowd—we say, look at these scenes to which we allude, only because we tremble for their results, and then enquire, how can pastors and churches maintain their ground under the disorganizing effect of such influences?

A voice of admonition has gone forth from those sections where these measures have been tried, and thoroughly tested by time. A correspondent writes, that the ministers of five churches were dismissed soon after the labours of an Evangelist. We state the fact without comment. He assures us

* The amount of donations received by Evangelists would not have been noticed, but for the fact that men indifferent to religion have turned the circumstance to the injury of the cause. The ascertained sum received by an Evangelist in one society, and that not the largest, would exceed *two thousand dollars* a year, exclusive of board. We make no complaint of this liberality; but could wish that the poor pastor, struggling with pecuniary embarrassments, might be remembered by these generous donors.

also that in one church, where *a hundred converts* were proclaimed, but were not immediately added, because they had no pastor for more than a year after the Evangelist left them, not *one* had made a profession. Another correspondent who speaks from experience, says that the present system of Evangelism divides churches and congregations into parties, in favour of, or against, the Evangelist and his measures.* It sets up as to matter and manner, a standard of preaching which the pastor can neither imitate nor avoid without creating dissatisfaction. It fosters, in the excitable and ignorant, a disrespect for the constituted guardians of the churches, and a spirit of censoriousness towards good men who do not enter into their views. It fosters in churches an undue dependence on *men* to produce revivals, and thus prevents their entire reliance on the Holy Spirit. It tends to substitute periodical excitement for growth in grace and a strait-forward performance of practical duties. The proof, in short, is abundant that the labours of our modern Evangelists are irreconcilably at variance with the duties of settled pastors.

But we have also the testimony of the past. All the essential measures animadverted upon, were tried in the great revival of 1740 in New-England, which was succeeded by a spiritual dearth of half a century. "A spirit of bitterness and denunciation went forth against all who hesitated to adopt the *"new measures."* In prayer, the solemnity and awe which become sinful beings in the presence of their Maker were exchanged for profane familiarity, revolting personalities, and disgusting vociferation. In preaching, decency and common sense were outraged in the perpetual effort to produce *effect*—to excite and inflame the passions. Erroneous or defective standards of personal piety were set up. The evidence of conversion was made to rest on heated zeal, sudden revelations of light and joy, forwardness to exhort and reprove others; and not on that spirit of humility and self-distrust which are the surest tests of Christian character.†" "In prayer, besides their shockingly irreverent familiarity with the Almighty, they not unfrequently trampled on the duty by mentioning individual persons, and interceding for them by *name*, as opposers of the good work."‡

* The present compared with the past condition of Berkshire county, Mass., is full proof of this fact.

† Christian Spectator, Sept. 1829.

‡ Ibid. June, 1830.

Let us hear the voice of that great and good man, Pres. Edwards. In his *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New-England*, he describes the errors which resulted in so long a train of evils. "Some have been bold in some things that have really been errors, and have gloried in their boldness in practising them, though condemned as odd and irregular. And those that have gone the greatest lengths in these things have been by some most highly esteemed, as those that come out bold for the Lord Jesus Christ, and fully on his side." "There is also a great temptation to an *assuming behaviour* in some persons: When a minister is greatly succeeded, from time to time, and so draws the eyes of the multitude upon him, and he sees himself flocked after and resorted to as an oracle, and people are ready to adore him, and to offer sacrifice to him, as it was with Paul and Barnabas at Lystra, it is almost impossible for a man to avoid taking upon him the *airs of a master*, or some extraordinary person. A man had need to have a great stock of humility and much Divine assistance to resist the temptation." "Another wrong principle from whence have arisen errors in conduct is, that whatever is found to be of present and immediate benefit, may and ought to be practised, without looking forward to future consequences. Some persons seem to think that it sufficiently justifies any thing that they say or do, that is found to be for their present edification, and the edification of those that are with them. Indeed in things that are in themselves our duty, being required by moral rules, or absolute, positive commands of God, they must be done, and future consequences must be left with God; our election and discretion takes no place here: But in other things we are to be governed by discretion, and must not only look at the present good, but our view must be extensive, and we must look at the consequences of things. It is the duty of ministers especially to exercise this discretion.— And particularly ministers ought not to be careless how much they discompose and ruffle the minds of those that they esteem natural men, or how great an uproar they raise in the carnal world, and so lay blocks in the way of the propagation of religion. This certainly is not to follow the example of that zealous Apostle Paul, who though he would not depart from his duty to please carnal men, yet wherein he might with a good conscience, did exceedingly lay out himself to please them, and if possible to avoid raising in the

multitude prejudices, oppositions, and tumults against the Gospel; and looked upon it that it was of great consequence, that it should be if possible avoided. (1 Cor. 10: 32, 33; Rom. 14: 19; 15: 1.) I believe that if the rules of Christian charity, meekness, gentleness, and prudence had been duly observed by the generality of the zealous promoters of this work, it would have made three times the progress that it has, i. e. if it had pleased God in such a case to give a blessing to means in proportion as he has done."

"Under this head of carelessness of the future consequences of things, it may be proper to say something of introducing things new and strange, and that have a tendency by their novelty to shock and surprise people. Nothing can be more evident from the New Testament, than that such things ought to be done with great caution and moderation. Persons that are influenced by an indiscreet zeal are always in too much haste; they are impatient of delays, and therefore are for jumping to the uppermost step first, before they have taken the preceding steps; whereby they expose themselves to fall and break their bones. It is a thing very taking with them to see the building rise very high, and all their endeavour and strength is employed in advancing the building in height, without taking care withal proportionably to enlarge the bottom, whereby the whole is in danger of coming to the ground; or they are for putting on the cupola and pinnacle before they come to it, or before the lower parts of the building are done, which tends at once to put a stop to the building, and hinder its ever being a complete structure."

Other evils are noticed by this eminent divine, such as the promulgation of the doctrine,—“an occasion of some mischief and confusion,”—that “external order in matters of religion and use of the means of grace is little to be regarded;”—and the error which “some have been in danger of, that ministers, because they speak as Christ’s ambassadors, may assume the same style, and speak as with the same authority that the apostles and Christ did.” The interruption of family worship is also noticed, as having “been made too light of.”

I wish to submit to the reader one more extract from Edwards: “We go too far when we look upon the success that God gives to some persons, in making them the instruments of doing much good, as a testimony of God’s approbation of those persons, and all the courses they take. It is a

main argument that has been made use of to defend the conduct of some of those ministers, that have been blamed as imprudent and irregular, that God has smiled upon them, and blessed them, and given them great success, and that however men charge them as guilty of many wrong things, yet it is evident that God is with them; and then who can be against them? And probably some of those ministers themselves, by this very means, have had their ears stopped against all that has been said to convince them of their misconduct. But there are innumerable ways that persons may be misled, in forming a judgement of the mind and will of God from his providence. God was pleased in his sovereignty to give such success to Jacob in that which from beginning to end was a deceitful, lying contrivance of his, that in that way he obtained the blessing. God was for awhile with Judas, so that he by God's power accompanying him, wrought miracles and cast out devils; but this could not justly be interpreted as God's approbation of his person, or his thieving that he lived in at the same time."

Every sound divine will concur with Edwards, that *success* is not certain proof that God *approves* of men and measures. We doubt not that most Evangelists are pious men, and sincere in the belief that Providence has called them to their work. But we are confident that much of the so called success which attends their measures, may be accounted for from natural causes, and that the good is done at too much cost. It is believed that they have mistaken the path of duty by selecting for their field of operation, churches supplied with judicious pastors and sufficient means of grace; and that the churches who thus employ them will in the end sustain injury. Pastors adjacent are best qualified to aid each other in protracted meetings, and the churches are not justified in employing a surplus ministry, while the world is famishing for the bread of life. Pastors can harmonize with each other; but in general they can never harmonize with the present movements of Evangelists. If they can, we may soon count upon the dissolution of the pastoral office. Our chief reliance must be on the ordinary means of grace, made effectual by the agency of the Spirit. The general prosperity of religion must depend on the cultivation of individual piety, and the steady shining of Christian light. The path of the just, is as the rising sun, brighter and brighter, to the perfect day; and not like

the meteor's flash; nor is *growth in grace* synonymous with a *periodical religion*. It is lamentable that every revival, that of Pentecost excepted, has been followed by spiritual death. If the churches will not do their duty without a reliance on *extraordinary* means of grace, God ere long will suffer these means to become a scourge, or cast them away, as he did the idolized serpent of brass, and confine his people to those *ordinary* means with which he has infallibly connected his blessing.

I have endeavoured to exhibit my views on this subject candidly, but fully and fearlessly. Wherein I am wrong, I shall rejoice to retract. But if I have uttered any degree of truth, I pray that pastors and churches may "read, mark, and inwardly digest" the same.

ART. VIII. REVIEW OF VAN DYCK ON CHRISTIAN UNION.

By Rt. Rev. B. B. SMITH, Bishop of the Diocese of Kentucky.

Christian Union, or an Argument for the Abolition of Sects;—By Abraham Van Dyck, Counsellor at Law. New-York, D. Appleton & Co. 1835. pp. 221.

WHATEVER may be thought of the merits of this work, its appearance may safely be regarded as one of the signs of the times. The echo has hardly died upon our ears, of almost universal acclamations in favour of the division of Protestant Christendom into sects. But here we listen to a far more correct note of warning against the prodigious evils of so unchristian a state of things. And it is scarcely less remarkable that this first note is sounded, not from the other side of the Atlantic, where the principle of subdivision has been tested only in its milder forms, but from America, and from a section of Western America, where it has been experienced, one would think, on a scale exaggerated enough to satisfy the wildest advocate for the peculiar benefits of

united action amongst adverse and contending sects. This fact alone may be hailed with humble gratitude to Almighty God as one of many indications that America, in its influence over those who profess and call themselves Christians, will be most auspicious in numberless respects ; not only by presenting an unobstructed field upon which Christianity may exert her highest energies ; but also by giving scope to whatever elements of evil may have wrought themselves into its frame-work to manifest themselves suddenly in their more baleful forms, so as to compel the earlier use of appropriate remedies.

This thought has often forced itself upon our attention, when we have contrasted the far greater evils of endless subdivisions amongst Christian people in new countries, with the milder forms in which they manifest themselves in old and well established communities. Where population is dense, and causes long in operation have served to bind together a vast majority of the people in the support of a preacher of some one of the orthodox denominations, the evil is hardly felt to be an evil, and can easily be tolerated. But where enterprise and emigration have brought them together in a small new village at the West, men of all shades of religious opinion—representatives not merely of the leading sects every where scattered through the country, but also furious advocates of some two or three splits and subdivisions amongst all these sects ; how they are ever to be brought together to erect a suitable place of worship, or to sustain Christian institutions upon a respectable and permanent footing, is a proposition which no modern inventor has yet had sufficient sagacity to solve. In such a state of things, Christianity must grovel dishonoured in the dust.

But we hold it to be impossible that evils so appalling and wide spread, can fail of working their own cure, and of opening the eyes of all dispassionate and truly benevolent Christians, as the eyes of the author of the work before us were opened, to the greatness of the evil of disunion, and the imperative duty of all Christian people to agree in the unity of the church. Here in America, where the curse of sectarianism has been the most bitter, its cure will be most sudden and most complete !

How the sentiment ever gained currency that sectarianism, is, upon the whole, a blessing, is utterly inconceivable !

Kindly dispositions must have led men to apologize for the prodigious evils of this system, or prejudice must have kept them stone blind, otherwise they never could have conceived that the base and low-born principle of emulation, (the only consideration adduced in favour of sectarianism,) could compensate for the innumerable evils of the spirit of party.

Volumes would ill suffice to unfold the evils of disturbing that unity, in which the Saviour prayed, that all his disciples might be bound together. A mere summary of those evils would cover too many of our pages with the blackness of darkness. It ministers food to pride and self-importance, it encourages upstarts, it magnifies the merest trifles into saving points of faith, it eats out the heart of personal and family religion, it divides families and convulses communities, it saps and undermines the due influence of the ministry, it encourages the spirit of insubordination and misrule, it alienates and embitters against each other the best of Christians, it strengthens the hands of the ungodly and loosens the loins of the church, it encourages the contempt of the blasphemer and hardens the heart of the infidel, it wastes and misdirects the energies of the church, fills Christendom with mourning, and covers it with dishonour, whilst it abandons the unenlightened heathen to their own forgotten and unpitied miseries. Sectarianism is one of the master devices of Satan. It goes farther than any other influence, perhaps, in keeping real Christians from that fulness of growth and vigour to which, without it, they might attain; stands directly in the way of the conversion of the multitude in Christian lands; presents Christianity to the heathen in a mutilated and degraded form; and fritters away or paralyzes the energies of Christians for evangelizing the world. It may almost be questioned which yields the adversary of souls most victims,—a debased and corrupt form of Christianity, or Christianity deformed by the curse of sectarianism!

Most of the remedies pointed out by Mr. Van Dyck for these evils, are mere expedients and palliatives. It could hardly be otherwise, since he has not even attempted to point out the causes of division. That mind to which God in his providence and by his Spirit, shall reveal the true causes of the evils which exist, will, most likely, become the honoured instrument of exhibiting the true remedy. God only knows whether the deep seated and true cause has ever

yet been fully discovered. And it may be reserved for some champion of the cross, more honoured and more happy than Luther or Cranmer, to usher in a new reformation, the effect of which shall be to restore the church to its primitive oneness and glory.

We have not the presumption even to dream that either of the causes about to be disclosed, is that one great secret, but true cause of all this difficulty, upon the discovery of which the remedy must depend. But discussion, in the spirit of candour and sincere humility, cannot have the effect of heaping more rubbish upon these causes where they lie concealed; but may, on the other hand tend somewhat towards removing a little of the rubbish, and to bringing us nearer to laying our hand upon the great cause.

It would be aside from our present purpose, to attempt to trace the cause of divisions and dissensions in the churches to the self-love and restlessness of base and ambitious men, or the impatience and headiness of mere novices, or to the pride and wilfulness of the human heart. The attempt is, to point out some of the nearer and more palpable causes in which these elements of evil, belonging to our common nature, have betrayed themselves.

Has not the time come when the enquiry may safely be pursued by Protestant Christians, whether one of the grand mistakes of the Reformation were not separation from the church, instead of reformation in the church? Might not all that patient perseverance, and humble energy which distinguished the very eminent saints of that day, if exerted long enough within the church, have prevented in the end any separation from it? might they not have resulted in the entire removal of all material error, either in doctrine or practice, which had been gathering around primitive Christianity during the space of more than a thousand years? It would seem that a return to those outward forms and symbols of our faith which prevailed in the earliest and comparatively uncorrupt ages of Christianity, must yet be the standard after which all Christians must agree to copy. How much better would it have been to have returned to these standards without ever having violated the unity of the church!

May we venture upon another fundamental enquiry? Was it wise to attempt to add to the brief, general, comprehensive creeds, by which, down to the time of the Reforma-

tion, Christians were content to regulate their faith? Has any thing been gained by spinning out the standards of faith into all the more minute ramifications of metaphysical and polemic theology? May not the thousand-and-one splits amongst Protestant Christians, on points of doctrine, be mainly traced to this fundamental mistake? Agreement in essentials and freedom in unessentials, is a wise axiom. Has it been the leading axiom of doctrinal sects? The knife which divides the polypus cannot be more prolific, than that knife which has been so much in use, in cutting off every member from the church who differed in any thought from some standard, by which the operator has been pleased to try his opinions. An unnatural effort to keep men's minds pared close, in order to conform to a particular creed, has led to more numerous and far wider departures from it, than could otherwise have taken place.

It would be venturing on still more delicate ground were we to ask, whether the effacing of the scriptural and primitive distinctions between clerical and lay officers in the church has not, by lessening the respect for the sacred order, and fostering a spirit of misrule and insubordination, greatly tended to the multiplication of sects? When the authority of proper officers ceases to be recognized, and the respect and obedience due to them are subverted, who can predict what endless discords may ensue? The tendency of this evil is manifestly to be traced in the far greater number of subdivisions amongst those sects, by whom the clerical order has been the most completely degraded.

It will be perceived that these three causes are of a general and permanent nature; and they are the rather adverted to, on account of a tendency too generally prevalent to refer these evils to casual, local, or temporary causes. We perceive as plainly as others can the operation of these latter causes, and we deplore them as devoutly. And indeed we know not but a summary of them ought to be sketched, for the sake of the unsuspecting. But we have felt solicitous in the present article, of directing the attention of reflecting men to the main and more influential causes of the divisions which abound among us.

Amongst the local and temporary causes which have aggravated the evils of sectarianism in our country, may be mentioned the radical spirit of the age, the fever for excitement and change, the prevailing disregard for office, and

contempt of government, the violent impatience of restraint, and the almost universal desire of power. These tendencies to evil have been rendered more precipitant, by the cast of education given to religious teachers, bewildering them with nice and useless doctrinal distinctions, diverting their studies from the history of the church, and inflaming them with impatience for immediate results, instead of teaching them to lay deep and well the foundations of a future and permanent increase. But enough of this.

Let us hasten to the most important practical part of the subject, the suggestion of remedies. And here it is also—aside from our object to point out the one grand remedy—THE OMNIPOTENCE OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY, because we are not penning an exhortation, or dreaming of the time as already come when all Christians shall be perfect Christians; but we are endeavouring to bring out practical suggestions, which may meet the exigencies of the present times, taking Christian people as they are.

And thus are we brought precisely to the knotty point of our subject. All are agreed that disunion exists and is increasing to a frightful extent. Most men are becoming sensible that such divisions are grievously unchristian and pernicious. Many think themselves quite prepared to adopt any effective remedy which may be proposed. But *what shall be done, what that remedy is*, we have found comparatively few who are quite prepared to determine.

Preliminary to the discussion of this topic, the great question arises, what sort of a union amongst the followers of Christ, should be proposed? Shall they be called upon to unite, in some way or other, as they now stand divided, or are they bound to agree in one outward form of Christianity? Mr. Van Dyck, and multitudes with him, appear to entertain no other idea of union amongst Christians, than an agreement that they shall not bite and devour one another. For our part we most explicitly avow our conviction, that every attempt to put a stop to the dissensions and subdivisions which distract the church must forever prove futile, until Christians are agreed IN ONE OUTWARD FORM OF CHRISTIANITY. We have no room to pause for unfolding in full our reasons for this opinion. They are briefly these however. Our Saviour Christ in his last prayer for his disciples, and St. Paul in frequent arguments in his epistles, refer to the ONENESS of the church—and at that period no

idea could have been conveyed by their language, but a church one in form, as well as in spirit. The earliest and purest writers of the church employ language precisely similar, and by the unity of the church, always mean unity in form and practice, as well as unity in doctrine and spirit. Common sense can repose with satisfaction on no other idea. Outward Christianity, with the multitude, is the whole of Christianity. Disunion in practice, is disunion in fact. And to talk about union in feeling and spirit, whilst there is disunion in fact, is about as wise as to exhort those to love one another, between whom some occasion of deadly feud actually exists. This common sense principle is sufficiently tested, by asking contending sects in Great Britain and America, how they can present one Gospel to the people of China, without a previous agreement in what outward form Christianity must be sent to them?

The hopelessness of such a union is the great argument against it. But is it any more hopeless than the triumph of Christianity over the tempers of men, whilst actual occasions of difference are left unremoved? Is more grace necessary to guide the understanding to right results, than under the most unfavourable circumstances, to regulate the affections of the heart? We look only to a Divine influence controuling the thoughts and hearts of men, to lead them into all truth, and to bring them back again to the unbroken unity of the church. Is it too much to hope that under this influence the minds of all good men will be guided into all truth?

But when the preliminary question is settled that, in order to heal the divisions amongst Christian people, there must be a return to one outward form of Christianity, a much more difficult question occurs, what that form shall be? Shall it be any one of the existing forms exactly as it is? shall one of the best of these be modified so as to approach more nearly to some supposed perfect standard? shall the excellencies of each be chosen and formed into an entirely new model, avoiding all the evils of those which now exist, and combining all their advantages?—or shall it be abandoned to chance, or left to expediency to determine what that form shall be? Neither of these methods will bear the comments of common sense. Under either of these suppositions it would be impossible to put into the hands of every honest and good man precisely the same cue, with the perfect confidence that it would lead him, upon principle, to the same results.

As inductive men we do not like to state what that principle is, in the form of an axiom; and yet we know not how it can better be stated than in the words of Tertullian: "Whatever is first is true; whatever is more recent is spurious." In other words, we must go back to that period in the church when it was as free from corruption in doctrine and practice as it can well ever again become before the millennium; when the church did appear in absolute oneness of outward form. By correct methods of investigation, we must ascertain what that form was, and with willing minds and hearts, we must agree, in all essential respects, to return to that unity.

Here enough is fixed and permanent to satisfy the honest enquirer. Here all is plain, for facts and truth become the objects of search. And it has appeared to us one of the strangest anomalies of the human mind, that so much which belongs to our common external Christianity should universally be received by Protestant Christians upon this only correct principle, and yet so many disputed points, involving the most disastrous consequences, should never be brought to the test of the same principle.

Is it important that Christians should agree in one Bible? Might the most desolating and disastrous consequences result from controversies respecting the books which go to make up this one Bible? Would it prove fatal to Christianity to leave the determining of this question to caprice, or expediency, or chance? There Christians have done well in agreeing upon those sound principles of investigation which lead them to substantial and sufficient agreement, what the Canon of Scripture is. The principle is correct, and therefore all honest minds rest satisfied in the same results. Abandon the question of the oneness of the Bible, to be agitated and kept afloat on the perturbed ocean of expedience, as the question is respecting the oneness of the church, and very soon we should have amongst us almost as many books claiming to be Bibles, as we have sects claiming to be churches.

And what are the laws of evidence, guided by which all Christians come to such admirable agreement as to the Canon of Scripture? Do we settle that grave point by appeals to the Scriptures alone? Do we require a "thus saith the Lord," for the admission of any book within the compass of the Bible? If not, how may the method of investigation, in few words be stated?

We select some period of Christian antiquity by universal consent antierior to great corruptions ; and in order to be quite safe, antierior to the existence of great causes tending to corruption ; the year 300 for example, previous to the conversion of Constantine, or the year 250, when the documents of the then existing Christianity were abundant, or the year 200, even when men were living who had conversed with the disciples of John ; and we ask, what books were received by Christians every where, and with one consent, as sacred books ; and these and no others we admit into our Canon. Then, with utmost care, we look into every previous writer, for concurring, or for opposing evidence. Finding nearly every thing clear and satisfactory, we finally repair to the books of the New Testament themselves for incidental and internal evidence, to endorse for, and confirm the whole. And here we rest satisfied, that we have grasped the TRUTH.

What hinders the application of precisely the same rule, which we apply to the integrity of the one Bible, to the question of the one church ? Here there is some change of subject as to a few details, but not as to principle. Both are outward matters, inseparable from Christianity. Both involve a great variety of facts, and the question can never be settled in either case except by an appeal to facts.

Is it then too much to hope that the progress of theological learning, stimulated by the evils of sectarianism, and guided by humility, true piety, and still increasing freedom from prejudices, will ultimately lead the best men, and the best ministers in our country to the adoption of correct methods of investigation, in order to restoring the unity of the church ? If here and there a ray of light has been scattered through those pages, we should be most thankful if we could concentrate every one of them upon the sentence ;—that men accustomed to investigation will be brought to agree in some external form of Christianity, just as soon as they are agreed as to the methods of investigation by which the truth of that one form may be ascertained !

We have purposely excluded every sentence which might even imply in what direction these plain principles might guide us. With us it would matter nothing to which of the existing denominations they would conduct ; or what modifications they would demand of each. Nay it would not startle us at all, were they to point out some outward form

of Christianity, buried and forgotten for fifteen hundred years. By following principle, we are quite fearless where we are conducted. We have only to hope and pray that the same spirit may be given to every enquirer, and that every candidate for the ministry may give the subject the attention which its importance demands, and then we shall all soon rejoice together, as members of one body, in the unity of the spirit and in the bond of peace.

It concerns us less than we can express, whether these opinions are regarded as foreign to the subject, or exceedingly new and strange. When unfolding great principles, praise or blame are alike indifferent. But far different are our feelings with regard to the place which we could wish that these principles might occupy in the minds and hearts of our most prayerful enquirers, and our leading theological teachers. To them, not the article, but the principles upon which the article is based, are most solemnly commended, in the name of God, with the earnest entreaty that they may be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, that their fallacy, if any is to be found in them, may be exposed, or if not, that their correctness may be avowed, and straightway applied to practice. For many years, ever since that return to a better state of religious feeling, out of which the chief missionary efforts of Great Britain and America have grown, and more particularly since the great general societies, for the distribution of Bibles, religious tracts, &c., have sprung into existence, the subject of greater union amongst Christian people has been much discussed. And for a time it was confidently anticipated, that revivals of religion, and co-operation for great objects upon principles of almost boundless toleration, by effacing the distinctions amongst sects, and leading their respective representatives to bury their animosities, would, in the end, bring Christians to be much more of one mind. We rejoice to bear testimony to the hallowed Christian influences which owing to these causes, during short intervals, have evidently filled the hearts of the best Christians in the land. But the indications of any tendency to greater practical union from these causes, if it ever existed any where but in the imaginations of good and ardent men, have long since passed away. We know of none who continue to look to what have been called the great national societies, or to such revivals of religion as of late have run over the land, as sending forth

one ray of hope that the church will soon be restored by their means, to greater unity and love. On the contrary, the bad spirit seems to be converting these mighty engines, into the readiest instruments of his will, in creating more divisions, and more wide spread disorders.

We must look abroad, therefore, for other and better influences, which we may hope are tending, and that God will overrule, to the desired end. That there is an actual increase of the spirit of primitive Christianity amongst us, notwithstanding the increase of fanaticism and infidelity, is a fact which cannot be questioned. And we may rest assured, that just in proportion as primitive Christianity pervades the hearts of men, will it become more and more easy to bring them to unite in primitive forms of Christianity. There may be some religion where sectarianism prevails. But just in proportion as religion soars above and triumphs over sectarianism, will the one church prevail in its primitive glory.

We have already interwoven the sentiment with the whole of this article, that the exaggerated and frightful evils of sectarianism amongst us, will shame and compel all good men, to seize fast hold upon principles which must lead them to agreement. The multiplication of sectarian theological seminaries, in the end, must hasten this result. For, in proportion as men become truly humble and teachable by greater theological attainments—as they occupy more commanding points of view, for overlooking the desolating contests between Christians—and as the responsibility of training the champions of their party for the time to come weighs more heavily upon their consciences,—just in these proportions will they be compelled to become modest, distrustful of themselves, and obedient to the guidance of correct methods of investigation. Let the professors of all our Theological Seminaries apply head and heart and hand to the discussion of this subject, having no object in view but truth, ready to go any whither, if only guided by principle; and as to any remaining differences amongst them, they might as well make a faculty of one school!

It would seem, also, as if Providence were shutting up the advocates of scriptural and primitive Christianity to the necessity of uniting against a common foe. Radicalism, infidelity, and fanaticism seem to be making common cause, and to be raging with more than ordinary fury against the Lord and against his Anointed. It will be a madness in the

friends of pure religion past conception, should they fall in the contest, through their own internal dissensions.

A similar constraint presses upon them in reference to the present posture of the missionary enterprize. At first, the salvation of souls from amongst the heathen, was the great and almost exclusive object of the missionary. But the time has now come when the few scattered bands of converted heathen are to be gathered into churches, and to be supplied with a permanent ministry. Can it be that the conductors and friends of our various missionary societies will go forward in their labours upon principles which must perpetuate, on heathen soil, and to the ends of the earth, the palsying and degrading controversies which agitate the church at home?

Should the present state of things continue, and its tendencies be still further acted out, it is impossible to conceive how much more disgraceful to Christianity and more ruinous to souls, it may become. Of this, at least, we have reason to be terribly afraid, that Almighty God, wearied by the follies and sins of those who profess to honour him, will visit them with some great chastisement, calculated to restore them to a sense of their duty towards him. Some of the best Christian writers, for many years have been filled with apprehensions, lest nothing but a season of persecution should prove sufficient to restore the church to its sense of duty. Violent persecutions are like great weights upon the key-stone of an arch, they keep the true church together by mere force. May God in his mercy bring about the desired change without being constrained to resort to a whip of scorpions, to scourge Christians into a right state of feeling! The time is at hand! Christians, must at once, of their own free will, agree upon principles surely conducting them to one outward form of Christianity, and all with one consent cheerfully return to the unity of the church; or they must expect that the change will be brought about by convulsions and sufferings, at thought of which the heart sickens! May the Great Head of the church, for the great love wherewith he hath loved it, speedily purify "it unto himself, a holy church, without spot or wrinkle, (or rent,) or any such thing."

ART. IX. REVIEW OF BEECHER'S PLEA FOR THE WEST.

A Plea for the West ; by Lyman Beecher, D. D. Second edition ; Cincinnati, published by Truman & Smith. New-York, Leavitt, Lord & Co., 1835.

A PLEA for the West is always sure to obtain among us a ready and favourable attention. The West is part and parcel of ourselves ; not, as some might say, the better half, but full three-fourths of our happy land. It contains at this present moment more than five millions of citizens ; and will probably in the life time of some who are now members of our families, contain a hundred millions. This fact is, by itself, a sufficient apology for writing books about the West, and for exciting the widest and most practical interest in securing the moral and Christian character of its institutions.

The author of this Plea has special claims to be heard. He was till recently an Eastern man, educated and matured among us, and who, in the very meridian of his influence, yielded to a call from the great Valley, to identify with it his future efforts and interests. But waiving these peculiar claims, Dr. Beecher's book is not likely to be overlooked. It gives us, in the burning style of its eloquent author, the great impressions which a residence at the West has made on his mind. It does not, however, aim merely at impression. The object of Dr. Beecher is to excite the Christian philanthropists of the Eastern and older states, to benevolent action.

"The West," he observes, "is a young empire of mind, and power, and wealth, and free institutions, rushing up to a giant manhood, with a rapidity and a power never before witnessed below the sun. And if she carries with her the elements of her preservation, the experiment will be glorious—the joy of the nation—the joy of the whole earth, as she rises in the majesty of her intelligence, and benevolence, and enterprize, the emancipation of the world.

"It is equally clear, that the conflict which is to decide the destiny of the West, will be a conflict of institutions for the education of her sons, for purposes of superstition or evangelical light ; of despotism or liberty."

With these views our author proceeds to consider, what is required to secure the civil and religious prosperity of the

West ; by whom, and how it must be done ; and the motive to do it.

The thing required for the civil and religious prosperity of the West is stated in a single sentence. It is "universal education and moral culture, by institutions commensurate to that result—the all-pervading influence of schools, and colleges, and seminaries, and pastors, and churches."

To the question, "By whom shall the work of rearing the literary and religious institutions of the West be done?" our author replies, "Not by the West alone." In this opinion we think, that all enlightened and Christian patriots will cordially unite. It is no disparagement to our brethren in the West to say, that they have need of our assistance in rearing their most expensive institutions. "No people," our author has well said, "ever did, in the first generation, fell the forest, and construct the roads, and rear the dwellings and public edifices, and provide the competent supply of schools and literary institutions. New-England did not. Her colleges were endowed extensively by foreign munificence, and her churches of the first generation were supplied chiefly from the mother country ; and yet the colonists of New-England were few in number, compact in territory, homogeneous in origin, language, manners, and doctrines ; and were coerced to unity by common perils and necessities ; and could be acted upon by immediate legislation ; and could wait also for their institutions to grow with their growth, and strengthen with their strength." Convincing however as this representation is, we think a little might be added to its force by the fact, that with all these advantages the literary institutions of New-England are not seldom observed to hang out the flag of distress. We shall not state how many of them have within the last ten years made their cries heard on this side Byram river ; because we are not persuaded, on the whole, that this reciprocation of sympathy and aid even with the best furnished portion of our country, is any detriment to the great interest of charity. And we are persuaded, that New-England is not on the whole a debtor to any portion of the American family.

But if even the oldest and best supplied sections of our country, still call for foreign aid in perfecting their literary institutions, it is no wonder certainly, and no cause of reproach, if the great West in the infancy of its settlements, and while the hardy emigrants are yet in sturdy conflict

with the dark forest and the untamed prairies, puts in a plea for help. Still less should any Western man allow his feelings of independency to get the better of his reason, and turn back the proffered aid, or deny the substantial grounds on which it has been sought.

The Plea of Dr. Beecher exhibits to us some of the commanding reasons for extending immediate and liberal aid to the West. We have read and pondered his eloquent thoughts on this part of his subject with deep interest, and yet not without a measure of disappointment. There is certainly great force in the consideration which is made the ruling one in this part of the argument. We admit, after weighing well and long, the incompatibleness of Romanism, ministered by Jesuits, under the eye of a foreign prince, with the genius of republican institutions. We are not blind to its present influences, or its past history in the old world; nor do we deny the efforts which this power is making to obtain a superiority in the new. And yet, we desire not to see the energies of the church and of Christian patriotism, concentrated so exclusively upon a single point in this mighty conflict. We desire, if we may so express ourselves, a more peaceful war. Let us rather outdo these missionaries of Rome, in the multitude and perfection of our institutions. Let us sow this whole broad land with the best wheat, and employ more of our men and means in doing it, than in plucking up the tares. In this view of the subject, the author would certainly acquiesce; we are persuaded too that he would act in accordance with it; while the latter part, and, indeed, a large portion of his book might lead to a different impression. In this particular, there is, to our mind, a falling off from the great argument with which it commences. The battle is won; but when we look for the elevation of a new world to truth and righteousness and the largest measure of civil freedom, we are presented with almost nothing beside the conquest of Romanism. And to this circumstance do we attribute the fact, more than once mentioned in our hearing, that the pronouncement of this discourse, previously to its publication, left upon the minds even of those who listened with approbation and even with delight, a disappointment in respect to the depth and permanency of its impression.

ART. X. ON RADICALISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN a former number we pointed out some of the principles by which true Reform is conducted. It is our present design to hold up the contrasted features of that degenerate style of reform, denominated *Radicalism*. And we do this under the impression that at the present crisis, there is no subject more deserving attention. Our object is not to designate any person or party, but to characterize a general system of operation, which has been recently gaining ground among us.

Radicalism may be described in general, as a mode of Reform unqualified by any of those cautionary maxims which have been laid down, and always adopted and acted upon, by wise and successful Reformers.—The true Reformer, standing in the ancient way, well considers every project of change, before he enlists in it. The Radical, weary of the established order of things, rushes into every innovating enterprise, without waiting to enquire, whither it leads. The Reformer, cherishing profound veneration and love for the institutions under which he has lived, seeks their amendment only, not their subversion. The Radical, extending his disaffection from the abuses of these institutions, to the institutions themselves, would gladly witness their overthrow. The one, aware that the blessings of the social state cannot be enjoyed without some abridgement of the privileges of the state of nature, cheerfully submits to the restrictions necessarily imposed on his personal rights. The other is perpetually at war with these restrictions, though society could not exist without them. The one rather prefers to tolerate an acknowledged abuse, than by suddenly correcting it, to endanger the existence of the whole body politic. The other, reckless of consequences, will pluck up the tares, even if in so doing he should pluck up the wheat with them. The one carefully consults for the interests of those who are innocently implicated in an abusive system which is devoted to destruction; the other tramples upon them, if so his end may be sooner attained. The former, tracing the evils in the social state to their true fountain in the depra-

vity of the heart, and aiming at a permanent reformation, resorts to those grand influences of education and religion, adapted to effect a radical change in the quality of our nature, and thus applies his remedies to the seat of the disease. The other, confining his attention to the particular instances of out-breaking evil, sweeps his scythe through their flowering tops, leaving their roots in the soil, to produce a new harvest of vices. The one waits with manly patience and religious composure, while the reformation for which he labours is *gradually* evolved, under the operation of its appropriate causes, and the ordering of an inscrutable Providence. The other, with an impatience equally childish and irreligious, demands *immediate* results, even where they cannot be accelerated without a miracle, and where, if they are unduly hastened, they must be fatally disastrous.

Such are the general attributes by which Radicalism is contrasted with a right mode of Reform. And by as much as wisdom is to be desired in reforming institutions which are the pillars of the public weal, by so much is Radicalism, which rejects and spurns it, to be deprecated. It is zeal without knowledge, where knowledge is most of all requisite. It is passion without reason, where passion ought to be silenced, and reason alone heard. It is an eyeless vigour rushing through a path beset with perils. It is a chainless torrent of popular excitement, breaking through every barrier, and hurling itself, through lifted flood-gates, upon the delicate and complicated machinery of human society.

But let us pass from this more general view, to a nearer examination of the elements of which this system is constituted. And as nothing can be thoroughly understood unless seen in the *causes* from which it springs, let us look first at the state of mind which gives it birth. And here we shall find, that it is to *deficiency* in the mental structure, that the excrescency of which we speak may be traced. The monstrosities which occur in the vegetable and animal kingdoms are traced by physiologists to an incomplete bodily organization. And it is with equal propriety, that the various sorts of *ultraism* in the intellectual and moral kingdoms are traced to some *defect* in the structure of the inward man.

A fundamental deficiency in that mental structure, out of which radicalism usually grows, consists in the want of *discriminative judgement*, and of that *common sense*, which may be defined, as *the right application of general princi-*

ples to particular cases. Those in whom this deficiency exists, for want of comparing between different objects which solicit their attention, are exposed to fall immoderately in love with any meretricious extravagance which may present itself. They look at part of a subject, not at the whole, or they look at it as isolated, and not in its multiform relations, in its immediate effects, not in its remote consequences—abstractly and absolutely, like sophisters—not practically, and as modified by a thousand circumstances, like true philosophers. When they have adopted some just and important principle, they push it to excess, and then apply it to all cases, without allowing of exceptions.

Exactly such are the intellectual habits of radical reformers. They pamper themselves with a few favourite notions, and devote themselves to a few favourite objects, selected at random or by fancy. Where has one of this class ever been known to devise a comprehensive scheme, or follow a comprehensive plan, for the public good? On the contrary they are always driving, with all their force, at some one object, in comparison with which, whatever may be its real value, they deem everything else insignificant. In the earlier stages of their efforts, they are seen groping after some simple, unqualified principle on which their own minds can rest, and by which they can act upon the public. And since they have nothing of that depth or sagacity of mind, which would enable them to discern the true bounds of principles, how far they apply, and where and why the application of them fails, they soon arrive at some unlimited generality of doctrine. And their business thenceforward is, to carry it into effect, even in cases where its application, to an unsophisticated mind, must appear plainly unjust and pernicious.

It is submitted to the consideration of the reflecting reader, whether this is not substantially the course pursued by many of the ultra reformers of the present day. The over-zealous advocate of temperance, for example, not content with the just, but qualified principle, that the *abuse* of ardent spirits, as of every thing else, is immoral, and their common *use* to be dissuaded on grounds of expediency, soon arrives at the clearer, unlimited doctrine, that *all use of spirits is sin*. He now proceeds to the application of this sweeping principle, and is led by it, in consistency, to condemn the use of one after another of those substances in

which alcohol is found dispersed, in however minute proportions, and to whatever degree diluted. And now since even the purest fermented wines contain a portion of alcohol, they too must be condemned, not on the score of the expediency, but the immorality of their use, and not merely as a common beverage, but in the sacrament of the Supper, where they are one of the elements appointed by Christ and uniformly employed in the church. To such absurd and even impious consequences are men brought by neglecting to observe the fixed boundaries of right principles, and those infinitely varying circumstances by which their application must be modified! The same habit of extreme generalization applied to the subject of natural rights, furnished Rousseau and Paine with those unlimited maxims, which captivated the common mind by their clearness, and when carried into application produced the French Revolution. And it is the same unfortunate habit, applied to the same subject, which is now putting into the mouths of our anti-slavery societies, maxims equally unlimited, clear, and captivating, and equally false and dangerous.

Those who indulge in this habit doubtless seem to themselves to be approaching nearer and nearer the truth, the more abstract and general are the positions at which they successively arrive; while in fact they are receding farther and farther from it, every step they take in this direction. There is not a principle, however sound and excellent when tempered with the necessary qualifications, which does not become false and pernicious, when pushed to excess, and exalted above all exception, to a sweeping generality. It was a wise observation of Aristotle,* "that in discourse respecting our duties, *sweeping* doctrines are more doubtful, *limited* ones more true, since our duties always relate to specific things." "They that walk in darkness," says the judicious Hooker, "know not whither they go; and even as little is their certainty, whose opinions only *generalities* do guide. General rules, till their limits be fully known, (especially in matter of public and ecclesiastical affairs,) are by reason of the manifold secret exceptions which lie hidden in them, no other to the eyes of man's understanding, than cloudy mists cast before the eye of common sense."†

* Eth. L. 1. c. 7. 'Εν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις, οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροι εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι: περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις.

† Ecclesiast. Polity, Vol. II., p. 27, Hanbury's ed.

It should be borne in mind by those who are emulous of forming and directing the public sentiment by such abstract propositions and general rules, that however clear may be their evidence, and however mighty and irresistible their influence for a season, especially with the mass of unenlightened and unreflecting minds, they can never furnish a permanent basis for the success of any cause. Their falsity will soon begin to be surmized, from the consequences they involve; it will ere long be deeply felt, and at length fully detected and exposed. Common sense must sooner or later rebel against the tyranny of all such exclusive and extravagant dogmas; and will then avenge itself by holding up to universal contempt the figment by which it had been so long blinded and suppressed. Reaction of this kind must inevitably follow, whenever the fixed limits of nature and truth are overstepped by the metaphysical refinements of sophisticated reformers.

[Naturam frustra expellas furca.*]

For a time indeed, it often seems as if some such abstract and refined doctrine, would carry all before it, and achieve a universal and perpetual dominion. It rallies around its alluring standard the undiscerning mass of mind, the ardent youth of the schools, and even of the higher seminaries of learning. It dwells on every mind, burns in every heart, bursts from every tongue, and moves a nation as by a common life and in one direction. To question this simple and luminous doctrine, now, in its ascendancy, would be to expose ones' self to an overwhelming torrent of popular obloquy. But its power ere long begins to decay, and its hold on the public mind to be relaxed. And the few who had at first stood aloof, in a reviled minority, begin to be reinforced by constant desertions from the dissolving mass, until they have in their turn become *the many*, and the public mind is again restored to sobriety and truth. "With gross and popular capacities," says that inimitable writer last quoted, "nothing doth more prevail than unlimited generalities, because of their plainness at first sight. Nothing less with men of exact judgement; because such rules are not safe to be trusted over far."

1 It would be endless to trace all the ways in which this lack of sober judgement and common sense, is betrayed by

* Hor. Epist. I. 10, 24.

the radical reformer. One of the most common, is in overlooking all the obstacles which render their success doubtful, if not hopeless, and confidently calculating upon the speedy triumph of their cause. Says Paine, in the preface to the Second Part of his Rights of Man, "I do not believe that monarchy and aristocracy will continue seven years longer in any of the enlightened countries of Europe." And it has often been our lot to see in our over-heated reformers, a display of similar fatuity, in over-estimating the grounds of success, and underrating those of discouragement; though it has been oftener the case, that the continuance of the objects to which these men have been respectively opposed, has been measured by months, rather than by years.

The defective intellectual constitution which is here made one of the negative causes of radicalism, is very common, and is by no means always productive of this pernicious result. When connected with mildness of disposition, or when compensated by education and learning, it is comparatively harmless.

But let a man of a restless and fiery temper, ignorant and undisciplined, be also wanting in judgement and common sense, and he is admirably qualified to be a reformer of the latest stamp. Urged by his restless spirit to be ever doing something, he acts from the most crude and immature conceptions. For want of knowing what others have thought and done before him, he has no standard to which he may refer; and, like all ignorant men, trusting with an overweening confidence to his own opinions, he adopts scores of exploded errors, and dashes upon rocks where thousands had been already wrecked. If he should happen to begin right, he does not know where to stop, and is sure to end wrong. A man with a weak head and strong passions, is like a ship under full sail, without ballast or rudder, which is likely to dash itself to pieces, and every thing with which it comes in contact. Were not the matter too grave for ridicule, the furious onset of such a man upon the settled order of human life, might be likened, in blindness and fool-hardiness, though not in innocence, to the heroic tilting of De la Mancha, when, with vizor down and lance in rest, he rushed upon the arms of the windmill. The headlong manner in which such a man enters upon the most

momentous concerns, involved in the most complicated relations, illustrates the truth, that

"Fools rush in, where angels fear to tread."

But Radicalism always discloses a still greater destitution of *moral*, than of intellectual excellencies. There is a class of graceful virtues, which constitute a kind of code of honour, designed to regulate the demeanour of imperfect beings towards each other, and to soften the asperities to which their society is liable. To this class of virtues belong, modest diffidence in one's own opinion when opposed to that of all the world, candid indulgence of the prejudices of others, charitable forbearance of their faults, and a favourable construction of what may appear against them,—due respect to the claims of prescriptive authority of whatever kind it may be,—deference to age, office, and other titles to regard. The exercise of these virtues, while it is not inconsistent with the higher moral virtues, is absolutely essential to the decorum and happiness of human society. Disregarding them would soon introduce the most shameless barbarities, in place of all those pleasant charities by which the social state of depraved beings is sweetened and adorned.

Let the reader now present before his mind any one of the leading spirits of Radical reform, whom he may happen to know, and he will find, that his prominent characteristics grow out of the absence of these comely and excellent virtues. It belongs to the very idea of a Radical to be self-confident and dogmatical, uncandid and intolerant, censorious and contumacious. He lays no claim to the virtues which have been mentioned, and even despises and condemns them. Modesty and self-diffidence he regards as effeminacy and indecision; charity and tolerance towards the faults of others, as cowardly compromise with sin; and every kind of deference to authority or station, as base servility. Sternness, rigour, and rudeness of demeanour towards even the slightest delinquency, he considers as the indices of moral courage, and the distinctive graces of the lion-hearted Reformer. In following out his crude conceptions of *what should be*, he never allows himself to be in the least encumbered by *what has been*, and proceeds in all respects,

As if the world were now but to begin,
Antiquity forgot, custom not known,
The ratifiers and props of every word.—HAMLET.

The deformity of this self-confidence, and disregard of received opinions and customs, cannot be better shown, than in contrast with some of the beautiful exhibitions of the modest waving of individual judgement on the part of truly great men, out of respect to the general voice. Bishop Hall, thus writes to his brother,* "Let me advise you to walk ever in the beaten road of the church; not to runne out into single paradoxes. And if you meet at any time with private conceits, that seeme more probable, suspect them and yourselfe; and if they can win you to assent, yet smother them in your brest, and do not dare to vent them out, either by your hand or tongue, to trouble the common peace. *It is a miserable praise, to be a witty disturber.*" It is recorded of Mr. Hale, by the great Clarendon, that he would often say, "that his opinions, he was sure, did him no harm, but he was far from being confident that they might not do others harm who entertained them, and might entertain other results from them than he did: and therefore he was very reserved in communicating what he thought himself, on those points in which he differed from what was received."†

The want of *religious sentiment* is another part of that deficiency of inward structure from which Radicalism proceeds. *Religion*, while it inspires the mind with unmingled abhorrence of evil, at the same time renders it tranquil in view of the existing disorders of the world. It teaches that consolatory lesson, by which the entire aspect of the world is changed, that evil is wisely permitted by God, and will be overruled by him for the promotion of his benevolent purposes. It does not diminish the motive to humane effort, but only quells every disquieting feeling, and induces over the mind of the truly pious philanthropist a calm and peaceful resignation. How opposite to this is the frame and temper of the turbulent reformer! He is not less agitated himself, than the agitator of others. Were God dethroned, and the world abandoned to the Powers of Evil, he could scarcely be more anxious and perturbed. It never occurs to him to think, in view of the towering forms of wickedness, that they exist under the permission of that Being who doeth all his pleasure, not only in Heaven above, but on earth beneath, and that however they may be regarded when separately viewed, they are to be esteemed *right*, as belonging to that

* Bishop Hall's Works, vol. I. p. 345.

† Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, vol. I. p. 50.

great system, in which partial evil is made the instrument of universal good.

There is no more common or offensive feature in the character of those men we are attempting to describe, than their assuming, in their own strength, and by means of their own, to effect the most signal revolutions in the state of the world, and their attributing to themselves the wisdom, power, and glory when such revolutions have been accomplished. How often are they heard to speak of what *they* have done, are doing, or are about to do, to change the state of society, without any reference, expressed or remotely implied, to that Power by which alone any change for the better ever has been or can be wrought. It has been said of some modern infidel philosophers, that they were accustomed to speak as confidently about the nature of things, and to seem to know as much about the laws of being, as if they had assisted in making the world. And it may be said with equal truth of some of our modern Reformers, that they are wont to carry themselves as loftily with respect to the existing state and coming destiny of the world, as though they assisted in governing it, and had enthroned themselves beside the Monarch of the universe. Deeming their allotted sphere of duty too private and inconsiderable for their superiour powers, they seek a larger stage, where they may act their part in view of the world. Without waiting either for a human call, or for the indications of the Divine will, they spend their strength in attempting to break open a door which Providence has closed against them, but which their wilful spirit prompts them to enter. Intoxicated with the idea of *universal Reform*, they soon forget their utter incompetency to effect it, and swelling in the conceit of their ability in proportion to the grandeur of the contemplated enterprize, they at length fancy themselves invested with power commensurate with the claims they suppose made upon them, and the responsibilities they have gratuitously assumed. Putting on the airs of Dictators in the moral kingdom, they decree, in the plenitude of their imagined authority, the downfall of existing systems, and ordain a new state of things.

Such aspiring aims, such lofty conceits as these, so often and so offensively exhibited by the great heroes of modern Reform, betray their entire destitution of every religious sentiment. Religion reconciles its possessor to a humble and secret walk with God,—to the rewards which crown a

life of simple obedience to his commandments. If called from a private to a public stage, and to a great work, Religion inspires the pious Reformer with a heart-felt sense of his dependence upon God for success in the work he has undertaken. Religion abases his pride, and checks his presumption, realizes to him his true place, and makes him conscious that he is only an instrument in the hands of that awful Power, by which the world is governed. It assures him that it is by God alone, that any true, great and permanent reformation can be effected in the world, and that the part of man is oftener to hinder, than to hasten, the work of God. Religion places the pious Reformer in the attitude of the captive Jews, so beautifully described by their Psalmist: "Unto Thee lift I up mine eyes, O Thou that dwellest in the Heavens. Behold, as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their master, and as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress; so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God, until he have mercy upon us."* Thus does he eye the movings of that hand by which the epochs of human history are revolved, and listen with silent reverence for the creative fiat, bringing light and order out of darkness and confusion.

There is another point in which the want of religious feeling is very often shown by ultra Reformers. We allude to the judicial authority, and the vindictive attitude, which they assume with respect to evil-doers, or those who do not come up to their standard of right. How often is every better feeling shocked by hearing these men, unauthorized by any official station, or by any pre-eminent purity of character, denounce the vengeance of heaven against their fellow-offenders! Not content with relieving, they would also *avenge* the oppressed; not content with restraining, they would also *doom* the oppressor. Having arrogated to themselves the prerogative of uttering the ordinances of heaven, they assume also to seize its lightnings, and launch them at those whom their imagination has invested with forms of gigantic wickedness. As if they were commissioned to be the special organs of the Divine Nemesis, they wave over the guilty the sword of judgement, and doom them to destruction.

Had these denouncers but learned the first lesson which Religion would teach them, that they themselves are involved with all mankind in a common guilt and ruin, and are

* Psalm cxlii.

themselves, as well as the most criminal, obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, they would be less forward to devote others to a judgement, averted from themselves only by the clemency of God. They would not dare to expect forgiveness for themselves, while they granted no forgiveness to others. Rebuked by the injunction, "Who art thou, O man, that judgest another, and doest the same things," they would leave the perpetrator of wrong in the hands of the Judge of the world, and refer to Him the awards of justice, which He claims as his peculiar prerogative: "Vengeance is mine, I will repay saith the Lord."

But although many of the traits of Radicalism may thus be traced to deficiency in the higher attributes of intellectual, moral and religious character; this system cannot be adequately described without referring to some of the *positive* principles from which it springs. If in doing this, we should seem to allow too little for those better motives by which ultra Reformers always claim to be governed, let it be borne in mind that the danger is, oferring on the other side, and being duped by their specious pretensions. Through the fond credulity of our nature, when we hear one loudly professing his sympathy with the suffering, or see him making a show of unwonted zeal in a good cause, we are apt to take him at his word, and to believe him to be as much more humane and philanthropic than other men, as he pretends to be. This credulity or, to name it more justly, *gullibility* of human nature, is one of the chief instruments by which impostors of every sort promote their ends. And it is by no means necessary that one should possess great ability, or render valuable public services, in order to reach a high place in popular estimation. However moderate may be his talents, and however little he may have done for the public good, he will yet be taken by the great world to excel others as much in merit, as he can surpass them in bustle and display.* Hence it is, that

* This truth is well illustrated in the following fable.

Deux citoyens harangoient sur la place,
 Montés chacun sur un treteau :
 L'un vend force poisons distillés dans une eau
 Limpide à l'œil ; mais il parle avec grace.
 Son habit est doré, son equipage est beau ;
 Il attroupe la populace.
 L'autre, ami des humains, jaloux de leur bonheur,
 Pour rien debite un antidote.
 Mais il est simple, brusque, et mauvais orateur :
 On s'en moque, on le fuit comme un fou qui radote,
 Et l'on court à l'empoisonneur.

some men of the worst character, by putting forth specious pretensions, often reap from the public a harvest of golden opinions, while the truly deserving are left with no other reward than the secret satisfaction of doing good. So that if, in any instance, through the suspicious surmises of a few, injustice should be done to the motives of our monopolists of all that is wise and good, ample amends are sure to be made them in the grateful incense of applause ascending to them in clouds from the multitude of their dupes.

Those who assume the office of public Reformers are apt to pretend, that theirs is a most ungrateful task, and one which is forced upon them, against their will, by their strong convictions of duty. With true Reformers, this is doubtless the case; to ultras it may perhaps appear to be so. But if they would inspect themselves more narrowly, they might discover other motives beside the love of right and a sense of duty which lead them to take up the seemingly odious business of public censure. One who reproves others, does thereby covertly commend himself. It implies a more than ordinary sagacity in him to detect evils which had been before undiscovered, and a more than ordinary virtue and courage to condemn that which had been long tolerated. Indeed, there is no better way of instilling into the minds of others a persuasion of one's pre-eminent goodness, than by boldly rebuking all manner of wrong. Perhaps now it might appear, on a thorough scrutiny of the motives which lead so many to take up the business of censure, which they profess to find so disagreeable, that they are unconsciously influenced by the desire of appearing wiser and better than others; or at least, that the griefs they feel at pulling down the reputation of others, are slightly alleviated by the thought that they are at the same time building up their own.

Other principles which are more distinctly active in leading to radicalism are, sometimes impatience under the suffering of wrong, sometimes the spirit of personal revenge, or a querulous and fault-finding disposition; sometimes a restless and uneasy temperament, which loves to sport on the waves of change; sometimes an ambitious spirit, which hopes to rise under a new order of things; sometimes even a fiend-like malignity, which rejoices in the confusion and turmoil of the elements of society.

The ostensible external motive in every reformatory en-

terprise, (and with true Reformers the real one,) is that specific evil which it is designed to remove. But with Reformers of the kind we are now describing, this evil is only the *pretext*, which affords them an occasion for exercising their innate propensity to be opposing and destroying something, no matter what. This is plain from the fact, so often noticed in the history of these men, that let what will become established, even that which they themselves had most insisted on, they are soon found opposing it, even if in so doing they take sides with what they had before most condemned.

An admirable illustration of the last mentioned trait, and of many other characteristic traits of the Radical, is furnished by the history of Cobbet. This remarkable man is thus described by Hazlitt :*

"Wherever power is, there he is against it : he naturally butts at all obstacles, as unicorns are attracted to oak trees, and feels his own strength only by resistance to the opinions and wishes of the rest of the world. To sail with the stream, to agree with the company, is not his humour. If he could bring about a reform in parliament, the odds are he would instantly fall foul of, and try to mar, his own handy work. I do not think this is vanity or fickleness, so much as a pugnacious disposition, that must have an antagonist power to contend with, and only finds itself at ease in systematic opposition. If it were not for this, the high towers and rotten places of the world would fall before the battering ram of his hard headed reasoning ; but if he once found them tottering, he would apply his strength to prop them up. He cannot agree to any thing established, nor to set up any thing else in its stead. While it is established, he presses hard against it, because it presses upon him, at least in imagination. Let it crumble under his grasp, and the motive to resistance is gone. He then requires some other evil to set his face against. His principle is repulsion, his nature contradiction. He is made up of mere antipathies, an Ishmaelite indeed, without a fellow. He is always playing at hunt the slipper in politics. He turns round upon whoever is next him. The way to wean him from any opinion, and make him conceive an intolerable hatred against it, would be to place somebody near him who was perpetu-

* Table Talk, or Original Essays, by Wm. Hazlitt. London : 1821. Vol. I. p. 124.

ally dunning it in his ears. When he is in England, he does nothing but abuse the borough-mongers, and laugh at the whole system. When he is in America he grows impatient of freedom and a republic. If he had staid there a little longer, he would have become a loyal and a loving subject of his majesty king George Fourth. * * He is the victim of self-will. He must pull down, and pull in pieces ; it is not in his disposition to do otherwise. * * He has no comfort in fixed principles. As soon as any thing is settled in his own mind he quarrels with it. He has no satisfaction but in the chase after truth ; runs a question down, worries and kills it, then quits it like vermin, and starts some new game."

The finishing stroke in our picture of Radicalism, (already become so dark and grim-visaged that we are feign to break company with it, and hope that others may be similarly affected,) shall be added by the graphic pencil of old Izaak Walton. In his life of Thomas Hooker, speaking of the Non-conformists of those times, he says:—"Of this party there were many that were possessed of a high degree of spiritual wickedness,—I mean with an innate restless pride and malice. I do not mean the visible and carnal sins of gluttony and drunkenness, and the like, (from which God deliver us !); but sins of a higher nature ; because they are more unlike God, who is the God of love, and mercy, and order, and peace ; and more like the Devil, (who is not a glutton, nor can be drunk, and yet is a devil) ; but I mean those spiritual wickednesses of malice and revenge, and an opposition to government ;—men that joyed to be the authors of misery, which is properly his work that is the enemy and disturber of mankind ; and thereby greater sinners than the glutton and the drunkard, though some will not believe it. And of this party there were also many whom prejudice and a furious zeal had so blinded, as to make them neither to hear reason, nor adhere to the ways of peace ;—men that were the very dregs and pest of mankind ; men whom pride and self-conceit had made to over-value their own pitiful, crooked wisdom, so much as not to be ashamed to hold unmannerly disputes, against those men they ought to reverence, and those laws they ought to obey ; men that laboured and joyed first to find out the faults, and then to speak evil of government, and to be the authors of confusion ; men whom company, conversation and custom had at last so

blinded, and made so insensible that these were sins, that like those that perished in the gainsaying of Core, so those died without repenting of their spiritual wickednesses."

If this description should appear to be unjust towards those for whom it was intended, it may be urged in apology, that it was extorted from the gentle spirit of Walton by the strength of his love for the venerable Hooker, who suffered much from the opposition of the Non-conformists. So true affection ever shows itself in spontaneous and indignant rebuke of all who would injure its object. It is only indifference which remains unmoved in seeing injuries heaped upon another: Love heaves the most placid natures into tumult, and would avenge even a look which threatened its object with insult. It was the most gentle of the disciples who invoked fire from heaven upon the villagers who insulted his well-beloved Master.

If, then, towards those among us who trample without compunction, now upon the purity of the doctrines, now upon the authority of the ministry, now upon the sacredness of the sacraments, which our Master has left us, there should sometimes break forth spontaneously a strain even of impassioned censure, let it not be thought unnatural, or be wholly condemned. It was a holy Apostle who said, with reference to the wrongs even of a fellow Christian, "Who is injured, and I do not burn!" Is it then to be thought strange, that Christian hearts should burn, when their Religion itself, its institutions, and its Author, are irreverently assailed? For our part, we neither covet nor respect that imperturbable quiet, that determined blindness to danger, that skilful neutrality, that calculating wisdom, that never-ending revision of fundamental things, that boundless toleration, sometimes exhibited by the friends of order and religion, in cases where the utmost decision is expected and demanded of them. To us it seems to betray indifference to the most sacred interests of humanity, to remain silent and unaffected while, one by one, the old landmarks in church and state are removed, to give place to a spirit of Reformation, which, by too much indulgence, has become at last so like the grave, as never to be satisfied. And we have felt that in times like these, we could not discharge our duty as public journalists, without bearing testimony, however feeble, against that spirit involving so many elements of evil, and at war with the spirit of Religion, and the best interests of society. If in discharging this duty

now, we have spoken any thing uncharitably of those well known among us as ultra Reformers, we must take shelter under the high examples of pardonable severity which have just been adduced, and trust we shall not be judged to have set down aught in malice, but rather in love for those civil and religious institutions, whose influence we sincerely believe to be marred, and whose very existence to be threatened, by that corrupt and atrocious style of Reform which we have attempted to pourtray.

LITERARY NOTICES.

- I. *Life of Jehudi Ashmun, late Colonial Agent in Liberia, with an Appendix containing extracts from his Journal and other writings; with a brief Sketch of the Life of the Rev. Lot Cary. By Ralph Randolph Gurley. Washington, 1836. 8vo. pp. 556.*

THIS is a noble tribute to the memory of a great and good man—more creditable, indeed, to the head and heart of the accomplished and estimable author, and more gratifying to the friends of African Colonization, than necessary to perpetuate the fame of Ashmun. His name is indissolubly associated with that humane enterprise. The firm foundations of the unexampled prosperity of Liberia were mainly laid by him, and he died a martyr in the cause. We say the unexampled prosperity of the colony at Liberia; for we maintain that this, spite of all the virulent misrepresentations that have been so industriously spread abroad, is merely the sober statement of the truth. In fact, Liberia, at the time of Ashmun's death, was a firmly established and flourishing colony—presenting all the elements of social prosperity, physical, civil, and moral, in as high a degree, and in some respects in a higher degree, than Jamestown and Plymouth, at the end of eight years from their settlement. Its progress since then has not disappointed its earlier promise; and we do not doubt that it is destined every year to strike deeper and deeper the roots, and spread abroad wider and wider the blessings of its growth, till they shall pervade all that country. Here is the everlasting monument of Ashmun; nor do we entertain the shadow of a doubt that, ages hence, his name will be a hallowed word over that continent, pronounced with grateful reverence by millions of the enlightened, the Christian, and the free.

We had intended to devote a portion of this number to a Sketch of the Life of Ashmun—an analysis of his character—a view of his public services in Liberia—together with some remarks on the history and progress of that colony. It is with the greatest regret that we find ourselves unable to fulfil our purpose. We have time and space only to express our pleasure and gratification with the manner in which, in general, Mr. Gurley has performed his task, and most heartily to recommend his book to every class of readers. The volume brings together a rich mass of most interesting information, respecting the enterprise with which Ashmun's latter years were associated, and nobody was so competent to set it forth as Mr. Gurley. The personal history of Ashmun is also full of deep and peculiar interest. His character was made up of strong and decided elements, originally with many faults, but with a great deal of the truly heroic in his constitution. And nothing is more striking, nor, if we are not

mistaken, will excite a deeper interest in the perusal of this volume, than to observe, how, by the sharp discipline of Providence, his character was sublimated, and the heroic elements brought out and purified from the earthly alloy. His life, till within a few years of its close, was one continued struggle with almost every kind of difficulty; and worst of all, and most galling and unendurable to a mind like his, an early imprudence brought a stain upon his reputation for integrity, which seemed destined, in its consequences direct and indirect, to follow him irretrievably, and to blast all the purposes of his life.

It would seem that the spirit of any other man would have been absolutely crushed down and destroyed, by the almost universal distrust, and obloquy, and the manifold embarrassments, that, at different times pressed upon him. His was not, however, a spirit to give way or sink down. He lived to surmount the whole crushing accumulation of evils; to see his fair fame not only freed from suspicion and aspersion, at home and abroad, but to know that he had compelled the confidence and won the admiration of all on both sides of the Atlantic.

Liberia, indeed, under the circumstances in which he was placed, was a theatre well fitted for him; where his extraordinary energy, his high capacity, his various resources, in short all that was lofty, resolved and heroic in his character, found full scope for action.

Ashmun died at New-Haven, on the 25th of August, 1828, in the thirty-fifth year of his age, shortly after his return from Africa, worn out by his toils in behalf of the Colony.

II. *The Portion of the Soul, or Thoughts on its Attributes and Tendencies, as indicating its Destiny.* By the Rev. Herman Hooker. Philadelphia, Henry Perkins:—Boston, Perkins, Marvin & Co. 1835.

The reader of this Volume soon finds himself in a different atmosphere from that of many of our recent works on practical religion. The stifled spirit of devotion, breaking loose from scholastic fetters, moves freely, and rejoices in its liberty. Imagination lends its wings, with which it ranges and soars, until following its native instincts, and obedient to the upward attractions, it reaches its centre and rest in God. It is the object of the writer, to show that the conscious wants of the soul, incapable of being satisfied with earthly good, conduct to God, in Christ, as its true portion. This truth he illustrates with unusual strength of thought, fervour of feeling, and felicity and copiousness of expression. He shows a mind familiarized with the writers of the seventeenth century, and inspired with something of their spirit. We trust the writer will often favour the public with such gifts, and have the rich reward of knowing, that some have been induced by his persuasive appeals to forsake the troubled and failing fountains of earthly pleasure, for purer springs.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. VIII.—DECEMBER, 1835.

ART. I. ON THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA RESPECTING GOD.

By REV. RICHARD W. DICKINSON, New-York.

THE idea of a God is of all others the most familiar to our minds. Impressed on our earliest childhood, it is interwoven with the great variety of our associations, while it may be regarded as emphatically second to every prominent thought in the view of reflective intelligence. In general no doubt is entertained regarding it. We believe as firmly in the being of a God, as in our own, or the existence of the material world. We recur to Him, with the facility which characterises the mental reference of children to their parent, or subjects to their ruler. We admire his works, recognize his providence, contemplate his perfections, and join in his praise; but while entertaining the sentiment, or even practically acknowledging the relations which it involves, how few, comparatively, have reflected on its probable *origin*. Yet it is a question of fundamental importance, *from whence has man derived the idea of God*—a Being spiritual in his nature, infinite in his attributes, the self-existent Creator of the universe.

Whether it originated in the fears of mankind; or was a device of kings and priests to secure their political ascendancy; or whether it was the deduction of unassisted reason in its native aspirations after unknown good, or simply its unaided suggestion to account for the otherwise inexplicable phenomena of nature; or whether it cannot be traced through tradition to original revelation; are questions which have agitated speculative minds, and successively secured their respective advocates.

We proceed, then, in this enquiry; and not without the
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hope that our effort, however unrelieved by that interest which appertains to periodical writing, may yet be in not a few respects useful to the cause of truth.

But, as preparatory to our argument, two remarks may be considered for their bearing on its designed conclusion.

1. In man's moral nature there is a constitutional provision for the idea of a God. If there were not, it is a question of no moment in what manner the idea originated; it could never be cordially entertained, nor constitute the basis of religious action. We readily designate the various orders of animal existences, from their physical adaptations. No one can doubt that beasts were formed to graze the verdant lawn; birds to soar in the atmosphere; or fish to swim in the liquid element. Physiology has noted the starting pinions and plumage of the unfledged bird; the impatient search of the duckling, scarcely disengaged from its shell, for water which it has not yet seen; the movements of the new-born infant's longing lips for the yet untasted fountains of the mother's breast; nor fails to recognize in these instinctive desires, the designed gratifications and ends of the animal to which they belong. Now the science of Pathology may demonstrate, from equally conclusive indications, the existence of a religious instinct in man. There are moral elements in his bosom which can be explained only on the supposition that he has been formed for the adoration of his great Creator. Be he where he may, or in whatever condition of solitude and untutored rudeness, he is the conscious subject of emotions which virtually say—"Where is God, my Maker?"

If we were not naturally susceptible of love and reverence, it would be in vain to present to us an object of blended loveliness and majesty. No appropriate emotions could, in this case, be elicited. We might ponder the attractive lineaments of the object, but our's would be "a brute, unconscious gaze." In like manner, were there no susceptibility to the impression of a God in the constitution of man's bosom, it would be conclusive evidence that he was no more formed to admit and act on the idea, than the brutes which perish. But what is the fact? We speak not of what seem to be the natural yearnings of high and serious intellect after communion with its unknown God. The human heart receives the impression of a God almost with the same mechanical facility with which the infant receives it appro-

priate nourishment. It matters not whether he have ever heard of God by the hearing of the ear : let man be placed amid the towering palaces of nature, and there is something within him which lifts his spirit above their cloud-capped summits to the invisible Creator. It is not in human nature to look over the vast heaving deep, the illimitable firmament, or wander amid mountain scenery, without emotions of awe and sublimity ; and in these we recognize the natural conviction of a God. There is to man's consciousness a Spirit in the midnight storm, as there is in the remorse of his guilty bosom a Revenger of his crimes. No impression is so common to mankind as this. It seems the spontaneous sentiment of human nature. It may be a mere abstraction, or assume an embodied form ; it may be rational in its expression, or deformed by superstition ; in every instance it may be modified or shaped by birth, training and temperament ; but wherever man is to be found, be he in solitary wilds or crowded city ; be he barbaric or philosophic ; there is the impression of a God. Or if among the rude sons of the forest one exception could be found, let the intelligence of a God be announced, and the deep emotion with which it is heard, shows the adaptedness of the human bosom to receive and cherish the sublime sentiment. Hence, in every attempt to inculcate true religion on the uncultivated mind, the difficulty has been found to consist in displacing false notions of a Supreme Being, rather than in demonstrating his existence. And we cannot but regard this, as one reason for that absence of all proof which characterises the Scriptures, whenever they allude to the Almighty ;—as if his existence were a fact rather to be felt, than to be apprehended chiefly by the understanding.

Such are man's religious susceptibilities, that the idea of a God needs only to be announced, to produce its designed impression. As well attempt to prove the existence of the sun after the eye has received and is enjoying its light, as to demonstrate the being of a God to the heart which already thrills with awe under the consciousness of its high relations. Like the adaptations of nature to our bodily organs, the idea of a God is suited to the affections of our bosoms ; and when once it obtains a lodgement within us, like that image of himself which Phidias wished to perpetuate by stamping it so deeply on the buckler of Minerva that no one might be able to erase it without injuring the whole statue, it cannot be dis-

placed without destroying the balance of the mind or the sensibilities of the soul. Man must lose himself in the Hercynian wood of illegitimate speculation, or merge himself in the brute ; or he cannot escape the conviction—"there is a God." He must be sure to preclude any interval of reason or sobriety ; or the awakening fears of his guilty bosom respond with awful emphasis to the deathless conviction of his soul—"there is a God." He may repudiate Christianity, but he has not banished the ever intruding suggestion of a God. He may declare himself an Atheist, but he has simply invested the true God with forms and qualities more flattering to the pride of his intellect or the lusts of his heart. It is still the practical conviction of his nature—"there is a God." The idea may exist in a material aspect, but it cannot be annihilated.

2. As any impression may be erroneous having no foundation in fact, it is important to remark in the second place, that a belief in the existence of an infinite creative intelligence, is perfectly consonant with right reason. If the heart admit the sentiment without reluctance, it is no less obvious, that reason corroborates the belief without difficulty. Perceiving, on experience, the connection which subsists between cause and effect, we never fail, on reflection, to refer the existence of this world to some adequate power. It matters not whence our idea of cause ; or however inscrutable the cause may be ; still there is no proposition to which our minds more readily assent, than that the phenomena of nature do not exist uncaused. The relation of cause and effect is inseparable from the perceptions of the human mind ; and though some have chosen to call in the agency of what they term Nature ; still that is their God ;* and though others have presumed to resolve every thing into the operations of Chance, still that, in reality, is their God. Employ whatever terms,—fate, chance or matter, the would-be Atheists have never been able to escape the idea of an eternal First Cause ; and however often and eagerly they have essayed the Hercu-

* "Si par Athée l'on designe un homme qui nieroit l'existence d'une *force* inherente à la nature, et sans laquelle l'on ne peut concevoir la Nature, et si c'est à cette *force* motive qu'on donne le nom de Dieu, il n'existe point de *Athées*, et le mot sous lequel on les désigne n'annoncerait que des fous." *Système de la Nature*. Part 2, chap. 11th. What an admission by an author who attempts to shew that there is no God ! It is of itself the strongest evidence that there is no escape from the idea of *necessary creation*. It reduces the controversy to this question ; shall we worship that *undefinable thing* without which nature cannot be conceived, or acknowledge an uncreated and supreme intelligence ?

lean task, they have only, by their reference to an eternal series, to casual existence, to the powers and operations of blind nature, involved themselves in a necessary succession of hypotheses and absurdities—like certain Greek philosophers in the middle ages, who, having settled it in their own minds that a circle is the most perfect of figures, concluded that the movements of the heavenly bodies must all be performed in exact circles, and when the plainest observation demonstrated the contrary, instead of doubting their position, had recourse to endless combinations of circular motions to preserve their ideal perfection.

Should it ever be reduced to ocular demonstration, that the First Cause of all things were a material agent, we could not conceive it possible for a Supreme Being, whose spiritual nature precluded the cognizance of our senses, to afford stronger proofs of his existence, than those which stand out so legibly on the whole frame of the visible world. Devoid of any spiritual ideas, but impressed with the belief of superior powers, the unenlightened mind among all the early nations of our race identified their existence with the sun and moon, or the elements of nature. It was a natural conclusion; and though an easy error into which the benighted intellect might have fallen, it may serve to teach us, that while no material object, however stupendous and glorious, can be God; yet, that if there be a God who is necessarily invisible to mortal sight, the unsophisticated conviction of the human mind is, that He has afforded us ample evidence of his existence in the phenomena of the universe. Regarding the idea of an uncreated, infinite Spirit, as a mere supposition, if He designed to impress on such a being as man the belief of his existence, what more could He do, but to show in space an exact transcript of the present material economy—the earth which we inhabit, with its “blue ethereal sky,” its starry firmament, its verdant carpeting, its gigantic mountains, its foaming cataracts, its fathomless oceans, lordly rivers, crystal lakes, its pathless forests, its endless diversities and immense multitudes of animated existences, each forming a complete system within itself, replete with proofs of design, and in all its parts so arranged and proportioned, as to constitute one grand and harmonious whole. Stand still, O man, and contemplate the wonders in the midst of which you are placed. Mark the regularity with which the orb of day rises to diffuse light and impart warmth, and sets to

give repose to animated nature. Mark the beautiful succession of the seasons, each bearing appropriate provisions for thy varying wants. Mark the adaptation of the air, the rain, the sunshine, to the revivescence and growth of the vegetable world—the vast economy, by which the diversified myriads of earth-born existences are daily fed. Mark the storm, the lightning, the volcano, the earthquake. Consider the mysterious and wonderful powers of knowledge, virtue, and moral action which belong to the world of mind. Lift up your eye to those unnumbered suns and stars and systems which revolve so harmoniously in the immensity of space; or examine the structure of that curious organ, by aid of which you are able, “at a small inlet which a grain might close,” to take in the greatness of an infinite creation; or of that yet more wonderful organ, which by a single beat, diffuses its life blood through all the arteries and veins of your bodily frame; and tell us if he be not unreasonable to the last degree who demands farther evidence, that a God exists. Do we admire the genius of him who by the combinations of light and shade has thrown upon the canvass some likeness to the beauteous or sublime scenes of nature; or of the statuary who has transformed his block into a senseless and inert imitation of man; and shall we say that nature herself knows no intelligent Author? that man, endued with sense and motion, has not been formed by some stupendous intelligence? When such are the marks of design which may be seen on every hand and through every medium; when unnumbered adaptations of means to beneficent ends are so plain that no stupidity can mistake them; when the Author of nature has afforded us glimpses of still greater contrivances, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; we are not surprised that Lord Bacon, the greatest of modern philosophers, should have declared, that “he would rather believe all the fables of the Legend, and the Talmud, or the Koran, than that this universal frame is without a mind.”

No proposition admits of such variety of proof as this,—that there is a God. With Locke, we may reason from the certainty of our own existence; with Berkeley, from the motions, actions and speech of others, as mere effects of a living, acting, thinking thing in man, which cannot be immediately discerned by our senses; with Bolingbroke, from the fact that non-entity cannot produce entity, and non-intel-

ligence, intelligence ; or with Kant, from the fact that the systematic adaptation of material things is not essential to their nature ; and on either of their celebrated positions build an irrefragable argument for the existence of an omnipotent and all-wise Creator. But it is needless to multiply arguments for the existence of a Supreme Being ; as it was injudicious in an ancient poet to load his invulnerable hero with a cumbersome panoply.

We retire in summer heats from the dust and noise of the town which man has built, and seek the renovating repose of the rural scene. The matin freshness revives our languid frame ; the grateful verdure relieves our wearied eye ; the aroma of flowers regales our sense ; the glad voices of nature's songsters rejoice our hearts :—Then mounts the sun his fervid chariot, and sheds his genial rays over the luxuriant fields, yet glittering with the dew-drops of the night. We seek the canopy of shade ; and as we look up to the firmament all beautifully blue, and around on golden crops, and ripening fruits, and grazing herds, and busy bees, and sportive insects, the heart catches the spirit of the scene, beats in conscious enjoyment, rises in instant gratitude to the "first good, first perfect, and first fair," and we wonder that any rational being can be an Atheist !

The heart responds so cordially to the intelligence of a Creator, we are not surprised, that for many ages, it was regarded as an innate sentiment ; or from its congeniality to the most enlightened reason, that it should seem to be its unpremeditated result. We are almost forward to assert, that the natural capacity of the human understanding, is of itself amply sufficient to ascertain and establish the point in question.

But the complete assent of reason to a fact, is no evidence that it was discovered by reason. It is an easy matter to discover that, which is already seen to be demonstrably certain. It is the characteristic propensity of not a few minds, to measure their original capabilities by the zest with which they ponder, or the readiness with which they comprehend, the original productions of others. How often do the conceptions of genius, from their very simplicity, delude us with the impression that we might originate, or induce us to wonder that we had not originated, the same brilliant thoughts ! Let them be frequently revolved, and, forgetful of their origin, we unconsciously appropriate them as our

own. Thus does the simplicity of inventions impose on our understandings. Who could not,—we are ready to exclaim, in that delusion which has been induced by the familiarity of knowledge,—have discovered the law of gravitation, or a western continent? But ages rolled away, and mighty minds rose and set, leaving scarce a trace behind, before the power of reason formed a Columbus, or a Newton. We doubt not that the stupendous achievements of these immortal names, might be traced to the expansive and energizing influence of *Revelation* on the human intellect. And who can say, that, at this very moment we might not be immersed in Egyptian darkness as respects our knowledge of the true God, had He not raised up and inspired his servant Moses!

For ourselves, notwithstanding the constitutional provision which may be found in man's moral nature for the belief of a God; notwithstanding the triumphant amount of evidence and cordial assent which reason brings to His existence; and though we once thought (and who has not after a perusal of Paley's incomparable argument?) that man never needed any other Scriptures than those which are written in the characters of beneficent design on the whole face of nature,—we are now not backward to acknowledge, that reflection on simply the opening declaration of the book of Genesis, has changed our opinion, and grounded us in the conviction, *that we are indebted for our knowledge of the nature and attributes, if not the very being of God, to an original revelation of Himself to man.*

If reason corroborate the declaration that “in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” we doubt not, that from an application of the principles of philosophical investigation, reason also will be heard to speak, in tones of moral certainty, that God wrote this passage by the hand of Moses.*

1. That Moses, in the exercise of his unaided powers, should have excogitated this rational doctrine, is a supposition fraught with extreme improbability. Considering the mental character of the early ages of the world, it is not reasonable to admit the thought that mankind then engaged in any speculations respecting the Creator of the universe. Even amid all the advantages which are afforded by revela-

* That Moses was the author of the book of Genesis will not be deemed a gratuitous assumption, if convenient reference be made to Art. I. No. VI. of the Lit. and Theol. Review. But see in particular Faber's argument: *Horn's Monism*. Vol. I. Sect. II. Chap. IV.

tion, whose rays are scattered on the remotest hamlet and habitation in a Christian land, what multitudes exist devoid of any knowledge of God, save that which consists in a vague and indefinite idea of His existence! How few ever think of enquiring respecting His nature, attributes and works! The sun unveils to their sight the magnificence of creation; but seldom do their thoughts range beyond this "visible, diurnal sphere." The orb of day sets amid golden clouds, and the moon peers above the horizon to diffuse her mellow light, and the stars come forth in twinkling lustre, and the planets irradiate the depths of ether, as they move on in harmonious grandeur; but all these worlds, so radiant with the glory of their Creator, immense in magnitude, countless in number, inconceivable in the rapidity of their motions, interest the mass of human minds far less than the lamps which mark our streets, or the bursting and scintillation of the sky-rocket. Necessitated to secure the means of animal subsistence, the throng of human kind enjoy no leisure for speculation. The rising glories of the morn suggest no other thought, but that they must rise to toil; and the coming on of evening, unfolding yet greater wonders, tells them only that now is the hour of their rest; or the time which might be devoted to high enquiries is squandered by others in low and mundane gratifications, incapacitating them ultimately for religious thought.

Now if such be the state of the general mind in an enlightened age, much more must a hebitude of the mental faculties have characterized mankind at the period in which Moses lived. Still in bondage to Egyptian tyranny, which for ages had pressed them in the dust, if the ignorance of the Hebrews might possibly have been less than their miseries, no facts need be adduced to prove, that slavery knows no leisure nor incitements for the exercise of profound thought. Nor is it reasonable to suppose, that any greater disposition or capacity for high and serious enquiries could have existed among co-etaneous nations, whose strength was expended in the conflicts of war abroad, or wasted in the indulgence of every lust at home. Among unenlightened tribes, little or no thought is entertained aside from the immediate wants of nature, and the gratification of depraved passion. We could as readily conceive of a paralytick, accomplishing the labours of a Hercules, as of an ignorant mind putting forth a voluntary and successful enquiry respecting the Infinite Intelli-

gence. It is the most sublimated enquiry which can engage the human mind; and it is not to be credited that the knowledge of an immaterial creative Power was struck out by the gross faculties of a dark age.

So simple does the analogical argument from effect to cause appear, as to be adapted almost to the comprehension of a child; still it involves a process of reasoning which could never be attempted by the human mind, unless it were in some degree improved and abstracted from sensible objects. Hence, the earliest speculations on this subject, of which we have any account, can be traced no farther back than the period when the cultivation of reason disposed the mind to reflection.*

Milton has made Adam a philosopher; but with as little propriety, we apprehend, as some Divines have made him a scholastic theologian. The Adam of "Paradise Lost," was Milton himself, rather than the Adam of "Genesis." That the first man, if he rose from the dust in the full perfection of his bodily and mental faculties, might have been astonished at the glorious phenomena of nature, seems far from improbable; but, poetically beautiful, or consonant with our feelings as may be Milton's description, the justness of his reasoning may fairly be questioned. The new created mind might have found "no end, in wondering mazes lost," rather than it should have been led to the analogical inference of a Creator, before experience had impressed it with the relations of cause and effect. Strictly speaking, no *a priori* argument can be framed. That of Clarke is an illustrious failure. It is founded on experience derived from an observation of external objects. Some previous intimation, then, of a God, is necessary to justify the supposition, that the immediate perception of a mind just waking up to the magnificence of

*According to some ancient philosopher, "primo in orbe deos fecit timor;" and it is not improbable, that the system of Polytheism originated in the fears of the ignorant multitude; but to attribute all speculation respecting a First Cause to the same ignoble origin, is a supposition not only gratuitous but fraught with the greatest absurdity. No enquiry has been more common and pleasurable to cultured intellects. The farther removed from want and disquietude, and the greater its improvement and discipline by study, the more inclined has been the human mind to engage in this lofty speculation. There is no foundation, then, for the opinion, which some atheistic writers have advanced, that speculation is the offspring of pain and want, and that man would never have undertaken the painful task of arguing on a First Cause, had he always lived in circumstances of ease and plenty. It might with more truth have been said, that atheistic speculation had its origin in the fears of ungodly men. To what unwelcome labour is the Atheist subjected!

creation, would be that of a Creator. Accordingly the supposition of an ancient, to whom Cicero alludes, is no less philosophically correct than curious: "That if persons who had long lived in subterraneous habitations, and had enjoyed *only a vague report* of the existence and power of the gods, should suddenly emerge into the light and lustre of the world which we inhabit, they would no sooner behold the earth and sea and sky, or *understand* the regular order of seasons and the vastness of the heavenly bodies, than they would at once acknowledge both the existence of superiour powers, and that these wonders were of their creation."

But man neither springs into existence in the full vigour and enlargement of his faculties, nor emerges from caverns of darkness into the effulgence of day. Familiar with the fabric of the universe before we are capable of reflection, the influence of gradual perception has precluded any emotions of wonder. It is only the man to whom the spectacle is novel, or whose faculties have been rendered inquisitive by education, who regards the steam engine with intelligent curiosity. So to the traveller, every scene is replete with absorbing interest, and suggests at every view appropriate enquiries, while the natives in general of that very land, which to him is a theatre of wonders, and a field of knowledge, are as little solicitous respecting its antiquities and history, as if they were incapable of thought. Multitudes may be found in different sections of the globe, who have never entertained even the suspicion, that those shining points in space were worlds of light; and it is because the power of education has never been brought to counteract that paralysis of mind which necessarily results from visual familiarity. It might be as reasonably supposed that the infantile body would grow and strengthen without the aliment which nature has furnished for its wants, as that man's unaided faculties would spontaneously assume the proportions of the philosophic intellect. The human mind must be taught, as the body must be fed; it must be stimulated by the force of education or of intellectual example or exposed to the influence of suggested thought, or it is physically incapable of any high enquiries respecting the causes and relations of things.

We are wont to speak of untaught native intellect; but the history of self-educated men will disclose in every instance, the influence of appropriate external causes in eliciting and shaping their undeveloped energies. The mechani-

cal inventions of Vaucanson may be traced to his having been obliged, while young, to attend his mother to the residence of her confessor, where, as a relief from tediousness, he was led to examine the pendulum of an old clock. The incident of having found in his mother's apartment Spencer's "Fairy Queen" made Cowley a poet; of having in an idle hour met with *L'Homme de Descartes*, made Malebranche the Plato of his age. Newton might never have deduced the principle of gravity, nor Franklin disarmed the lightning, had not the former been struck on his head by a falling apple, and the latter incidentally found De Foe's "Essay on Projects."

That the human mind, so degraded through ignorance as it must have been in the infancy of society, should have enquired after God; or that even the few among the mass who might have been endued with natural talent, could have discovered God, unless circumstances had conspired, or some incident had occurred, to arrest their attention, and elevate their thoughts, will then be admitted to be improbable.

Now it may be suggested, that Moses was favourably situated for the developement of intellect; nor will it be denied, that to superiour native powers, were added advantages of education, which distinguished his lot in life, not only from any of his kindred, but from the mass of mankind. Rescued in his infancy by an Egyptian princess from the waters of the Nile, he was brought up in her father's palace, and educated as her own son. What he was taught, it is difficult to determine with certainty; though Philo, as quoted from Clemens by Faber,* specifies in his allusion to the education of Moses, arithmetic, geometry, medicine, music, rhythm, hieroglyphical philosophy and astronomy. But Egypt was celebrated at that period for its science and literature, and as Moses, from our authentic information, was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," it is not improbable from our knowledge of the Grecian philosophy,—the elements of which were borrowed from that nation, that he was disciplined to the investigation of natural, moral and theological subjects.

We have been thus explicit, not only to preclude any impeachment of our candour in meeting a plausible objection to our train of reasoning, but to render it the more apparent, that the Egyptian education which Moses received, could not

* Hor. Mos. Vol. I. page 212.

have furnished him with his ideas respecting the Creator of the world.

Let it be granted that the far-famed wisdom of Egypt embraced moral apothegms, the economy of politicks, some knowledge of physiology and medicine, and not a few refined speculations on mind and matter; still, the same writings which acquaint us with the early history of Moses, afford ample evidence, that the God whom he knew was altogether unknown to the father of his royal patroness. "Who is the Lord," said Pharaoh, "that I should obey his voice to let Israel go? I know not the Lord neither will I let Israel go." Skilled as the Egyptians might have been in certain sciences; with all other nations at that period, they were alike immersed in the darkness of Polytheism. So far from entertaining any sublime notions of God, they were more degraded than the nations which prostrated themselves before the heavenly bodies, or deified their ancestors with the elements of nature, by the homage which they rendered to an indefinite multiplication of bestial and vegetable deities. The Mosaic worship, in not a few of its peculiar rites, is expressly guarded against the insinuating idolatry of Egypt; and if this be not sufficient to satisfy every reasonable mind that the notion of a Supreme Intelligence could not have been derived from that nation, can the contrary supposition be any less than absurd, when it is recollected, that the Egyptians themselves were ridiculed by surrounding Polytheists for the grossness of their idolatry?

That there might have been a few minds, as was subsequently the case in Greece, who from habits of thought were led to perceive the absurdity of the popular mythology is not improbable; but that any esoteric doctrine existed among the priesthood which embraced the pure principles of Natural Theology, is a suggestion replete with difficulties. Even if it be not reasonable to suppose that the Greek philosophers* who visited Egypt were initiated into the mysteries of their belief, would the king, who in all the early ages was linked with priests, have been ignorant of the principles which they withheld only from the knowledge of the vulgar herd? But if the priest, from the impression that his royal protectress designed him for their order, had admitted Moses alone into the arcana of hieroglyphical theism, how is it to

* The Greeks derived their religious ceremonies and borrowed the names of almost all their gods from Egypt. Herodotus, *Eut.* 53, 9.

be accounted for, that, contrary to the policy of his supposed instructors, and the universal custom of the heathen priesthood, he did immediately promulgate this rational doctrine to the multitude; nay, proscribed the polytheistic worship of the Egyptians, under penalty of death to the guilty Hebrew! So peculiarly circumstanced from being the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, would have been forward to act in opposition to the sentiments of his education? But let it be admitted, that the vigour of native intellect, the aspirations of ambition, or the enkindling emotions of long-smothered patriotism, led him to declare his greatness and authority by throwing off the shackles of prejudice, defying the priests, and enlightening the people; it can never be satisfactorily explained, why, if his theistical views are to be ascribed to priestly tuition, he did not avail himself of their belief in the metempsychosis or immortality of the soul,—a doctrine (and so considered by all heathen legislators, whether they in reality regarded it as true or not;) of the last importance in facilitating the designs, and securing the influence of a political aspirant. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact, that the patriarchs were not ignorant of a future state. But the sanctions of the Mosaic law are so exclusively temporal, that while no sceptic since Bolingbroke has failed to adduce this circumstance in *prima facie* objection, Warburton (with whatever success our position is not concerned) has rendered it the basis of his celebrated argument in defence of Moses' divine legation.

Let it not be said, that if the Egyptians had attained the knowledge of immortality, they could not have been ignorant of the true God. It might be shown that these points involve processes of reasoning so different, that while the human mind could not exclude the presumption of its future existence, it might be wholly in darkness respecting its great original. But in all probability, it was *their very ignorance of the Creator* which induced the belief of the Egyptians in the doctrine of metempsychosis. Certain it is, that the heathen philosophers have furnished us with the data of their conclusions on this subject. "Nothing can be produced out of that which has no existence," said Democritus, *nor can any thing be reduced to non-entity*. Or as Perseus expresses it,

"De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti."

Now if they had entertained any suitable notions of God as an omnipotent Creator, obviously an act of annihilation would have appeared as easy a matter on the part of Deity, as the act of creation ; but supposing matter to be eternal and indestructible, it secured a necessary inference to their minds, that the soul of man, which for aught they knew had always existed, could never cease to exist. Yet what involves greater ignorance of the true God, than this prominent doctrine of Egyptian belief ? It implied that God, had no distinct existence ; that all souls were an emanation from him, and ultimately absorbed into his essence, identifying God and the Universe.

There is, however, one more recourse for the advocates of natural theology. The Greeks, it is known, improved upon the rude principles of science which had been introduced from Egypt, until Pythagoras discovered the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid, and Thales predicted an eclipse ; and in like manner, it may be thought, that Moses from his instruction by Egyptian priests and sages was stimulated to essay discovery in the regions of metaphysical speculation. However unsatisfying or enormous might have been the reserved opinions of his supposed instructors, with a mind disciplined for thought by early education, it is evident that no one could have been more favourably situated for calm reflection and successful enquiry than he, during his forty years residence in the deep seclusion of the wilderness. Removed from Egypt, we can readily imagine that his mind might often revert to its moral condition, and loath its degrading superstitions. We see his eye moisten in commiseration, and his heart beat with indignation, as he thinks of the oppression and wretchedness of his enslaved kindred. Involuntarily he lifts his eye to Heaven, as if to invoke retribution on the tyrant and deliverance for the slave. Or again, the vague notions of superiour powers which his youth had imbibed recur to his mind. Whose mind in that early age, if not his, shall be led to enquire, how came this glorious scene into existence ? "Must there not of necessity be an adequate and intelligent Cause ? What spirit is that which thinks in mine, and shines in yonder firmament, and speaks to my heart in the tranquillizing stillness of the desert ? Why do I exist with all these faculties so distinguished from the herds around me ? Whence this aspiration after something, I know not what ? Whence

this sense of right and wrong? Has man no Maker; the injured no avenger? Is this universal frame without a thinking head and beating heart?—Surely, there is a God—the Creator and moral Governour of the world.”

But our imagination, wafted by the breath of revealed truth, has carried us away from the decisions of natural reason. So easy is the process by which we attain to the demonstration of an Almighty Ruler, it is difficult to conceive that Moses, so endowed by nature and education, and so long embosomed in the depths of reflective solitude, could have resisted the high conclusion, or failed to discover the true God.

In arguing, however, concerning the natural capacity of the human understanding, it would be as unfair to decide from the attainments of the mind assisted by revelation, as to assume the present state of mechanical improvement as a criterion of the degree of civilization to which the ancients had attained. Nor is any *à priori* reasoning admissible. To ascertain what Moses was capable of achieving by his own unaided powers, there is but one legitimate course; and that is, to institute an enquiry respecting the theistical sentiments of the most civilized nations, at a period when human reason was confessedly unassisted, but most intent on metaphysical speculation.

It cannot be maintained, that the attention of Moses was more particularly directed to this subject. The existence and attributes of a Creator were the especial and all-absorbing themes among the Grecian sages. It cannot be supposed, that Moses enjoyed greater advantages than they for the prosecution of this subject. Aside from the fact that the latter had visited Egypt with a view to directing or enlarging their minds, they constantly enjoyed that stimulus to intellectual exertion which arises from philosophic associations and conflicting opinions. Much less may it be presumed, that however energetic the intellect with which the former was endowed, it was superiour to that of the latter. The native elements of the human mind, never shone forth with more dazzling radiance, than from the recesses of the academic grove; or assumed such forms of beauty and sublimity as immortalized the schools. Giants in intellect, their works remain as monuments of the might of human achievements. The greatest of modern minds have been their most enthusiastic scholars. The very despisers of Moses have

bowed in adoration at the shrine of their acknowledged, perhaps unapproachable greatness. Yet must it not be conceded by every candid mind, that all their writings are but melancholy records of the incapacity of human reason to discover God. Is not the result of their every speculation confirmation strong of the apostolic position, that "the world by wisdom knew not God." The vagueness and confusion of the speculative opinions, which brooded over the Gentile world, before it was visited by the "day spring from on high," can be likened to nothing short of that chaotic darkness, in which the earth existed before God said, "Let there be light."

If Moses had originated his views respecting the Deity, it must have been through one of two mediums,—either from perceiving the necessity of a First Cause, or from nature's marks of manifest adaption to specific ends. Now both of these modes of reasoning were so familiar to the heathen philosophers, that neither Clarke nor Paley may justly be considered in any other light, than as the Aristotle and Socrates of modern times.

But to what purpose was their mastery of these arguments? Did they attain to any clear, consistent, or correct views of the uncreated mind? All their mighty speculations tended to little else, than a perception and esoteric acknowledgement of the absurdity of the reigning superstitions.

The Monad of Pythagoras was the universe itself; the Deity of Zeno was an active ethereal fire which pervaded and informed the passive material mass; of Aristotle, an external, physical power; of Plato, an independent mind having no creative power. But it is unnecessary to particularize. Having no definite views of the spirituality, personality, and unity of the godhead, in general, the god of the schools was an infinitely extended soul, not a simple, indivisible essence. He was a mere philosophical agent, invented by reason in attempted explanation of existing phenomena; not an object of praise and prayer. He was controlled by a fatal destiny,—not omnipotent. He was wrapped in the shades of impenetrable darkness; existing in indolent quietude, and at an unapproachable distance,—not the father of mankind, ever active in his universal, beneficent agency. If they may not properly be denominated Atheists, still less may they justly be regarded as Theists. If universally they were not

absolute Pantheists, it cannot be proved that in more than one instance they had any idea of the divine unity.

As he was pronounced by the oracle to be the wisest of men, so is Socrates the only one whose unassisted ken almost pierced the veil which shrouded the true God from mortal knowledge. But let it be distinctly considered, that his recognition of the divine unity* and personality, (if indeed, it may not be traced to a report of the belief which separated the Israelites from all the surrounding nations,) was scarcely more than a mere suggestion, which never assumed in his mind the shape of logical conviction, nor in his teachings the form and consistence of system; that he used the terms *god* and *inter gods* changeably; and that his constant practice in sacrificing both in private and public to the popular deities, his frequent recourse to divination, to say the least, were not very consistent with so sublime a belief. Blinded, indeed, by the most unworthy prejudice, must be the mind, which can degrade the theistical views of Moses, by a comparison with Socrates, much more with the speculations of other pagan philosophers.

That many sublime conceptions of the Divinity may occasionally irradiate our search into the antique regions of metaphysical speculation will readily be conceded; but like

* Warburton, has endeavoured to show, that the secret of the Mysteries was the doctrine of divine unity; and adduces in evidence the *Palinodia* of Orpheus, but it cannot be proved that the Hierophant taught this doctrine to the initiated. It is alike uncertain whether the *Palinodia* were written by Orpheus, whether its date be antecedent to Christianity, and whether it were recited in the ceremonies of initiation. Eusebius (*Præpar. Evang. Lib. 13. chap. 12.*) has cited the *Palinodia* from a Jew who lived 200 years before Christ, but in connection there is an incidental allusion to Moses and Abraham which has induced a belief in the minds of some critics that these verses were fabricated or interpolated by Aristobolus, or some other Jew. St. Justin's (*Exhort. ad Græc. p. 18.*) quotation differs from Eusebius, but all that can be deduced from his reading, is, that the author, whoever he might be, or at whatever period he might have lived, has not expressed himself respecting the Supreme Being in a more definite and consistent manner than Cleanthes, or Aratus from whom St. Paul quoted. The early Christians were so anxious to recommend the Scriptures by referring the heathen to points of similar belief in their own authors, that the most obvious interpolations have been detected in their version of Pagan hymns. In the hymns, as preserved by Pagan writers, of each of the poets to which we have alluded, the idea of a Supreme Governour is confounded with that of the stories which identified the Deity and the world. Were they conclusive, however, as to the belief of the divine unity, no evidence can be gathered from ancient authors to prove that it constituted a profession of faith at Eleusis. Socrates refused to be initiated, and on this account was thought to be destitute of religion; but if the unity of God were the secret, how happens it that he alone should have discovered it? See in connexion, the remarks of Faber, *Hor. Mos. l. Vol. Sec. II. Chap. VII.*

those brilliant coruscations, which light up for an instant the midnight sky, involving the traveller in tenfold darkness, these glittering thoughts serve only to render more sensible to the surrounding obscurity. It need not be shown, that the imposing splendour of these infrequent conceptions, fades away and dies, when compared with declarations so overpoweringly effulgent, as those which the Mosaical writings contain. Pause, for a moment, in reflection on this single sentence, (and it is among the most sublime which have been preserved to us,)—"I am whatever has been and is and shall be; and my veil no mortal has ever drawn aside"—and say, whether it does not, of itself, more than intimate the existing and hopeless darkness, in which the ancients felt themselves involved; whether the temple at Sais, on the architrave of which this sentence was written, might not most appropriately have contained an altar, bearing a corresponding inscription—"To the unknown God."

Let the utmost weight, however, be attached to the golden sentences of the ancient philosophers; let it be granted, that they caught some glimpses of the Infinite Majesty. Which of the schools arrived at a definite conclusion; what philosopher ever inculcated Mosaical sentiments of God, or taught one simple principle of theistical belief? Would not the whole array of philosophic minds have been smitten with amazement, had one of their number exclaimed, "There is one only living and true God?" Think of the obscurity and perplexity which characterize their speculations. It need not now be essayed, whether the whole range of their philosophy could furnish us with even a plausible system of eclectic theism. In this we have been anticipated, not only by some of the ablest of the Christian writers, as Justin Martyr and Augustin, who according to their own confessions, vainly searched and agonized for truth, until their minds were brought in contact with the Hebrew Scriptures; but even by Cicero, whose treatise *de Natura Deorum* amounts to nothing more, than a triumphant exposure of the uncertainty and vanity of all the existent systems of philosophical theism. Nor is it a result which should excite our surprise, when Plato, whose mind was still more profound than that of his immortal master, himself declared, "that, to discover the Artificer and Father of the universe, is indeed difficult, and that when found, it is impossible to reveal him, through the medium of discourse, to mankind at large."

If the later Platonists shall be found to be more consistent and satisfactory in their views, it will be recollected, that their date is posterior to the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into the Greek language,—a circumstance which was not without its immediate influence on all philosophical speculations.

A dispassionate enquiry precludes all doubt, that amid the irradiations of their schools, the wisdom of their senates, and the magnificence of their architecture, they were “without God in the world.” That altar erected in the centre of enlightened Athens, too truly tells us *all* that the Gentile world knew of God, after an elaborate enquiry of four thousand years. Mark well that inscription ;—TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.

Oh ! how should all deistical pretensions be abashed, and the pride of reason be humbled in the dust ! Look back to an earlier age, thou boasting sceptic ! Pry into the desert of Midian—thou shalt find that a greater than Socrates is there ! He is engaged in recording theistical instruction for all coming ages. Are his enquiries embarrassed by difficulties ? Does he combat no doubts, or shield his views from the possibility of scepticism ? Is he irrational, inconsistent, or unsystematic in his positions ?—Where else can be found such sentiments of God ? Uncreated, He has existed from eternity. Purely spiritual, strictly individual, essentially immaculate, He is as infinitely removed from all contact with matter, as distinct from all other existences, as his nature is free from imperfection and sin. Guided not by destiny, but by the unerring law which emanates from his infinite wisdom and goodness, He exists in absolute independence. Omnipotent to execute his sovereign pleasure, the world is not an emanation from his nature, but a creation of his will: Invisibly omnipresent, He does not, with Epicurean indolence, disregard the affairs of his creatures, or attend only to the things which are great in human estimation ; but fastening his vision on each revolving world, with each revolving thought of man, He knows all that can happen, either in time or space ; provides for every want, both of man and beast ; directs and orders all that takes place ; holds in his hands the destinies of every rational being, as amenable to his moral government ; and subserves the universe of mind and matter to the undivided, unrivalled glory of his incommunicable name.

Such is a faint delineation of the Being whom Moses knew and adored. Wonderful man! Amid millions of idolaters, sole iconoclastic monotheist! In thy conceptions of an immaterial Creator, a supreme Intelligence,—all-wise, all-mighty, all-good, obscuring the brightest, proudest speculations of the mightiest minds of philosophical antiquity!

Now, we ask, how are we to account for the fact, that Moses, in an uncultivated age, should entertain theistical views, which the greatest of heathen philosophers failed to discover; but which appear the more agreeable to reason, the more our reason is disciplined by philosophy and enlarged by science? Admitting that the heathen world, in the midst of its polytheism, entertained some indefinite notion respecting one *Optimus Maximus*, when all their speculations tended only yet more effectually to deface its impression, *is it credible* that Moses should have attained these rational and sublime views by the bare power of his own unassisted mind?

2. It is highly probable (i. e. admissible of the strongest moral evidence) that Moses derived his knowledge of God from original Revelation. Admitting his being, it cannot be asserted without denying his omnipotence, that a revelation from God is abstractly impossible; nor can such an occurrence be regarded as improbable, unless it be reasonable to believe, that the Creator of this world is not all-wise; or that He has formed the human race for no assignable end. Surely, man was not placed here through caprice. Look at his rational and moral constitution. Why alone gifted with intelligence? Why able to discern the reflected lineaments of wisdom and goodness? Why this mysterious faculty of thought, which can stretch itself into immensity and almost grasp infinity? Why this exhaustless capacity for the love and adoration of excellence, if he were not formed for high communion with his Maker? To suppose the contrary, is to brand his being as an enigma, and render all the phenomena of the universe less coherent and intelligible than the "leaves which the Sybil scattered on the wind." To reject, consequently, the presumption in favour of an original revelation to man is, to impeach the wisdom and beneficence of his Maker; it is to accuse Him of having wantonly formed man, and then abandoned him to be the sport of accident; or of having formed him for a high end, and then, paradoxically, attempting to effectuate his purpose by most studiously with-

holding from his rational creature any communications of divine knowledge.

If, according to the speculations of some of the most profound philosophers, it be probable that He who endued man with the organs of speech taught him their use; that even in relation to some of those arts which contribute to the comfort of civilized life, man in the infancy of our race was not unassisted by his Maker; much less is it reasonable to believe, that man was left by God in ignorance of his high relations.

Let it not be said, that, on account of his rational endowments and moral sensibilities, there was no necessity for any immediate revelation. Aside from the futility of unassisted reason, which is sufficiently obvious from the history of heathen philosophy, it is questionable, whether man uninstructed could ever have entertained general ideas; whether it would not have been impossible for him to conceive the idea of an infinite, simple Spirit; while it is certain, from universal observation and experience, that man must be taught, or he remains forever ignorant and incapable of mental exertion. As to natural conscience, it will not be maintained, we presume, that however she may intimate the existence of a moral Governour, her teachings could be available to all that knowledge of God which is indispensable to our well-being.

How absurd is it, we had almost said, to contend against the probability of man's having been immediately instructed by his Creator. Why not gravely argue, that God need not have furnished animal existences with the means of attaining the end of their being? "In the course of time they would have discovered them." * * * "If, indeed, they had not died on the eve of dawning success." The existence of animal instincts, is not only a proof of infinite wisdom in the Creator, but a living refutation of deism. Has God thus beneficently endowed the young of every animal; and did He withhold from man alone the means of at once accomplishing the sublime purposes of his being? If instinct were necessary to the brute, not less indispensable was revelation to man. It is now to man, as a heaven-born instinct, teaching him what reason cannot. And the same arguments which may be adduced in favour of probable revelation, prove that it was *ab origine*. It would be a violation of the constitution of things, infinitely more flagrant, had the Father of the universe abandoned his rational creature for ages before making Himself known, than if earthly parents should with-

hold shelter and nourishment from their new-born child, until they had convinced themselves, by its parched and pallid lips, its piteous cries, its dying struggles, that it could not thrive and live without their sustaining agency. Hence, the abstract falsity of any religion bearing date posterior to the creation. Hence the impregnable vantage ground which Christianity maintains amid the array of antagonist systems. The latest of his posterity may know the same eternal God whom Adam knew.

That Moses, therefore, must have enjoyed the advantages of divine revelation, may be logically deduced from three considerations which have been suggested to our minds, by the opening sentence of his history.

1. The clearness and positiveness with which he speaks of *one immaterial Creator*. Had he been present when "the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy," he could not have uttered a declaration more express and decided. In vain shall the records of profane history be searched for any statement which can bear a moment's comparison with this: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*. God, the supreme reality—the omnipotent intelligence, filled the whole sphere of his vision. He stood sublimely apart from all other existences. Amid the unnumbered deities of surrounding nations, like Sinai rearing its cloud-capped peak above the wide spread sands of the desert, He towered in solitary majesty, to a height which was inaccessible and full of glory. It is the lucid distinctness of his views respecting God, which constitutes the marked distinction and surpassing glory of the Mosaical system. Not one, of all the philosophical schools, ever proposed the immaterial, independent existence of one only God, as its distinguishing tenet; nor amid the multitude of their conflicting opinions, can any distinct recognition, much less any positive expression of it be discovered. Unblessed by a revelation from the source of light, how could they avoid obscurity or contradiction in their sentiments? Most congenial, as it may be to our minds, to conceive the existence of one intelligent Supreme; it is, nevertheless, so difficult to form any idea of a Being, whose nature is purely spiritual, that to speak of him with definite precision is not unlike the vain attempt of a blind man to describe light. If ever we speak of God in terms of confidence and lucid distinctness, it is with our hand on the Bible: and however "rooted and

grounded" we may be in the belief of supreme, spiritual unity, as characterizing the divine nature; yet no one, in the least accustomed to reflect on the operations of his own mind, will deny that it is of all conceptions the most difficult to retain in vivid, operative remembrance; that we involuntarily invest God with a material form; that we never think of Him without unconsciously proposing to ourselves some visible object.

We are not surprised, therefore, at the constant proneness to idolatry which all uncivilized nations have evinced; or that the Hebrews, despite of the instructions and warnings of their leader, should so repeatedly abandon his God in favour of heathen deities. The adoration of a brazen calf is better adapted to an ignorant people; nay, of the sun and moon to a mind however improved, if uninstructed by Heaven itself, than the worship of the invisible, intangible, inconceivable God. If Moses, considered as a political aspirant, had determined by the vigour of his own native intellect to devise an effective system of priestcraft, is it not probable, that he would have advanced other notions respecting the nature of God, than such as are the most difficult for even the enlightened mind to apprehend or retain;—which could not possibly be impressed on the efficient belief of such a race as the Hebrews, without the miraculous, corroborative interposition of the Creator himself? If he had not enjoyed this actual assistance of Almighty God, could he, in an uncultivated age,—his own mind but poorly furnished and disciplined in comparison with unnumbered minds of after ages,—have expressed himself with that clearness and positiveness of authority, which alone proceeds from conscious certainty? A self-taught child of nature, and thus speak of Him "whom eye hath not seen, nor can see?" O tell us, ye would-be wise, ye self-adoring sceptics! how happens it, that he should—

"So get the start of this majestic world
And bear the palm alone."

I wonder not that ye should have branded him as an enthusiast; a dupe; an impostor; and conspired to rob him of his crown.

"Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world
Like a Colossus; and we petty men
Walk under his huge legs, and peep about
To find ourselves dishonourable graves."

2. The cosmogony of Moses affords presumptive evidence of original revelation. Compared with that of the early pagan nations, it is brief and simple, while theirs is arrayed in all the gaudy colours of allegory; his is sober detail, theirs vague and marvellous; his, as a system, is consistent and rational, theirs is merely a group of wild and distorted images. If his, therefore, bears a stronger resemblance to an authentic history, it is equally obvious that those events, a mutilated account of which is interwoven with the mythological cosmogonies of every pagan nation, must actually have transpired (else whence this universal tradition respecting them?), and that the Mosaical is the true account.* We need not enquire, whether it be probable, that any unassisted mind, in any age of the world, could have drawn up such a history as that which is found in the first chapter of Genesis. Let our view be confined to the first verse of that chapter. It contains information of a fact which can be found no where else. In the beginning God created—*Created?* How came he by that idea? The wisdom of Egypt, the philosophy of Greece, the discriminative powers of the Roman intellect, the inventive imagination which characterized all the oriental nations, were unequal to its conception. The earliest philosophers of whom we have any knowledge, alike with Ocellus, Plato, and Aristotle, maintained that matter was eternal. *Ex nihilo, nihil fit*, was the fundamental maxim of all their speculations. Aristotle has attributed the opinion, οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μηδενος γενέσθαι—as common to those of his day with all preceding philosophers: and Plutarch, in his representation of the Platonic doctrine, says, “that the substance or matter of which God made the world was not created, but always lay ready for the Artificer, to be arranged and ordered by Him; for the creation was not out of nothing, but out of what had been without form, and unfit; as a house, or a garment, or a statue is made.”† The inference, consequently, is by no means inadmissible, that the human mind could not have excogitated the idea, that this world was produced from nothing. The spontaneous impression of the mind, on a survey of creation, is, that all things ever were, and ever will be, as they are. The resistless conviction of not a few of the

* See Faber's Sketch of Heathen Cosmogonies, *Horn's Mosaics*, Vol. I. Sect. I. Chap. II.

† Hence, though pagan writers not unfrequently used the term *Creator*, they attached no other idea to it than that of an Artificer.

pagan philosophers was, that the creation of the world is too stupendous a work for even God to accomplish ; and despite of all our superiour knowledge, when we contemplate the vastness of the material universe, and find ourselves lost amid countless suns and stars, to the smallest of which our earth dwindles into insignificance, and from the nearest of which the disk of our world can scarcely be discerned, we involuntarily exclaim, how is it possible that these revolving bodies, whose numbers and dimensions stagger our calculations, should have emerged from nothing into being? Admit that the *creation* of the world has been authentically declared ;—we may even believe it to be a fact, and yet it is a fact of which we can form no conception. That this vast frame should have been *created*, equally surpasses finite comprehension, as that the Creator himself should have existed from eternity. But if the latter proposition must of necessity be admitted,—though it be inscrutable to our minds,—so must we concede the yet more inscrutable proposition of Him

“ Whose word leap'd forth at once to its effect ;
Who called for things that were not, and they came.”

To assert that nothing can exist uncaused, is to violate the primary conviction of the mind that something must have existed from eternity ; and in like manner, to assert that matter cannot be produced from nothing, is to involve us in all the absurdities of the heathen schools, worse confounded by modern Atheists. Socrates did not fail to perceive the difficulties which embarrassed every existing theory respecting the genesis of the world ; and by consequence leaving this *questio verata* to the vain logomachies of the sophists, has told us, with greater emphasis than by positive affirmation, not only that he was ignorant of the *Almighty* God, but that he did not regard human reason as competent to successful enquiry on a subject so remote from possible knowledge, as that of the world's origin. Yet when the *creatio ex nihilo* has been suggested as a fact, it clears up a thousand difficulties ; appears the more rational as our enquiries extend, and gathers proof from the phenomena of nature.

Unaided, then, by supernatural light, was it Moses who has disclosed to us the secrets of the beginning? We could with equal facility believe that it was his spirit, and not the Spirit of the Almighty, which dissipated the primordial darkness that brooded over the unformed earth.

3. Regarding this passage as a simple proposition, it admits of no philosophical explanation, except on the ground, that the Hebrews were not destitute of either the historical or sensible evidence of a divine revelation. The advocates of the Bible have been wont to contrast the poetical addresses of the Hebrews to their God, with the immortal effusions of Cleanthes, Euripides, or Orpheus to Jupiter; and destitute indeed must he be of all sensibility to the sublime and beautiful, who does not perceive the incomparable superiority of the former. But still, though the high excellence of Hebrew poetry may be traced to the more rational and sublimated opinions which they entertained of the Supreme Being, it may not be adduced as a conclusive argument that they enjoyed a revelation from Heaven. The imagination is the only faculty which seems to be at all developed among an uncivilized people. The very expressions of an early and rude state of society are to a degree poetic. Every vestige of remote antiquity denotes the character of the human mind in the infancy of the world; and it is not unreasonable to admit the supposition that the age which nurtured the genius of a Homer, might have given birth to the most rapt descriptions of Deity. But the elements which contribute to the growth of poetic genius, preclude the formation of the philosophic mind. The very habits of mankind, in an uncivilized state, are at variance with that mental quietude which is indispensable to speculative thought. To expect to discover any traces of metaphysical enquiry among erratic hordes, composed of shepherds or savage hunters, were to betray unpardonable ignorance at once of the operations of mind and the history of our race. If any writings are found among such classes, they invariably disclose an exuberance of sympathetic feeling, with no capacity for thought; thus demonstrating that the poet, rather than the philosopher,—the singer, not the sage, is demanded by the wants of an uncultivated people. It is not until men have been gathered into permanent abodes, and a division of labour has been introduced, and a collision of intellects takes place, that arts are invented, science cultivated, or education sought. The first attempts at reasoning, compared with the speculations of erudite and disciplined minds, are as the lisps of the infant, to the perfection of speech. History proves, that the earliest traces of incipient civilization are discoverable, in sententious sayings on human life, isolated moral periods, and philosophi-

cal fables. The nature of mind precludes any discovery or deduction, whether physical or moral, until experiments have been made, or proofs investigated; and the progress of science, during the last century, most conclusively teaches us, that the last attainment of a philosophic mind, as the result of all its inductive enquiries, is the power of forming a simple proposition. To this end, how did Newton toil, that he might trace the demonstrations which enabled him to assert the laws of the planetary system !

Now on the supposition that the notion of one omnipotent Creator, who formed all things out of nothing by his mere will, was excogitated by reason, must not the discovery have been preceded by the most elaborate enquiry ? Could the proposition, that "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," have possibly been framed, except by a most improved and philosophic mind ; and that, as the result of the most profound, inductive abstraction ? No one will contend that the application of steam power, or the invention of the lightning rod, might have been hit upon by an uncivilized people. "When the intellectual faculties are just beginning to unfold," says Dr. Robertson, "and their feeble exertions are directed towards a few objects of primary necessity and use, it is preposterous to expect that men should be capable of tracing any relation between effects and their causes." Yet, though no speculation is confessedly attended with so many difficulties as that respecting the origin of the world ; and though no state could have been more unfavourable to the expansion of the reasoning powers than that which characterized the first ages of the world ;—*here is the son of a Hebrew slave*, in the midst of an ignorant, degraded, long-enslaved race, themselves surrounded by a nation of the grossest idolaters, authoritatively declaring to them, *as a fact*, that which no philosopher of later and the most cultivated ages, however protracted and repeated their efforts to demonstrate it, or render it probable by analogical reasoning, *ventured to affirm* ! Unlike men whose aim is to convince, or to secure an intellectual reputation, by a display of their powers of reasoning, he adverts to no train of thought,—adduces no proofs ; but simply throws down the naked, unsupported proposition, "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

Now we are reduced to this alternative : either to believe, contrary to evidence, that the world was then advanced to a

state of civilization and intelligence superiour to any subsequent degree of mental improvement, or that Moses was endued with the most enlarged intuitive perception ; either, that all analogical reasoning and all historical experience are directly violated by his declaration, or that he spoke on the authority of Heaven, to a people already acquainted, either through the medium of tradition from their fathers, or evidence addressed to their senses, with the fact asserted. If God were not previously known by the Hebrews, the bare affirmation of Moses would have been instantly rejected by that law of the mind which demands evidence just in proportion to the end proposed. He might have laboured to induce the belief ; but with infinitely less success than Newton, had he simply persisted in the assertion, that our earth and the planets revolve round the sun, instead of presenting to the world the series of demonstrations by which the discovery was at once made and established. But if, on the other hand, the memory of the Creator had been faithfully transmitted to the Hebrews ; and especially if sensible evidence of the Creator's power had been afforded by the recent and unequivocal interpositions of his Providence in their behalf ; then, all necessity for argument was alike anticipated and superseded by God himself ; and it was at once philosophical and sufficient for Moses to declare the fact in the form of a simple proposition.

Why does infidelity prate against the credibility of physical miracles ? If Moses were not indebted to original revelation, this single declaration involves a greater miracle. We can sooner believe, that God appeared to him in the burning, unconsumed bush ; that the waters of the Red Sea opened to admit the passage of the Hebrews ; nay, that the sun stood still in the heavens, at the command of Joshua, than that this declaration was made without supernatural aid. The infidel professes to believe in the existence of a God.—Why ? Because he fails not to perceive in any of the objects of nature, the marks of an agency impossible to man. We take up the Bible ; on its first page this declaration meets our eye :—"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."—We cannot but pause in profoundest astonishment. What powers of intellect, what capacious stores of knowledge, what sublimated conceptions must its author have had ! Who could he have been ? Tell me not, that any finite, unassisted mind lighted up that moral luminary for the world of mankind.

If, according to the shrewd suggestion of John Foster, a man must possess the very attributes of Divinity before he can be competent to certain knowledge that there is no God ; to our mind it is scarcely less apparent, from reflection on the unnumbered difficulties which embarrass every attempt to account for this declaration on sceptical principles, that if Moses were not inspired of God, it was *Himself* who in the beginning created the heaven and the earth. Absurd ! do we hear the infidel rejoin ? Then tell us of the mysterious processes of reasoning by which you are able to falsify the marks of a divine origin which are at once inscribed on the date, the authority, the form, and matter of this primary declaration. Reckon the incalculable chances which are arrayed against the supposition of unthinking ignorance, that it was a *happy hit*. Demonstrate (not dogmatize) that Moses was not aided by heaven to promulgate a fact which the history of literature and science, the experience of all past ages, teach you never would have been known, had he not declared it. Give us the evidence of your omniscience, for no less an attribute is necessary before *you can know*, despite of all probabilities, that the rational and sublime historian of Creation was not inspired by the Creator of heaven and earth.

1. If, then, such be the nature, attributes and works of God, He has given a special revelation of himself to man. If, according to our prefatory remarks, the idea of God be most suited to our moral nature and most agreeable to reason ; it is equally obvious from the train of argument which we have pursued, that without the lights of a divine revelation, we should have been enveloped in utter ignorance of *the one only living and true God*. It was to impress the belief of his independent existence and spiritual unity, that He made himself known to Moses by signs which could not be mistaken or disputed. It was to perpetuate the pure faith, that by the most singular polity, He separated the Hebrews from all connexion with the idolatrous nations of the earth, committing unto them the "lively oracles of God" until the time should come, predicted by his own word, when a more resplendent manifestation of his attributes would be made to the world in the mysterious constitution of his "only begotten Son."

Here is God's revelation to man. Wonderful book ! Does it stagger credulity ? Is its admission accompanied

with difficulties which the finite mind cannot satisfactorily solve?—But as God exists, the Creator and moral Governour of the world, so surely is this the word of God. The evidence that this volume suggested the belief of an immaterial creative intelligence, is as certain as that all nature corroborates the belief. It is owing to the radiance of Nature's evidences, that so many minds, whether sceptical or not, have been blinded to the true origin of our idea respecting God. We are not unaware of the authority of *names* which may be arrayed against our position. Let the remark be repeated a thousand times, that "no miracle was ever wrought to convince Atheists, because they might always arrive at the knowledge of a Deity by the light of nature." *Did* its well known author? We trow not. Lord Bacon had never been able, with so much significance, to designate the history of nature's phenomena, *volumen operum Dei, et tanquam altera scriptura*, had he not enjoyed a previous acquaintance with Revealed Truth. Clarke essayed, independently of revelation, to enforce conviction on the atheistic mind; but his inference by no means follows from his metaphysical premises. Aristotle might have said that "a self existent Being must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice, truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the Supreme Governour and Judge of the world," if the inspired Scriptures had previously unfolded to him the divine nature and attributes. Revelation is the telescope of reason; and it is owing to this fact, that the suggestions of God's word have been mistaken for the deductions of man's reason. So to our supernaturally illuminated vision, the feeble glimmerings of nature's light have become the planets moving in their respective orbits.

It may be in vain to attempt to wrest from the Deist a candid acknowledgement of his obligations to revealed truth. When a lie has been long cherished by the human mind, it seems to incorporate itself with all its moral elements. But we soberly aver, that the disbeliever in revelation should turn Atheist—yes, go out beneath the broad expanse of the firmament, and declare in the hearing of listening worlds,—*There is no God!* Can you not screw your philosophy up to such a point? Do you shudder at the very thought? Then bow down, in the docility of penitence, before the injured majesty of Revealed Truth. To stop short of this, is to convince us, not of your profundity, but of your

pride; not of the soundness of your reason, but the hollowness of your heart. No honest man will attempt to palm on the world the deductions of another, as his own. None truly great in intellect will vaunt the powers of human reason.* No one capable of appreciating the difficulties under which the greatest minds of antiquity laboured in their speculations concerning Gbd, will be reluctant to acknowledge, that Moses must in some manner have received supernatural illumination. "Call to-morrow," said a Heathen sage† when asked 'what God was?' Again and again, "call to-morrow." The answer was the instinctive tribute of natural reason, to the inscrutable majesty of the Supreme Existence. It is the humble acknowledgement of every profound thinker, whenever he attempts to embody his conceptions of that *something* which his thoughts and reasonings cannot grasp. Shall we then reject a volume, which, in no wise derogatory to his high attributes, discloses the Supreme Reality to the eye of our faith, in the most sublime, and yet endearing attitude,—reject it, on account of trifling, irrelevant difficulties, when our most philosophical and honourable and operative views of God are found *there* and no where else—bearing the most conclusive testimony to the divinity of its origin? No;—perish all human systems of philosophy, but leave us our Bible; or you have left us "without God in the world."

2. If the idea which Moses entertained of the nature of God be correct, we may infer that the Divine Being would have adopted precisely such a method of revealing himself to man, as is found in the Holy Scriptures. It having been already shown, that no reasonable objection can be adduced against the probability of a revelation, we will not discuss the question whether man should have been endued with the intuitive knowledge of his Maker. Let his rational and moral constitution, with the nature of God as an infinitely perfect spirit, be distinctly retained in mind. Now through what medium shall a revelation be made? Shall it be by a law written on the heart? But this, at the utmost, could only impel man to a certain course of action, without impart-

* "In my opinion," said Sir Humphrey Davy, "profound minds are the most likely to think lightly of the resources of human reason; it is the pert, superficial thinker who is generally strongest in every kind of unbelief."

† "Quanto diutius considero, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior." Symonides.

ing to him any definite knowledge of his lawgiver. Shall it be by an internal, spiritual illumination? But what evidence could we have that the light within us was not darkness? or wherein would such a clearness of mental perception differ from intuition? Adam might in some manner have been made acquainted with the Divine nature and attributes; but no one would contend for tradition, save the lover of ghostly power, or he who has not sufficient enlargement to perceive that it could in no manner be effectually secured from corruption, except by a succession of inspired men, or rather the inspiration of every man through all generations; which is as much a contradiction in terms as a perpetual miracle. We may not suppose that God would have formed man without acquainting him at once with the author and end of his being. Could the Divine purpose, then, in reference to the successive ages of the world, be in any manner so effectually answered, as by employing human instruments to embody authentic history, or immediately inspiring them to record the knowledge of his attributes and will?

Some have contended for the all-sufficiency of the light of nature to this end; and it is not surprising. We have seen how perfectly agreeable to reason are the disclosures of the Bible respecting God; and no believer, if in the least conversant with science, can be ignorant that all nature may be rendered tributary to the illustration and defence of revealed truth. The evidence of nature may be indispensable to corroborate the teachings of revelation. But how happens it, that nature so brightly symbolizes to our view the attributes of her great Creator? If the eye of reason, however perfect its construction, do not necessarily require a medium of vision equally with our bodily eye, sure we are, it *cannot be proved* that natural theology has instructed us in the true knowledge of God. The history of all nations furnishes indubitable evidence, that man, unblest by revelation, knows not the High and Holy One. Without the aids which inspiration has afforded, we might now be looking up to the hosts of heaven as our gods; and God would look down upon a world of benighted, degraded idolaters.

Should it be intimated, that from a jealous regard to revelation we do wrong to reason, it may be in truth replied, that it is no disparagement to this noble faculty of the mind, if in attempting to ascertain its real powers, the history of

the world proves them to be limited. But if, in any instances, the advocates of revelation have verged to one extreme, certain it is that the devotees of natural theology have gone to the other. It is not uncommon at the present day for the deistical illuminati to talk about the light of science, and the superiour faculties which the march of mind has afforded to our theistical speculations, and *they* are not surprised at the darkness which environed the heathen intellect; but in all their pride and fancied greatness, to the great ones of antiquity they are as midday insects compared with midnight stars. It was well said, and I think by Goëthe, that Deists are butterflies who have thrown off the covering under which they attained their perfect organization. To us they have ever appeared not unlike the sage critics of Columbus. O, vain men! it is owing to this blessed volume that reason commands such reach in investigation, and can bring to her purposes such energy in action. It is because she sits where the light of heaven streams upon her, in all the effulgence of the sun of righteousness, that she seems so godlike in her powers, so radiant with glory.

Others have thought, the best possible manner, and the only efficient way, in which God could reveal himself, would be by some striking manifestation to the senses. Suppose this were done. We see his flaming car as it rolls through the darkness of the midnight heavens. We hear the thunder of his voice, which breaks, in startling accents, on the leaden ear of universal sleep. The long extinguished fires of Sinai are rekindled on yonder mountain, in token of his descent. He throws himself in some undefined, appalling shape across the path of the transgressor; or strikes the unbeliever dead before our terrified sight. What is the consequence? He has annihilated our moral freedom; precluded the ennobling exercise of our spiritual faculties on his high attributes, and degraded us in the scale of intellectual being. Man is operated upon by his Maker as if he were a brute. Instead of a rational and moral being, guided by reflection, believing on evidence, obedient from free choice, he has become a trembling slave, overwhelmed by the visible display of the Divine Majesty.

We admit that a representation of Deity which shall constitute a violation of the laws of nature (if such, indeed, be an accurate definition of a miracle), may be indispen-

sable to corroborate a written revelation; but it could be permanently adapted only to a people who, from ignorance and the circumstances of their condition, were incapable of appreciating any other evidence than such as might be addressed to their senses. Nor could any material representation, however sublime, of such a being as God, bear any proportion to his essential glory, or any relation to his spiritual nature; while it would for ever restrict us, in our contemplations of God, to an image, at once degrading to his perfections, and contracting to our faculties of thought.

But a revelation addressed to us through the medium of inspired written language, while it respects our rational constitution and progressive susceptibilities, may shield the Divine character from erroneous and unworthy notions. Our conceptions of Him will be clearer and more enlarged, our approximation to Him, in mental elevation and moral excellence, will be more near, just in proportion to our study of his word and obedience to his spiritual requirements. Faith, as an intelligent, voluntary exercise, will secure the glory of his name, and the true dignity of our nature. With such a revelation as this, what themes of meditation are presented to us! what questions for the trial of the highest intellect! what room for the excursive faculties of mind! what fields for the acquisition of knowledge! By the influence which it is calculated to exert over our being, how may we be elevated above the grovelling perceptions of sense! how may we hold communion with the Supreme Intelligence, and be fitted to take part in the sublime exercises of immortality! Look at the man who consecrates his mind and heart to the practical belief and intimate knowledge of the inspired Scriptures;—

“How near he presses on the Angel’s wing!
Which is the Seraph, which the child of clay?”

The very conception of such a Being as the God of the Bible, elevates man to the consciousness of himself, as possessing an immaterial, deathless principle. It cannot be steadily entertained for a moment, without the most profound abstraction of mind; while it is capable of illimitable expansion. We may add thought to thought, and image to image, and still with the certainty that all is infinitely short of the reality. It opposes itself to all that is material and mutable; surpasses all that is beautiful or sublime;

eclipses all that is splendid; subordinates to itself all that is great and good; until earth-born existences fade away from our vision, and the universe itself vanishes into nothing.

3. To reject the Holy Scriptures is to deny God. The Deist scorns to submit to the grand requisition of inspired truth;—*faith* is derogatory to his reason! Now could he prove that the human mind, by its unaided energy, attained to the knowledge of God, it may be doubted whether, in his theistical belief, he is not acting on the very principle which he repudiates in the Christian believer. Certain it is, he cannot demonstrate an eternal First Cause; he cannot disprove the suggestion of the Atheist, that it is a mere hypothesis, to account for the phenomena of the universe.* Would it not seem, then, that his belief is founded in faith?—his entire system being reared on that which, independently of inspired authority, is a gratuitous assumption! But his idea of God is too shadowy, his belief too theoretical, to secure his practical acknowledgement of a Supreme Being. To be rationally affected by the idea of God's existence, we must be impressed with the belief, that although impervious to our senses, He is intimately conversant with our thoughts; that He is not merely an upholding, animating, directing power; but an all-seeing witness—the Judge of all the earth, as well as its Creator. The moral grandeur of the Mosaic declaration consists in its unfolding at once, and with impressive authority, the relations which mankind sustain to a personal Creator; and a belief in the inspired record cannot fail to secure to God the place which He should occupy in our affections, the authority which He should exercise over our conduct, the tribute to which He is entitled from dependent and accountable beings.

But the Deistical system, from its very nature, as a theoretic speculation, can exert no efficient influence over the moral man, or retain an effective grasp on the mind. Let the naturalist look up to the heavens, or around on the earth. The scriptures of creation are written in characters too ill-defused to repress this sinful emotion, or arrest that wicked purpose. The God of nature is too retired and silent to be felt as the rebuker and avenger of crime; His glory is too much obscured by the shades and visions of ma-

* See Storr and Platt's Theology—Book 11. Sec. 13. §§. 3, 4, and 7.

terialism to counteract the splendour of the world's attractions ; His vicegerent soon yields, unable by itself to bear up amid the floods of passion and the collision of selfish interests.

Hence it is, that God is not in all the thoughts of those who disbelieve the Bible. Overpowered by the pressing temptations of sense, they retain no consciousness of His immediate presence. Insensible to their high relations, they erect no altar to His praise, perform no action to His glory. Nay, let our naturalists have all they ask ;—if it be so, that the Being whose existence and attributes they so clearly perceive through his works, has not stooped from his high throne to communicate with his rational creatures, it is a resistless inference, that He no more claims our obedience and adoration, than an intelligent homage from the beasts that perish. The very principle for which they so strenuously contend, resolves the Almighty into the Deity of Epicurus, alike indifferent to all the actions and interests of his creatures.

“Who sees with equal eyes, as God of all,
A hero perish, or a sparrow fall ;
Atoms or systems into ruin hurl'd,
And now a bubble burst, and now a world.”

Hence it is, also, from the vagueness and ineffectiveness of its principles, that Deism (as might be illustrated in the case of Hume, Voltaire, and others) tends by easy gradations to the abyss of Atheism. There is no practicable *πρὸς* between a belief in Revelation and the virtual dethronement of the Almighty. To shut out the God of the Bible from our hearts, is to preclude the operative, if not actual, sight of God in his creation. Hence, if Revelation were annihilated, what must be the inevitable consequence? Despite of its effulgent light and effective motives, how many love not, fear not, know not God! If its beams were *withdrawn*, the physical darkness of the earth, in the absence of its luminary, could but feebly image that moral night which would overspread the world of mankind. Oh! the horrors of such a night! Pride and hate, lust and violence, war, rapine, and carnage, have stalked from their hiding-places, for Atheism has tolled the knell of God's existence, and proclaimed to an affrighted world that death is an eternal sleep!

ART. II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

By REV. LEONARD WOODS, D. D.

NUMBER V.

How the affections are influenced by previous affections.

IN former numbers I endeavoured to show, what influence the will has upon the affections, and the affections upon the will. I shall now enquire, *what relation the affections have among themselves, or the manner in which our affections at any time are influenced by antecedent affections.* This enquiry will be found to be somewhat complex, and of course attended with difficulty. But a distinct and careful prosecution of it will, I think, conduct us to some important and satisfactory results.

It is indispensable to the right understanding of this subject, as well as of many other subjects in mental philosophy, to consider, that *the operations of the mind generally result, not from any one cause exclusively, but from various causes combined.* We are taught by experience, that a particular operation or state of mind follows a particular cause; and to this cause we are accustomed to refer it. And it may be, that this cause has not only a real and uniform influence, but a chief influence; and we may direct our attention at the time to this influence only; and so may be ready to conclude, that nothing else has any influence in causing the mental operation or state. Whereas, a farther consideration of the subject may show, that this operation or state results from a great variety of causes, some near and some remote. This principle will be more distinctly brought into view and applied, before we close this essay.

It seems hardly necessary to remark, that when we use the words *cause* and *effect*, and other words of similar import, in relation to the mind, we are to give them a meaning correspondent with the nature of the subject. It is perfectly according to common usage, to apply these words to the mind as well as to the material world, although not in precisely the same sense. And why should any one suppose, that it is not as admissible to make this use of the words *cause* and *effect*, as to take any words which were originally applied to body, and apply them to mind? Who would object to our using the word *move*, and its derivatives, to de-

note an influence exerted on the mind, because in their literal and original application, they denoted an influence on matter? An adherence to such a principle would lead to an entire revolution in our modes of speech, and would divest language of its greatest beauty and force. Be it so, that the use of words for which I now contend, is metaphorical. It is not, therefore, any the less just and suitable. The propriety of such a use of the words *cause* and *effect* appears in this, that there is as real and uniform a relation between cause and effect in *mental* science, as in *physical*. A *cause* is that from which an effect flows,—that which has an influence to produce an effect,—that by which another thing is brought into existence. An *effect* is that which flows from something else as its cause, or is produced by the influence of a cause. Now, that which we call a *mental* or *moral cause*, has an influence as real and certain as a physical cause. As to *certainly* and *uniformity*, the *relation* of cause and effect in the two cases is alike, although the *nature* of the cause and effect in the one case is exceedingly different from what it is in the other. Do you say, there is so wide a difference in the nature of what we denominate cause and effect in the two cases, as to expose men to mistake, if we employ the same words in both? The difference intended, I admit, is obvious and entire. And the very circumstance of its being so is sufficient to prevent all mistake. For if we have the requisite information and judgement, we shall always understand the words in a sense correspondent with the nature of the subject.

It ought not here to be overlooked, that we sometimes speak of cause and effect in a *mixed* sense,—a mental cause is sometimes connected with a bodily effect, and a bodily cause with a mental effect. Numberless phenomena of this kind are involved in the connexion of body and mind. It is a connexion of mutual influence. Thus, a volition, which is a mental act, causes a bodily act; and an affection of the body often causes a mental act.

We now proceed to consider the subject introduced above, namely, *the connexion existing among the affections, and the manner in which our present affections are influenced by those which occurred in past time.*

One way in which a previous affection has an influence upon present affections, is *by being distinctly recollected*. When brought by an act of memory before the mind as an object of contemplation, it becomes, like any other object of

attention, a means of exciting present affections. It is, however, *only one* of the means,—one of a variety of things which operate as causes of present affections. Those very emotions which arise in view of a past affection, may result in part, and even chiefly, from other causes. And those other causes may greatly modify the appropriate influence of the recollected affection; so that the emotion which that recollected affection produces, may be very different from what it would have been, had that been the only cause concerned.

Experience teaches, that *the affection which is excited by the recollection of a past affection frequently differs from it in point of character*. An apostate angel doubtless recollects the holy affection of which he was once the happy subject; but the recollection occasions an unholy emotion. And a Christian, in time of spiritual declension, often recollects the happy feelings which he had in former days, while no similar feelings are awakened by the recollection.

But experience teaches that, *in other cases, the recollection of a past affection is followed by an affection of a similar nature*. Thus, if past goodness is recollected by one who is holy, the recollection will excite a good affection, that is, a feeling of holy approbation and delight. If, however, the same person calls to mind a past *sinful* affection, he will still have a holy affection excited, that is, an affection totally unlike the one recollected.

In view of these facts, you may perhaps say, here are very different effects resulting from one and the same cause, that is, the recollection of past affections, and does not this disprove the truth of the position, so commonly admitted, that the same causes produce the same effects?

I answer, this would clearly be the case, if the recollection of past affection were the only cause concerned, and the different effects referred to resulted from this cause alone. But, in fact, the cause which operates in this case, is a *complex* cause, and the principal part of this complex cause is the state or habit of the mind. Indeed, the recollection of past affection is rather to be considered as the occasion of bringing out the affection which naturally results from *the state of the mind*; this being the prevailing internal cause. It is this which determines the particular influence which the external motive exerts. If an intelligent being has a

holy state of mind, it is the fixed law of his nature, that in all ordinary circumstances, outward objects will excite holy emotions ; and that if he has an unholy state of mind, outward objects will excite unholy emotions. Take an illustration of this from the natural world. Heat will harden or soften, according to the *nature* of the substance on which it acts. That *some* effect is produced, is most directly to be attributed to the heat ; but that the particular, *specific* effect is produced, rather than some other, is owing to the nature of the substance. Take another case. The same sun, and rain, and soil, produce different kinds of fruit, as oranges and lemons. The growth of fruit, as a general fact, is owing to these causes. The difference in the kinds of fruit results from the nature of the trees, and this results from the difference in the nature of the seed from which the trees sprung. Of the complex cause concerned in producing fruit, *the specific nature of the tree* is a chief part ; and it is this which determines the nature of the effects. This general principle is as true in mental science as in physical ; although the causes and effects in the one are, in their nature, so different from what they are in the other. The peculiar relation of our affections to the divine law, and our being worthy of praise or blame on account of them, does not by any means imply that they arise in the mind without appropriate moral causes. It results altogether from the *nature* of moral causes, and of the affections flowing from them.

It is not meant by any of the remarks above made, that the affections always flow on in an unbroken series, and that no cause whatever can interfere to prevent this : for, although the state of the mind and the outward objects commonly acting upon it naturally tend to this result, there may be extraordinary causes which will mingle their influence with these, so that the series of similar emotions will be broken, and those of a different kind excited. For example, a moral agent, under the influence of strong temptations, changes from holiness to sin ; and a sinner, under the special influence of the Holy Spirit, becomes holy. But the occurrence of these changes under the operation of extraordinary causes does not prove, that a continuance of the same affection is not likely to result from the ordinary causes abovementioned, namely, the *state of the mind*, and *outward motives*. Nor does it prove that these ordinary causes may not, in due time, become so powerful, as absolutely to preclude any change in

the character of the affections. Unquestionably this will be the case both with the holy and the unholy in the future state.

Having thus shown how past affections exert an influence upon present affections *by being recollected*, and how this influence is modified by other causes, I proceed to show in the

Second place, that the affections we exercise have an influence in regard to subsequent affections, *by means of their influence on the state or habit of the mind*; or, which is the same thing, *upon the mind's aptitude to the exercise of particular affections*. This, which has already been hinted at, is the most important way in which any affections influence those which follow. That there is such an aptitude or tendency of the mind to put forth certain emotions rather than others, under the influence of the same external objects, is a fact well known, and commonly admitted. This aptitude, which exists in various degrees, shows its highest power when a particular object excites an affection more readily, or more frequently, or more strongly. Now it is manifest, that *the natural tendency of any affection which is exercised, is to increase the aptitude of the mind to the exercise of the same affection*. It is, indeed, true, that this tendency may be counteracted, or its effect varied, by other causes; as will appear in the sequel. But every exercise of mind, taken by itself, plainly has the tendency abovementioned. Thus benevolent emotions give the mind a greater aptitude to the same emotions. The consequence of every act of love to God, supposing us free from all opposite influences, is, that we shall be more *apt* to love him hereafter; in other words, we shall love him more readily, and in a higher degree. It is on this principle that Christians are advanced from one degree of piety to another. Every exercise of holy love has a good influence upon their character and state; and that, too, in proportion to the purity and strength of the exercise. A few holy exercises, in which all the intellectual and moral energies are roused to intense action, contribute more to the growth and confirmation of a holy principle and habit, than thousands of exercises which come from a divided or sluggish heart. The same is true of malevolent affections. The emotions of anger and revenge naturally tend to increase the aptitude of the mind to the same emotions; and this effect will be in proportion to the

strength and violence of the antecedent emotions. This is more commonly expressed by saying, that the malevolent passions are strengthened by exercise.

But *this natural tendency of our affections*, like that abovementioned, *is frequently modified by other causes*. A particular affection may be attended with such circumstances, that it will be followed by a less aptitude to the same affection than existed before. Let a man's compassion be strongly excited by the appearance of distress in beggars, and by the touching appeals they make to his heart; and let him find afterwards that this appearance is generally deceptive, and these appeals founded on falsehood; and the natural consequence will be a less degree of aptness to have his compassion excited by similar causes. The exercise of compassion, if left to produce its own natural effect, would certainly increase the mind's tendency to compassion; but in the case now supposed, the other causes which come in for influence, that is, the discovery of imposture, and the painful emotions consequent on the exercise of compassion in such circumstances, go far towards suppressing the exercise, when cases of beggary again occur: and these counteracting causes may have an influence so great, as to deaden the heart to the exercise of pity in all other cases. It is on the same principle, we are to account for the influence which *fiction* and *theatrical exhibitions* have to deteriorate the moral and social character.

Similar remarks may be made as to the feeling of friendship and confidence. By itself, it tends to increase the mind's aptitude to the same feeling. But a man may so often find his friendship misplaced, and his confidence betrayed, that in the end no amiableness or worth of character can gain his heart.

This qualifying influence of circumstances appears also in regard to sinful affections. Thus strong emotions of anger, and the consequent utterance of violent, abusive language, if separate from other influences, would produce an increasing tendency to anger, and in the end a habit of indulging it in all its violence. But in certain cases, the occurrence of violent anger may prove a safeguard against a like occurrence for the time to come. This, however, is not to be attributed to the proper influence of anger, but to other circumstances connected with the operation of that passion, particularly to the regret, and shame, and self-re-

proach, and other evils, occasioned by it. The same is true of other depraved affections. The criminal disposition which David indulged in the matter of Uriah, and Peter in the judgment hall, were, through the influence of other causes, undoubtedly followed by a state of mind more strongly fortified than before, against the same dispositions. Through the grace of God, it is so with Christians generally. The sinful emotions which arise in their hearts, and which lead them to acts of disobedience, occasion the bitterness of sorrow, and that sorrow embitters the sin which occasioned it; while on the other hand, the new evidence which their own experience in such cases affords, of the immeasurable forbearance and goodness of God, increases their love and gratitude, and renders them more unwilling to offend him. Even in the history of men destitute of religion, instances are not wanting, in which the transgression of the divine law, especially a flagrant transgression, instead of producing its natural result, that is, *increasing sinfulness*, becomes the occasion of such reflections and emotions, as lead, by divine grace, to a saving change of character.

Here I cannot but notice a serious mistake sometimes made by good men, who represent it as an invariable fact, that sinners, while unrenewed, are continually growing more and more hardened and confirmed in sin; that they will certainly have less feeling on the subject of religion in future time, than they have now; and especially that those who pass through a season of special divine influence without being converted, will in every case become more stupid and bold in sin, than before. Now this is doubtless the case frequently, if not generally. But it is well known, that some sinners, though not savingly converted in a time of revival, retain an increased sensibility to divine truth, a greater dread of sin, a deeper feeling of the worth of the soul, and a more awakened attention to the means of religion. Instead of falling into greater thoughtlessness and insensibility, they are more disposed to consider their ways, and more alive to divine truth. And like things occur among sinners in other circumstances. These facts, however, by no means prove, that continuing in impenitence does not constantly increase *the amount of guilt*; nor do they prove that living in impenitence does not *naturally tend* to produce a growing strength of sinful affection, and a growing disregard to duty. They only prove, that there are other

causes which bear on the subject,—causes which oppose, and sometimes overcome, the direct, natural tendency of sinful affections. Sinners would be always acquiring greater and greater hardness of heart, as Pharaoh did, were they given over, as he was, to the unchecked influence of their impiety. This will unquestionably be the case with all sinners in that state of retribution, which will fully develop the evil nature and tendency of sin, and will show, with perfect clearness, how God regards it. But in this world, the tendency of sin to increase its own power in the mind, though generally and to an alarming degree manifest, is yet subject to many powerful checks. It is the merciful appointment of God, that other causes, both outward and inward, shall come in for a share of influence, and not unfrequently lead to a moral state, exceedingly different from that which would have resulted from the operation of sinful affection alone.

From this examination you will perceive, what every advance in the knowledge of mind renders more evident; that while we find that in one respect and another, a particular law exists and produces important effects in our intellectual and moral nature, it does not exist alone, but is combined with other laws or influences, which diminish and sometimes entirely prevent its proper effect; though at other times they greatly increase that effect. It is this combination of intellectual and moral laws and causes, which renders the philosophy of the mind so complex, and the acquisition of clear, definite notions so difficult.

This brief enquiry leads to conclusions of great practical moment. *A definite knowledge of the principles above disclosed, besides preserving us from many hurtful errors which prevail concerning the affections, must prove a powerful motive to guard against all sin, even the first and feeblest motions of it in the affections, and to cherish, with the utmost assiduity, every feeling that is pure and holy.* If it does indeed result from the constitution of our minds, that one good affection naturally leads on to others, and that a continued train of good affections are more likely to arise in the mind, and to arise in a higher degree of strength, in consequence of every good affection which is exercised; then surely a good affection must be regarded as of immensely greater value than if it existed *by itself*, without any influence upon the subsequent movements of the mind. A pure

and holy emotion, considered merely in itself, is of great worth. But how much greater must its worth appear, when we consider, that it has a tendency to perpetuate itself; that it exerts an influence which, instead of passing away with the moment, will naturally extend into all future time, and contribute to form a character permanently and unalterably holy:—a possession of greater value to a moral being than all the creation beside. Duly impressed with this view of the train of happy consequences likely to flow from right affections, we should crave them as the choicest of all blessings, and should open our hearts wide to give them room. We should guard most assiduously against every thing without us and within us, which would in any way hinder or diminish their happy influence; and we should, above all, continually look in fervent prayer to the Father of our spirits, the fountain of holiness, that he would fill us with all pure and heavenly affections.

Equally salutary must be the effect of our considering the influence of *sinful* affection upon our subsequent state. With what watchful care should we avoid every unholy emotion, if we remembered, that it is a disease of the soul, hard to be cured; that when admitted into the mind, it takes such hold of our moral nature, as will be likely to insure its continuance; and that every operation of this hateful distemper naturally increases its strength, and renders it more fatal.

We are here taught how to account for that low, earthly state of mind, that distance from God, that spiritual blindness and death, which we so often have occasion to deplore. This state is not to be considered separately, but in connection with its causes. It is in a great measure to be traced to what has been faulty in us in times past. Every sinful feeling which we have heretofore exercised, has left its stamp upon our hearts. That moral state which we lament, is to be regarded as resulting chiefly from the general current of our moral feelings in past time. Every vain thought, every proud, resentful, or unkind feeling, every corrupt desire, which has lodged within us, has had an influence not limited to the time when it took place, but reaching to all following time, and helping to constitute our permanent habit of mind. Thus our present condition may truly be regarded as a kind of index to the antecedent states of our mind,—the sum of the impressions made upon us by the af-

fections we exercised the previous moment, the previous hour, and day, and month, and year, and all previous time. How often have we learned by experience, that our feelings through the week have an effect upon us on the Sabbath, and our feelings on the Sabbath, through the week? How evident it is that the thoughts and feelings indulged in childhood and youth have an effect upon character, which is visible in manhood, and even in old age! The wrong states of mind of which we are at present conscious, and which may sometimes appear unaccountable, are, in many cases, to be traced back to what took place ten, twenty, or even fifty years ago. And it is not to be doubted, that the state in which the wicked will find themselves in the future world, will be the fair result of all their dispositions, thoughts, affections and desires, during the time of their probation. With what awe should we be inspired, when we contemplate this constitution, which God has given to our immortal minds! With what fear and trembling should we consider the fact, that an unholy affection, exercised in early childhood, yea, at the very commencement of our moral being, will certainly be followed by a sinful, impenitent life, and a sinful and miserable eternity, unless the sovereign grace of God interpose to turn things from their natural course.

Should we wake up to just apprehensions of this subject, how deeply should we be impressed with *the evil of sin*, not merely as it consists in a wrong state of mind, and as it is attended with unhappiness at the time of its occurrence; but *as tending, according to the moral constitution of man, to draw after it endless pollution and misery!* Considered in this light, every sinful emotion which rises in the heart is an evil of fearful magnitude, spreading a pestilential influence over the whole of our existence. Surely then, no degree of vigilance or resolution against sin can be too great. It is better to forego any present pleasure, or endure any extremity of suffering, and even to sacrifice life itself, than to take this deadly poison into our souls. Entertaining these views of the subject, with what amazement as well as grief should we look upon the multitude of rational beings around us, who live without concern, and with apparent satisfaction, in the midst of the most dreadful plague which ever seized on man, and who are so stricken with madness, that they often seem to be the more pleased, as they exhibit more visible and certain symptoms of eternal death!

Finally, This examination respecting the connexion which the affections have among themselves, has clearly shown, that mental philosophy, rightly understood, conducts us to conclusions perfectly coincident with the dictates of holy writ.

ART. III. INVARIABLENESS OF THE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY AMIDST THE DIVERSITY OF ITS FORMS.

By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, President of the Theological School at Geneva.

Translated by the EDITOR.

[NOTE.—The original discourse of which the following is a translation, was delivered at the commencement of the annual session of the Theological School at Geneva, 1st of May, 1834, and printed at the request of the Evangelical Society of that city. It is here inserted both on account of the intrinsic interest of the subject, and as an argument for that closer union, towards which the minds of many Christians are now turned. Such an outward union as is to be desired, must depend upon the inward agreement of Christians in the essential doctrines of our religion, as its first condition. If this agreement is found to exist in the great body of Christians, in all ages; (which it is the object of this discourse to show, and which might be inferred from the very nature of Christian piety,) then it would seem right that this agreement should be recognized in some general creed, and strengthened by some outward bond. Whatever importance may be attached to the speculative differences which have always existed among Christians, these differences cannot be allowed to justify the breaking of this bond, except so far as they affect the essential points of Christian doctrine. Of the various theories respecting Christianity, some are more true, and deserve accordingly to be earnestly contended for, in opposition to others which are less conformed to the nature of religion. These various theories result from the various intellectual habits, and the various outward circumstances of Christians, or from the various degrees of knowledge and piety to which they have attained; and are therefore always likely to exist. They furnish the appropriate exercise for the high virtues of forbearance, toleration, and charity, which otherwise would have no place. They ought not, indeed, to be regarded with indifference; on the contrary they should awaken the most lively interest, as matters both of philosophical enquiry, and of practical moment. But to make them the nucleus of separate ecclesiastical organizations, and the condition of Christian fellowship, is to sacrifice the great practical advantages resulting from the outward unity of the Church, in behalf of

a speculative uniformity of opinion on unessential points, which is of little importance, impossible to be realized, and perhaps hardly to be desired.

On this subject we would urge upon the candid attention of our readers the enquiries of Bishop Smith, in his communication on Christian Union, in our last Number. "Was it wise," he asks, "to attempt to add to the brief, general, comprehensive creeds, by which, down to the time of the Reformation, Christians were content to regulate their faith? Has any thing been gained by spinning out the standards of faith into all the more minute ramifications of metaphysical and polemic theology? May not the thousand-and-one splits amongst Protestant Christians, on points of doctrine, be mainly traced to this fundamental mistake? Agreement in essentials and freedom in unessentials, is a wise axiom. Has it been the leading axiom of doctrinal sects? The knife which divides the polypus cannot be more prolific, than that knife which has been so much in use, in cutting off every member from the Church who differed in any thought from some standard, by which the operator has been pleased to try his opinions. An unnatural effort to keep men's minds pared close, in order to conform to a particular creed, has led to more numerous and far wider departures from it, than could otherwise have taken place."

As to the translation here offered,—it was commenced before we were informed that a translation of the same discourse had been made for the last Number of the Quarterly Observer, and was partly in type before that Number reached us.

EDITOR.]

The Church dispersed throughout the world announces this faith; she teaches it, she transmits it, as if she had only one mouth; for although the modes of expression in different places are diverse, yet is the force of the truth which is delivered one, and always the same: even as the sun, that work of God, is one and the same throughout the universe.—Irenæus, Advers. Hæreses, L. I. c. 3.

How great is that activity,—how diverse the labours, the efforts, which men are exhibiting upon the earth! But time passes its level over the greater part of their works. Even should they attempt to raise a tower to the heavens, the summits are cast down, and after a few generations, mingled with the sands of the desert.

There is nothing here below which is stable, except Christianity. This alone is immutable, like its Author. It is that Rock of Ages against which still new waves have ever broken, and will always break, without having power to shake it.

If, then, there is any one who would give to his work on earth a character of stability and permanence, let him attach it to Christianity. His work will then receive from the eternal religion an impress of immortality.

These, however, are not truths which are universally received. On this subject there are two great errors among

men. Some pretend that there is nothing immutable, even in the essence of Christianity. "The Christian doctrine," say they, "is only a particular form of the religious sentiment. This form has taken the place of an antecedent form, and will itself be succeeded by another. The Religion of the Saviour," they add, "must necessarily have proceeded from the state in which mankind was found, at the time of the Cæsars," just as buds and blossoms spring naturally from a tree in spring-time. A strange error to which Rationalism is, indeed, obliged to resort, but which is most strikingly refuted by history. No! Christianity is not a mere human appearance! History, that infallible witness, exhibits it to us, not in accordance with, but in direct opposition, to the different directions of the human mind, at the time when it appeared. The wisdom of the world did not give it birth, but on the contrary sought to crush it. Christianity was not the child of that period, but at once its adversary and its regenerator. It was not from the dust of the earth that this precious fruit grew; it cannot then return to the dust. Heaven at that moment gave to the earth an incorruptible treasure, which successive generations are bound to transmit unimpaired from hand to hand; which we, in our turn, have received; which we now hold with fear and reverence in earthen vessels; which we shall soon deliver to our children, and which will abide unaltered among men, until heaven and earth shall flee away, and no place be found for them.

But while on one side we encounter the imaginations of the levellers of Christianity, we meet on the other the pretensions of an inflexible dogmatism, which would assign to the Christian system during the whole continuance of the Church, an *appearance* constantly uniform. Something there is in Christianity which does not change; that is, its essence: but there is in it, too, something which changes; which is, its appearance. And it is for want of properly discriminating between the appearance and the reality, that so many have misunderstood the invariable nature of the religion of Jesus Christ. A man changes in appearance through the different ages of his life. He is, however, always the same man.

At the moment when Christianity was given to us from on high, it became necessary that, like every thing else which enters into the sphere of humanity, it should be clothed with a human form. The exterior circumstances of each epoch

may have exercised a decided influence upon the development of Christian truths. To one particular form another may have succeeded. These successive forms, too, may have been far from indifferent, and one may have been far better than another. But the same essential truth has always been found in all the forms which have passed away, as it always will be found in those which are to come.

The work in which we are here engaged is, indeed, feeble and insignificant; but this is its glory, that it attaches itself to the eternal work. Did we here propose to maintain any thing relating to one or another of the forms of Christianity, we should have no guarantee for the perpetuity of the cause which we defend. The first revolution in human society would sweep it to the tomb, with every thing which is merely incidental. But if we are attached in our work to the very essence of Christianity, then the holy cause to which we devote our labours, participates in the perpetuity of the work of God. We may fail; and ere long, following the way of all the earth, we shall fail. Our school may fail; but the cause to which it is devoted will not fail, either in Geneva, or in the world. According to an ancient oracle, it is to this that the assembling of the people shall be.

Yes, this is the foundation of our hopes, in the midst of difficulties and trials. It is this which, thanks to God, inspires us with courage. And it may be worth our while, to spend a few moments in exhibiting this characteristic phenomenon in the religion of Jesus Christ:—*the invariableness of the doctrines of Christianity, in the midst of the diversity of its forms,—the voice of the Church one and the same in all ages.*

If we search, in the different periods of history, for the various human forms which the immutable truth of God has successively assumed, we shall find a great number of them. It is necessary to bring them together, to unite them, and to form from them more extended masses. Thus we obtain, in the last synthesis, four periods or principal forms. The first is the primitive form, or that of *Life*; the second, the form of *Doctrine*; the third, the form of *the School*; the fourth, the form of *the Reformation*. The Church of Christ, according to a Scriptural comparison, is like an individual man. She has had her youth; she has had her maturity; she has had her old age; and then, though without dying, she has had, if we may so speak, a mighty resurrection. These are the four epochs,—the four ages of the Church of Jesus Christ.

We shall traverse rapidly these four forms, in appearance so diverse, I might almost say, opposed, in order to see whether we shall not discover, under each of them, the same immutable truth. We shall listen to the voice of the teachers. The declarations of a single man cannot, indeed, give us an adequate knowledge of the faith of the Church. But, if we consult the writings of teachers who have lived in countries remote from each other, and if we find, in the midst of a great diversity of views, doctrines in which all are agreed, may we not thence conclude, with reason, that they were the doctrines of the Church, then dispersed over the earth? What, then, are the particulars to which we should direct our researches?

All Christianity, as well as all religious philosophy, relates necessarily to three principal points. First, on one side there is GOD,—then, on the other, MAN; and then there is the relation between them,—the bond which God employs to unite man to himself,—REDEMPTION. Let us see, then, what the voice of the Church, in the different periods of Christianity, teaches us on these three points.

The Form of Life.

We exclude from the primitive period or form, the Apostolic age, which should be separately considered. This primitive form commences, according to our view, with the successors of the Apostles, and extends to Arius. The character by which it is distinguished is *Life*. The truths of Christianity were not yet set forth with all that precision, and in that systematic order, which will distinguish them at a later period. The *Christian life*, which results from faith in those truths, is the essential thing. In this period they live for the Lord in the midst of an idolatrous world; and die for the Lord in the arena or at the stake, without much discussion respecting his person or his work. Christianity is content to exist, to know and evince its existence, without enumerating and classifying the essential parts of which it is composed; just as man is, for a long time, content with possessing being and life, without investigating and explaining in order, that in which this being and life consist. Certain Rationalist teachers (those whom a too superficial knowledge has not undeceived) infer, strangely enough, from this peculiarity of the primitive form, that the truths of Christianity

did not then exist, and that there was no doctrine, because there was no philosophy of doctrines. But to conclude from this absence of precision in doctrine, that the truths of Christianity had no existence, is a mode of reasoning as strange and as false as would be that of the unskilled disputer, who should affirm, that, during the time before man had formed a distinct and rational notion of his being, its several parts did not exist.

It results from this character of the primitive form, that the controversies in that epoch seldom turn upon doctrines. There are different tendencies, rather than different doctrines. We meet with families which present different aspects, rather than with sects which maintain opposite opinions. Let us trace the order of these different families, before exhibiting the doctrines which the voice of the Church then proclaimed.

To the divine inspiration of the Apostles succeeds the Christianity of the Apostolic fathers. It would seem as if the natural order is here reversed, and that, for once, the ingenuousness and simplicity of infancy follow after the vigour and maturity of the full-grown man. The Church, under the conduct of Ignatius, Polycarp, and many other faithful disciples, lives in the presence of the great idea of the near return of Jesus Christ. Behold the summary of her faith : "a new creation must be effected in humanity, before the solemn hour shall arrive." "There are three constitutions, or economies, of the Lord," says Barnabas, one of those fathers, who was already inclining in another direction, "the *hope* of life (the Old Testament), the *commencement* of life (the New Testament), and the *consummation* of life (the kingdom of heaven)."

But, by little and little, this heaven ward motion seems to cease in the Church. There appears a generation not so deeply penetrated by the spirit of Jesus Christ. They gather curious traditions respecting the appearance of Christ on earth. Carnal Jews, who looked for a Messiah entirely human, retain their gross views under the Christian name. It seems as if the Church, exhausted by her upward flight, falls back to the earth. Let us not be surprised at this. After a great excitement there generally succeeds a season of drowsiness.

Then appears on the boundaries of Christianity, and almost without its limits, a tendency diametrically opposite. The oriental philosophy aspires to join itself to the religion

of Jesus of Nazareth. It strips Christianity of its practical character, and transforms it into systems which lose themselves in the clouds.—For the saving doctrine, Gnosticism substitutes a fantastic cosmogony, by means of which it attempts to explain what is inexplicable, and an enthusiastic theosophy, which pretends to procure for man on earth, the sublime contemplations of heaven.

The West shrinks back from these adventurous vagaries of the East. Tertullian, in proconsular Africa, and Irenæus, in Gaul, oppose to them a simple, positive, historical Christianity, and hold up to men that faith by the small and the great equally live. Regarding philosophy as the source of Gnosticism, they begin to look with a jealous eye upon the wisdom and scientific culture of the Greeks.

But this exclusive simplicity has its own dangers. Pagans of learning and refinement, failing to find in the Christianity which is presented to them, any thing answering to the wants of their minds, continue in the worship of false deities, or plunge into the bold system of Gnosticism. Many eminent minds are thus lost to the Gospel. Alexandria, seated on the banks of the Nile, between the oriental and occidental world, observes it. Alexandria, that great emporium of learning, where, as tradition declares, the Evangelist Mark carried the simple word of Christ, undertakes to become the mediatix between these two tendencies, and these two parts of the known world. Pantænus, Clemens, and Origen lay the foundation of a Christian science. In this respect they conform to the East. But they founded it upon the Scriptures; and in this they conform to the West. *Γνῶσις ἀληθινή*—true knowledge—alas! it was not altogether such. Although these teachers did not abandon the fundamental principles of Christianity, philosophy deposited in their systems the perfidious germ of the two great heresies of the subsequent epoch, and indeed of all epochs.*

The Alexandrian school accomplishes the gradual disappearance of Gnosticism, and supplies its place. But then it calls up the opposition of the severe school of the West. A remarkable warfare between these two churches, or rather, these two schools, takes place in the third century. The two opposing tendencies serve mutually as counterpoises to each other, and thus contribute greatly to the prosperity

* Arianism and Pelagianism.

of Christianity. Alexandria originates a theological spirit in the church. She begins to elucidate and systematize the doctrines. She prevents a gross anthropomorphism from invading the heavenly religion of Jesus Christ. The West always resorts to the simple and literal sense of the written word. It insists that Christianity must be felt,—experienced in the heart, and manifested in the life. It prevents this positive and saving doctrine from being transformed into vain and fanciful speculations.

Such are the successive phases of the primitive form. In the midst of all these phases, a spirit of life animates the Church. It is the season of her youth. Christians of the primitive times, redeemed from the sins of Paganism, feel in their hearts, the transforming power of the Gospel, with an energy by so much the greater, as they are able to compare that which it has caused them to become with that which they had been until then. Their conflict with the world reminds them more constantly of their calling as soldiers of Jesus Christ. All is life and motion in the church. She has rapturous desires for heaven ; she has them also for the scaffold. And, although her golden age is reserved for the *new heavens* and the *new earth*, the Christian society, in those days of her youth and life, presents to us traits of a celestial beauty.

What now are the truths professed by the teachers and citizens of that new people which the breath of God has created in the midst of the world ?

They acknowledge one living God. In Him they worship, not only the Father, *the First Cause of all things*, but also the Son, *the Redeemer*, and the Spirit, *the Sanctifier of fallen humanity*. They believe that the same God who created man in righteousness, redeems him from sin, and does not cease to sanctify him until he attains to eternal life. They know nothing of those strange errors by which some aim to deprive God of the work and glory of redemption, to give it to a creature.

The idea of a holy Trinity in God is discovered from the earliest beginnings of the primitive period, and does not cease to be announced in a manner constantly more distinct. How does the voice of these first soldiers of Jesus Christ confound the impudent pretensions of our own days !

Clemens, a disciple of Paul, giving glory to Almighty God, says in Rome, "one God, one Christ, and one Spirit of

Grace."* Polycarp, a disciple of John, when dying in the flames, ascribes the eternal glory of the age of ages "to the Father, with the Son, in the Holy Spirit."†

Justin Martyr, the first of the teachers in whom the conjunction of the Christian faith, and of the philosophy of the Greeks is effected,—a converted sage, who sheds his blood for his master under the Antonines,—proclaims "Unity in Trinity."‡ Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, about the same time, professes, in a manner still more distinct, the holy Trinity.‡

Tertullian, an advocate in Africa, now become a simple shepherd of the flock of Jesus Christ, thus expresses himself shortly after: "There is one only divine being, in three persons intimately united."§ He proclaims "the Trinity of one only Divinity—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit."¶ And elsewhere, he says, "Let us guard the sacrament of our economy, which establishes Unity in Trinity, recognizing three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but of one substance, of one state, of one power, because there is only one God."** And with what power does the venerable Bishop of a city near our own, shaken at the time he lived, by the rage of the people against Jesus Christ, and in our own day by another kind of rage,—Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, who had forsaken the famous shores of Asia to carry the light of the Gospel to the Gauls—with what force does he defend the great doctrine of *God manifest in the flesh*: "Christ," says he, "unites in himself God and man. If man had not conquered the enemy of man (the Devil), this enemy would not have been justly conquered. But on the other hand, if God had not given salvation, we should not have possessed it with assurance."††

Thus far we have reached scarcely more than ten years after the death of the oldest apostle, and yet we find this

* Clem. Rom. 1 Cor.

† Euseb. Hist. Eccl. IV. 15.

‡ Justin. Expos. Fidei.

§ Theoph. Ant. Antol. II. 23.

¶ Una substantia in tribus coherentibus. Tertul.

¶ Trinitas unius divinitatis, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.

** Unitatem in trinitatem, Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, unius autem substantiæ, et unius status, et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus. Tertul. Adv. Praxeam.

†† Iren. Adv. Hæreses. Lib. III, Cap. 20.

doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, proclaimed by so many illustrious teachers,—a doctrine of which Christ designed to establish a perpetual monument in his universal Church, by instituting baptism. The greatest teachers of Christianity defend with zeal the consoling idea of God become man. The more we advance, the more multiplied are the testimonies rendered to this mystery, in the Churches of our Lord. We find the eternal divinity of the Son of God deeply graven, every where, in the inmost feelings, and in the devout exercises of Christian people. And even one of the wisest of the Pagans, writes to the greatest of their emperors “They sing hymns to Christ as God.”*

But if we enquire, *What did those Christians of the epoch of LIFE believe respecting MAN?* we shall not see them imagining, with the ancient pagans, or with many modern teachers, that evil results from the natural organization of man, and that this evil is not opposed to the holiness of God. The first man having, by disobedience, separated his own will from the divine will, human nature was abandoned to itself;—such is their doctrine.

Let us now approach the College of the Apostles, and interrogate those who were their companions or successors. Barnabas, the fellow-traveller of St. Paul (Acts XIII.), thus addresses us: “Before we believed in God, the abode of our hearts was full of corruption and sin. Our heart was filled with idolatry, and was the abode of demons.”†—Justin, who had vainly sought, in all the different systems of philosophy, for the key of man’s history, finds it, at length, in the fall of Adam, effected by the seductions of the devil, disguised in the form of a serpent.‡

In the view of the simple and practical Irenæus, the first man is like to one who, having become “a prisoner,” propagates his race in his prison.—Already does the profound genius of Tertullian style the corruption which has insinu-

* Plin. Epist. ad Traj. X. 96.

† Barnabas, C. 16.—Some teachers have called in question the authenticity of the letter of Barnabas. Their motives seem to me feeble. Rationalists themselves, Bretschneider in particular, believe it to be authentic. We name Bretschneider because his authority goes far with Rationalists and Unitarians. We do not know, however, that his testimony, distinguished though he may be, in many respects, is of much weight in a question of ecclesiastical history. He places, for instance, Tertullian after Origen, and makes him live at the end of the third, and the commencement of the fourth century; which is a century too late.

‡ Dial. cum Tryph. p. 306.

ated itself into human nature, "original sin," *vitiū originis*. "The first man," he says, "has infected the human kind which have proceeded from him, and has made them partakers of his own condemnation."* Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, that great luminary of the Church, understands the origin of sin in the same way. "The new-born infant," he says, "has no sin, excepting that he is carnally born, according to Adam, and has, by his very birth, contracted the contagion of death."†

And if we are required to repair to the halls of the Alexandrian school, hoping that its philosophical theologians will utter words flattering to our pride, we will conduct you thither also, and you shall hear Origen, thus addressing you:—"Adam turned aside from the straight path of Paradise, to take the evil paths of mortal life. In consequence of this, all his descendants have also gone astray, and have become like him, unprofitable."‡—"Every man is corrupt in his father and mother. Jesus alone has entered pure into this race."§—"It is impossible for man, at the outset, to look to God; for it is necessary that man be, at first, subjected to sin."¶

Thus did Egypt, as well as Gaul, and proconsular Africa, as well as Asia, regard man only as a fallen and impure being.

But how was this polluted being to be united with a holy God? What did this primitive epoch believe as to the way in which God saves man? Let our enquiry be still directed to those who immediately encircle the Apostles. They will teach us the same holy doctrines of grace, which, at a later period, were more fully set forth. "The son of God has suffered," says the Apostolical Barnabas, "in order that his sufferings might give us life. He has offered as a sacrifice for our sins the tenement of his spirit (his body). Having learned to hope in the name of the Lord, and having received the remission of sins, we are become new men, and we have been created anew."¶ Hermas, (the person, perhaps of whom Paul speaks, Rom 16: 14,) says,—“Before

* Tertul. de testim. an.

† Cyprian, Epist. LXIV. ad. Fid.

‡ Origen, Comm. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. III.

¶ Origen, Homil. XII. in Levit.

§ Origen contra Celsum, Lib. III. 62.-

¶ Barnabas. VII. 16.

man receives the name of son of God, he is destined to death. But when he receives this seal, he is delivered from death, and passes to life.*

"The law of God," says Justin, "pronounced a curse upon man, because man could not obey it, in all its extent (Deut. 27: 26). Christ has delivered us from this curse by bearing it for us.† And do we, at the present day, speak otherwise ?

Irenæus regards circumcision as a type of the redeeming blood of Christ,—the tree of life, as a type of the cross of Christ. He teaches, in another place, that men ought not to attempt to purify themselves by sacrifices, but by the blood of Christ, and by his death. The paschal Lamb is to him a type of Christ, who saves believers by the sprinkling of his blood. The two bullocks, the one of which, according to the law of Moses, was sent into the desert, the other offered to God, are types of the two-fold advent of Christ, the first for death, the second for glory.‡ He contrasts the obedience of Christ, with the disobedience of Adam. "Christ," he says, "reconciles the Father with us, in replacing, by his perfect obedience, the disobedience of the first man." And following his comparison of man plunged by sin into prison, and the bondage of the devil, he declares, that "Christ has payed, by his sufferings, the ransom necessary to deliver man from this captivity."

In like manner, Origen recognizes, in the death of Christ, the power which delivers man from sin. The whole primitive Church beholds in the sufferings of the Lamb of God, the means by which the road which leads back to the Father, is opened again to humanity. It is faith which renders man a partaker of this deliverance, and at the same time communicates to him a life divine. "Called by the will of God," says Clement of Rome, a disciple of the Apostles, whose name, St. Paul declares, is written in the book of life, "we are justified, not by ourselves, not by our own understanding, nor by our own piety, nor by works which we have done in the purity of our hearts ; but by faith, by which the Sovereign God has always justified men. Shall we, therefore, repose quietly and cease from well-doing ? On the con-

* *Hermas pastor. Lib. III.*

† *Dial. cum Tryph. C. 30.*

‡ *Justin, Dial. cum Tryph. passim.*

trary, we must do good with joy, as God, who has called us to himself, acts without ceasing, and rejoices in his activity.”*

Behold then this holy Church of the primitive period. Hear how she addresses us from the depth of her distresses, and, so to speak, from the height of her scaffolds. She confesses her wretchedness, and embracing the knees of Jesus, she calls him, “her Saviour and her God.” How can we forget the deep and unaffected tone of her sincere piety ! And what a sad business is that of some teachers of our day, who seek to strip her of her white robe, and to clothe her with the miserable rags of their own unbelief ! This profane attempt is, indeed, an act of homage which they render to her. The first Unitarians had recourse to the same expedient. But such efforts are vain. To all who will lend an ear, the primitive Church will never cease to declare the immutable words of truth.

Form of Doctrine.

Although we have been able to gather only a few ears, here and there, from the immense harvest which was spread before us, yet have we enlarged upon the primitive period more than may comport with the limits of this discourse. We have done this, because it is the only spot on which the enemies of Christianity venture to expose themselves, and to hope for success from their ingenuity. They despair of other periods, or rather, they make the strong, common and public profession of faith which is found in them, and which is so opposed to themselves, the subject of reproach and virulent accusations. We shall put forth no great effort to secure a victory on a field of battle where our enemies have already proclaimed themselves vanquished ; and which they abandon to us.

Here opens upon us the era of great teachers, of great truths, and great heresies ;—a period when Christian theology, the elements of which were prepared during the period preceding, was carried, by distinguished men of God, to a great height ;—the time of Athanasius, Hilary, Gregory, Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Chrysostom. It is the age of strong men,—the mature age of the church.

* Clem. Rom. 1 Cor. 6: 32.

The last pyre of the confessors of Christianity is extinguished. The memorable council of Nice assembles. The form of *life* is at an end; the form of *doctrine* commences. Not that life has entirely departed from the Church. God forbid! But doctrine has now become the predominating feature. The full-grown man loves to have distinct ideas, to give a reason for what he believes. So is it now with the Church. No longer compelled to struggle with enemies without, she can give more attention to the internal faith which she professes. The different tendencies of the primitive form now manifest themselves with more distinctness, and, by a remarkable transformation, are converted into opposing doctrines; just as the dormant tendencies of youth are developed in manhood, and transformed into determined and distinct traits of character, into positive vices or virtues. Great heresies appear, conducted by Arius and Pelagius. But these very heresies become the means, in the hand of God, of establishing the Christian doctrines with more clearness and power. The truths of Christianity, being thus defined by the Church at that period, are faithfully transmitted to later times. They will be preserved in the midst of the abounding disorders and ignorance of succeeding ages. This dogmatic form will be, through divine grace, a cuirass to begirt those doctrines amidst great strifes and overturnings, or a hammer to effect an entrance for them into the hard and sensual heart of the rude and uncultivated. Still it must be acknowledged, that so great importance was even then attached to them, in their minor ramifications, that, for the sake of doctrinal forms, the very essence and life of Christianity were sometimes forgotten.

The East and the West still preserve their essential characters. The East continues the country of high speculations; the West, of practical questions. The East contemplates God. The West employs itself with man. In the East, Arius and Athanasius appear. In the West, Pelagius and Augustine. But both in the East and in the West, the truth, though violently attacked, gains for itself universal and splendid triumphs. Having passed the season of its youth, the Christian doctrine, like the first man, must needs be put to trial. But there needs not to be a second fall. It resisted the temptation, and remained firm.

The doctrine respecting *God* was the first which was displayed, during this period, with majestic brightness, because

it was the first against which man dared to lift a threatening hand. Athanasius of Alexandria, a distinguished teacher, perceived, in the profound mystery of Redemption, the necessity of the eternal divinity of the Redeemer. Earth had no Saviour, if its Saviour was not God. If Athanasius devoted his whole life, and endured so many exiles, to defend the identity of substance between the Father and the Son, it was not because he attached a great value to a dialectic subtilty. No, it was for the very essence of Christianity and the salvation of souls that he contended. The end of Christianity is to restore man to communion with God. For this there must needs be a Mediator. "But if the Son of God," says Athanasius, "differs from God in essence, there must be a new mediation, by which he himself may be united to Him. He alone, who has no need of such mediation in order to become one with God,—who *himself* partakes of the divine essence, can establish a real communication between God and the creature. Now, the Son of God is this person. Were he a mere creature, however excellent, instead of uniting God and man by placing himself between them, he would only separate them from each other."*

But let us hear the whole Church, speaking in the symbols of her faith. "This," she says, "is the universal Faith,—that we adore one God in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, without confusion of persons, or division of substance. For the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son is another, the person of the Holy Spirit is another. Yet the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have one and the same divinity, an equal glory, a co-eternal majesty. Such as is the Father, such also is the Son, and such the Holy Spirit. The Father is uncreated, the Son is uncreated, the Spirit is uncreated. The Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God; and yet, there are not three Gods, but one God. . . . This is the true faith, that we believe and confess one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, to be both God and man. As God, he is of the substance of the Father, begotten from eternity; as man, he is of the nature of his mother, and born in time;—perfect God and perfect man;—equal to the Father, in his divinity; inferiour to the Father, in his humanity."†

A contest of more than sixty years, (from A. D. 320, to A. D. 381,) was necessary to determine, expound, and de-

* Athan. *Oratio contra Arian.*

fend the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. New contests now commence for the purpose of settling another doctrine. Soon after Athanasius and the theologians who followed his movement, we see a teacher appear in the Church, who seems to have been commissioned by God, to develope and defend the Scripture doctrine respecting *man*;—a teacher not less distinguished for the depth of his genius, than for the lustre of his piety. It is Augustine.

Other teachers preceding him, had shown, by their confessions, the unchangeableness of Christian doctrines. "In the sin of Adam," says Hilary of Poitiers, "the whole human race have sinned."*—"We have all sinned in the first man,"—is the testimony of Ambrose of Milan; "in him human nature has sinned."† But it was when the great teacher of the West, under whose influence all those were formed, who, for ages after, had a clear view of the truth, it was when Augustine appeared, that all the depths of human impotency were disclosed.

He first abandons Manichæism, and then Platonism, finding in neither, that internal peace which he needs amidst the tempests of life. He seizes with eagerness upon the Gospel, which dissipates his doubts, consoles his heart, and sheds new light upon all his ways. In the midst of his contests with sin and philosophy, he has learned in himself the whole corruption of the human heart. This is the chord which is to vibrate in all his instructions. Pursued at once by a sublime ideal of holiness, and by all the seductions of sense, he sees, amidst the shock of these conflicting elements, the depths of his heart opened to his view, as the tempests of the ocean disclose the depths of the abyss. He finds himself in presence of a man, who, destitute of an ideal of holiness, and living in easy and common circumstances, has only a superficial view of human nature, and adopts most fanciful ideas respecting the moral power of man. Augustine joins issue with Pelagius. The strife is not that of two men merely, but of two principles, of two great tendencies of which the human mind is susceptible, and which are discernible in all times. Augustine sees the first man alienate himself from God. From that alienation results his sin. From that sin proceeds the moral disorder which has pervaded

* Hilar. in Matth. C. 18

† Apol. Davidis Cap. 2.

human nature. Mankind he considers as "a ruined mass."* The consequence, to his descendants, of the fall of the first man, (which was also its punishment,) was "obligation to sinning."† Man has lost his freedom, and the power of doing any thing truly good.‡ He can have no more than God gives him. If some men attain to the faith of the Gospel, the reason must not be sought for in man himself, since all are equally incapable of any good. It can be found only in a special agency of God, in a secret counsel of the Deity, in an election of grace.§ After a contest of nearly thirty years, in Africa, Italy, and central Gaul, Truth triumphs, and the doctrine of the entire impotence of man remains in the Church.

In like manner, (and this brings us to the third point which we have to examine,) the doctrine of *grace* was at this time developed by these teachers. The excellent Hilary had already declared: "Redemption is bestowed gratuitously, not according to the merit of works, but according to the pleasure of the Giver, according to the election of the Redeemer."|| "In this," says Augustine, "consists the grace of God through Jesus Christ, that He justifies us, not by *our* righteousness, but by *his own*."¶ But he insists particularly, that the idea of grace excludes all merit, and all natural disposition in man to receive salvation. God is the Alpha of salvation, as well as the Omega. "What God begins by producing, He perfects by co-operation. In beginning, He operates that we may will; in perfecting, He co-operates with those who have had the will."** *He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord.*

Thus it is, that in this period of doctrines, Christian science makes great advances. The doctrines respecting God, man, and salvation, which the teachers of the first period had found in the Scriptures, were more deeply sounded, and more fully unfolded, by those of the second. Theology advances under the influence of the Spirit of God; for there is a progression in theology. What, then, shall we say of those,

* *Massa perditionis. Pecc. Orig.* 21.

† *Obligatio peccati. C. D. XIV.* 1.

‡ *Prædest. S. S.* 3.

§ *Quæst. ad Simpl.*

|| Hilary in Psalm.

¶ *Suâ, non nostrâ justitiâ.—De gratiâ Dei,* 52.

** *August. De gratiâ et lib. arb.* § 33.

in our day, who would induce us to abandon these advanced degrees of sacred science, not merely with the view of carrying us back to the elements, but that they may force upon us grievous errors, which the Church has long since refuted and banished from her bosom? Leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on to perfection; not laying again the foundation.

Form of the School.

A new form succeeds to that which had itself displaced the primitive form. After a season of darkness, you see, about the middle of the eleventh century, a great intellectual movement working in the West. It was this movement which gave birth to Scholasticism. The School (*schola*) seeks to separate itself from the Church, which had hitherto held supreme and single sway. It wishes to secure to itself an authority and action independent of the hierarchy. Certain men of liberal minds, who, at first, were not generally ecclesiastics, nor monks, attempt to form free schools, entirely distinct from those which had hitherto existed. From these schools, the university of Paris, that mother of Scholasticism, soon springs up. The spirit of the School (we should say *now*, the spirit of the university), may be discerned from the general character of Scholasticism. Its object is to apply philosophy to Christianity, to reduce doctrines to system, to show their connexion and their internal evidence, to gain over to them not only the heart, but the understanding also. So that, if the first period was the period of *Life*, and the second the period of *Doctrine*, the third may be considered as the period of *System*. There is still life in many parts of the Church, there are doctrines in every part; but *system* is the predominating feature. *Now*, every teacher publishes his system, or *Summary of Theology*.* It is the old age of the Church, which, in the course of nature, succeeds the first two periods of youth and manhood. Old age loves to arrange truths which have been before collected. It is the season of meditation. It has little power of impulsion, but more of reflection. Although there were men of strength in the middle ages, the proneness to systematize was the distinguishing feature of those times.

* *Summa theologiae* of Alexander Hales, Venice, 1576; of Albert the Great, Bâle, 1507; of Thomas Aquinas, Paris, 1675, etc. etc.

The study of History received then no attention. Scarcely more importance was attached to exegetical studies. Yet the European mind was effectually roused from its protracted lethargy. It needed a guide to direct its movements. That guide was *Dialectics*. And as Theology was the science of the age, it was also the field upon which the human mind ventured under the auspices of this guide. This trait of the school tended to Rationalism and Infidelity. Yet the earliest teachers of that period sheltered sacred theology from their attacks. "The Christian," says Anselm, the father of Scholasticism, "must arrive at understanding, through faith. I seek not to understand that I may believe, but I believe that I may understand. And, indeed, I believe, because, if I did not, I could not understand."* Soon, however, Abelard and his school possess themselves of the principle of Scholasticism, and become the defenders of free enquiry. They wish, first, to *learn*, and then to *believe*. "Faith," say they, "confirmed by investigation, is far more sure. We must attack the enemies of the Gospel on their own ground. If we must abstain from discussion, we shall find it necessary to believe every thing, falsehood as well as truth."† Yet, notwithstanding this tendency to Rationalism, notwithstanding the anathemas of the Church against them, these Rationalist theologians cannot be reproached for the abandonment of any doctrine of faith.

But we will not entirely absolve Scholasticism from reproof. It often disfigures Christian truth. Its tendency, and the state of the Church at that time, necessarily led to this result. Human reason can never venture with safety upon those great truths which pass all understanding. The School of the middle ages, like the Alexandrian School in former times, disturbed some doctrines, in its anxiety to strengthen the Christian system. Still it is true, that Scholasticism produced not a few distinguished minds. I do not hesitate to say, although it may occasion surprise, that, under its influence, the Church made some progress; I speak not of progress in spiritual religion, but of progress in theological science. The teachers who were the light of those ages, communicated much sound doctrine to the crowds that filled their schools, and followed them by thousands, even to the deserts, wherever they saw them plant the chair of instruction.

* Anselmi Epist. XLI. Prologion, C. 1.

† Abelardi Introd. ad Theol. C. 3.

Orthodox Christianity is considered by a class of people of all others the most incredulous, as an invention of the middle ages. This vulgar accusation of the wise men of the eighteenth century, surely does great honour to those times; far greater, I think, than they deserve. It might, however, free us from the necessity of proving that Christianity existed *then*. Nevertheless we will interrogate some of those teachers to whom we have already alluded.

What, then, is the exposition of the doctrine of salvation given by Anselm of Canterbury, the most influential, perhaps, of the philosophical theologians of those times,—the second Augustine of the Latin Church,—a man of great power, who knew how to unite the labours of philosophy with purity of faith? The Scripture system of Redemption is developed and presented by him in such a manner as to obviate objections, and to satisfy, at once, the understanding and the heart.—“All rational beings,” he says, “are bound to submit their own will to the Divine will. This law was violated in the sin of the first man. Thus the harmony of the moral order of the world was destroyed. The law of eternal justice requires, either that mankind be punished, or that the lost harmony be restored by a satisfaction made by man. Without this, it would not be consistent with the moral order of the universe, that impure man should be admitted to the communion of blessed spirits. Man could not of himself accomplish this satisfaction. As by one, human nature had become corrupt, so by one must satisfaction be made. But he who would effect it, must have something to bestow above what belongs to any created being. He must, then, be God himself. And, at the same time, in order that the satisfaction may be available by man, he must be human. He could, then, be no other than God-man. This God-man offered himself voluntarily to death; for he was not subject to it. He maintained the most perfect obedience amidst the deepest afflictions. God, therefore, was under obligation to reward him. But since Christ, as God, was self-sufficient, he needed no reward. He could, therefore, transfer his own merits to the world, and demand, as a recompense, the salvation of believers.” Such are the words of Anselm, in his work, entitled, *Cur Deus homo?*

But, what is very remarkable, considering their common reputation, the Schoolmen insisted particularly upon the sanctifying influence of faith.—“The sufferings of Christ deliver

us from sin," says Peter Lombard, the illustrious *Master of Sentences*, who for centuries ruled in the Schools; "for this immense sacrifice of Divine charity brings us within the embrace of God's love, and this love sanctifies us."*—"The just who live by faith," says Robert Pulleyn, "are already sanctified within; and receive good works as a sign of their faith and holiness. Faith first produces holiness of heart, and holiness of heart produces good works."†—"Man, in his original state," says Alexander Hales, the *Irrefragable Doctor*, "was not opposed to God. Then he had need only of *formative* grace. But now he has something within him which is in opposition to God, and which can be removed only by the power of God. In his present condition, therefore, he has need of *transforming* grace."‡

There existed, it is true, differences and controversies among the scholastic teachers; but their very controversies prove, that they were established upon the common ground of the great truths of salvation. For example, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas (the *Angelic Doctor*), and others, contended, that the sacrifice of Christ effects the redemption of man, in virtue of its own intrinsic value (*ex insito valore*;) whilst many other Schoolmen, especially Duns Scot, the *Subtil Doctor*, maintained, that this Redemption was only a consequence of the counsel or design of God, who had valued the redemption of man at this price. Behold, then, in what they differ. But all agree in this: "Lost man is saved by the death of the God-man."

Form of the Reformation.

Such was the testimony of the School, and of the Church, in those ages, to say nothing of the numerous witnesses for the truth, Wickliffe, Waldo, and others, who were the precursors of the mighty movement which was about to take place in the world. The Church had passed her season of youth, buoyant with life,—her mature age, full of power and clearness,—and her old age of system and reflection. But, with Scholasticism, the exercise of reason also had departed. The hierarchy wished to bring within its close embrace, life, doctrines, system, all, and to place the funereal stone upon all

* *Sententiarum*, Lib. IV.

† *Sententiarum*, Lib. VIII.

‡ *Gratia reformans. Summa.*

the noble tendencies of the Church. It wished to reign alone. Vain presumption ! The Church bursts asunder the bonds of death. The stone is rolled away. The sepulchre opens. She comes forth, like a man restored to life ;—and we greet the fourth period—*the form of the Reformation*.

If the three successive forms, which we have surveyed, have appeared to us distinguished as the form of *life*, of *doctrine*, and of *system*, what character shall we assign to this ?

A Reformation is a restoration of ancient forms. But this restoration was not effected at the expense of any one of those forms. The Reformation re-established and united the three successive forms, which had before existed in the Church of God, apart from each other, and composed them into a beautiful triad. Such was the character of the fourth period. The Reformation took the form of *system*, and carried it back upon the form of *doctrine*. Then it carried back these two forms united, upon the form of *life*. Or rather, it proceeded in an inverted order. It started with *life*, led it forward into *doctrine*, and crowned the whole with *system*. The Reformation united the three sorts of culture which preceded it.

It began with *life*. Luther experienced in his own heart, by divine grace, the vivifying influence of Religion, as, perhaps, no teacher of the Church had ever experienced it before. The Reformation went forth in full vigour from the heart of the reformer, where God had planted it. The era which was under the exclusive influence of the teacher of Wittemberg, was, if we may so speak, instinct with life. This is so true, that the excellent work which Melancthon, the theologian of the Reformation, published at that time (we speak of the first edition of his *Loci Communes*), passes over the doctrines concerning *the essence of God*, the *Trinity*, not because they appeared to him of no importance (on the contrary, they form the basis of his system), but because, as he himself said, it is better to revere these mysteries, than to sound them.

But, at the same time, beneath this *life* you will discover the well-appointed members of Christian *doctrine*, and soon after, in the second period of the Reformation (which commenced with the Confession of Augsburg, drawn up by Melancthon himself), these doctrines were defined, and presented in all their power. The Trinity, the entire corruption of man, and, above all, the doctrine of grace, and of justification by faith, were developed with a clearness and depth

scarcely equalled in the era of doctrine. Already, too, you may discover *system*, in the harmonious distribution of those different members of the body of Christian doctrine. But system manifested itself most distinctly during the third period of the Reformation, under the influence of two great theologians,—Melancthon in Germany, and Calvin at Geneva. The Institutes of Christianity will ever remain one of the most beautiful monuments of the Christian system.

How strong were the voices which, at that time, proclaimed the immutable truths of the Gospel! Listen to the teacher of Wittemberg, the great Luther, concerning the divinity of Jesus Christ.—“If Christ does not abide the true and essential God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and Creator of all created things, we are lost. For what would the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ avail us, if he were a mere man, like you and me? He could not have vanquished Satan, sin, and death. We need a Saviour who is truly God, and raised above sin, death, the devil, and hell. It matters little that the Arians exclaim:—‘Christ is the noblest, the most exalted of creatures.’ They think, in this way, to recommend their shameful error, so that the people may not detect it. But if they strike at the faith, though in the least thing, it is all over with us. If they rob Christ of his divinity, we are past all deliverance from the judgement and wrath of God.”*

And what did the Reformation declare concerning *man*? It ground to powder the various subtleties of the School, and set forth the true doctrine with admirable clearness and simplicity. Even before the publication of his famous theses on indulgences, Luther published others on *man*. Listen to some of those truths, which, in this morning of the bright day of the Reformation, this great teacher declared himself ready to maintain in the Church.

“It is true that man who is become an evil tree, can will or do only that which is evil.”

“On the side of man, there is nothing which precedes grace, unless it be impotency and rebellion.”

“There is no moral virtue without pride or sorrow, that is to say, without sin.”

“He who is destitute of the grace of God, sins continually, although he neither kills, steals, nor commits adultery.”

Or shall we entertain you with the homage which the Re-

* Interpretation of the first chapter of St. John's Gospel, T. IX.

formation rendered to the doctrine of *grace*? It was by this doctrine that it overthrew the bulwarks of Rome. The Reformers did not desire that man should place his confidence, or rest his salvation, upon any thing which he might do, in or of himself. Christ was the only foundation. Faith in his name was the only method of grace. Every other doctrine must lead either to pride or despair.

Listen to Luther writing to his friend Sponlein: "Art thou, at length, weary of thine own righteousness? Dost thou rejoice in, and trust thyself to, the righteousness of Christ? Learn, my dear brother, to know Christ, and him crucified. Learn to despair of thyself, and to sing to the Lord this song: 'Lord Jesus! Thou art my righteousness, but I am thy sin. Thou hast taken what was mine; thou hast given me what was thine own. Thou hast become what thou wast not, that I might become what I was not!'"*

"Works," said he at another time, "are not taken into consideration, where justification is concerned. True faith can no more fail to produce them, than the sun can fail to emit rays. But it is not works which induces God to justify us."†

"Without doubt, the renewal of the heart must follow faith," said Melancthon; "but, where justification is concerned, turn off thine eyes from this renewal, and fix them only on the promises, on Christ, knowing that we are justified only for the sake of Christ's love, and not on account of our renewal. Faith justifies us, not, as thou writest, because it is in us as the root of a good tree, but because it lays hold on Jesus Christ, through whose love we are rendered acceptable."‡ "We offer nothing to God," said Calvin, "but we are prevented by his pure grace, without any regard to our works."§

All the reformers, though they differed in some respects, are one on this point. In Germany, Switzerland, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, and even Spain, they announced justification by faith, and declared—"If this article stand, the Church stands. If this article fall, the Church falls." But why is it necessary to insist upon these things? Have we not in our hands their Confessions of faith? And do not the enemies of this faith, as well as its friends, acknowledge, with one consent, that this was, indeed, the doctrine of the Reformation?

* Luth. Epist. T. I.

‡ Melancth. ad Brentium, opp.

†[Luther ad Melancth. opp.

§ Calv. in Epist. ad Titum.]

A fifth period, a fifth form, has now commence din the Church, mysterious, unknown, whose peculiar characteristics it is not yet given to us to discern. But there is one thing which the history of past forms teaches us. The fundamental truths which we have passed in review, will also constitute the essence and glory of the future form. That saving doctrine which we have every where found, will never leave the helm of the Church. It will never abandon that precious bark to the treacherous, though momentary gale of the heresies of a Theodotius, an Arius, a Pelagius, or a Socinus. What has been, will be.

Nor this alone. The history of past forms assures us, that the future form will unite all which was excellent in them. God suffers nothing to be lost in his Church. And this shows us clearly the errour of some pious and well-disposed Christians, who speak only of returning to the primitive form, forgetting all that lies upon the route thither. The Church can no more divest itself of the influence of the successive forms through which she has passed, than a tree can divest itself of the layers which every spring adds to it ; or the body of a full-grown man, of its annual increments. As for us, we do not turn away our eyes from the future ; but neither do we forget the past. The past will live again in the future. Life, doctrine, system—all will be found united in the new form.

But will there not be something to give it a peculiar character, and thus to distinguish it from the form of the Reformation? Doubtless there will ; but this something is yet to come—and who shall describe it? Nevertheless, I will hazard a conjecture. Will not the peculiar feature of the new form be a universal activity in extending to every race of man, and to every man of every race, what the preceding forms have produced? Has not the period of the Reformation united all the isolated excellencies of the first three, that the new period may lay its hand upon them, and spread them abroad among mankind? Must not Life, Doctrine, System, or rather Christian Science, become the property of our race as they have never been hitherto? I am silent on these things, which are still concealed from our view by a dark veil.

But there is one thing which we ought to know. We are at the entrance of a new period, and of a new form, for Christian science as well as for the Church ; and it is the present generation, which will be the instrument of God, in

giving to this period its first impulse. Here is an immense labour to be performed, and but very few labourers. In this hour, at least, my voice shall call to you whose ears it does or may reach. Train yourselves, Scribes and Teachers ! destined, under God, to open the new path of knowledge and piety. Learn that the hand of a mighty faith and mighty knowledge are necessary to vanquish a mighty unbelief. Enrich yourselves from the past, in order that you may be prepared for the future. Young men ! who are preparing to serve the Churches of Him who laid down his life for his sheep, or who have already the care of his flock, learn what sound theology demands from you. Profit by the lessons of history. Let her lead you beyond that narrow sphere where the prejudices which surround you, have, perhaps, shut you in. Let her compel you to forsake that cheerless track, where none but sordid spirits can drag themselves along. Live, not with the passing moment, but with the ages that are gone. History calls up the ages past, and brings them around you. She makes you hear their solemn testimony. Will you reject the faith of the whole Church, the voice of Jesus Christ himself, for that of a single teacher ? Disdaining the glory which comes from God, will you seek that of the world ? Continue, rather, that admirable chain, whose first link is the Lord ; and which, being formed throughout by the great teachers of Christianity, has, at last, come down to you. Separate not yourselves to the service of some obscure heresy. Though you should be alone amidst your fellow-disciples, alone in the Church, alone in the world, to confess God manifest in the flesh, comfort yourselves with the thought, that you are associated with those illustrious witnesses of so many different periods, whose voice we have now recalled to your hearing. History shows us, that Christianity has never ceased to act with power upon the thoughts and lives of men ; but she shows us, also, that this renovating influence has always been exerted by means of the same doctrines. The orthodox doctrines of Christianity alone possess the power of renewing individuals and nations. Every other doctrine serves only to amuse souls, or to destroy them. Never will you see *life*, where *truth* is not found. Would you run the career of an orator, who diverts people by words of mighty sound ; or would you be benefactors of man—saving him by the wisdom of God ? Link yourselves to that which is saving, to that which is immutable, to that

which is eternal. Move forward like a sacred cohort! What new and mighty efforts are making in Switzerland, France, Germany, Holland, Great Britain and America, to restore sound theology to the world, and to establish the throne of truth!

And Thou, thrice holy God! in whose light we see light, illumine us, and open to us the gates of that knowledge, whose immense treasures are all hid in Jesus Christ.

ART. IV. COLTON'S FOUR YEARS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

Four Years in Great Britain, 1831—1835. By Calvin Colton. In two Volumes. New-York: Published by Harper & Brothers. 1835.

NOTWITHSTANDING this work, at the period of its publication, shared largely in the commendatory notices of some of our daily prints (for who could be so uncivil as to censure a work with which he had been gratuitously favoured?)—yet were we impatient for an opportunity of glancing at its pages: not because it might be regarded as a “new thing under the sun;” or that there was any urgent demand for a book of travels in Great Britain, now that intercourse with her shores is quite as frequent and almost as rapid as between the extreme ports of our own land. They are deserving of no small degree of credit, who have returned home, from scenes now so familiar, content with the health to which they have been restored, and the colloquial materials which they have gathered for the instructive gratification of their friends; instead of expending time and strength in the composition of a book, which, however graphic, impartial, and accurate, can at best, do little more than revive our knowledge, and secure for its author only an ephemeral celebrity. Indeed, it is surprising that men of mind should covet the distinction of publishing their travels in England, when recent travellers in America, have forever set the question at rest,—whether a

popular work may not be written, with but a modicum of sense.

An account of regions but *seldom visited* or *little known*, may not sink in comparison with scientific discoveries. He who thus enlarges the field of useful knowledge, or contributes to the gratification of cultured taste, is not to be undervalued, though others may have conferred greater benefits, or won greener laurels. But to mock our expectation by a sounding title; to disparage our judgements by distorted statements; to deface the scenes which genius has immortalized; to relate as wonderful, what we daily see, or as new, that which has been familiar to us from childhood; to exhaust our patience with unnecessary detail when we are seeking for causes, or amuse us with gilded things and trifling incidents,—the puppet-shows at which children stare and gape,—when we need to hear of man as formed under other models of government;—*away with* such an authorship! Stewart, the graphic delineator of the Sandwich Islands, shall be remembered; but Stewart the *visitant* of England must be forgotten.

Had the work which we propose to notice, borne the name of a stranger, or the title of a six month's tourist, we should have experienced similar emotions with Mr. Colton, when in company with his friend he entered the English garden at the Petit Frainon,* and probably have laid it aside with a corresponding exclamation,—“This is nothing but a book of travels in *Great Britain!*” But our esteem for its author, and solicitude to ascertain the result of *four years'* observation, have quite overcome our repugnance to travels in England, and almost imparted novelty to the subject.

For an American to write dispassionately respecting England, we conceive to be no easy task. Three thousand miles of ocean intervene; and when, after a protracted confinement to the monotony of a ship, after having escaped all the real or imaginary dangers of a transatlantic voyage, we find ourselves actually on the solid ground of our mother country, we are almost transported beyond the consciousness of personal identity—we tread on magic ground—we breathe an exhilarating atmosphere. If the American, who for the first time touches that soil, be an educated man, it is to him classic ground: if a clergyman, the ground on which he

* Vol. I. p. 84.

stands, is hallowed by the blood of martyrs to the cause of religious liberty ;—he is encompassed by the shades of Christian heroes. So strange is that delusion* which has been induced on the mind by having compassed the wide waste of waters, he almost imagines that he shall witness the stern conflicts of Protestantism, and mingle in converse with those mighty spirits which secured liberty to the Church—the Bible to the world. Or, if the emotions of a republican be strongest in his bosom, he reflects that it is the land from which the lovers of freedom were driven to breast the terrors of the ocean, and the savages of the wilderness. Here ruled the men who aimed, through tyranny, to rivet around his country the chains of slavery. Nay, if his mind has been conversant with only the works of fiction, a thousand images start up before him into life. He cannot enter a time-worn mansion, or mark, in the distance, a frowning tower, or lose himself amid the intricacy of winding lanes, without the thronging associations of romance. Perhaps he will unconsciously identify himself with the hero of a Fielding or a Scott, and feel himself struggling with imaginary difficulties,—befriended by an unknown hand,—loved and honoured by some noble fair one.

Besides, there cannot well be a greater transition than from New to Old England. It can scarcely be imaged by the disparity in form and feature which obtains between the mother and child. We have passed from a land of republican simplicity, to one which is characterized by all the pomp and circumstance of monarchy ;—from a Church which sustains itself in total disconnexion with civil power, to one which is wholly dependent on the State ;—from the midst of a scattered population, to a land where human beings throng as the locusts of Egypt ;—from a country scarcely reclaimed from the wildness of nature, to one which, from its hill-tops to its marshes, has long known the hand of cultivation, —where rural beauty appears in every form to enchant the eye, and every opening through the shade of venerable trees but serves to unfold yet another ivy-covered temple, or seat of lavish wealth and imposing magnificence.

First impressions respecting England, cannot be otherwise than erroneous. The proper state of mind for the just observation of any foreign land, is that in which we hold the

* Three thousand miles are as three thousand years.—*Franklin*.

judgement in suspense. No one should write concerning a foreign land, till his emotions, of whatever kind, have subsided, and time is given to observe with accuracy, and remark with candour. The mind of a traveller may be either a common-place-book, or a philosophical treatise, according as he simply collects and arranges things, or duly and dispassionately weighs them.

Mr. Colton has enjoyed an advantage over previous journalists. He need not tell us what he felt at first, but what he thought at last. He need not "hasten to an end," to meet an unfortunate engagement with his publisher; nor depend on *on dits*, when ample time remains for personal observation; nor resort to gossip and caricaturing,—the expedient of impoverished minds as well as bodies, to secure a ready sale. From the abundance of his leisure, his observations should not be superficial. From the recurrence of opportunities, we may reasonably expect that he can in few instances be deceived by appearances.

But in some respects a foreign sojourn of four years, may be disadvantageous to a writer. During such an interval, his judgement is liable to be unduly influenced by the partialities of personal friendship; or various circumstances may repeatedly occur to disturb his equanimity. We can readily imagine, too, how the love of our far distant home might operate to the disparagement of all that is attractive abroad; or how the propensity of our nature to detect faults, might meet with numberless temptations. On protracted converse with an individual, we naturally begin to scrutinize. We doubt the traits which were once acknowledged, and at last discover faults in him, of whom, at first, our praise was unequivocal. Happy, indeed, if we do not "exaggerate, and set down aught in malice." Thus time may disclose a thousand blots on the lineaments of a nation which, at first, imposed on us by its greatness, and dazzled by its splendour.

However piercing our scrutiny of another's character, nothing is more common than to be blind to our own defects. In like manner, may it not be possible to forget America* in

* "How outrageous," said an American gentleman to us on a certain occasion, "that the booksellers in Westminster will have no connexion with a work which is in any wise opposed to the Established Church. I have searched every store, and at last was informed that if I wished a book so favourable to the cause of dissent as that, I must apply at the other end of the city." We were not a little amused; and could not resist the temptation of reminding our friend, that in the state from which he came, it would be quite as difficult to procure a work unfavourable to the cause of negro slavery.

our critical observation of England? Besides, our character as a people is not fully established. There are strange elements from time to time evolved, of which, but a little while since, we hardly dreamed. The republicans of to-day, we had almost said, may not present the same aspects on the morrow. He who shall spend many years abroad, may find, on his return, that his country is greatly in advance of his knowledge. He bears with him (ex. gr.) his impressions of the state of things in 1830; but his comparisons may not answer to the social, civil, or religious aspects of his country in 1835; so active the habits, so restless the elements of a republican community!

But aside from these considerations, we very much doubt, whether it be possible to write a dispassionate work respecting any foreign nation. What is an Englishman's account of France; or the reverse? Can an Englishman write with candour on the subject of the American Revolution? Even Botta, notwithstanding our expectations, has betrayed unaccountable prejudices in more than one instance. Will the British public anticipate impartiality from the hand of a republican writer? Or can *we*, without ignorance of our relations to England, or rather of human nature?

Mr. Colton sets out with the determination not to be partial in favour of England. He complains of "Americans who allow themselves to be dined and toasted out of their characters." But may not his fear of seduction have screwed up the virtue of republicanism to an unamiable austerity? May not his determination to be true to his own principles and relations, have placed him in an unfavourable attitude for rectifying or enlarging his views? Perhaps, from his clerical character, he was not particularly exposed to the captivating influence of rich dinners, or the witchery of high life; and may not this circumstance have imparted an unconscious bias to his feelings. Perhaps, also, he was a more attentive observer abroad, than he had been at home. We could wish that he had merged the American, in the character of an independent observer; but this, it may be, were impossible. Certain it is, that he has not, in any instance, proved traitor to his republicanism. He carries it with him wherever he goes. We see its features developed through the medium of varying circumstances, in every possible expression, reminding us of his most amusing *view of himself* on entering Ossian's Hall.*

* Vol. 2, p. 51.

We are happy to state, however, that he has not forgotten his clerical profession. This is a circumstance by no means unworthy passing note. Scarce a packet leaves this port without numbering among its passengers some reverend gentleman. Indeed, no pastor can now become strengthless through abundant labours, without being gravely advised to visit Europe. If such a step would ensure mental sanity, or a stock of ideas, it might not be unadvisable for *exhausted preachers*, to avail themselves of the invalid pastor's privilege. But whatever the motive for a transatlantic voyage, no clergyman should lose sight, for a moment, of his high engagements. There is an imperious necessity for consistency of deportment, not only as regards the evidence of personal piety, but on account of the religious interests of those with whom he is brought in contact. Impaired health can be no excuse for the neglect of personal and relative duties. The gratification of curiosity, is rather a poor reason why the soul should not be satisfied. We are at liberty to gain a knowledge of the world, but not at the expense of self-denial and spirituality of mind. What good might not be instrumentally accomplished on ship-board, and in a foreign land, if every clerical traveller should exemplify our holy religion! British Christians are solicitous to ascertain the character of our piety, as influenced by our civil circumstances and ecclesiastical organization. Let the deportment, the conversation, the discourses of our Clergy, be such as to cheer their hearts, if not to inform their minds. Let it be the grand object of every disciple to convince all within his sphere of influence, that as Christianity is not a creature of the state, so personal piety is not a thing of circumstances.

It will not be thought that we have unnecessarily digressed, when it is considered, that the appropriate black dress has of late, in more than one instance, been figuratively laid aside. It would seem as if some ministered at the shrine of local deities, (not of the one only living and true God,)—so changed has been their "walk and conversation" when abroad,—so conformed were they by turns to all manners and all men. Foreign travel is no ordinary test of the religious character. In England, but more particularly in France, there is every temptation to do as we would not in our own land. How many have availed themselves of the *incognito* to visit the theatre, as if example were the only reason why a Christian should not cross its polluted

and polluting threshold! The principle of acting in a place according to one's relative character, as a stranger or resident, is virtually founded on the supposition, that there is no reality in moral distinctions; while if generally adopted, it would, in all our large cities, whether at home or abroad, fill to overflowing, and perpetually support, every edifice of vicious amusement. Many have unconsciously acted on the same principle in relation to the Sabbath. Considering the dissipation of mind, and the exuberance of animal spirits which every visiter of the old country, to a greater or less degree, experiences, it may not be surprising, that, in not unfrequent instances, the claims of the Sabbath should be made to yield to the solicitations of worldly pleasure.* But the Bible recognizes no apology for known sin. Mr. Colton has afforded us in his work a striking illustration of the *necessity* of a Sabbath: Let his example teach us all, when abroad, of the necessity and moral beauty of clerical consistency, in relation to the observance of the Sabbath.

The general strain of remark in these volumes is grave, and their tendency salutary to the cause of truth and virtue. The pages of our author cannot be perused without leading us to think and feel. He is not always satisfactory, but he may be generally instructive. He does not often cause us to smile, but he will, at times, elicit our sympathies. The sentiments with which he inspires us, in view of some advantages in our lot, are those of gratitude, rather than of exultation. We should hardly be induced to remove to England, if, on any account, we were dissatisfied to remain at home.

The picture which these volumes unfold of the Church of England, is a work of no ordinary merit. We thought ourselves prepared for a statement respecting the enormous wealth of the establishment; yet the developement was astounding. Possibly, some inaccuracies may be detected in his

* The temptation to profane the Sabbath is stronger in France. There, no Sabbath is recognized. The most attractive galleries, cabinets, and gardens in Paris, are thrown open on that day. The water-works at Versailles (the greatest curiosity of art in all Europe), are put into operation only on the Sabbath, and that at an interval of months. We cannot but pity the weakness of poor human nature, but often are we more amused at its expedients to quiet conscience. A distinguished American clergyman justified himself in visiting these works on the Sabbath, as we have understood, by remarking, "that any achievement which enlarged his conceptions of the human mind, led him to adore the uncreated mind more profoundly." Another Reverend gentleman, while the water-works were the topic of conversation among some acquaintances at Paris, very opportunely enquired,—"whether there were no places of Protestant worship at Versailles?"

statistics; but we must accede to Mr. C. the palm of having taken all pains to attain a just conclusion. He was not ignorant of the difficulties attending this subject. He has furnished us with the modes of estimating the expense; and, with the scrutiny of a Bentham, he has compared the wealth of the English Church with the revenues of France, Spain, and Rome, and calculated the comparative expense of Christianity in different countries. It is his opinion that the Church of England has been aggrandized by a separation from Rome; but, whether it be so or not, his remarks must command attention.

Nor will the reader, however inclined he may be at other sections of this work, to profit by the device of its author while walking in the "valley of desolation," and to inscribe on the page, "*tired and gone back*,"* pause at the close of this weighty exposition.† He will be interested to ascertain the mode in which the revenues of the Church are distributed among the different orders of clergy; his blood will curdle at the "Slaughter of Rathcormac;" his indignation will kindle into a flame in view of the "Tithe Oppression;" nor will his sympathies fail to mingle with the Dissenters as he ponders their disabilities; or, in illustration of their grievances, reads the case of the "Sick Widow,"—the "Rector imposing Tithes, or a Dissenting Clergyman's Garden,"—the "Indelicate Application;"—and though last, and seemingly insignificant, by no means least, the "Dying Wish of a Poor Woman."

Should any one be forward to doubt these statements, ample testimony to their truth might readily be procured. Many facts (according to the recollection of the writer of this Review), equally if not more harrowing to the feelings, were adduced in the House of Commons in the August of 1834. We cannot repress our apprehensions, however, that Mr. C. may have, unconsciously, far from aided the dissenters, by virtually identifying their cause with that of the radicals.

Some may possibly object to his entire disclosures; but, certainly, no discriminative or candid mind. Christianity cannot be injured by any just expose of its corruptions; though, despite of our author's introductory "protest," it may not be assumed with certainty, that any alliance of Church and State is necessarily, a corruption of Christianity. Surely Heaven will

not frown in anger on the king of Great Britain, should his government energetically subserve the high moral and religious interests of his subjects.

Nor can such disclosures tend to the detriment of the Episcopal Church in America. She is disowned by the Church of England, and disconnected from the state. Mr. C. speaks of the English establishment simply as a political institution.* It is the hierarchy, as wedded to the throne, which he describes; and his account† of her functions is no less striking than true.

But it is not to be expected that a writer on this subject should secure the approbation of all, so widely different are the views which are entertained among us of the Church of England. By some it is identified with the works of the mighty dead; by others with the intolerance of archbishops and the intrigues of statesmen. One regards it as a political engine of portentous power; another as the grandest instrument in the conversion of the world. With many it is the indispensable agent in securing the unity of the faith; with more it is the parent of infidelity and heresy. Speak of the clergy of the establishment, and you recall to the minds of not a few, an anecdote of some fox-hunting rector; while others will pleurably descant on the virtues of a Martyn or a Richmond. Mr. C., in our opinion, betrays neither scantiness of knowledge, nor narrowness of view. Dark as is the picture which he has drawn, it is not unrelieved by a gleam of light. Notwithstanding the exceptionable characters of political clergyman, the "established Church is blessed with a numerous class of *evangelical*, faithful, pungent preachers." He has brought this fact, of which we have the most ample assurance from the accounts of more recent observers, prominently forth as a redeeming feature in the Church. His remarks respecting the superiour popularity of evangelical preachers, are such as might have been anticipated. His views forcibly remind us of Robert Hall's Review of a Clergyman of the establishment, who called on his brethren to "join in pathetic lamentations over the prostrate state of religion, upon no better ground, than the neglect of places of worship, where the Gospel was *not* preached, and where there was little to attract attention, beside the privilege of hearing *fine music*, and seeing *fine ministers*, for nothing."

* Vol. II. p. 101.

† Vol. I. p. 243.

Even Bulwer, in his "England and the English," did not deem it irrelevant to his purpose to glance at the inconsistency and folly of what was understood by *dignified* preaching. Indeed, the secret of attraction in the desk, is preaching the Gospel without fear or feebleness;—plainly, faithfully, feelingly. The conscience which has been implanted in man's nature, bears involuntary testimony to the truth that the Christian ministry was designed to be a remedial function, and may not with impunity, even to ambitious views, be prostituted to an office for mere delectation to worldly minds.

If the work under review, may be allowed to speak for its author, the Church, in his opinion, must be at once and forever separated from the State. Such, in reality, is the general and almost universal sentiment of our country. But it admits of no shadowy doubt, whether the prostration of the established Church would subserve the greater interests of Christianity. It is a fair question, whether the same, if not greater evils would not result from the separation of Church and State in England, than would attend the union of any ecclesiastical polity with the government of the United States. Certainly an attempt to abolish the English establishment must be attended with hardly less difficulty than to rear an ecclesiastical establishment in America. That which would be a curse to us, in the existing state of religious parties in our country, may be a blessing in the very different circumstances which designate the English people.

We are inclined to think, that the author of "Spiritual Despotism," is far from being erroneous, in his main positions respecting the English alliance of Church and State, though our republican pride and hereditary prejudices would repress the acknowledgement. He is ignorant of our civil relations who imagines that an ecclesiastical establishment is necessary for us; and we may betray still less acquaintance with the government and condition of England by the presumption, that no establishment is necessary to her welfare. We can readily perceive, with this Junius of the Church, the necessity of reform in respect to the system "of pluralities, the sale of advowsons, episcopal translations, and those ecclesiastical customs of every sort which have one simple motive—the love of money;" but can we know, whether the establishment be wrong in itself, before all the proposed reforms have been fairly brought to the test? We cannot but think,

notwithstanding the evils which have so long attended Church establishments, that the abstract question respecting the propriety and utility of the perpetuated existence of the established Church in England, must be viewed apart from its imperfections or abuses. But even if the system be bad in *principle*, sure are we that radicalism is worse in *practice*. If the alliance of the Church and State be unscriptural, unnatural,—at war with the well-being of the social system, the evil is not to be remedied by a ruthless hand. "It is in the moral world as in the human frame;" remarked an acute writer—"dislocations which have been of long standing and to which the neighbouring parts of the system have accommodated themselves cannot be brought back to their proper state, without time, patience and gentleness."

The question, whether there should be an establishment in England, resolves itself, we apprehend, into a previous one;—whether the civil government of England should be subverted? Episcopacy is a component part of the British constitution. The Church is strictly a political organization. It is a branch of the government, and like the monarchy itself, it must be supported; though like any form of civil polity, it may not with impunity oppress the obscurest subject. In our view the establishment could not be thrown down without destruction to the monarchy; and if such would be the consequence, let the Church remain forever in connexion with the state. What necessity (always excepting the gratification of our national prejudices) can there be, for changing a government which has advanced England to a height of prosperity from which she may look down on all the nations of the earth? The British Constitution is the sublime result of all the experience and wisdom of ages,—the perfection of limited monarchy. "A subject of any of the monarchies of Europe, on visiting England, will not unlikely be amazed," says Mr. C., "that a monarchy can be so mild, and the subjects of it enjoy so much liberty, as in England. There he will find the utmost liberty of speech and of the press; security of person and property against the encroachments of arbitrary power; a right to do what a man pleases, if he does not violate the rights of his neighbour, as fixed and defined by law for common good." * * "The king of Great Britain has not at this moment so much power as the president of the United States." Republicans in general, may not be forward to ad-

mit the truth of these statements. But the recent course of events in our land, has fastened on not a few intelligent minds, the painful conviction, that there is more freedom of discussion, more respect for the constitution, more regard for law and justice, more security to life and property from lawless aggression in England than here. Our government can be justly viewed as hardly more than a political experiment. From its very nature, past success can be no infallible criterion of future prosperity. *Esto perpetua*, is our prayer; *videre, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet*, shall be our object; but the sources of our danger are no longer imaginary; and we are unable to repress our apprehensions that coming events have cast their portentous shadows over the length and breadth of the land. Fifty years hence (and then we shall no more than have survived our political boyhood in comparison with "Old England,") will be time enough before we presume to exalt ourselves as an example to the world. As yet, we are only a spectacle. Shall England, then, forego the solid benefits of her monarchy for the problematical advantages attendant on the subversion of the Established Church? What is Christianity to gain by involving the "United Kingdoms" in a fierce and long conflict for the chimeras of radicalism? It is in vain to think that England or France can become permanent republics. Let monarchy be levelled with the dust,—republicanism must soon give place to democracy.—Then will anarchy follow on with appalling strides, until despotism, armed with all her terrors, shall rise to conclude the bloody drama of radicalism. So speaks the oracle of history. Well for America, were she less sanguine of the future, and more studious of the past! Our constitution is a shadow which must speedily pass away, if it cannot oppose an impregnable barrier to the smallest encroachment of the popular will.

In this connexion it may not be improper to notice the reprehensible manner in which Mr. C. speaks of what he conceives to be the general sentiment of the English people.—"No one is afraid of the king—not even the poorest—*any more than of his donkey*." This remark might possibly be excused had it been uttered in the privileged looseness of familiar conversation; but in print, it is too undignified to escape censure. If it be true that no one is *afraid* of the king, why adopt an illustration so strikingly vulgar? What

its author's feelings are, need not be enquired ; but it implies that the people at large have even no *respect* for their most gracious sovereign.

Mr. C. animadverts at large, on the *peculiar* corruptions of courts. What fountains of iniquity ! we wonder he could have refrained from discoursing to the people on the moral purity of a republican cabinet. Surely Dr. Hurd* must have been blinded by the prejudices of an unsuccessful partizan, or we might shrewdly suspect that there was no little truth in the representations of some of our political prints. "The outside indeed was fair ; but to me, who had an opportunity of looking it through, nothing could be more deformed and hateful. All was ambition, intrigue and falsehood. Every one intent on his own schemes, frequently wicked, always base and selfish." Ah, we can give the ingenious prelate no credit for candour or charity. Had he lived in our day and land, very possibly he might have conjured materials for a similar picture.

Whatever the form of government, it will necessarily exert an influence, whether beneficial or not, on the cause of public morals. "Bad influences from high quarters" are not confined to England. "What originates *in a court* and is tolerated there, though it be a scandal, is too apt to be tolerated in general society ;"—as if the same grave remark might not be made respecting whatever "originates" in republican high places ! In like manner, we might in this connexion, remind our author, that if the "metropolis be the centre and soul of the nation," so is a city the centre and soul of a republican state ; that if "the sons of the noble and the wealthy are exposed to peculiar temptations by some grand defects in English society," almost as sad defects may be detected here ; that if the "manners and customs of the higher ranks in England *descend*," so do they throughout our land ! But the reader will not think that we compliment his powers of discernment, any more than Mr. C. the intelligence of his readers, whom he so kindly assists to the meaning of the proverb, "high life below stairs,"—by an explanatory note !

Our author has rendered a most beautiful tribute to the "order of a well-regulated English family in the higher ranks." He regards it as presenting one of the fairest

specimens of the social state which this world can furnish." We cannot, however, entirely accord with his views respecting the aristocracy. We prefer the aristocracy of England, to that which is affected in America. Aristocratic feelings are quite as common here, as there ; though not so acknowledged. A multitude of facts might be adduced in support of our opinion. And it occurs to us, that instead of being the legitimate result of any form of government, they grow out of the necessary inequalities in human condition. Republican equality is an abstraction. Despite of the main position of our declaration, there are the greatest inequalities in relative circumstances. Hence, the man of wealth, looks down on the poor ; the fashionist, contemns the vulgar ; and the first circle guards itself with jealous pride against all rude encroachments. The objection against associations or matrimonial alliances on the score of rank, though more common in England, is not unfrequent here. All the advantages of academical education and literary accomplishments are sometimes insufficient to counteract the misfortune of a "low origin." Nothing but wealth can make amends for the want of "respectability" in domestic connexions ; and why ? because wealth, in these instances, is the republican substitute for "noble blood"—it secures the gratification of aristocratic feelings. In many places in our own country the line between the first and second classes is as definitely drawn, if not as pertinaciously observed on the part of the former, as in England between the nobles and commoners. The lowly republican, too, is not unfrequently as elated by his title, though it may be only that of *major*, as if he had been *knighted*. We can as easily distinguish persons in the higher walks of life by their easy bearing and open manners, as Mr. C., the "nobility." It may be as truly said of many families, as of the "nobility," that "the privileges" of their lot in life "make them noble in manners." The levee of the president ; the saloon of Congress Hall ; the occasional *grand balls* which are given by some families in our large cities "exhibit this difference" as really, though not so gorgeously, as the "queen's drawing-room." "As a republican, nay, as a man, as a Christian," Mr. C. "protests against the propriety or justice of maintaining those distinctions which make these differences in character and society in England." Christianity does not sanction pride. It should render us humble under the most tempting

circumstances of our standing in society; but he might with equal propriety "protest" against the constitution of Providence which necessitates inequalities in human condition. *Owenism* is an absurdity. The man who would confound distinctions and reduce all ranks and classes to a level, is fighting against an ordinance of Heaven. The well being of any community is essentially dependent on the pecuniary inequalities and various grades of its members. "Society can be stationary" only where these essential elements of social improvement are not allowed to operate.

That the English, in their respective orders, should virtually "conspire, to keep down those who are below them," is not surprising. It is the necessary consequence of a dense population. "Let every one know, and keep his own place," (which is the first grand fault of the English, according to Mr. C.'s observations) is the sentiment of our own land, in all places where violent competition has been induced. It is a sentiment which naturally springs from a desire for self-exaltation or aggrandizement. "Society," cannot remain "stationary" where it obtains. The greater the effort to confine the human mind to a certain sphere, the stronger its vindictive desire to break through its enclosure. Its energies are developed in proportion to the obstacles which it may be doomed to encounter. Let men be free and enjoy the means of knowledge, and it matters not what distinctions obtain in rank and fortune. They will rise in the scale of mental and moral greatness. Their success, too, will be more in accordance with their real abilities. If they cannot be nobles, they will be men indeed. If they cannot assume the insignia of royalty, they will be royal in their art and profession. If they "must keep their own place" they will be pre-eminent in their sphere; and it is for none but the *outward* observer, to deny to even the servant, the praise, to which he is as truly entitled for superiority in his menial office, as the lord in his proud relations. The state of society in England contradicts our author's reasoning.* Where is there more general activity of mind than there? Where have the arts and sciences been advanced to so great perfection as there? Where shall we find such numbers of well-trained servants, skilful artificers, or greater, better men? Despite of the civil disa-

* Vol. 2. pp. 238—41.

bilities of dissenters, (for which we offer no apology,) how many among their ranks, have from the lowest origin risen to a greatness which shames the pride of rank, and eclipses the splendour of royalty? "Any one in America may lawfully aspire to the highest civil offices."—"Tis a proud reflection. But it may be doubted, from an observation of human nature, whether facility of elevation be the greater spur to mental exertion; and from the general character of successful aspirants, whether the structure of our civil society be not more favourable to the gratification of avaricious ambition, than the merited exaltation of intellectual and moral worth? We have yet to discover, whether the state of society in our own land, be not more favourable to *pretensions* than to *true merit*.

As to the "other fault" of the English, which Mr. C. specifies, it is surely a *grievous* one! We fear the rich and pleasure-loving gentry of our own land have gone too far to be admonished, since it is no uncommon circumstance at the present day for hundreds of dollars to be lavished on dogs, and thousands on horses. We hope no English traveller will revenge himself on our author by visiting our semi-annual races, or taking a census of the dogs, at least, in some of our towns in the interior. We are convinced, however, that English gentlemen are at fault, if the ladies are doomed to lavish their affections on dogs. Republican gentlemen are wont to spare our ladies the necessity of wasting their delicate sensibilities in a manner so unworthy; though alas! in some instances they might better for their own happiness have "led about a dog."

Perhaps the "English are not more remarkable for loving the brute creation" than some of our agriculturists whose barns are ten-fold larger than their houses, or whose fields display the finest breeds. "The excessive love which the English have for the horse and dog," is the natural result of their taste for rural sports. The lady's fondness for her "pet," betrays the influence of fashion, or the affectation of romance. As it may be regarded as one instrument of her vanity, by which she designs to impress on others her superiority to the drudgery of life, so the gentleman's regard for horses and hounds is the natural expression of his pride, which leads him to appropriate to himself the achievements of his animals. But whatever the cause, this excessive fondness is undoubtedly, as Mr. C. observes, a perversion of the

affections of the heart. It should be reprobated, and the more so, as "there are a thousand objects of human kind needing benevolence." But if men are not Christians, they are lovers of the creature in some form; and for our part, we are as willing persons should expend their money and affections "on horses and dogs," as see them perverting "the noblest ends of society, and man's existence," by "the excessive love" of *hoarded dust*.

In his chapter on the "extortions of menials" our author remarks, "take it all in all, the tax of satisfying the various orders of servants, porters and guides in England, if a stranger would go wherever it is desirable, is enormous." But in proportion to our population and the degree of travelling, is not extortion quite as frequent here? Might not similar incidents, be "put down to the credit," of some of our stage, steam and railway offices, as that which Mr. C. has formally recorded against "Brotherton's Coach offices."

In another place, he charges the Roman Catholics in London, with always exacting money of strangers. He says it is unlawful to take money for admission to places of public worship. It may have "been so decided by a London magistrate;" but the writer of this Review distinctly recollects having seen within the vestibule of one of the established churches in the vicinity of the "New Palace," the following notice: "Strangers are respectfully informed that by the payment of a fee to the sexton they will be conducted to a seat."

Mr. Colton's remarks on the service at the Chapel Royal are not the inappropriate or the invidious observations of a stern republican. All the distinctions of society, should be laid side in the house of God. It is a redeeming feature in the Roman Churches, (more particularly observable in France;) that the rich and poor, the high and low meet together, and sit or stand promiscuously on a level.

The King with his "marking strings" was probably an object of little "dread" to the American visitant; but we cannot think that he had no respect for this august personage, since he has so carefully informed us, that on another occasion, he *actually stood "within two feet or eighteen inches"* of his Majesty! We apprehended from this interview, no little danger to his republicanism; but our mind was soon relieved. It is easy to perceive that he does not sink the dignity of an American. It was necessity which

compelled him to stand opposite the King for about ten minutes, "with only space" he observes, "for one person to pass between *me* and him." The reader, however, will follow our traveller with no ordinary interest through the gorgeous scenes of the King's levee, and Queen's drawing room. But if his attention had been previously directed to England, he will be surprised that Mr. C. should so often have descended from the character of an author to the capacity of a guide. His work has certainly encroached, in some respects, on the appropriate department of an inferior mind. Still the dulness of "things familiar," is relieved at times by a striking incident, or graphic account:—Such (ex. gr.) as Mispah—Dr. Raffle's funeral sermon—the tongues—scenes in Newgate—the murderer and suicide—the funeral of Clementi—the Welch, with the story of the brother and sister, and the martyr dog.

In the place of the "composition of the houses of parliament," or the "manner of public debates," we should have been more indebted to him, for a comparison between the forensic eloquence of the parliament and the capitol. His portraits of "four British statesmen," are well drawn; and we cannot but regret, that he who has interested us so deeply in the striking delineation of Grey, Brougham, O'Connell, and Macauley, should not have favoured the American Church with an occasional sketch of some distinguished preacher, or benevolent man.

Mr. Colton's descriptions, though in some instances happy, will not, in general, endure the test of criticism. He is wont to combine too many particulars, to employ too many words, and these not always of the most classical usage. His descriptions of natural scenery lead us (and that not rapidly) from object to object, rather than unfold to us, at once, as from a distant eminence, the glowing *tout ensemble*. Were it not for some occasional strokes, we should term them statements, rather than sketches. He gives us the dimensions of a scene, when we are expecting to behold the graceful blending of light and shade. He arranges *marking strings* for our imagination (if we may draw a figure from his allusion to the office which was performed for the royal worshippers), instead of simply affording "room and verge enough" for the play of the reader's mind. We might advert to the "meditation" in which he was interrupted by the conscience-stricken young man;—to the "funeral at sea" (not overlooking, *en*

passant, his profound speculation on the fate of the body);—to the “still day;”—“the ramble;”—or more particularly, to the description of the marble cenotaph in Windsor Castle, but his strained and incongruous description of the “lightning cloud,” was of itself sufficient to induce the apprehension that Mr. C.’s was not exactly the pen for delineating scenes which the *Waverly Novels* have rendered sacred to the genius of Scott. Accordingly, almost the first sentence which met our eye on opening the second volume, was this: “Scotland would be venerable in her naked majesty, in the eye of a seraph spirit, who on wings should make survey of her face, spread out to the heavens, even in desolate loneliness, if that spirit might be supposed to have any thing of a taste akin to man for the beauties of nature.”

But we can pardon a failure in this respect. Travelling in Great Britain is a *sensation*. There is every thing in vision and association to kindle the dormant emotions of the soul. We are delighted—ravished! In the overflowings of our enjoyment, we wish to impart a portion to our distant friends. But before concluding to write a book, is it not advisable for a man to ascertain the peculiar structure of his own mind? The man whom the prince of Abyssinia employed to effect his escape from the “happy valley,” was a good mechanist, but nature had not designed him to soar in the air. He was confident, however, that “he should have vultures and eagles behind him. He waved his pinions awhile, to gather air, then leaped from his stand, and in an instant dropped into the lake.” It is no disparagement to Mr. C. to presume that on examining, he would find that imagination is not the faculty of his mind most happily developed. Dr. Johnson was a nervous prose writer, but his attempt at poetry,—

When observation, with extended view,
Surveys mankind, from China to Peru,—

was tautology worse tautologized. Thus, our author is better at matters of fact, than sketches of fancy. He is a close observer, a ready calculator, an admirable reporter of meetings and occurrences, but no vivid portrayer of natural scenes or moral sentiments.

Mr. C. was “exceedingly jealous of *walking society*,” when visiting Abbeys and ruins. But if he had been accompanied in all his excursions, though his readers might have

been favoured with fewer sentimental reflections, his own fears had not been so strangely excited when he was left for a moment by his guide, or accosted by a beggar. Perhaps we are mistaken. He is not unfrequently nervous and apprehensive. Look at his account of a "narrow escape" from drowning; of the dreaded Brompton crescent; of a surprise on Waterloo bridge—his subsequent allusion to the villain and long process of reasoning to render probable the assailant's purpose; or the list of his suppositions on "a train of cars;" or that "horrible whisper" which he heard at the entrance of the "Tunnel." All this, for aught we know, may be what the French term *naivete*, but there was something of the same disposition, if we recollect aright, in the sage who confessed to Imlac,—“I am like a man habitually afraid of spectres, who is set at ease by a lamp.”

We might advert to some of our author's similes,—such as the “head of an English vessel rising from the water like the circle of a pumpkin,”—the boat's filling “as quick as one could fill a tea-cup in a tub of water,”—the wheels of the car “going round as fast as a woman's spinning-wheel,”—“most all the mountains of Scotland being as bald as a man's hand,”—or Brougham in his movements “being not unlike a baboon.” We might also allude to other peculiarities of style,—such as “drinking deeply of a vision,”—“the king takes his station in the throne-room *on his feet and uncovered*,”—“there lay evidently on the table a corpse,”—“it was tremendous; it was awful; it was overpowering; my whole nervous system was shaken,”—“Mr. Croker began, as well he might, as he could not help, as was most befitting;” and so on. But upon the whole, if we are bound to recommend his style, it must be for the same reason, that Dr. Bell thought that medical students might learn more from an unskilful, than an expert operation.

We should not, however, have alluded so particularly to the defects of Mr. Colton's style, had he not enjoyed the advantage of four years;—were he not about to issue another volume;—and did it not fall within the object of a literary Review. The high order of English literature may be traced in part to the severe censorship of their critical journals. Even personal antipathies, sectarian prejudices, and party animosities, pervading the “Edinburgh” and “Quarterly,” have thus indirectly subserved its cause; and if the literature of our country shall ever rival, in general, that of England

and Scotland, the style of our writers must be the subject of review, equally with their sentiments. Our critics must do their part towards rendering every traveller an Irving in manner, as well as a Colton in matter. There is too great a disposition among our writers to be satisfied with themselves, if they have only conveyed, what our eastern neighbours call the *idea*, no matter how provincial the expression, how uncouth the language, how vulgar the simile. Hence it is, that we are so obnoxious to the biting sarcasm of English critics. Nay, some are not backward to intimate that they *despise style*. It is, indeed, a cheap way of showing the superiour order of our minds, to undervalue or condemn that which we do not possess. But a man might as well inform us that he is destitute of taste and classical accomplishments,—of genius; and then expect that we shall look on him with the more profound respect!

But, though Mr. Colton's volumes have subjected the reviewer to critical toil, they will amply repay the perusal of general readers; nor do we, notwithstanding the remarks which "Four years in Great Britain" have elicited from our pen, look with less interest for the appearance of "London." We hope it will be characterized by philosophical views and moral reflections. The secret of writing not only for present interest, but *future study*, may be found, we apprehend, in Johnson's Tour through the Hebrides; or of writing for permanent fame, in Brougham's advice* to Macauley. But with "London," whatever its character, as with "Four Years," we must be content; not only, as Mr. Colton remarks, "it is easier to tell what a book should be than to make it," but because "in all sublunary things there is something to be wished which we must wish in vain."

* Vol. II. p. 218.

ART. V. SAVIGNY* ON THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

Translated from the German,

By BARON DE ROENNE, Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, near the government of the United States.

To the Editor of the Literary and Theological Review.

SIR—In the pamphlet recently published by the Council of the University of this city, relative to the organization of a Law Faculty in that institution, you will have observed a communication addressed to me, by the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, Baron de Roenne; and in a note on page 8, you will also have seen the following statement of the circumstances which led to that communication, and of my obligations to its author.

"Being desirous to obtain the most accurate information within my reach, in regard to the Prussian Law Schools, I recently availed myself of an interview with Baron de Roenne, Chargé d'Affaires from the Government of Prussia, near that of the United States, to solicit from him some account of their present state. This gentleman, who was bred to the Law under the tuition of the celebrated Savigny, and who is himself an accomplished jurist, cheerfully complied with this request, and communicated to me numerous particulars on the subject of my inquiries. His statements were so interesting and instructive, that I subsequently took the liberty of requesting him to commit the substance of them to paper, with a view to their publication, in connection with this letter. It will be seen from his communication, which will be found in the Appendix, that he not only complied with this application, but even exceeded it, by preparing for my use a translation of a recent paper of Professor Savigny, giving a general view of the German Universities. I am very sure that my professional brethren will concur with me, in awarding to this enlightened foreigner, their best thanks for the information contained in his letter; and I trust that the lively interest displayed by him in the cause of intellectual improvement in the United States, will secure for him the respect and regard of other American readers. The essay of Professor Savigny has no particular reference to the faculties of law; but as it embraces an instructive view of the German Universities, and contains many profound reflections on the subject of education, I shall take some fit mode to bring it before the public."

* Frederic Charles von Savigny is professor of Civil Law in the University at Berlin, and one of the most eminent jurists of his nation. He belongs to what is there called the *historical* school of lawyers, in opposition to the philosophical school. In accordance with the principles of that school, his writings are pervaded with love for ancient laws and institutions, by veneration for the past and the distant. His numerous works on law are distinguished rather for profound learning and elegance of style, than for depth of philosophical investigation. The following Essay on the German Universities, was originally published in the "Politisches Journal," Hamburg, July, 1833.—EDITOR.

In compliance with the promise contained in the above extract, I beg leave to place at your disposal the translation referred to. As it was prepared by a foreigner, and was moreover intended to be quite literal, its language is not always perfectly agreeable to the English idiom. Your acquaintance with the German will enable you to correct it in this respect, without injury to its general fidelity; and for this purpose I also hand you the journal in which it originally appeared.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
New-York, Oct. 15, 1835.

B. F. BUTLER.

So much has always contributed to divide the Germans, that it may be deemed necessary to cast a glance now and then at those common advantages which are still left to the whole nation. This will help us both to enjoy their possession, which warrants us the continuation of the fresh life of the people, and to understand the means of their preservation. Amongst the most peculiar and the most valuable of these common possessions, *our universities* have at all times been numbered, and they have accordingly often found zealous friends and panegyrists. But the most certain evidence of their value has always been and is still to be found, in the love and gratitude of those who have spent part of their youth in these institutions; for, however far they may now be removed by age, rank, or profession from the university life, they will almost always not only remember it with pleasure, but gratefully acknowledge, that the beneficial influence it had upon their education, could not have been fully supplied by any other means.

It is indeed true, that they have had powerful enemies, especially for a few years past. The most moderate of these opponents have been of opinion, that the universities had survived themselves, and that the constant progress of our literature, rendered them, to a great degree, unnecessary. Others deem them dangerous to the peace of the States, or to the welfare and the morals of our youth. Both of these classes wish, if not the subversion, yet such a reform of the universities, as would be almost equal to their subversion.

Perhaps an enquiry into the real condition of these institutions, might contribute to reconcile these conflicting opinions. It would do so, could it be shown that whatever, in these institutions their friends love, is approved of by such of their antagonists as are well-disposed; and that what the latter condemn, is not only foreign from, but directly opposed to their nature.

Ever since the middle ages, it has been the custom in the greater part of Europe to establish schools, in which the foundation might be laid by oral instruction, for the most important branches of a public calling. However the form and use of these schools may have varied, according to different ages and countries, the conviction has been general and prevailing, that the proper road to public life, and especially to the service of the Church and State, leads through them. This common object may, therefore, be regarded as constituting the nature of the *European universities*.

Before the art of printing was invented, such schools were, of course, deemed indispensable; since there were no external means, apart from oral instruction, by which the knowledge requisite for the object abovenamed, could have been adequately communicated. The art of printing has removed that external necessity. Not only does there exist already a sufficient number of books for self-instruction in all the sciences, but it would be easy to cause to be written a connected series of preparatory text-books for every public calling. In this way all that is absolutely necessary for the attainment of this external object would be provided for, and this, too, in a manner more cheap and more convenient for all, than is done at present by the universities. If, then, these institutions are still to be continued, it can only be because some important and peculiar advantages are secured by them, which would be lost by a mere study of books. Such now is exactly the case; and in order to make it obvious in what these advantages consist, it is necessary that the characteristics of all the different methods of conveying instruction, should be apprehended and exhibited.

Our first enquiry will naturally be, in what respect the task of a scientific *author*, differs from that of a *teacher* in the university. The author addresses himself to all who are interested in his object,—to those contemporary with himself, and to those of a future period, without any regard to the differences of their mental cultivation. The generality and indefiniteness in which this public stands before the mind of the author, must unavoidably give a general cast to what he writes. His work is so far valuable, as it contributes to establish or develop the science of which it treats. But it can be considered only as a single fact in the history of this science; and the author himself is only, as it were, an organ of the ideal spirit, by which this science is progres-

sively improved. Thus every thing conspires to remove the *personality* of the author, and the peculiar manner of his individual developement, from the eye of the reader.

Not so with the teacher in the university. There stands before him a certain number of individuals; all personally known by him,—all very much in the same stage of mental cultivation,—generally unacquainted with the science which he teaches, but in the fresh and unexhausted strength of their youth. Now to these students, this science, so far as it has hitherto advanced, will naturally appear, as it were, *personified* in their teacher. He will have incorporated so vitally into himself, what had been for a long time gradually and slowly forming, that the same impression will be made on them, as if his science had been now at once engendered in his mind. Whilst the teacher thus gives a vivid representation of the genesis of scientific thought, the kindred spiritual power is awakened in the student, and excited to re-production. He will not only learn and understand, but also vitally re-produce, what he has seen so vividly presented before him, in its living realization.

Even in studying books, we have often found that views and facts come before our eyes, nay, become clear and convincing to our minds, without making a lasting impression; whilst the same thoughts, at other times, in a more favourable state of the mind, are seized by its productive powers, incorporated into our being, and made our own. Now what, in this case, is mostly the effect of circumstances merely subjective or accidental, (perhaps the merit of the author's spirited style,) the same can and ought to be the uniform fruit of personal instruction, when properly applied.

Though it is true that personal instruction has, under all circumstances, the greater efficacy now ascribed to it, yet it is its being united with the student's first entrance upon study, in the freshness of his youth, and with the reciprocal effect of the many who at the same time experience the same impression, which gives to the universities a high value, which cannot be supplied by any thing else. Thus might be applied to them, what a great master has said, though in a different connexion:—"To write is an abuse of language; to read silently for one's self, is a miserable surrogate for discourse. *All the influence of men over one another is exer-*

* Goethe's *Life*, Vol. II. p. 570.

cised by their personality ; the strongest influence is that exercised by youth upon youth,—an influence which gives rise to the purest effects ; and it is these effects which vivify the world, and do not allow it to die, either physically or morally."

The fact that the distinction between these two kinds of scientific instruction is often obscured in actual life, by their being interchanged, cannot affect the reality of this distinction. Many books approximate, by their liveliness and individuality, to the oral kind of discourse ; and many lectures, both in their excellencies and in their deficiencies, resemble a printed book. But the pure form of the book, and the pure form of oral discourse, always remain the same, although he who has chosen one of them may at times pass over into the sphere of the other.

These advantages of the universities have been often, though indistinctly recognized by their friends. By neglecting to reduce them to distinct notions, they have fallen into important errors respecting their true nature, which did not remain without influence upon the judgements they formed of individual teachers. These wrong judgements deserve to be mentioned. Thus it is erroneous to judge of the merits of a teacher by any discoveries which he himself may have made in his particular branch of science, and which he is accustomed to communicate in his lectures. It is indeed true, that by the novelty of the information thus conveyed, a deeper interest in the lectures might be excited, both in the teacher himself, and in the students, and that thus the great object of instruction might be promoted. But this novelty is, in itself, foreign to this object ; and just as an excellent teacher can be imagined, who had never enriched his branch of science by new discoveries, so can science be highly indebted to one, who has little success as a teacher.

It is equally erroneous, though very common, to estimate the merit of a teacher by the excellence of his manner of delivery. The facility with which an oral teacher expresses his thoughts with correctness and taste, cannot indeed but be conducive to the great object ; and many teachers pay too little attention to it, since much more might be done in this respect by determined effort than people generally believe. Still amongst the attributes which characterize the superiour teacher, only an inferior place can be assigned to this ; and it is generally overrated. There have at all times been teachers, who

though having a good, perhaps a brilliant mode of delivery, have yet accomplished but little: whilst others, who were hardly able to deliver a single sentence correctly and without faltering, have yet awakened in their pupils the *spirit* of science. And the reason of this is, that the former with all their fluency of speech, have possessed nothing worthy of communication; while in the case of the latter, the powerful workings of their minds could not remain concealed by their stammering discourse from the view of the intelligent student. But it is impossible to say how often the true merit of a teacher is mistaken in this way, especially from the partiality of students, and to their great injury.

Nearly related to this mistake is another, viz. judging of the merit of a teacher exclusively from the degree of excitement which he imparts to his auditors. One who is not at all able to excite others, is indeed unfit for teaching; but on the other hand, excitement is only valuable when it is the means of eliciting good faculties and tendencies. He therefore who elevates the scientific standard in the view of his pupils, who makes every, even the slightest progress towards the attainment of it, appear to them a worthy aim of their most intense efforts, and who thus incites them to such unremitting inquiry and to such rigorous demands on themselves, as will put an end to all their self-conceit,—he is the true teacher. But one who leads them to be satisfied with superficial effort and empty show, and to decide peremptorily and proudly when truth can only be attained by an honest exertion of the whole power of the mind,—he may indeed excite his pupils, but to their ruin, however much, in their foolish delusion, they may praise him.

It is also erroneous to place the merit of the universities in that personal contact, which enables the teacher to exert an influence upon his pupils by seriousness and love, by advice, encouragement and admonition. Such an intimacy is, indeed, important, and any one who has experienced its beneficial effects will gratefully remember it. And no teacher who is truly and from choice devoted to his profession, will regard it with indifference, or withdraw himself from it. But this personal intercourse depends so much upon accident, and, at large universities, can be realized to so limited an extent, that it cannot be regarded as the great merit of an university education.

If we thus make deduction of such things as are partly

accidental and partly subordinate, we shall feel disposed to acknowledge the truth of the account above given of the advantage of the universities. The true ground of the advantage of an university consists, *in the excitement to scientific thought which it furnishes, by presenting a similiar process of mental activity already gone through with by the mind of the teacher.* And that teacher will be best able to realize this advantage to his pupils, in whom the power of forming scientific notions is most conspicuously developed. In this respect young teachers have a natural advantage, which however may be supplied and outweighed by those more advanced in years, if they succeed in preserving youthfulness of mind in connexion with their ripened knowledge and experience.

It has been admitted above, that there is no longer that external necessity for universities, which once existed; and, that therefore their importance might be thought diminished. But on the other hand, it is from this very progress of the age, that a new reason has arisen to enhance their value. It cannot be denied, that the mechanical facilities for the diffusion and even for the progress of science, have been greatly increased by the constant agency of book-printing; but it is obvious, that, at the same time, every thing now produced in the scientific world, is less and less *personal*. *To prevent such a change, founded in the very course of historic events, is impossible;—to regret it, is useless; but is it possible and salutary, to awaken and foster opposite powers,* by which that which would be injurious only by being partial or extreme, may be converted into a means of enrichment and animation to our whole intellectual condition. Thus the universities may acquire a new importance, by affording an asylum to what is personal, as it were, in science, and by continuing in their narrower circle, what in ancient times, and until the discovery of the art of printing, was the only mode of scientific communication,—times in which this communication was more scanty in its external means, but warmer and more humane in its influence upon individuals.

All that has hitherto been said on the state and merits of universities is equally applicable to all the nations which possess such institutions. It still remains to indicate the peculiar attributes by which the *German universities* are distinguished from those of other nations. This common cha-

racter consists, in the first place, in the fact, that each of them embraces all the sciences, instead of being limited to a single science, like the special schools of many other countries. The advantage of our system, in this respect, has been so often and so thoroughly explained by others, that it may here be passed over; since it is our design to draw the attention of the reader to such features of the subject as are less known. Besides, this circumstance can only, to a very limited extent, be regarded as a peculiarity of the German universities. For after the very first universities (those of Paris, Bologna and Salerno) had been established in the middle ages, as *special* schools, they were soon converted into general schools, and the numerous universities formed after them immediately assumed the same general character; so that after a short time, but few exceptions were to be found: as, for example, that of Salerno, which has always remained a medical school; and that of Paris, where the Roman law was excluded from the circle of instruction by an express prohibition. We mention this general character here, amongst the peculiarities of the German universities, only because it is in contradistinction to the system of special schools, which has recently been introduced into many other countries.

A second peculiarity of our universities is intimately connected with the scientific state of our nation. There is no other nation, where so important a part of the scientific activity is assigned to the public teacher. At all times, our first-rate literary men have taken a pride in acting as professors, even in small universities. That this circumstance contributes very much to promote the general object of the universities, is obvious. For a teacher, who at the same time takes an active part in cultivating the science he teaches, (though the two functions are different in themselves,) may generally be expected to possess that *living* vigour of scientific thought, by which alone he can succeed as a teacher: and on the other hand, the susceptibility of the pupil to become thoroughly imbued with the principles taught him, will be enhanced by the well-founded reputation which his teacher enjoys as an author. Thus the general superiority, which must necessarily attend the office of teaching, becomes ennobled by esteem for the particular teacher; and the higher authority which he thus obtains cannot but be conducive to his success. And so inversely,

when the teacher cheerfully performs his duty, it must have a favourable influence on his investigations as an author. Many a thought has been struck out in literary conversation with a friend, which never would have occurred to the scholar, in his solitary labour. And so a teacher who is connected with intelligent pupils, will find thoughts suggested to his mind, or quickened to new interest, by some appropriate expression, which would never have occurred to the mere author beyond the excitement of personal contact.*

It is evident that the above mentioned peculiarity of our universities, does not depend upon any prescribed system, but upon the habit and disposition of our learned men. Still it depends indirectly, upon an important fact, without which it could not exist, and this is, that kind of liberty in teaching which we enjoy.

Our teachers enjoy an almost unlimited liberty as to the choice of their topics of instruction, and the arrangement of their lectures; and the students are equally at liberty as to the choice of teachers and lectures. This liberty renders the relation of teacher honourable, and excites an emulation by which every improvement of science, either as to form or substance, is brought to bear immediately upon the business of instruction at the university. The opposite of this liberty may exist in different degrees, and is actually found in many countries. Liberty is entirely excluded where not only the object of the lectures, but also their form and arrangement, is strictly prescribed to the teacher, and when the pupil is directed from what teachers, and by what lectures he is at any time to receive instruction. *In such cases the plan of the Lancaster schools is, at it were, transferred to a sphere, where it cannot but operate ruinously.* Nothing is here left of the peculiar advantage of oral instruction, except the merely accidental benefit which may arise from the personal relations between teacher and pupil. If we except this accidental advantage, the object of such an institution might be equally as well, nay, more surely and more perfectly attained by a series of text-books, without any oral instruction.

A much lower degree of the limitation of liberty consists in prescribing to the pupil a considerable number of lectures, which he must, at some time, have attended to, leaving him

* This is very feelingly acknowledged by Niebuhr in his Roman history (Vol. I. p. 12 of the preface, 3d edition), as suggested by his own happy experience.

at liberty, as to the selection of his teacher, and as to the sequence and connexion of the lectures. Though the best part of liberty is thus left untouched, yet this system has been found by experience to be useless, and, indeed, injurious. It is founded upon the intention, commendable in itself, of raising the student to the highest point of thorough and liberal education by obliging him to attend to a great variety of lectures; but wherever this must be enforced, contrary to inclination, nothing is gained by it, unless it be, that the students are put to the ignoble game of collecting certificates for show's sake, and to comply with a formal rule. *So little can the business of instruction prosper, when under any external constraint.*

But what justifies us in ascribing peculiar merits to our German universities, in preference to the institutions of other countries? It is neither that the learning of our teachers, is already become complete, nor that our students are in the way of becoming eminently accomplished, which distinguish our universities from the schools of other nations. For if we should pretend that all our institutions are thus distinguished, a mortifying spectacle might not unfrequently be held up before us. But this is their glory, that they have received a form in which every distinguished talent for instruction can be developed, and every lively susceptibility on the part of the pupil be satisfied;—a form by which every degree of progress in science is provided with easy and rapid access, especially into the most congenial minds;—a form which renders it easy to discover the higher vocation of distinguished men, *and by which even to the poorer life of narrow-minded students an enhanced feeling of existence is communicated.* We dare be proud of that form; and all who know any thing of our universities will agree, that this praise is literally true, and not at all exaggerated.

But this very lively susceptibility, in which we place their merit, is that which has led to the principal objection against them. As they are accessible to truth, so it is pretended, they are equally accessible to error and evil; and to prevent this danger, all liberty and individuality must be banished from instruction. Such considerations have given rise, in many countries, to the opposite forms above mentioned. The full investigation of this important point, is beyond the limits of the present subject, connected as it is with other and more difficult inquiries. A few words will suffice for the present

purpose. Whenever there are false or evil tendencies in any age, they are allotted to it by God as a special trial, which it has unavoidably to undergo. *To destroy or to weaken in such a case, the mental powers themselves, because they might desert to the enemy during the contest, is unnatural and ruinous.* All that can be done by external authority, in time of such contests, is, to bring together, to encourage, and to support those who are disposed to strive for truth. In addition to these general observations, there are other reasons, relating particularly to the universities, which render the propriety of this liberty of instruction, as far as they are concerned, still less doubtful. For every thing which is done in them, is done by a certain number of teachers, who are well known, who do not appoint themselves, and can be easily superintended. In such a relation, personal confidence can render every degree of liberty safe, and indeed desirable.

To obviate any misunderstanding, it remains to enquire, with what right we ascribe the attribute now explained to *German* universities. When the first universities were founded in the middle ages, it generally happened that the most learned men were made teachers, and that the greatest liberty of instruction prevailed. These circumstances depended so entirely on external relations, that they could hardly have been otherwise; so that no individual can claim the honour of having devised so beneficial a scheme. Similar relations have been subsequently preserved or formed anew in different countries, whenever the universities have attained a considerable reputation. Such was the case in the sixteenth century in France—such in Italy in quite different times. But in looking upon the fact as it now lies before us, however it may be accounted for, such universities have become peculiar to Germany. And we may justly regard them as *common* to our nation; so that it is false and wrong, to call such universities as have been described, *Protestant* or *North-German*. Predilection for one's country, be it ever so small, is praiseworthy; but it becomes false and dangerous when it degenerates into a haughty misconception in regard to any part of our native land. *Germans have indeed little cause to multiply, by vain pretensions, the divisions already existing in our nation, in consequence of its peculiar fate!* But it is a different thing, and perfectly proper, to acknowledge the provincial peculiarities which exist

among us, and which may be expected to appear in the universities, enabling each of them to keep up its peculiar genius and character. Equally proper is that noble emulation which incites us really to excel others, and which is not incompatible with mutual love and esteem. But if there are considerable parts of our country, where universities of the nature above described, are not to be found, it is not because the susceptibility of the people, and their mental wants are different; but because in such parts, other views on public instruction than those here expressed, are prevalent.

Our universities have come to us as a noble inheritance of former times; and it is a matter of honour for us to transmit them, if possible augmented, at least unimpaired, to the generations to come. What we have probably to expect in this respect, deserves serious reflection; but more, what we are bound to do. Here again it is necessary, above all things, to distinguish what is accidental, that we may not be perplexed and misled in considering what is essential. Thus the older universities in Germany have enjoyed a good deal of independence as corporations, by voting in the representative councils, by exercising an extensive jurisdiction, and by administering themselves their large landed property. Many of them are entirely or partly deprived of these rights, and the universities that have been erected of late, have not obtained them at all. All these circumstances had then relative value, and have been useful in many respects; but they were foreign to the great object of the universities—indeed often detrimental to it. Much nearer related to that object, are the splendid scientific collections and institutes, with which many of our universities are richly endowed. And how is it possible not to acknowledge gratefully the high value of such advantages for literary investigations, and the noble feelings that produced them? Nevertheless, the nature of these advantages is often misunderstood, for they rather belong to an academy, than to an university; and it should never be forgotten, that some universities with very indifferent endowments of this kind, have recently excited an animated intellectual life; while the richest endowments cannot secure instruction from sinking into complete lifelessness. It would be an unfortunate error if governments, which are not rich enough to place their universities on an equal footing with some others in respect to these incidental endowments, should cease, on this account, to keep them at

elevated points, in which they were formerly the pride of many of our smaller states ; or if the opinion should become prevalent, that a university without a first rate apparatus, can be considered only as a second rate school.

Turning away our looks from all these accidental circumstances to the essentials of our universities, and asking, *what ought to be done to preserve them, and to elevate them to a still higher rank*, we must be convinced, that their welfare or their ruin depend upon three different causes, since an influence is exerted upon them from three different sides—the *governments, the teachers, and the students*.

When we ask what the *governments* ought to do for the benefit of our universities, we are fortunate in being able to confine ourselves to a mere account of what has always been done by them, and what they are still doing, wherever the universities are found in a truly thriving condition. Those who have been entrusted with these affairs have been well aware, that it was not their province to create the intellectual powers on which the prosperity of their institutions depends, but that it was their task to find out, to acknowledge, and to foster these powers. In appointing and promoting teachers, they have not been improperly influenced by the notoriety which a learned man might have acquired, nor even by the single circumstance of his having deserved well of his department of science as an author ; they have had chief regard to that which alone constitutes the calling of the teacher, his power of awakening and cultivating in his pupils a taste for science. They have not forgotten, that in order to the attainment of this highest object of a school, the moral worth and deportment of the teacher are equally important and indispensable with knowledge and talents. Whenever a controversy has arisen among the cultivators of a science, the guardians of the school have refrained from embracing either party, and have continued to regulate their measures only by the general and sure marks of the merit of a teacher, *unconcerned as to the party to which he might belong*. Ignorant persons, looking upon these things from without, and imagining themselves to be in the case of the trustees, may indeed be of opinion, that the whole propagation of science is entrusted to their hands ; that the teachers called by them are only their organs, and that it is part of their duty to direct and controul these teachers in the performance of their duty. Such may be the opinion of those who

know nothing of the matter. The trustees themselves know very well that it is not so. They understand that it is one thing to possess that moral and literary tact, which enables one to judge correctly of the general worth and excellence of a learned man, and to make a good election; and quite another thing for one to possess that superiority which alone could justify his claim to set up an advanced standard in science. By acknowledging this natural distinction, and abiding by it, they find no difficulty in maintaining the high dignity of their own station, without prejudice to the internal independence of the office of teaching, by which alone there can be an harmonious co-operation for the promotion of their great common object.

What the teachers ought to do, in order to render the universities prosperous, is so evident, that it hardly needs to be told. After having formed a clear idea of the nature of their office, it is only to be desired that they should hold it in very high esteem, and devote to it their best efforts. There are many things to disturb them in the discharge of their duty, and to withdraw them from it. In the first place, there is the business of *authorship*, which, we have already said, may sometimes exert a favourable influence upon the business of teaching. But it can also have an injurious effect, by becoming so prominent as to oblige the teacher to neglect his appropriate duty, and by exhausting his best and freshest powers. This fault may be owing to the opinion (not to mention less noble motives), that the sphere of an author is much more extensive than that of a teacher. But it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that an able teacher, in his narrower compass, may exert a more certain and deep-going influence, and that thus the want of the extension, may be more than made up by the intensity, of his influence.

A second and more important interference with the appropriate business of teachers, is their frequent dealing in practical employments. If this practice were properly restricted, it might, perhaps, be useful in counteracting the limitation of a learned profession, and produce a most happy reaction upon the business of the teacher, by enlarging his horizon, and by enlivening the dry study of books. The inducement to such practical activity, appears in quite a new aspect where newly formed representative institutions promote a more general participation in public affairs. Every unprejudiced mind will allow, that the lively and varie in-

terest in these affairs, forms a peculiar advantage of our times; and what can be more natural, than for the learned professions to bring the last results of their private studies, to bear upon the real world? There are, however, two things to be considered on this subject, from our present point of view. In the first place, the business of ruling and legislating, upon which members of the representative councils, as well as political authors, exercise so much influence by their judgement and advice, is so difficult and responsible, that it is to be desired that every one who feels an inclination to it, should possess, as a first condition of his fitness for it, a deep distrust of his own powers, so as not to adopt any resolution without the most rigorous examination. There are, in our days, a great many well-disposed men, who bring to the contemplation of public affairs, a youthful cheerfulness of view, and hopes destitute of solid foundation. These are generally satisfied with some prevailing ideas and maxims, which resound in all quarters, and lie sufficiently on the surface to be seized by the mass of the people, and to be worn by them, and liked, as a common badge. Having become very familiar with these ideas, and finding themselves associated by them in a circle rather numerous than select, they have no doubt of their vocation to public life. Did they look deeper, they would regard these very things as a reason why they should doubly suspect themselves.—In the second place, it may be that a teacher's engagement in public life will claim so much of his time and strength, and especially draw so deeply upon his feelings, that it cannot but produce a neglect of his appropriate duty, which he will come to look upon as a subordinate object. This is altogether reprehensible;—for, however strong one's vocation to public life may be, the business of teaching is too serious and too dignified to be conducted otherwise than with all the soul and strength; and one who views the subject honestly and conscientiously, will rather prefer to give up the business of teaching, than to degrade it by neglect.

In relation to the duty of teachers also, we must here again mention the different condition of our universities, already alluded to. Many of them have of late been far more richly endowed than others;—many have been erected in large capitals. Through the influence of these causes, their nature and powers have received a more full development, which must be regarded as a great advantage. On the

other hand, the universities in smaller towns, offer peculiar advantages, which must necessarily be wanting in the former; so that it is only in the contrast of the two kinds, that the true merit and nature of our universities can be fully understood. It ought, therefore, to be deplored as a great loss, if universities of this second, but more numerous class, should—not cease to exist, for that, indeed, is not to be feared, but—be less esteemed, on account of their wanting the advantages belonging to the former, and if they should enjoy less than formerly the warm interest and the powerful support of their governments. There are means enough to maintain them in that elevated station to which they have reached. These are exactly the places where an affectionate personal regard for each of the students,—attention to all their employments,—the discovery and encouragement of their respective merits,—are not only practicable, but of certain utility. Many will deem this an improper way of governing a great institution, because these effects are produced by other means than by statutes and rescripts, and because other results than such as are recorded in tabular statements are looked for. But the truth is, a vital progress can be promoted and sustained only by a vital influence. It affords a special facility for the support of universities of the kind now considered, *that in many small German States a cordial attachment to this particular State has been happily preserved; by which all that is done in the university of that State has a peculiar interest, which will make up for many other advantages.*

But what hoots the noblest patronage of the government, what the brightest talent of the teacher, if not seconded by the corresponding exertions of the students? For them alone are all these institutions provided, and they are all useless, unless they rightly apprehend them. Fortunately, they enter the university at an age, when false tendencies cannot have become so deeply rooted in their minds, as to prevent the influence of good teachers. It is true, that they encounter at the university itself many degrading tendencies and customs, or such as are adapted at least to estrange them from their true object. Most of these dangerous tendencies are such as have long existed, and need not to be mentioned here; but there are others, which have arisen in our own times. We refer especially to the false and superficial political interest, recently sprung up. We cannot indeed blame the young men, most of

whom are destined to take an active part in public life, for beginning to feel a deep interest in its affairs, even while at the university. But if they truly love their country, they ought to evince this love, by a thorough and earnest preparation for public life. And nothing can more disturb this preparation, than the foolish vanity of assuming to pronounce their own opinion, in matters where they are not yet entitled to a judgement; or than that party-spirit, which, wherever it appears, distorts the free and noble view of life and science. Many persons have received from nature but little capacity to engage in public affairs: *and after they have wasted that little in stale and false enthusiasm, nothing is left for their active manhood but cold selfishness, and perhaps the obstinacy of established prejudices.* To check such a false tendency, by earnest and affectionate admonition, is especially the duty of the teacher. Many teachers, it would seem prefer to foster this tendency, by flattering the pride and arrogance of their pupils, instead of bringing them down. Whether they do so from a selfish desire for favour and applause, or with a view of gaining friends for the party, by which they imagine the general welfare will be promoted;—whether they do so with the most honest intention;—even if their political doctrine should contain not a little truth; a heavy responsibility still rests upon them; for even on the most favourable of these suppositions, they have led the students in a path, which will do them as little good, as it will the community. Even of the best amongst them we can only say: *they know not what they do.* But how can these and other similar abuses, be checked? Laws and police regulations are good and necessary to prevent the gross out-breakings of evil; but they do not reach farther. The personal influence of the teacher, by advice and admonition, is salutary, but of a very limited nature, and much less important than the continually operative influence of the good morals and dispositions, which the student may have brought with him from his paternal home. *Such false tendencies can, in general, be successfully opposed, only by giving an increased impetus to the right tendency.* If, through the exertions and talents of a circle of able teachers, the interest of the student can be enchained, there will be comparatively few who will fall into any false tendency.

What may be considered as most wanting at present, is a more varied excitement of the diligence of the student, a

stronger calling out of his own activity, and a superintendence of the same. This subject is indeed of so delicate a nature, that we might almost be afraid to touch it. For any thing introduced here as a general form, and with external constraint, must soon prove fruitless, if not injurious. What is done in behalf of this object, can prove successful only when it originates in the peculiar method and tendency of each teacher, and so is capable of being greatly modified according to persons and periods. It is doubtless here to be taken for granted, that there is an affectionate interest on the part of the trustees of the universities in the operations and success of all the teachers, and a mutual confidence subsisting between both parties. Arrangements for this object might be facilitated at large universities, by introducing a class of persons between the teachers and students. These might be partly young teachers, and partly older and more distinguished students, who should be employed in directing the studies of the younger. Small associations for literary improvement, are already frequently formed spontaneously amongst zealous students, and only need to be made more general, and brought into close connection with some one of their teachers. But all this ought to be done without any external constraint, so as to make it a matter of propriety and honour, and only encouraged by the example of distinguished individuals. This arrangement would have the additional advantage, that after the expiration of the term of study, a much better judgement respecting the ability of individual students might be formed, than could be gained from the customary examinations.

In comparing the students who collect at the same university, we perceive a great difference as to talent and previous cultivation; and the question hence arises, *to which class of his auditors the teacher shall address his lectures?* Many are for putting the standard as high as possible. They want the teacher to make the most distinguished students their standard—those who are called by nature to be themselves the promoters of science; leaving the rest to learn as much from this instruction as they can. This opinion is wrong, not only because it would be unjust to provide for the benefit of the few, neglecting the wants of the many; but for quite a different reason. God has immediately provided for those few, and they do not need the help of our institutions. They would succeed even without universities;

and they may easily find a soil at every institution where they can strike their roots, and find nourishment; even if nothing should be provided expressly for them.

Others on the contrary, place the standard of instruction as low as possible. Many students are without the least susceptibility for instruction of a genial and vital kind, owing both to their want of talents and the meanness of their character. But such persons, it is said, are not wholly unable to commit to memory mechanically some trivial extract, and in the same mechanical way apply it again to any profession. According to the above opinion, these inferior wants ought to be chiefly provided for by the universities; because this miserable food might, at the same time, be partaken of by the more gifted, and thus none would go away empty. But for such students, the university is too good a place; and so is any literary profession; so that it would be desirable to discourage them entirely from pursuing a literary course, and let them choose some mechanical business more adapted to their capacities and dispositions.

Having thus justly excluded these extremes, as aside from the true destination of the universities, there is left, as the proper object of their charge, the numerous and respectable middle class—those that often need, and generally are susceptible of a higher incitement, and the direction of whose minds is for that very reason, most important and beneficial. Every teacher should regard it as a matter of honour to provide for such with all his power; he should offer them the best he possesses; he should encourage them to encounter difficulties, though he should not disdain to strive for their sake, to gain a truly popular and easy style of instruction. Some may view this effort in the light of a condescension; they may even regard this popular expression as a thing of very equivocal merit, while, in fact, it consists, in many instances, only in the more perfect development of the thoughts themselves. Universities are similar, in this respect, to states. In these too, great heroes and statesmen, learned men and great artists, particular classes distinguished for great influence and wealth, may contribute very much to render the condition of the whole more glorious. But the stability of the state does not depend upon them. Much less does it depend upon servants and day-labourers, or upon strolling and houseless vagabonds. It depends, on the contrary, upon the numerous middle

classes, partly devoted to mental occupations, partly to agriculture and trade of every description and, to every degree, and upon the sound sense and just sentiments prevailing among these classes.

In what condition the German universities *are*, has now been shown. Whether they shall remain such,—whether they shall rise or fall, is left with us to decide, with those of the present generation. *The judgement of posterity will hold us accountable.*

ART. VI. CHAPIN'S ESSAY ON SACRAMENTAL USE OF WINE.

By Rev. DANIEL DANA, D. D., Newburyport, Mass.

THE DUTY OF THE CHURCH.—*A Prize Essay by Rev. Calvin Chapin, D. D. on the question, What is the duty of the churches, in regard to the use of fermented, i. e. alcoholic wine, in celebrating the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper?*

THERE have been periods in the Christian Church, in which authority and prescription were every thing; and argument—we might almost say, Scripture itself—comparatively nothing. There have been periods in which a few splendid and imposing names gave laws to the community at large; and even extorted an unnatural homage from the most vigorous and gifted minds.

But those times are gone by. Let them pass. And if it be the will of a wise and sovereign Providence, let them never return.

Evils of this kind, however, enormous as they confessedly are, are not the only obstructions to the progress of truth and piety. What has been remarked of the individual mind, is not less true of the mind of the community. It is a *pendulum*, never resting in the centre, but ever vibrating from one extreme to its opposite. If there is an attachment to antiquity, which is excessive, may there not be a passion for

novelty, equally excessive? Is there no medium between a slavish submission to authority, and a supercilious contempt for the accumulated wisdom of ages? Is there no middle path between bigotry and scepticism?—between blind faith and downright infidelity? In turning our back on prescription and authority, shall we take leave, too, of reason, of common sense, and the Bible itself?

We tremble for our country. We almost tremble for the Church of God. Indeed, we have long been convinced, that apart from the numberless enemies which encompass the Church from without, it harbours in its own bosom, evils which are amply sufficient for its destruction; evils which, had it not an Almighty Guardian, would have actually destroyed it, ages since.

The order of the day is innovation. The spirit of the age is innovation; innovation restless and reckless; innovation which, while it professedly aims to improve and perfect Christianity itself, disfigures its beautiful structure, mars its fair proportions, undermines its very foundations, and threatens to leave nothing of this divine system, but its name.

We have seen the first principles of Christianity assailed. We have seen some of its most important doctrines explained away. Yet we confess we were not prepared to witness a direct attempt to change one of its most sacred ordinances. Nor will we dissemble the surprise, or the pain we have felt at the appearance of the Essay which is announced in the present article.

Toward its author, we cherish no sentiments but those of esteem and veneration. His long course of unquestioned piety, and active devotion to his Master's cause, forbid every suspicion that his motives and intentions, in the present case, are other than pure. If, in his attempt to banish the use of wine from the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, Dr. Chapin has materially erred, the error originated, we doubt not, in a deep and almost overwhelming sense of the mischiefs of intemperance, especially its ravages within the Church; and an ardent desire to see these appalling evils removed.

With these views of the character and motives of Dr. C., we can be under no temptation to treat him with any personal disrespect. We would studiously avoid every approach to it. Still, truth has its paramount claims. In the ques-

tion he has discussed, are involved the vital interests, the peace, and the purity of the Church of God. We are, then, not only permitted, but bound, to speak with freedom; to detect whatever of fallacy may exist in the arguments of our venerable friend, and to point out the bearings and the consequences of the scheme which, with something of plausibility, and still more of sincerity and earnestness, he has broached and defended.

To the question, *What is the duty of the churches in regard to the use of fermented, i. e. alcoholic wine, in celebrating the sacrament of the Lord's Supper?*—Dr. C. replies promptly and decisively; **SUCH WINE SHOULD BE DEVOUTLY AND THOROUGHLY REJECTED.** He adds, This is the only satisfactory answer which a careful investigation of the subject presents.

In support of this decision, Dr. C. suggests the evils of alcohol, and of the artificial excitement it occasions; and the impossibility that Christ should have “authorized his disciples to remember him by drinking that which can make drunkards.” He admits that the pure, unfermented juice of the grape may be lawfully employed. But having stated that this must be inaccessible to the inhabitants of many regions of the earth (indeed to the greater part of Christendom), while yet the sacramental Supper is designed to be a universal ordinance in the Church, he comes to the conclusion that wine ought to be banished, and **WATER** adopted as its substitute. For this change, he offers a variety of reasons; the production of water by the pure act of the Creator—its universal diffusion—its salutary effects on the human frame and mind—its religious uses under the ancient dispensation—its resemblance to the blessings of the Gospel—its typical import, &c. &c.

To Christians at large, this train of remark will afford little satisfaction. They will perceive in it a departure from first principles, and a path opened to the most dangerous results. Who sees not that in regard to positive divine institutions, our duty is equally plain and imperious; the duty of unqualified, implicit submission? Here, all *a priori* reasonings are out of place; all objections are palpably fallacious; and every plan, and every thought, of change, or modification, ought to be resisted with horror.

The positive institutions of Heaven are emphatically trials, both of our faith, and our obedience. They bring

home the question, whether we will submit our understandings to the divine guidance, as well as our wills to the divine pleasure. To oppose them, is to dispute infinite authority. To attempt their improvement, is to prefer our ignorance to the wisdom of Heaven. To dispense with them, or with any part of them, is to repeal the laws of the sovereign of the universe.

And are we in no danger of treating a divine ordinance with disrespect, if we press it into the service of a preconceived hypothesis, and force it to speak a favourite language of our own?—The wide-spread and fatal evils of *intemperance*, none can deny. As Christians, we are bound to wage against this giant sin, a war even of extermination. But let us look well to our weapons, and our mode of warfare. Should we, in aiming a blow at the enemy, wound Christianity itself, by corrupting, or mutilating one of its sacred institutions, our zeal would be sadly misdirected and unblest. And while religion would suffer, is it possible that the cause of temperance would be benefited?

In the Essay before us, much labour is expended to prove that the wine employed by the Saviour, in the institution of the eucharist, was *unfermented*; and hence an argument is drawn, that all wine which is fermented, must be forever banished from the celebration of the sacrament. How directly such a conclusion would have followed from such premises, had they been incontrovertibly established, we need not now enquire; for we are constrained to consider the attempt to establish them, a complete failure. That the divine interdict of *leaven*, during the celebration of the Jewish Passover, should be thought by the author to bear on the point, affects us with nothing but surprise. And what conclusion shall we draw from the Saviour's address to his disciples; *I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom*? Does it intimate that the wine they were then drinking, was new? Or does it not intimate, if any thing at all, the very reverse?

But let us look at the subject more directly. The vintage occurred in Palestine, in the month of June or July. Between this period, and the institution of the sacrament, there was an interval of eight or nine months. Is it not, then, highly probable that the wine employed was fermented wine? True; the Essay asserts that during this interval,

"the juice of the grapes *might doubtless* be preserved *without* fermentation." And having remarked that "it would of course be, as was most desirable, perfectly destitute of alcohol;" it adds, "The *strongest possible presumption* is therefore warranted, that *unfermented* and *spiritless* liquor was used in the institution." But we must protest against this inference. The *possibility* of a thing does not imply its *probability*; and certainly does not warrant the *strongest possible presumption* of its actual occurrence. Yet we are told afterwards; "Of the same character, *no doubt*, was the wine which, by miracle," the Saviour "created at the marriage in Cana." And here, again, we are compelled to enter our protest. We sincerely believe that the probability is strong on the contrary side; especially when we find that the wine thus miraculously furnished at the close of the feast, was declared preferable to all that preceded it; and moreover recollect the Saviour's own declaration of the *general* preference given to old wine, when compared with that which was new.

But we take our leave of these nice investigations. Their value and importance, we apprehend, are somewhat less than is often imagined. Not that we would speak disparagingly of the labour and learning which have been recently employed in interrogating the Holy Oracle on these subjects. They have their use. And what is the point to which they have conducted us? What is the lesson they teach? We think it is this; that the Scriptures, entirely explicit as they are, on all the great articles of truth and duty, have left many minor points unascertained; perhaps unascertainable. In regard to these points, our duty and wisdom obviously lie, not in boldly deciding, nor in warmly disputing, but in calmly enquiring, in judging with caution, and candidly regarding those who may think differently from ourselves. As to the question at which we have glanced, no enlightened student of the Bible will pretend to any *demonstrative* evidence that the Saviour, in instituting the sacramental Supper, employed *fermented* wine, or that he employed that which was *unfermented*. In the absence of such evidence, if we admit *only the possibility* that fermented wine was employed by Christ, it is obviously wrong to assume any ground which will necessarily involve guilt in its use. But when it is considered, how strong the *probability* is, that fermented wine was actually used by Christ, this assumption

appears truly appalling. How much is it to be regretted, then, that intelligent and pious men should, in their zeal, undertake to settle the point beyond dispute or doubt; and then proceed to erect on this imaginary basis, a system which confidently lays claim to the submission of the Church universal.

Much stress is laid, in the Essay before us, on the *impurity* of the liquid styled wine, which, at the present day, is generally used in the administration of the sacramental Supper. If, originally, the real juice of the grape, it is contaminated by an infusion of ardent spirit. In other cases, it is principally made up of the basest, perhaps the most noxious ingredients. These things, so far as they are facts, claim the serious attention and care of the churches. Surely, the death of the Saviour should be commemorated with something which has more than the mere *name* of wine; something which will not destroy, but promote the health, even, of the material frame. But we can see no force in the argument, as designed to prove the necessity, or the lawfulness of a *change* of the appointed element. In regard to this element, we admit the desirableness of as near an approach to entire purity, as is practicable. Still, if it be a fact, that to preserve it from acidity, a portion of spirit is absolutely necessary, we do not conceive that such a slight infusion can be viewed as a *disqualifying* circumstance. If, as it seems to be alleged, this would bring it under the ban of the *temperance pledge*, we are yet to learn that such an objection ought to prevail. We have no conception that any Christian, in adopting the pledge of temperance, meant to incur an obligation incompatible with his previous and paramount obligations to his Saviour. Or, could such a strange and fearful act be conceived possible, it would be a *nullity* in its very performance; and should be regarded only with the bitterness of penitential sorrow.

The Essay suggests another difficulty, arising from the case of those communicants who have been reformed from a course of intemperance, and who, by the smallest portion of alcohol, in the sacramental cup, must be, as is intimated, imminently exposed to a relapse. And distinct, and somewhat pathetic allusion is made to some awful instances of this kind, as having actually occurred. We will not deny that in the bare possibility of such an occurrence, there is something inexpressibly painful. But ought such a possi-

bility to repeal an ordinance of Christ; or materially to modify and change it? Did not the Saviour, when he first instituted it, perfectly know all its aspects and bearings, and all the infirmities and dangers of his professed followers? Are we permitted, in view of any startling calculations, or startling facts, to turn aside from his express command? Is there any path of safety for his people, but the path of duty? Can the professor whose self-denial, and whose fidelity to his Saviour, would yield to the temptation now supposed, be any thing more than a mere professor? Can the faith which would fail in such circumstances, be the faith which conquers the powers of earth and hell? We grant that for the reformed inebriate to incur, spontaneously and uncalled, the slightest temptation to a relapse, is unwise and sinful. But may he not safely follow where his Saviour leads?—May he not, in the path of duty, confidently expect divine protection?

But the most exceptionable and dangerous portion of the Essay has received, as yet, no explicit notice. It is that in which the author seems to propound the vital principle of his theory. And here, to preclude the possibility of mistake, we will quote distinctly, and somewhat largely, his own words. They are those which follow.

"The cup, [in the sacrament] of whatever it may consist, is only a *symbol*. *It need not be wine*. It need not be any liquid having the *name* of wine." "Wine—whether in reality such, or in name only—cannot be essential to the *right, edifying and acceptable* celebration of the Lord's Supper." "*Christ does not require his churches to use precisely the same kind of material substance in commemoration of his death, which he used when he instituted the commemoration.*" He "has left the *externals*—the emblems—the *symbols*—to be regulated by his people, as their circumstances and ability are found to dictate. These circumstances, he foresaw, would teach them to procure and use such articles of necessity and convenience, as their respective situations on the globe would require." "Christ gives you full liberty to make the sacramental bread of such substances, and to furnish the sacramental cup with such drink—excluding effectually and always, every kind of liquor that is capable of producing intoxication—as you, wherever situated, but moved by the love of duty, do find most conducive to your own growth in heavenly piety."

After the surprise and pain which these declarations must excite in most Christian readers shall have somewhat subsided, they will naturally enquire, How are they supported? What are the rational arguments, or the Scripture texts, on which they rest? Surely it might be expected, that the venerable writer, thus taking a stand in opposition to the sentiment and practice of the Christian world from the earliest ages to the present time, would fortify his position well. It might be expected, that while urging on the churches a procedure entirely new, and in the most sacred and affecting of all ordinances, he would plainly indicate their *warrant* for the change. Nor let it be forgotten, that this warrant must rest on something different from probability, or mere expediency, or plausible reasoning. It must be enstamped with Divine authority, or it is worthless. It must be sustained by the Holy Oracles, or it must fall.

Every such expectation, we are constrained to say, is disappointed. With deep and painful reluctance, but on full conviction, we declare that scarcely the semblance of Scripture authority, or even of sound argument, is brought to bear on this most *vital* point of the case.

On the other hand, the great and simple principles on which the Church, from the earliest ages, has rested her faith and her practice, remain perfectly unshaken, and in full force. To the intelligent Christian, these principles are familiar. Still, a moment may not be unprofitably employed in bringing them distinctly to view.

The ordinances of the gospel are the appointments of Christ. The materials or emblems which they embrace, are of his selection, and of his prescription. As they bear the stamp, not less of his wisdom, than of his authority, they have a peculiar and pre-eminent adaptation to the ends designed; and were doubtless selected and prescribed for that reason. They are therefore fixed and unalterable. These observations apply, in all their force, to the water in the sacrament of Baptism; and with equal force, to the bread and the wine, in the Lord's Supper. The particular species of bread, or of wine is not prescribed; and, of course, is not essential. But bread and wine are both enjoined, and equally enjoined. They are therefore both, and equally, essential to the regular and approved celebration of the ordinance.

We are aware of the suggestion which has been repeatedly offered, that our Saviour, in instituting the Supper,

simply availed himself of the materials which were at hand ; that no selection or preference was implied in the case ; and that he might have prescribed other materials and modes of celebrating his death, equally impressive and affecting. These are conjectures sufficiently adventurous. Of their probability or improbability, let the intelligent and tender-hearted Christian judge. It is a relief, and a pleasure, to state, that some by whom they have been favoured, have, on reflection, ingenuously abandoned them.

Many good men, and many great divines, have believed that the sacramental bread and wine were designed to speak to the Christian's heart of his Saviour ; and of the life-giving, strengthening, and refreshing virtues of his dying love. A pious imagination may have sometimes wandered too far in this delightful field. But is this a sufficient reason why it should never be entered ? If it be probable, if it be barely possible, that such designs as those we have mentioned, are attached to the sacramental emblems, must not this thought unspeakably endear them to every pious mind ? Is it possible that any Christian, viewing them in this light, could ever consent to part with them, or with either of them ?

But we have more than conjectures and probabilities. We have certainty. We know that both in the New Testament, and the Old, the blessings of salvation are exhibited under the emblem of bread ; and Christ is that heavenly bread. Hence, partaking of the bread in the sacramental Supper, Christians derive spiritual life, support, and nourishment, from their crucified Saviour. We know that in the language of prophecy, *wine* is employed to represent the blessings of the gospel. And in the Supper, wine is the appointed and appropriate emblem of the blood of Christ, that precious, exhaustless fountain of all spiritual and immortal blessings. " This cup," said the Redeemer to his disciples, " is my blood of the new testament—is the new testament in my blood. Drink ye all of it." After this, shall Christians be perplexed and chilled with the intimation that wine is no essential ingredient of the sacred feast ; and that something else may be equally significant and useful ? Shall they turn away from the appointment of their Saviour, to an invention of their own ? Has the Most High sanctioned one species of observance by his *authority*, and when that is neglected or abandoned, will he sanction a different one by his *blessing* ?

On the whole, we cannot but think that the point is settled, so far as the Scripture can settle any point. THE USE OF WINE IN THE LORD'S SUPPER IS EXPRESSLY ENJOINED BY CHRIST, AND MAY NOT BE ABANDONED BY CHRISTIANS. Having arrived at this conclusion, we can scarcely think it incumbent on us to specify and refute every objection which may be thought to lie against it. Sad indeed would be the condition of the Christian world, if no article of truth or duty could be considered as ascertained and fixed, until completely divested of all difficulty. Of what value, of what conceivable weight, are the most plausible objections of human ingenuity, or even of mistaken piety, on the one side, if we see, on the other, a distinct expression of the authority and will of God?

Still, in the present case, we would be perfectly willing, did time and space permit, to consider and discuss the principal objections which have been raised. Nor will we, confined as we are, refuse them a passing notice. We are confident that their force is rather imaginary than real.

Is it, for instance, objected, that on the same ground on which we insist on following the first disciples in the use of wine, at the first Supper, we must extend the imitation to the very kind of wine employed; to their recumbent posture; to the very hour of their celebration; and even to the "large upper room" in which they were assembled? The reply is obvious. If the particulars mentioned are embraced in the Saviour's command relative to the ordinance, the objection is pertinent and valid. But the fact is precisely the reverse. Respecting these particulars, there is not the shadow of an injunction. But the command to "eat of this bread," and "drink of this cup," ("the fruit of the vine,") is explicit and conclusive. It follows that the former were the mere *circumstances* of the celebration. The latter relates, so far as externals are concerned, to its *essence*.

It is objected, that the gospel and its ordinances are designed for all nations, and will be speedily extended to them all; but that the celebration of the Lord's Supper in the use of *wine* must be, to many of the human family, an absolute impossibility. But extreme cases of this kind, we apprehend, will rarely be perceived to exist. Ordinarily, where Christian missionaries find their way, ships, commerce, and the productions of various climes, are likewise found. Through the modern improvements in science and art, and the won-

derfully increased facilities of communication, almost every part of the globe comes into contact with almost every other part; and the interchange of commodities between the various nations becomes practicable and easy. We believe the era is approaching, when every spot of our globe will be illuminated with the heavenly light of the gospel; nor can we easily doubt that the favoured inhabitants will possess the appropriate means of celebrating its ordinances.

In the Essay before us, the author points us to the intemperance of multitudes in Christian nations, as a grand impediment to the conversion of Mahometans and Pagans. Doubtless there is too much truth in the representation. Nor can the fact be sufficiently lamented. It calls aloud on the Christian world to purify itself from this dire abomination. But upon what principle it should require or permit the Christian *church* to change an ordinance prescribed by its Redeemer and its Head, it is difficult to discover. In the heathen cities, generally, where the gospel was originally planted, and Christian churches were erected, there was an awful prevalence of vice; especially the vice of intemperance. Yet, surrounded as they were with scenes of riot, and the devotees of Bacchus, these churches celebrated their Redeemer's death by eating bread and drinking wine. Nor did it occur to them, nor to the Apostles under whose direction they acted, that they were laying snares for the souls of men, or obstructing the conversion of the heathen. In one of these churches, the ordinance was awfully prostituted; and the sacred wine, itself became an occasion of riot and excess. These signal abuses excited the indignation of the apostle Paul, and drew from him the sharpest reproofs of the guilty offenders. But it does not appear, that this distinguished man sought the remedy for the evil in the banishment of wine from the communion table. Let us not assume to be wiser than he. Rather let us not assume to be wiser than the Redeemer himself, who, perfectly knowing the nature of man, and the nature and tendencies of things, has, in the wisest and best manner, adapted his gospel and his ordinances to the promotion of the holiness of his church, and the conversion and salvation of the world.

The only remaining objection at which we shall glance, is that which pervades the whole Essay, and is drawn from the *pernicious effects* of the use of fermented wine in the sacramental Supper. The fact assumed is, that such use,

in whatever proportion, tends to an excitement which is at once the *counterfeit* of religious affection, and its *opposite*; and absolutely incompatible with all spiritual edification and enjoyment. From many expressions, one would conclude it to be the author's opinion, that this is the grand evil in the Christian church; the source of delusion and ruin to multitudes of professors; the scandal and stumbling-block of an ungodly world. In the fervour of his zeal, he seems to brand every cup thus furnished, as the "cup of devils," and worthy only to be indignantly rejected. These representations will be grievous to many Christians, and gratifying to many infidels and scorners. While we doubt not the sincerity with which they were uttered, we cannot but consider them as overstrained and erroneous. Can it be that the Christians of this and other lands are placed in so awful a dilemma, that they must either dishonour their Saviour by abandoning his table, or sin against him in attending it? Have they, in what they have thought their holiest duties, and nearest approaches to God, been insensibly accumulating offence and provocation? Have their best frames been mere hallucinations—the result of animal excitement? Has a little impurity in the sacramental cup polluted their services, and brought a curse upon their souls?—For our part, we cannot but avow very different apprehensions of things. We cannot but suspect that the evils alleged have been greatly multiplied and aggravated, if they have not been absolutely created, by the excited imaginations of our worthy brethren. We have no idea that a little alcohol, finding its way, and often by absolute necessity, into the sacramental wine, has converted it into a moral poison. We cannot believe that a little taste of such wine once in one, two, or three months, has turned our professors into inebriates, or is likely to do it. Nor can we believe that the *fates of the Church* depend on a revolution in this point. We see in the churches other evils, truly great and portentous—sad declensions from the truth—fatal conformities to the spirit and maxims of the world—awful irregularities of life; and we are grieved that that pious zeal should be needlessly and fruitlessly expended elsewhere, all whose energies are imperiously demanded here.

We have thus recorded our views of the main points embraced in the Essay, with an explicitness and freedom

which are demanded by the nature and importance of the subject ; and, we trust, not without the deference and tenderness which are due to the character of the author, and his high standing in the Christian church. Could we believe that in our discussion, there is a single word calculated to affect injuriously the feelings or the reputation of our venerable friend, we would wish that word blotted from our pages, and blotted from the memories of our readers. We readily admit that some points have been laboured at greater length, and perhaps with more earnestness, than would have been thought needful, had we been engaged with a writer of inferior consideration.

In closing our remarks, we must repeat the expression of our deep regret that this subject should, at this time, be agitating our American churches. That an ordinance calculated to awaken the tenderest sensibilities of the Christian heart, to dispel every element of discord, and to diffuse through the Church universal, the tranquillity and peace of heaven, should become a source of bitterness, and an instrument of angry debate, is inexpressibly deplorable. Surely, the previously existing condition of our religious community was not such as to present an imperious demand for a new topic of contention. And where is this ominous contest to find its termination ? Shall it be permitted to convulse the Church to its centre ? Shall religion herself bleed with a thousand wounds, inflicted in her own temple, and by the hands of her professed friends ?

These collisions in the Church exert a most inauspicious influence on the general mind. All reflecting men, whose religious principles began to be formed and fixed, find themselves shaken from their faith, and cast on an ocean of doubt and universal scepticism. Others, inclined to infidelity before, have these fatal tendencies strengthened, and thrown to an immeasurable distance from all sober and sound belief. Multitudes in the community, observing the ever varying principles, and ever varying practices of professed Christians, conclude that there is nothing definite, nothing ascertained, in Christianity itself. In short, if the public mind is obviously unhinged ; if every principle in religion, and in morals, is boldly questioned, or boldly denied ; if infidelity and practical licentiousness sweep over the land like a flood, and threaten to destroy all that is precious and sacred in our

country, is there not a *cause*? And may not that cause be found in the vacillations, the disputes and divisions within the Church?

The recent attempts to banish wine from the sacramental Supper are professedly grounded in attachment to the temperance reformation, and are part of a plan for securing to that reformation a complete and universal triumph. Will this plan, pursued by such instrumentalities, be successful? We think not. Will the great body of Christians in our country *wish* it success? We think not. They will entreat their brethren whom they see lending their aid, with upright intentions, to such a cause—meekly, but earnestly and unweariedly entreat them—to desist. As to all beside, who, under whatever pretext, are corrupting or mutilating an ordinance of God, they may very justly be addressed in the warning furnished by the great Roman poet—

Procul O, procul este profani.

ART. VII. REVIEW OF FINNEY'S LECTURES.

Lectures on Revivals of Religion. By Charles G. Finney. New-York: Leavitt, Lord & Co. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 18mo. pp. 438.

THE author of these Lectures, upon the merits of which we have undertaken to give an opinion, performed, for many years, the arduous work of an evangelist. With a reputation for eloquence, and a popularity which would have exerted a ruinous influence on many minds, he has nevertheless maintained an unblemished character. Possessed of a comprehensive and vigorous intellect, and being kept in contact, by his work, with the popular mind at all points, he often reasons forcibly, and just so as to bring conviction to the common understanding. A humane, and we would hope, truly benevolent desire to save sinners, has taught him, though without a regular education, and without models, that true eloquence which aims to convince and persuade. Indeed, he has formed himself upon nature, on which the first and best models themselves were formed. We see here

no ambitious display of ornament, no unnatural attempts to excite the feelings, no ill-timed appeals to the imagination. He speaks like a man in earnest on important business,—and so far like a true orator. **An important** subject deeply felt, communicates no small degree of eloquence even to the most phlegmatic: what then shall we expect from the Christian, by whom things eternal are almost realized through faith? what of the Christian minister, who has made himself accountable for souls, invested himself with a responsibility which no reason can measure? Is not want of eloquence in him at once a defect of piety, of sensibility, and even of sincerity? By a cold, inanimate manner, does he not tell more plainly than words or reasoning could declare it, either that his subject is unimportant, or he himself in jest? We cannot but be of opinion that eloquence, in the minister of the gospel, is a moral, rather than a literary qualification;—that the gaudy, tumid, frothy eloquence too common, offends against more sacred rules than those of a just rhetoric;—that a simple, direct, and affecting style of address, is that which a pious heart, not less than a correct taste, would dictate.

The author of these Lectures reasons much; but his reasoning is mostly addressed to the conscience and the heart; he is seldom purely instructive; he ever aims at the persuasive. He rarely attempts to discuss abstract propositions in mental philosophy, or metaphysical theology. For such discussions neither his education nor his habits have qualified him. And such reasoning belongs not to the sacred desk. Where it conveys any idea, it is as often misapprehended as understood. Mr. Finney reasons to establish the most interesting and important positions, to show the sinner the unreasonableness of his objections, the madness of his delays, the folly and wickedness of his excuses,—to drive him from every refuge, and lead him to resolve upon an immediate reformation of his life.

This work claims to be little more than a full skeleton of the author's lectures; it will not, however, suffer much by a comparison with his other discourses, which have just issued from the press: it makes no pretensions, indeed, to literary merit, but contains many passages of very forcible popular eloquence. We make some quotations from his Lecture on "Means to be used with Sinners," which we esteem by far the most happy of his productions. Speaking

of the testimony which Christians owe to the truth of the gospel, he says :

"They should live in their daily walk and conversation as if they believed the soul to be immortal, and as if they believed that death was not the termination of their existence, but the entrance into an unchanging state. They ought to live so as to make this impression fall upon all around them. It is easy to see, that precept without example, on this point, will do no good. All the arguments in the world will not convince men that you really believe this, unless you live as if you believed it. Your reasoning may be unanswerable, but if you do not live accordingly, your practice will defeat your arguments. They will say you are an ingenious sophist or an acute reasoner, and perhaps admit that they cannot answer you; but then they will say, it is evident that your reasoning is all false, and that you know it to be false, because your life contradicts your theory. Or that if it is true, you don't believe it, at any rate. And so all the influence of your testimony goes to the other side." "You are to bear testimony to the vanity and unsatisfying nature of the things of this world. You are to testify this by your life. The failure in this, is the great stumbling-block in the way of mankind. Here the testimony of God's children is needed more than any where else. Men are so struck with the objects of sense, and so constantly occupied with them, that they are very apt to shut out eternity from their minds. A small object that is held close to the eye may shut out the distant ocean. So the things of the world, that are near, magnify so in their minds, that they overlook every thing else. One important design in keeping Christians in the world, is to teach people on this point, practically, not to labour for the meat that perisheth. But suppose professors of religion teach the vanity of earthly things by precept, and contradict it in practice. Suppose the women are just as fond of dress, and just as particular in observing all the fashions, and the men as eager to have fine houses and equipage as the people of the world. Who does not see that it would be quite ridiculous for them to testify, with their lips, that this world is all vanity, and its joys unsatisfactory and empty. People feel this absurdity, and it is this that shuts up the lips of Christians. We see why it is that preaching does so little good. If the church were to live only one week as if they believed the Bible, sinners would melt down before them. Suppose I were a lawyer, and should go into court and spread out my client's case, the issue is joined, and I make my statements, and tell what I expect to prove, and then call in my witnesses. The first witness takes his oath, and then rises up, and contradicts me to my face. What good will all my pleading do? Just so it is with a minister, who is preaching in the midst of a cold, stupid, and God-dishonouring church. In vain does he hold up to view, the great truths of religion, when every member of the church is ready to swear he lies."

Cicero has told us, that it is the opinions of the common people, and not of the learned, the refined, or philosophical, that are to be regarded in forming our estimate of the public speaker. It is the popular mind that he addresses : he endeavours to move and mould it to his will ; and his power is best known and estimated, by those on whom it is exerted. These Lectures contain many striking thoughts, many valuable observations, the result of good sense and a long acquaintance with mankind ; but it is the perspicuous, nervous, and simple style, the warm and earnest manner, less removed, indeed, from colloquial familiarity, than didactic stiffness, which, in our estimation, constitutes their principal value. The speaker always addresses himself directly to

his audience : he reasons, indeed, sometimes forcibly, sometimes plausibly, sometimes sophistically ; but it is *with his hearers* : he always aims at producing some effect, and never rests satisfied till it is accomplished.

This work gives us a far higher opinion of Mr. Finney's skill as an orator, than of his ability as a writer. We have observed, that Cicero makes the influence of the speaker over the popular mind, a test of his power. These Lectures, regarded only as possessing a tendency to produce the immediate effects on a promiscuous assembly at which the speaker aimed, must hold a very different rank from what they would, viewed merely as a literary work. The practical orator, especially the demagogue, accustomed by long habit to play on the popular mind, and call forth what notes he pleases, acquires a habit—a tact which enables him instantly to adapt means to an end, as if by a delicate instinct, and to gain a point by sophistry or artifice, which others would lose by sound argument.

But while we heartily commend the higher points of Mr. Finney's style, we regret to see the very frequent appearance of a studied vulgarity, which really sinks his subject, counteracts the impressions it should make, and is alike unbecoming in the orator, and indecent in the preacher. However this might serve the temporary aims of the demagogue, it must destroy, or seriously impair, the influence of a preacher on an audience possessing any considerable degree of moral or intellectual culture. To elegance of language, we did not expect him to be partial ; but we are sorry to see him give his sanction to the opinion, that affected coarseness will give cogency to argument, or that it is innocent to gratify the passions of those who delight to see truth degraded by the meanness of the dress in which she is presented. Our remarks may be illustrated by a few quotations. Speaking of long prayers, he says, "and no doubt God wishes they would leave off, too." "God won't believe it." The following, with the coarseness contains too much of the artifice of the demagogue. While he puts the excuse into the mouth of an anxious enquirer, he endeavours also to put the absurdity it contains, into the mouths of his opponents. "I was distressed because I thought God required me to repent, but if He will do it, *I can wait*." He was afraid "the devil would drive him away from his people, and by undertaking to satisfy the devil, he offended God." He undertook "to

go between God and the devil, and God spewed him out." It seems to be a part of his system, that Christians are always asleep except in revivals, and very often then; that the natural and habitual state of the church has always been that of sleep. Speaking of the millenium, he says, "the church will not sleep the greater part of the time, and once in a great while wake up, and rub their eyes, and bluster about, and vociferate a little while, and then go to sleep again." We do not feel bound to reconcile such language with the rules of good composition, or with that reverence which the Christian ever aims to cherish, while thinking or speaking on such solemn subjects, especially where the Supreme Being is mentioned. We are sure such language would shock every mind, which retains even a common respect for religion. We cannot think that language which is banished from the parlour, and is not tolerated in good society, can forward the legitimate aims of the pulpit. After all, we think that the literary merit, which this work disclaims, is almost the only one that is justly due to it.

In examining this work theologically, we wish we could pass as high encomiums on the matter of the work, as we are persuaded, are justly due to the genius of its author. He will pardon us, we hope, if we are constrained to express a far higher opinion of his talents, than of his discoveries. While his eloquence, his character, his reputation, acquired by unwearied labours, and great apparent success, are lending their influence to give admission and currency to views of religious institutions, doctrine, and practice, at once unscriptural, dangerous, and licentious, we feel it our duty to put the public on their guard against what comes so strongly recommended and ably supported.

The contempt for the wisdom, the opinions, and the institutions of past ages, so prevalent and so fashionable in the present, is no argument, either of its learning, its sagacity, or modesty. This has been styled emphatically *the age of improvement*; it is certainly an age of *change*. If such be the constitution of the human mind, that heretofore it has originated only error;—if human wisdom has planned only institutions foolish, impolitic, and unjust;—if it has been reserved for this age to convict all the preceding of folly, error, and ignorance; we wish only that they may have a fair trial, and we are prepared to acquiesce in their condemnation. We shall hail, with enthusiasm, those glorious

truths, which are to take the place of ancient errors. But as to that spirit which considers it as a sufficient objection to an opinion, that it is ancient, that is, that it has endured the scrutiny, and received the approbation of the wise and good of all ages ;—that spirit which rejects a doctrine merely because it is said to be the growth of dark and barbarous times, that is, that it had not, like ourselves, the good fortune to be brought forth in an era of light ; that spirit which condemns received opinions and established usages unheard, and leaves their place unsupplied ; that spirit whose great object is to demolish ;—we have no hesitation in predicting, that as it originates in a reckless pride, it will terminate in a licentious scepticism.

Many seem to suppose, because the present age has demolished some false theories by experimental facts, that it can overturn the most settled opinions, the clearest results of reason, by a bold denial ; that because it has extended the boundaries of some of the sciences by its discoveries, it can overstep the fixed limits of common sense, by its moral improvements. We regret to see many of the unsuspicious lending their aid to those who are deliberately and recklessly endeavouring to unsettle human opinion, on the most important subjects. If the human mind has hitherto been unable to discriminate truth from falsehood, what better hope remains for the future ? Has the present age also added new powers to the intellect ? If not, does it not follow that it is more rational to distrust our faculties than our opinions ?

The insidious methods by which many are attempting to overthrow established opinions, agree very well with the spirit which dictates the attack. An artful, insidious, and specious eloquence, which consults the tastes, the inclinations and opinions of the community, is too much cultivated. Error is not pushed forward in a bold and shameless manner ; naked, it would be sure to be known and detested. No. It is most modestly veiled and disguised. It is introduced as having a close connexion with important truth. Truth itself is made to introduce error, and they are so artfully blended, that ordinary minds know not where to make the separation. Indeed, one would suspect that by long practice in mixing truth and falsehood, these writers had at last hit upon some proportions at which they combine.

But, if the great mass of human opinions which have received the sanction of past ages, are yet to be examined, and may prove errors ;—if, until this age have brought in its verdict, an individual must either himself undertake to revise the decisions of former centuries, or settle down into a gloomy scepticism ; there is one class of truths,—the decisions of an omniscient and immutable God, which are above suspicion. Those doctrines, upon which depend our well-being here and hereafter, can be questioned or suspected, only by dishonesty and impiety. If the Bible be the word of God, its doctrines must be immutable as their Author. It is folly to expect that any new light, long latent, is yet to spring from Revelation ;—absurdity to suppose that Revelation will contradict itself. Are we to be told, that the great evangelical doctrines of the fall of man, the atonement of Christ, the corruption of human nature, its renovation and sanctification by grace,—that these truths, in which the church has always been almost unanimous, are still to be questioned ? Are we to suppose that the Bible still contains truths more important concealed in its pages ; above all, that it may contradict these ? If it be a book so obscurely written, that the great body of honest readers have always misunderstood it, or drawn from it the greatest possible errors, it is not only a falsehood, but a contradiction, to call it a Divine Revelation. If it be true, that the truths of the gospel can expect no new light from Revelation, much less should any be wished or expected from the efforts of human reason. Revelation was given as a remedy for the ignorance, the darkness, the errors, and the weakness of human reason ; and it can hardly be expected, that reason is to remedy any fancied defects of Revelation. While reason is instructed by the Author of reason, the Source of all intelligence, it is her duty to be silent ;—to listen, but be silent. God has imparted all the light which his infinite wisdom saw necessary, and we display only folly, in our attempts to be wise above what is written.

Whenever philosophy has presumed to meddle with the truths of Revelation, it has either distorted, perverted, corrupted, or denied them. Particularly have we reason to dread that science, lately dignified with the title of *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, and which has been supposed to have a very close connexion with Theology. It is with regret that we see Theology condescend to borrow assistance

from a science inaccurate in its definitions, unsatisfactory in its reasonings, contradictory in its conclusions, licentious in its influence, and of all others the most arrogant in its pretensions. We cannot but look with some suspicion on a science which has absurdly attacked almost every ultimate truth which must be the foundation even of her own conclusions,—which has attempted to bring into suspicion those axioms from which reason must make all her deductions,—and which has denied the existence both of the material world, and of that very mind which is the object of her inquiries.

We are disposed to concede to her, what we believe is the highest praise her warmest advocates have claimed for her: she has *retracted* the errors she herself had advanced,—*disprove* them she could not. They were *absurdities*, incapable alike of *proof* or *refutation*. We wish she could as readily repair her *mischiefs*, as *recant her errors*. When God had revealed himself in his Word with such evidence as to leave incredulity without excuse; when civilized man had questioned nature in ten thousand ways, and she had returned an unvarying answer, “there is a God of infinite goodness, wisdom, and power,” Philosophy dared to lift an impious voice both against nature, and nature’s God. That philosophy, whose only business is to *state in words*, what the *most vulgar mind* constantly *feels*, dared to set aside the evidence which had commanded the assent of all ages,—of evidence which might, at all times, be tested by the senses, or confirmed by the rigorous conclusions of a science which rests solely on demonstration. The pretensions of this science, the fame of its supporters, aided by the general corruption of manners, spread atheism through the most polished nation of Europe; led civilized, refined, and enlightened society, to cast off the restraints of conscience, and placed them in a state of warfare against both Revelation and the moral principles of their own nature. Now, in a science where the grossest and most licentious errors have been introduced by the greatest geniuses, the most elegant and even accurate reasoners that the world has ever seen; where exactness of definition is scarcely attainable, and then intelligible only by long habits of abstraction; where error is almost sure to escape detection; where a whole life has been spent in refuting propositions, at which the most illiterate would laugh, could he understand them;—

we think the conclusions are deserving of much suspicion. Let its authority be established in its own province before it ventures to invade the territories of Theology. Its worst errors have arisen from quitting its proper sphere; from presumptuously attempting to pass those bounds which Infinite Wisdom, by limiting the powers, has been pleased to prescribe to the researches of reason. Nothing is more certain, than that it has no right to revise the truths which have emanated from Truth itself. The word of an unchangeable God is certainly a sufficient warrant for belief; and he who receives His truths simply because they are approved by reason, is still an infidel. Can this philosophy add evidence or authority to the declarations of God? Can it add perspicuity to that system of truth, which comes from the pen of inspiration, and is proposed, not to be the subject of speculation, but simply to command our belief and controul our practice?

The peculiarities of a system of divinity, long popular in New England, were built on that scheme of philosophy, which makes the mind a series of perceptions and emotions, leaving no room for personal identity or accountability. A very bold philosophy is still applied to the subject of moral agency. We feel ashamed to see Christianity descend to borrow aid from a philosophy which has waged a persevering warfare against common sense. It is at once *presumption* and *rebellion* to attempt to pass the bounds which a merciful God has prescribed both to *reason* and *Revelation*: above all, it is folly to suppose that the most dark and uncertain of all sciences is to throw additional light on the pages of Inspiration. Philosophy, it seems, must throw light on the subject of moral agency! that is, it yet remains to be proved that man is an accountable being! The testimony of conscience is to be set aside, as insufficient. The Bible has told us, that the law of God is still in full force; and those who will not believe either *conscience* or the *Bible*, may be expected to pay but little regard to *philosophy*. No reasoning, however, can prove, what conscience alone can teach, that we are accountable beings! Let the law of God be explained and enforced in all the spirituality and extent of its demands, and conscience, though obscured by the fall, darkened by the sophistry of a corrupt heart, and blunted by sin, will still acknowledge most of its claims;—enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the whole.

The author of these Lectures, in a late series of sermons, has advanced a novel doctrine, the influence of which is manifested throughout the work before us, and really gives to it its distinguishing character. We shall therefore take some notice of the discovery, drawing it from the first sermon of the series, where it is fully stated and defended. Mr. Finney tells us, that "for many centuries but little of the real gospel has been preached;" he accuses those great doctrines, in which the Fathers, the Reformers, and the whole church have been almost unanimous, of "leading down colonies to hell," "delaying the conversion of the world;" "making God an infinite tyrant," "and destroying man's accountability." He does not seriously attempt to prove that these doctrines are *unscriptural*, but only *unphilosophical*. The Reformers and Fathers, it seems, had erroneous views of mental philosophy, and a light has now beamed forth from the *science of the mind*, which is to change the face of the world.

It seems *almost a contradiction*, that the whole Christian church, for many centuries, has been guilty of heresy; and *surprising*, that they should be convicted, by a single individual, in whom at last orthodoxy reappears. We were a little surprised, that this grand Reformer did not avail himself of the authority of Scripture, to convict the church of her errors; but mental philosophy, it seems, was sufficient. We are surprised, that he has not accounted for the ambiguity of Scripture, which has misled the lovers of truth and holiness, in all past ages. Their fundamental error, from which, he assures us, the others necessarily result, consisted in believing in the *corruption of human nature*. They believed in the existence of what they figuratively termed the *heart*, literally *the will*,—that this is the seat of a disease whose only remedy is regeneration and sanctification. This *heart* or *will* in which they believed, our author frankly assures us, so far from being diseased, does not even exist, and that regeneration is nothing but successful persuasion. He condescends then to tell us what meaning we may apply to the term *heart*. *THIS DEFINITION* is the basis of all his reasonings. It is *THIS* that is to remove all the errors of the church. Were the Fathers and the Reformers of the church still alive, with what joy would they listen to this definition! Ye holy men, rich in faith, gifted with genius, skilled in the languages of the Bible, whose lives were divided between

the interpretation and preaching of the word of God, rejoice! A light is to beam forth from *philosophy*, and dispel the licentious errors, which you have drawn from the *Scriptures*! Let us listen to his definition, (Ser. 1, p. 6,) "*The spiritual heart is the fountain of spiritual life; is that deep-seated, but voluntary preference of the mind, which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, and from which they take their character.*" This preference, it must be kept in mind, is not involuntary or forced; no, it is altogether a *voluntary* preference. This foe to any thing which he can represent as *physical* in the mind, informs us that it is *deep-seated*. He has given us the geography of it; "it lies back of all the other voluntary affections and emotions, and from this they take their character." The advocates of orthodoxy had supposed, in opposition to this reformer, that there were in the mind moral and intellectual susceptibilities or powers, but that emotions, and what he calls *affections*, are but momentary mental states or acts. They had not been aware, that these last have a *permanent existence* in the mind; and a *place* in front of the voluntary preference. We had supposed too that the character of voluntary affections and emotions, depends on their *nature*, and not upon the *fact*, that the voluntary preference lies behind them, *giving* them a character, *making* the same things, which have *no character of themselves*, sometimes of *one character*, and sometimes *the opposite*.

Mr. Finney cannot, by this voluntary preference, mean the faculty of the will, of which volition or preference is merely the act. This is the doctrine which he is opposing, and we would not suspect so shrewd a reasoner to contradict himself. Preference, if it mean any thing, is an act of the mind. It is this act, which the sinner is bound to change. Is it a past act? It is too late to change it. Is it a future act? It is too soon; for it has, as yet, no existence. Is it a present act? It must be. Yes, the sinner is bound, by the same act, not only to exercise voluntary preference, but to change voluntary preference.

To exercise voluntary preference, then, and to change voluntary preference, must be the same act. There can be, from the nature of things, no act of changing it distinct from exercising it. The *heart* and the *act of changing it*, are the same thing. To require a man, then, to change his heart

or preference, according to our author's definition, is to require not only what is *impossible*, but what is *inconceivable*.

We afterwards gather from his reasoning, that he does not mean that the sinner *literally* changes his *heart* or *preference* at all. For once he gives to his text the generally received interpretation. He acknowledges that by one volition we cannot directly call another into being; indeed, we should think it strange, if a person should prefer a different and opposite preference. He means, we at last find, only that the sinner must prefer exactly contrary from what he does prefer. This, he tells us he is *ABLE* to do, and the only difficulty is, he is *NOT WILLING*. Motives must be forced upon his mind; his *great disease* being in reality a *wilful want of consideration*. This he tells us, (page 23,) "*is not merely the cause of sin, but sin itself*." Sin is thus boldly and openly accused of being the cause of itself—the sinner, one would suppose, might now, according to the author, be acquitted.

We have heard his definition. Shall we apply to it so grave a name as *heresy*? We think it deserves no harsher term than *absurdity*. Is this the doctrine that is destined to change the face of the world? Yes, we must adopt this Pelagian view of man's heart, because the orthodox views of a depraved heart, which needs regeneration, he tells us, make God an infinite tyrant, people hell with colonies of sinners, and destroy the sinner's accountability! Formerly it was thought that God creates man with a heart which *He* alone can change. New divinity has taught us that God creates man without a heart; that the sinner must *make his own heart out of nothing, and that the sinner alone can change it*. Strange that the sinner, left perfectly *independent*, having it at his *option* to make what heart he *pleases*, should *uniformly* prefer to make a *bad one*!

Having ventured some remarks on the consistency of the author's definition of heart, we still feel it a duty to take some notice of the *inaccuracy* of this definition,—an inaccuracy, which pervades all his attempts at metaphysical discussion, and leaves him at liberty, with tolerable logical exactness in deduction, to establish almost any conclusion which may suit his caprice or convenience. These remarks are offered merely to show how little confidence can be placed on reasoning where definitions are so inaccurate:

not to disprove the existence of such a heart as he has defined,—something incapable of proof or refutation. With regard to mental phenomena, the appeal must at last be made to every individual's consciousness; and if any man shall be found who lays claim to such a heart, we should think it useless to contradict him. The epithet *voluntary*, applied to preference, is strictly tautological; yet it has an influence on the subsequent reasonings. The term *preference*, has reference to those great moral opposites, *sin* and *holiness*, *God* and the *world*; and a change in this preference, constitutes a change of heart. The term *preference*, applied to these objects, is certainly unfortunate, since it implies that both holiness and sin may be loved, and one, on the whole, be preferred. But these objects, from their very nature, are opposites: if one be loved, the other must be hated. The author assures us, that the sinner, so far from deigning to weigh, will not even consider the opposite class of motives: but if, as he assures us, it be true that the sinner constantly exercises preference, that term implies that both classes are constantly before the mind, of which the one is chosen and the other rejected. Besides, should the sinner succeed in banishing a certain class of objects from his mind, motives to holiness, or a change of heart, are necessarily before him at all times. If he banish God from his thoughts, the world is still before him, which excites his love, but should call forth his hatred; sin is before him, and viewed with love instead of aversion. Moral objects cannot be banished from his mind, and they will call forth holy or sinful feelings.

Aside from making the heart a mental operation, (preference is certainly nothing more,)—something which has a *momentary existence*, and not *permanently belonging* to the mind,—we have a mental act, and no object of that act; preference, and nothing preferred. Can preference exist and have no object? exist where nothing is chosen, and nothing rejected? Does preference, in the abstract, constitute a human heart? If this cannot be, then it only remains, that it be preference for either holiness or sin; and we can see no great difference between that preference for holiness or sin, which he acknowledges, and the taste for holiness or sin, which he imputes to his opponents.

Preference, which he says constitutes the human heart, must, from its definition, mean an act of the mind. But he

uses the singular number : does he mean that there is but one act of the mind, as there is but one heart ? Is it a permanent act ? how then can the sinner be required to change it ? From his using the abstract term *preference* in the singular number, we have no doubt, but the writer had some obscure idea of such a faculty as the human will ; and that it was this which he was attempting to describe, while professing to deny its existence. Neither nature nor language will permit a novice in intellectual philosophy, to contradict the principles of his own constitution, without, at the same time, contradicting himself. Here, however, the proposition is obscurely affirmed, in what was meant for its denial.

Our author assures us that philosophy has now become so far perfected, that men can correctly interpret the Bible. The Reformers, he tells us, "were continually interpreting the Word of God according to the systems of mental philosophy, that then prevailed ; consequently, the gospel had not yet its primitive effect ;" they "introduced into it embarrassments and contradiction, mystery and absurdity." Did these holy men make the Scriptures bend to philosophy ? make philosophy their standard, and use Scripture only to authorize the vain speculations of a presumptuous reason ? The imputation is bold, uncharitable, and false. The gospel, as taught by the Reformers, is the same as that which is now received by all evangelical denominations, and none but the holdest and most hardened of its enemies have ventured to call it, a "mixture of contradictions and embarrassments, of mystery and absurdity."

The new philosophy of Mr. Finney, which is so speedily to change the face of the world, had been invented and propagated centuries before by Pelagius. The church, however, and the Reformers, still retained a belief in the corruption of human nature, and its need of regeneration ; they regarded neither the arguments nor objections of philosophy ; but believed the Bible a sufficient authority for all the doctrines which an honest, prayerful, and learned interpretation, should draw from its pages. We have no doubt that the discovery just named is original with Mr. Finney, though not new to the church. His time and talents have been, we regret to say, in a great measure, wasted in the invention of an old heresy, which might have been found in the most common abridgements of Ecclesiastical History, ready made to his hands.

A quotation from Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, followed by some extracts from Mr. Finney's Sermons, will show that we have here only a new discovery of an old error. "The authors of this heresy were Pelagius and Cœlestius, both monks; the former a Briton, and the latter a native of Ireland. They lived at Rome in the *greatest reputation*, and were *universally esteemed on account of their extraordinary virtue and piety*. These monks looked upon the doctrines which were commonly received concerning the *original corruption of human nature*, and the *necessity of divine grace to enlighten the understanding and purify the heart*, as prejudicial to the progress of holiness and virtue; and tending to lull mankind in a presumptuous and fatal security. They maintained that these doctrines were as false as they were pernicious; that the sins of our first parents were imputed to them alone, and not to their posterity; *that we derive no corruption from the fall*; but are born as *pure and unspotted as Adam came out of the hands of his Creator*; that mankind are therefore *capable of repentance and amendment*, and of arriving to the highest degrees of piety and virtue *by the use of their natural faculties and powers*; that, indeed, external grace is necessary *to excite their endeavours*, but that they have no need of the *internal succours of the Divine Spirit*."

Pelagius denied the commonly received doctrine of the original corruption of human nature, and the necessity of divine grace to enlighten the understanding and purify the heart. What less does Mr. Finney? He says, (Serm. 3, page 11,) "For if the nature itself be depraved, then regeneration must be physical." That purification of the heart which the church has always believed to be necessary, in consequence of the corruption of our nature, he brands with the epithet of physical regeneration; and tells us that this, together with the kindred doctrine, which he styles physical depravity, makes God an infinite tyrant, and absolves man from his allegiance. Pelagius too maintained that these doctrines were pernicious, and as false as they were pernicious. Mr. Finney, without deigning to explain, or explain away, one of the numerous passages which have satisfied the whole church, that the Bible teaches these doctrines, thinks it sufficient if he can prove them unphilosophical. Pelagius taught, that we derive no corruption from the Fall, but are born as pure and unspotted as Adam came out of the hands

of his Creator. This is the sum and substance of the system. Mr. Finney assures us, (Serm. 1, page 16,) "Sinners make their own wicked hearts," and (same Serm. page 8) he teaches us that Adam made his. "He immediately preferred God as his supreme ruler, and this preference was a perfectly holy heart." He tells us that men conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity are as really created in *the image of God* as Adam was. Pelagius taught, that men are capable of repentance and amendment, and of arriving at the highest degrees of piety and virtue, by the use of their natural faculties and powers. Mr. Finney says, (Serm. 1, page 17,) "Were it not that I suppose there is a sense in which a man's heart may be better than his head, I should feel bound to maintain, that persons holding this sentiment, that man is unable to obey God without the Spirit's agency, were no Christians at all,—obligation is only commensurate with ability." Pelagius taught, that mankind need external grace to excite their endeavours, but that they have no need of the internal succours of the Divine Spirit. Mr. Finney, equally with Pelagius, denies what ancient Reformers meant by the internal succours of the Holy Spirit, and believes only in what are generally called the common influences of grace, confined to the understanding. He believes, (Serm. 1, page 23,) "that it is the sinner's wilful inconsideration, and diverting of his attention, that lays the only foundation for the necessity of the Spirit's influences. The Spirit *forces* upon his attention and consideration those motives which he hates to consider and feel the weight of." Thus, far from teaching that man is unable to repent and believe, he tells us that he is *unwilling*, only because he is unwilling to consider and weigh the motives, which should induce him to repent and believe. His disease is not even *unwillingness to obey*; it is only *unwillingness to weigh motives*, and the sinner must be *forced*, not *persuaded*, to weigh them.

Here we are told, that human nature is not corrupt: more, that there is no such thing as human nature, distinct from the moral character of an individual: human nature and human character are found to be synonymous terms. There is no real difference in men, except what is produced by motives. God must know, that those who now love him most ardently, with sufficient motive would as cordially hate him. Superiour force of motive would transform a seraph to a damned spirit, or a damned spirit to a seraph; change

heaven into hell, or hell into heaven. The Fall of man, which made the Atonement necessary, is formally denied. Sinners come into the world as pure as Adam came from the hands of his Creator. The fact, that sinners make for themselves wicked hearts, he tells us (Serm. 1, p. 16,) "is entirely the result of temptation to selfishness, arising out of the circumstances under which the child comes into being." Thus the cause of human wickedness, is not to be sought in *human nature*, but in *Divine Providence*. The change introduced by the apostacy, is not a *change in man himself*, but some unknown *change in his circumstances*: *inability* is only the *inability* of motives to get access to his mind. Sin has been introduced into the mind of every individual by *Providence*, and continued by *inconsideration*. We learn too, that the sinner, by an act of preference, does more than prefer—he even changes and reverses preference; and this, not *past or future* preference, which is an *impossibility*, but a *present* one, which is a *contradiction*. The renovating and purifying influences of Divine grace, in which the great body of evangelical Christians always have been, and still are united, are formally denied. We are now told, that the Holy Spirit does not in any sense renew and sanctify the heart. He only *persuades* the sinner to do it. The influence of motives, it seems to the philosophic mind of the author, accounts for this change; and on a subject which the Scriptures have told us is incomprehensible, he must make his comprehension the limit of his faith. He acknowledges that the sinner *hates* the true character of God, when *feebly presented*; but it appears perfectly rational that he should *love it with the whole heart*, when *powerfully exhibited*. An object which, *feebly* seen, excites only aversion, may be expected, when presented *vividly*, to kindle the warmest love. The last act of the mind, in view of a certain motive, may be *perfectly sinful*; and, with the same motive, and no change in the mind, the next act may be *perfectly holy*.

If Mr. Finney means, with Dr. Emmons, to deny the existence of *that faculty, the will*, on which President Edwards wrote one of the most acute and cogent pieces of reasoning which the world has ever seen; if he leaves only volition or preference, which Edwards calls its affections or operations—the enquiry remains, does he mean, with Dr. Emmons, that there are innumerable volitions, preferences,

or hearts? or does he mean, that the abstract voluntary preference, which has no object, and lies dormant behind the other voluntary affectionous and emotions, is the only accountable act of the mind—so that there is but one heart? His succeeding reasoning shows that he meant neither. He does not mean to say, that man puts forth one act of preference, which is never repeated: he intends to state only, that man, having once preferred holiness or sin, his succeeding preferences continue to be of the same character with the first; and he uses the term *deep-seated voluntary preference*, to state the fact, that the same general preference is a quality of all succeeding volitions. So we find, at last, that the heart is not what Dr. Emmons describes it, an *infinite number of volitions*: it is not even *one*—it proves to be merely a quality of mental operations. Thus, we see, that although God has created man once, and given him a nature which makes him a subject of moral obligation, yet these writers have found it necessary to make him again, and bestow on him a constitution which makes his accountability more accordant with their ideas of justice: doing, if possible, more violence to man's nature by their absurd theories, than they have done to the Holy Scriptures by their bold interpretations. The one has made the heart a bundle of volitions, and man himself an infinite series of incoherent perceptions and emotions—leaving no room for identity, and no subject for accountability. The other has made the human heart but a *quality* of mental operations.

One would suppose it enough for a single individual to assert, that God's people, renewed and led by his Spirit, have always drawn from his Word, doctrines, the very enunciation of which makes the Lord of the Universe an infinite tyrant, authorizes man's worst rebellion, and makes the most licentious of doctrines, Universalism, in Mr. F's view, the only expedient by which the ways of God can be justified to man. (Serm. 3, page 72.) But this is not enough, in the *presumption of correcting the heresy of the church universal*. Mr. Finney introduces an error, which has been *known, rejected, and execrated* by the children of God for many centuries; an error which now forms the essential constituent of all the systems which are opposed to evangelical doctrines. Mr. Finney has presented no new objections against these doctrines: he has only more boldly and more loudly reiterated the false charges which have always

been preferred against them by the Socinians and Unitarians. He has sided with those zealous asserters of the spirituality and extent of man's obligations, and shares their alarms at doctrines which have even the appearance of impairing man's accountability, or countenancing his licentiousness.

Mr. Finney, in these Lectures, advances some new views on the subject of prayer. We will quote a few passages in which they are pretty fully developed. "Faith consists in believing that we shall receive the very things that we ask for." But of this we must have *evidence*. He continues, "A person is under no obligation to believe, and has no right to believe a thing will be done unless he has *evidence*. It is the height of fanaticism to believe without *evidence*. The kinds of evidence a man may have, are the following: First, Suppose that God has especially promised the thing. Secondly, Where there is a general promise in the Scriptures, which you may reasonably apply to the particular case before you. If its real meaning includes the particular thing for which you pray, or if you can reasonably apply the principle of the promise to the case, there you have evidence." "In case of those promises of a general nature, where we are honestly at a loss to know in what particular cases to apply them, it may be considered rather as our privilege, than as our duty, in many instances, to apply them to particular cases; but, whenever the Spirit of God leads us to apply them to a particular object, then it becomes our duty so to apply them." "If the case comes up to enquire as to the *time* in which God will grant blessings in answer to prayer, you have this promise, 'While they are yet speaking, I will hear.'" Thirdly, "When there is any *prophetic declaration, that the thing prayed for is agreeable to the will of God*. If the time at which the event is to come is specified, or may be learned from the prophecies, and appears to have arrived, Christians are bound to understand and apply it, by offering the prayer of faith." Fourthly, "Where God makes a revelation by his Providence, by giving to Christians a *spiritual discernment respecting its movements and developments*, Christians are bound to pray in faith." Fifthly, "The Spirit leads Christians to desire and pray for things, of which nothing is specifically said in the word of God." p. 56. "And if you are led by the Spirit of God to pray for certain things, you have just as much reason to expect the thing to be done, as if God had revealed

it in his word." "He excites the very desires he is willing to gratify. Take the case of an individual. That God is willing to save, is a general truth. But how shall I know the will of God respecting that individual, whether I can pray in faith, according to the will of God, for the conversion and salvation of that individual, or not? Here, the agency of the Spirit comes in to lead the minds of God's people to pray for those individuals, and at those times, when God is prepared to bless them." Respecting this *evidence* which is made to prove that certain blessings will be bestowed on particular persons at certain times, though our author is able to fix the time, by detaching a passage from its proper connexion, and perverting its meaning, yet we had not been aware, that any particular persons have been mentioned *by name*. He doubtless means, that the promises are directed to us as *Christians*, and if so, our *expectation* that we shall receive a blessing, on his scheme, ought never to be any *stronger* than our *assurance* that we possess the *character* to which the promise is annexed, which, at most, does not amount to that *certainty*, which this prayer of faith supposes.

Mr. Finney, by boldly and grossly misapplying or misinterpreting the texts which he deigns to use, seems to make faith consist in a *presumptuous license in interpreting promises*, rather than in a *humble confidence in the faithfulness of God to fulfil them*. Page 91, he says, "A general promise may, with the same propriety, be applied to the *conversion of a soul*, as to the *performance of a miracle*." But what necessity is there for making Providence prophetic? God has promised to Christians, the life that now is, as well as that which is to come; assured them that he is more willing to bestow the influences of his Spirit on them, than earthly parents to bestow favours on their children; that he who has not withheld his Son, will, with him, freely give them all things; that all things are theirs; that all events shall work for their good; and are not here blessings adequate to all their wants, sufficient work for faith, and sufficient objects of a holy desire? After forbidding us to say what we shall do on the morrow, and telling us, that we know not what a day will bring forth, does he expect us to *believe* where he has scarce allowed us to *guess*. Besides, such faith could lay claim to no *greater certainty*, than the *presumptuous conjecture*, on which it would be founded.

Respecting *prophecies*, we had always supposed it the duty of Christians to believe and plead the promises which God has made, respecting the future extension and glory of the church; though they cannot yet fix the precise time of their full accomplishment. Our ignorance of the time, does not detract from the certainty of their fulfilment, or from our obligations to believe and plead them. Their accomplishment is suspended on the *prayers*, not less than the *labours* of the church.

With respect to *holy desires*, from the fact that the *objects* of them are so *general*, we should hardly think it *possible*, even if it were *allowable*, to *interpret* them as *revelations*. Things material are not the proper objects of spiritual desires. There are no internal spiritual desires that exactly answer to the removal of a particular disease, the success of a given project, food, raiment, and health; the Christian should have the same object, the glory of God, before his mind, in offering petitions for all these things. Infinite Goodness will always bestow on the Christian, the very blessings that Infinite Wisdom sees best for him to receive. He who at once inspires, hears, and answers prayer, withholds one blessing, only to bestow another which better meets the Christian's wants. God *refuses* his *petition*, while he *gratifies* his *desire*. Besides, who has taught the Christian that holy desires are revelations? They are what the Bible commands him to possess; what the Christian ever aims to possess; they are given him to enable him to do his duty; to maintain peace of conscience, communion with heaven,—to impart *holiness*, and not *knowledge*,—to make him a *Christian*, not a *prophet*. When we desire the glory of God in the accomplishment of any scheme, whose success seems to us connected with his glory, does this imply that the connexion, which, to our finite reason, seems *probable*, is *certain*? Is this desire given to the Christian, to teach him the future, or simply to enable him to feel as he ought in view of the course of Providence? Do the benevolent wishes of the holy heart *anticipate and fix the events of Providence*?

Prayer, or communion with God, we had been taught to consider, as constituting at once the *life* and *happiness* of the Christian. It is something more than mere petition. It is adoration of the perfections of the blessed God, thanks for his blessings, confession and godly sorrow for sin, trust in the merits of Christ for forgiveness, holy desires for tem-

poral and spiritual blessings, and faith in the veracity of God who has promised them. God inspires the Christian with such a sense of his corruption, his weakness, his ignorance, and his innumerable wants, that prayer *seems* the *spontaneous* language of the renovated heart. It is the great channel through which the Christian receives all his invaluable blessings. Interrupted, his graces wither, his strength declines, his peace is destroyed, his happiness is lost. Neither religion nor the world can give him satisfaction. Our author seems to place the whole of prayer in petition; and most of our petitions are to consist of intercession for others. He speaks with the most improper levity, of adoration; censures men "for spinning out a long prayer in telling God who and what he is." From his denial of man's corruption, and making the operations of Divine grace to consist merely in *forcing* the creature to consider and weigh motives, it might naturally be expected, that he would not think that the Christian has much to do in his own heart, or much need of assistance.

With respect to these views of prayer, it is somewhat strange that they have never been adopted, or even generally known in the church. Mr. Finney assures us, that nothing but what he calls the prayer of faith, is really prayer—that "they who know not what this is, have good reason to doubt their piety." They certainly have every reason to *disbelieve* it, or *consider themselves in a backslidden state*, if they have always lived without prayer. Thus, after expressly charging the whole church, for many centuries, with *being heretics*, he now, by direct inference, accuses them of being *hypocrites*, or *backsliders*.

Mr. Finney at times admits the obligation of submission in prayer; but his views leave no room for it. He assures us, that we must know what the will of God is, before we have a right to offer the prayer of faith. If so, the Christian cannot say with his Saviour, "Not my will, but thine be done." There is no occasion for it. He has learned this already, or his prayer is presumption; and God's will and his own he knows are the same.

These views, which seem to ascribe so much efficacy to prayer, are but a complete and formal denial of its influence. A person must know that a blessing is just about to be received, before he can have a right to believe and pray. Faith, then, does not *procure* blessings: it only *predicts*

them. God is not influenced to bestow blessings in consequence of prayer, but either without any regard to it, or in anticipation of it. Faith is the *effect*, and not the *ground* of God's determination to impart answers to prayer.

Mr. Finney tells us, that this faith is built on *evidence*: of course it can be no *more certain* than the *evidence* on which it rests. It has generally been supposed, that mere intellectual belief is an *involuntary act*, an operation of the understanding. It is difficult to see how it can possess a moral nature at all. We may be voluntary in *surveying*, or in *seeking* and *collecting* evidence; but when once we have *sought* and *found* evidence, we *necessarily* believe. But it is with an *important limitation*, that he admits of a belief of the understanding. Hear his definition:

"We want to know, in what cases, for what persons and places, and at what times, we are to make the prayer of faith—that is, to believe that we shall receive the very things we ask for? I answer, when you have evidence from promises, &c. &c., that God will do the things you pray for." What now is necessary to authorize the prayer of faith, which rests on evidence, and can be no surer than the evidence on which it rests? What must we know before we have a right to exercise faith, or can exercise faith? We must know, that it is God's will that we do the thing we pray for. Faith then consists in *believing* that God will do the thing we pray for, when we *know* he will do the thing we pray for; in *believing* that a thing will take place, after we *know* it will take place; in *believing* a thing, after we do already *believe* it. Thus, the Christian is told, that he has neither an ability nor a right to believe, until after he has believed. No wonder, he assures us, that it is so little a matter of speculation, that its advocates cannot always believe even in the existence of such a faith, which cannot *exist* till after it *has existed*.

The Christian's desires, it seems, are no longer to be regulated by the *commands of the Bible*: they *themselves constitute a revelation*: they are *promises* on which he is to rest his *expectations* of Divine blessings. The professor of religion is permitted, when at a loss for the *meaning of the promises*, to interpret them by *his own desires*. How soon may he be expected to extend the *same principle* to the *Divine commands*? Providence is turned into prophecy, and the ignorant and the deluded are permitted to interpret

it. Here is all the license that fanaticism has ever found necessary for the wildest and the wickedest schemes. Here some of the grossest abuses with which the enemies of revivals have ever charged them, are formally authorized, by one who sets himself up as their great advocate and patron.

After demolishing, by philosophy, those traditions of the elders, which, he says, corrupt the law, he next proceeds to remove the law itself, to show that it is neither holy in its nature nor just in its demands; that holiness really consists, not in *loving* God, but in *thinking* of Him—thus giving us a new law. The following quotations contain the very spirit of his system :

“People talk about religious feeling, as if they thought they could, by direct effort, call forth emotion. *We might as well think to call spirits up from the deep.* The emotions are **PURELY involuntary states of the mind.** They **NATURALLY** and *necessarily* exist in the mind, under certain circumstances calculated to excite them. But they can be controlled *indirectly*; otherwise there would be no moral character in our emotions, if there were not a way to control them. We cannot say, Now I will feel so and so towards such an object; but *we can command our attention to it*, and look at it intently till the proper feeling arises. Let a man call up his enemy before his mind, and his feelings of enmity will rise. So, if a man thinks of God, and fastens his mind on any parts of God's character, he will feel: *emotions will come up by the very LAWS of mind.* If he is a *friend of God*, let him contemplate God as a gracious and holy being, and he *will have emotions of friendship kindled up in his mind.* If he is an *enemy of God*, only let him get the true character of God before his mind, and look at it, and fasten his attention on it, *and his enmity will rise against God.* So any *action, thought, or feeling*, to have moral character, must be directly or indirectly under the control of the will. If a man voluntarily place himself under such circumstances as to call *wicked* emotions into exercise, he is entirely responsible for them. If he place himself under circumstances, where virtuous emotions are called forth, he is praiseworthy in the exercise of them **PRECISELY IN PROPORTION to his voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence.**

“What I want is, to have you distinguish between *emotion* and *principle*. By emotion, I mean that state of mind of

which we are conscious, and which we call *feeling* ; an *involuntary state of mind* that arises, of course, when we are in certain circumstances, or under certain influences. There may be high-wrought feelings, or they may subside into tranquillity, or disappear entirely. But these emotions should be *carefully distinguished* from *religious principle*. By principle, I mean the *voluntary decision of the mind* ; the firm determination to act out duty, and to obey the will of God, by which a Christian should always be governed. When a person is fully determined to obey God, because it is right that he should obey God, that I call principle."

Here are some important principles. The spirit of them pervades the work before us. In fact, they are a summary of his system.

1st. That love to God and enmity towards him are not *voluntary emotions* ; that, of themselves, they have no moral nature, but *borrow* one from the *circumstance*, that the will has an *indirect* influence in calling them into existence. 2d. That a person is *responsible* for his emotions, *precisely in proportion* to his *voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence*. 3d. That *love to God and all Christian graces*, are to be carefully distinguished from *principle, or a determination to obey the will of God*.

Whatever may be the result of metaphysical speculations on the subject of moral agency, we suppose, either that the law is still in force, or that man is released from all allegiance to his Maker. Upon this law, which requires that we love God with the whole heart, and our neighbour as ourselves, hang all the law and the prophets ; it comprehends all the preceptive part of the Bible : is the sum of man's moral obligations : all the Christian graces, by an easy analysis, are resolvable into love to God and man as their essential principles ; these affections alone, which have always been regarded, not only as voluntary, but volitions themselves, give value to external obedience, which should be but an outward expression of them : external obedience must spring from these affections, or others which are lawful. If from the latter, it is no longer obedience but sin. *Involuntary emotions*, from the very definition of the terms, cannot be of a moral nature. Our author, therefore, assures us, that they *derive* a moral nature from the *circumstance* that the will has an *indirect* agency in calling them

into existence. But how happens it that God has placed the sum of human obligation—all that is *holy* in affection or *valuable and praiseworthy* in action, what constitutes the happiness of heaven, and is heaven itself—in something which has no moral nature in itself, but *borrow*s it from a CIRCUMSTANCE? So, then, the law itself is neither holy in its nature, nor just in its demands, but is supposed to *acquire* a holiness and justice from the circumstance, that the will may exert at least an *indirect* and remote influence in fulfilling it. Here we are taught, that mere volition gives *its whole value to holiness itself; a character to an emotion before that emotion exists*. We find, then, that when the Christian turns his thoughts on the perfections of God, and is conscious of love; when he turns his eyes upon the ocean, and has the emotion of sublimity, or his thoughts upon a distressed family, and has the emotion of pity; or upon an affront, and has the emotion of revenge and hatred, it is the will which *gives* a character to these involuntary emotions. No enquiry either must be made into the *motives* which induced the person to call these emotions into existence. It would seem that whatever the author calls *voluntary* must not only be *right in itself*, but be able to make even *obedience to the law right*.

Again, he has told us that a person is responsible for his emotions, only so far as he has been voluntary in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence. His grand objection against orthodoxy is, that, in his view, it teaches that something besides unwillingness prevents the sinner from duty, and if it does, he says God must be an infinite tyrant. But what is duty? Is not love to God and man the very sum of it? Yet he tells us that *the will cannot directly call these emotions into existence any more than it can call spirits from the deep*. But it can *indirectly*. Well. The sinner, no matter from what motives, calls up the true character of God before his mind. Here, according to our author, his responsibility ends. He is conscious of enmity. Mr. F. *acquits* him while the law of God *condemns* him. Now, it is either a *quibble*, or a *deception*, to tell a person that it is only *unwillingness* that prevents from duty. God does not demand *willingness to weigh motives*, or *willingness to obey*, but *obedience itself; holy affections expressed by holy actions*, not *willingness to exercise love, which is nonsense, but love itself*. Respecting volition in

calling up motives, what person of common sense ever thought it possible to love God without *thinking of him*, and what serious mind ever supposed it *innocent* not "to have God in all the thoughts?" Who, before Mr. F., ever thought that holiness and duty consisted in *thinking* of God, not in *loving* him?

Again, the *involuntary emotions of love to God and all the Christian graces*, are to be carefully distinguished, not only from actual obedience, but from that determination to obey God, which constitutes PRINCIPLE. What kind of principle must that be which is to be so carefully distinguished from all that is *holy in affection, or valuable in action*? A vague general resolution to obey God, because it is right, from a conviction that it is our duty, a conviction which every mind must have if the testimony of conscience has not been silenced. *A resolution to obey God.* What kind of obedience is that, into which the love of God is not expected to enter? It must be mere *external obedience*, and *that from sinful motives*. A person is required to yield external obedience from right motives, as much as to yield it at all. Mr. F. insists much on submission to God, which he strangely defines to be a resolution to obey God, as a condition of salvation. If the sinner, on the spot, expresses such a resolution, a resolution perhaps *reversed* as suddenly as *formed*, he is encouraged to hope. But Mr. F. carefully distinguishes a general, vague resolution to obey God, from those spiritual affections which have always been considered the only true obedience, and the only safe evidence of a change of heart. He tells us, after this, that he has met with thousands of awakened sinners, who never knew, till they conversed with him, what it was to feel the pressure of present obligation. What ideas of the nature, value, or obligation of spiritual affections, can he have, who calls them involuntary emotions, and classes them with those sympathies, which belong to us as animals, or those emotions, which we necessarily feel in view of the grandeur and beauty of nature?

The following quotation will show how much influence, what he denominates principle, is expected to exercise on the mind of those whom he calls Christians.

"Teach them how to cultivate a tender conscience. I have been often amazed to see how little conscience there is even among those who, we hope, are Christians. And here

is the reason of it. *Their consciences were never cultivated. They never were taught and told how to cultivate a tender conscience.* They have not even a *natural conscience*. They have dealt so rudely with their conscience, and resisted it so often, that it has got blunted, and *does not act.*" Can philosophy teach any other way to cultivate conscience, than habitually to obey? and do not Christians understand their obligations to this? It is like telling the ship-master to cultivate the *rare habit* of consulting his compass. Is it not the character of the Christian, that he habitually labours to keep a conscience void of offence towards God and man? What has he to do but duty? Is he not working out his salvation with fear and trembling? Is not God also working in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure? Has he not renounced all sin? Does he not hate it more than the most loathsome object, and fear it more than suffering? He who does not make it his great object to avoid all sin, and his great business in life to keep his heart, is as *really* an Antinomian, as the boldest Universalist. He who teaches that persons can be Christians on easier terms, establishes the gospel on the ruins of the law.

After removing the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel and the law itself, he proceeds to lay violent hands on the positive institutions of Christianity, to make room for new measures. p. 168. Let us hear him :

"When a measure has novelty enough to secure attention to the truth, no other *new measure* should be introduced. You have *secured the great object*, NOVELTY. And the more *sparing* we are of *our new things*, the longer we can use them. By a wise course, this may undoubtedly be done for a long series of years, until our present measures have sufficient *novelty* in them again to attract and fix public attention. And so we shall never want for *something new.*" p. 249. "Perhaps it is not too much to say, that it is impossible for God himself to bring about reformations, but by new measures." He informs us that the Reformation itself, the revival in England under Wesley and Whitefield, and in this country under Edwards, were in reality nothing but the introduction of new measures. p. 240—241.

We presume that most of the opponents of new measures will agree with Mr. Finney, in asserting, that the only tendency to do good, which new measures possess, consists in their novelty. But, while he contends that they should be

often changed for those still newer, we think it would be far preferable to banish them for ever, and return to that respect which is due to long tried and divinely appointed means of grace. Is it a safe doctrine, that God has established no connexion between means and his blessing? Are we to be taught that he cannot bless, but by new measures? that the regular institutions of the gospel are defended and continued only from the indolence of their supporters? that their only tendency is to sink the religious community in a lifeless formality? We are now told, that religious institutions are only artifices, to catch the public attention; that their *influence* lasts no longer than their *novelty*; and that they are to be changed for others, which the caprice or prejudice of individual ministers may introduce. Religious institutions, then, are to be in a state of perpetual change. But when the public is thus frankly told that they are nothing but tricks, will they not be likely to withdraw their confidence alike from them, and those by whom they are proposed? But what proof is alleged in favour of the position, that all improvements in religion have always been owing to the introduction of new measures? Is it not true, on the contrary, that every corruption has gained admission by adding new measures to apostolical institutions? Has not every reformation consisted in returning to the purity of ancient doctrines, and the simplicity of ancient institutions? Was not the Reformation of this character? Did not the peculiar influence of Whitefield, Wesley, and Edwards, consist in insisting on the grand peculiarities of the gospel, which had been kept out of sight by the latitudinarian spirit of the English Establishment, and the Arminian errors of the New-England divines?

New measures have been introduced by new divinity, and seem to have a close, an inseparable connexion with it. The dangers of self-deception from the deceitfulness of the heart, the delusions of Satan, and the influence of our wishes on our belief, once so much insisted on, are now laughed at. Mr. Finney tells us that there is no need of a sinner's doubting; that his doubts are so much evidence against the reality of his conversion.

With respect to the anxious seat, we doubt the right of ministers to require, and the utility of requiring, a public profession of a desire to become pious. With regard to the effects of this measure, we have no doubt that it has produ-

ced as much *disgust* among Christians, as *delusion* among sinners.

Christians have always found it necessary to increase the number of meetings in times of revivals ; not, however, to produce revivals. With respect to protracted meetings, they interfere with necessary duties, especially the duties of the closet ; on which the success of all public means depends ; they owe their origin and influence to that new divinity, which teaches that a change of heart is effected merely by force of motive ; and that the great benefit of means consists in collecting the largest possible amount of motive, and bringing it to bear upon the mind of the sinner. New measures cannot have a lasting popularity with those who believe that it is God alone who gives efficacy to means and instruments ; that he has established a permanent connexion between the regular means of grace and his blessing ; and that he is jealous of his own glory, and demonstrates the inefficiency of means and instruments, even when he grants them the greatest success.

These meetings, which break down ministers, and which our author tells us produce a *spasmodic religion*, are, from their very nature, only occasional means ; but their *tendency* has been most seriously to impair all respect for the regular institutions of the gospel. They have been almost wholly laid aside in many parts of the country, and Christians are employed in enquiring into their effects. It remains to be proved, whether the church has been *overspreading* the world, or the world has been *overflowing* the church.

We have seen that Mr. F. introduces the Pelagian heresy ; that he holds only to what the church has always called the common influences of the Holy Spirit ; that he encourages the most dangerous fanaticism with regard to prayer ; that he teaches that the spiritual affections are only involuntary emotions, to be carefully distinguished from principle ; that the natural influence of the regular means of grace, is only to produce a lifeless formality. We have been astonished at the infrequency of his quotations of Scripture ; that he seems to take it for granted, that the audience will dispense with *its authority*, if they can have *his reasonings*, or *know his wishes*. He often barely tells them, *I want you to do thus, I want you to feel so*, as if his *wishes* would have more weight than *God's commands*, or rather as though he himself were at once their *God* and *Bible*. We deem it

a duty, as he complains so much of censures, to quote some of his own. First he tells us, p. 398, "The church has *entirely mistaken the manner in which she is to be sanctified.*" Respecting the influence of the ministry heretofore, p. 348, "The truth is, that very little of the gospel has come out upon the world for these hundreds of years, without being clogged and obscured by false theology. People have been told that they must repent, and, in the same breath, that they could not repent; until the truth itself has been all mixed up with error, so as to produce *the same practical effect with error*, and the gospel that has been preached has been *another gospel, or no gospel at all.*" Respecting our young ministers, p. 177, "I appeal to all experience, whether our young men in seminaries are thoroughly educated for the purpose of winning souls. *Do they do it? EVERY BODY knows they do not.*" Those who so ably conduct our theological seminaries, p. 177, "are men of another age and stamp from what is needed in these days of excitement." Some of them are modestly advised to resign. P. 269, he tells us, "that no doubt there is a jubilee in hell every year, about the time of the meeting of the General Assembly." That "nothing will excite opposition in the Presbyterian church so soon as a spirit of prayer." The General Assembly, we trust, is aware that there is an appeal from him, who has judged the heart, to Him who knows it, and perhaps, has not much to fear, either from the jubilees of the devils, or the censures of Mr. Finney.

We think, however, that these censures spring rather from the nature and limited extent of his education, than from any rancour or malice of feeling. Doubtless, like Saul of Tarsus, he thinks he is doing God service while censuring the doctrines, officers, and institutions of the church. We cannot but think, however, that an itinerant preacher, with his popular talents, zeal, and acquired influence, would be like a tornado passing through our churches; doing some immediate good, together with much permanent mischief; utterly prostrating all respect for the ministry, doctrines and institutions of the gospel; upon which depend the *purity* and *permanence* of religion. We are rejoiced that he has been called to the head of an institution, which may now serve as a model to those literary and theological seminaries which he has so severely censured.

We think that Mr. Finney has been instrumental in

plunging multitudes into a fatal delusion ; of widely diffusing a bold and licentious fanaticism : how far guilt belongs to him, it is neither our province or wish to determine. Evangelical divines have always inculcated on young converts the duty and importance of anticipating the unchanging decision of the last day, by habitual and rigorous self-examination ; they have inculcated the Divine command, which premises that as Jesus Christ is in professors, except they be reprobates, they should prove themselves, find those lineaments of the image of Christ, which have been written on their hearts by the finger of God. Especially have the ministers of the gospel in this country been assiduous in their endeavours to discriminate between true and false religion ; and none more so than President Edwards, under whose authority Mr. Finney has more than once attempted to take shelter. This able divine wrote one of his most valuable treatises as a help to self-examination. It has always been the belief that a good hope, so far from being shaken, will be strengthened by being tested ; and that self-examination is unfriendly only to delusion. Divines, heretofore, have taught that the work of the Holy Spirit consists in producing the Christian character perfect in all its lineaments ; that Christian affections are to be tested, not by their intensity, but by their nature, their permanence and power ; by the fact that they produce an obedience universal, habitual, and cordial ; and that after all, we need to search ourselves and pray God to search us, lest we perish in a fatal delusion. After all the exertions of the ministry to prevent self-deception, how often have facts proved that numbers have been deceived ; and how many, whom the trials and temptations of the Christian life have not detected, may we fear will be undeceived, when it will be too late to repair their mistake.

It has always been the belief of the evangelical ministry, that the devil, who can transform himself into an angel of light, can, by the great subjects which revelation discloses, work powerful feelings in the mind of the sinner, and very nearly counterfeit true religion. We know, indeed, that the great things of eternity, of themselves, operating as motives, will produce most powerful impressions on the unrenewed heart. Mr. Finney places the whole of religion in the influence of motives on the natural heart. Though he speaks of a *new heart*, yet after all it is the *old heart* that makes it. It is only an artful abuse of language. We still speak of

heart, though Mr. Finney has told us, that there is no such thing as heart, distinct from voluntary preference; we cannot but think with the old divines and mankind in general, that there is such a thing as the heart, or flesh, or carnal mind, of which, aversion to the character and authority of God, insubordination to his will, hatred, anger, envy, malice, ambition, and revenge, are the spontaneous affections. We have mentioned what has been the course of divines, hitherto, but what is Mr. Finney's? He proposes to the sinner who has already experienced the inefficiency of a thousand resolutions, a single resolve, expressed in terms of studied ambiguity and obscurity;—a resolve "to submit to principle;" "*to submit* to obey God." He proposes to persons of all characters and conditions, when in a state of excitement and agitation which precludes deliberation, one resolution, and if the sinner says he has made it, he is forbidden to doubt; he is told that it is almost certain evidence against him to doubt; that a good hope, or religion, is matter of consciousness, and a doubt almost an absurdity. Now what is the tendency of this course, but to collect, cheer up, and drive forward a herd of ignorant and deluded persons into the toils which the devil always keeps spread to ensnare the unwary?

No doubt the great enemy of mankind as *effectually* secures his victim, by inspiring him with a false hope, as by plunging him into the wildest dissipation. But who can measure the responsibility of pursuing a course so directly calculated to further his views? With respect to Mr. Finney, we consider him rather as an instrument than an agent. It is true, he has not, as we had till lately supposed, the plea of ignorance. But fanaticism is capable of producing a delusion, which will as *really* confound the distinctions between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, on some subjects, as insanity itself. How far it should operate as an excuse, we are not bound to determine. Early in his career, Mr. Finney received the friendly advice and exhortation of several gentlemen, distinguished for their talents, wisdom, and experience—one of them better entitled to be heard with regard to revivals, than any man living. His errors were clearly pointed out, their tendency fully shown, or rather their consequences most exactly predicted. The opinions of these gentlemen were entitled to an attentive and prayerful examination: at least they had a claim to *respect*. But his

mind had reached that state, in which arguments and objections alike confirm one in error. He now sees his system developing itself in the most fearful manner. It is in vain for him to cast the blame on those whose misfortune it has been to be compelled to witness and share the shame which inconsistency, gross immorality, and often barefaced hypocrisy, have brought upon religion. No human force can arrest the influence of this system : it must show itself ; and any more open and deliberate attempt to cast the blame of such backslidings on others, will serve only to impair confidence in Mr. Finney's integrity. Those who believe in nothing higher than a morality, which draws its motives wholly from this world, justly regard the virtue of the mere moral man, as a fixed and permanent principle. Christians believe that piety is " God working in the heart of the believer, both to will and to do according to his good pleasure," —continuing and perfecting the work which he has begun, so that the path of the just shall shine brighter and brighter to the perfect day. What shall we say of revivals, where not half, sometimes not one-fifth, sometimes not one-tenth of the converts, have preserved even the form of godliness, for a few months only? These persons, whom policy, self-respect, a decent regard for their own reputation, worldly motives, as well as those of religion, should have restrained from grossly violating their solemn engagements, have forfeited the respect both of the church and the world, fixed a lasting and deserved stigma on their own character, and brought even religion itself into suspicion. Yet we generally find, that those persons who have deservedly forfeited the esteem and respect of man, too often presume on the favour of God ; and cling to their false hope, till the delusion, which has brought disgrace on the church, brings destruction on themselves.

But it would be well if the influence of this strain of instruction were confined to its unhappy victims. It extends far beyond them. The evil falls heavily on the church. Are persons to be received to the church, who come forward and assure us, and *boast* that they put their hands to the plough, without first setting down to count the cost? Are persons to be received as supporters of the purity, guardians of the discipline, and depositories of the doctrines of the church, upon an evidence, the strength of which would not justify a person in entrusting a trifling sum of money to their

care? Can they who know next to nothing of Christian doctrine, of the nature and extent of Christian piety, of their own hearts, who have merely made a solitary good resolution, and know not yet how they shall keep that, can they be able to measure or feel the responsibility they take on themselves, by setting themselves forth as living exhibitions of the purity which Christianity inculcates and produces; examples for the world, epistles of Christ, which must be known and read of all men? The effects of this course, we have said, have already been fearfully manifested; but we have only begun to witness them. Its effects must be, even supposing these individuals succeed in retaining the form of piety, to fill up the church with persons sceptical of the doctrines, impatient of the discipline, and regardless of the harmony and peace of the church; above all, who will more than neutralize the influence and example of the sound and spiritual members. These persons will encourage, and even seem to authorize and justify the impiety, the scoffs, and the arguments of infidels; none of which have so much force as the irreligious lives of professors of religion. They will make religion appear not only contemptible, but ridiculous.

This system of religious instruction brings the doctrine of the Divine influence on the heart of the Christian, into doubt and suspicion. The believer feels that these influences of the Holy Spirit are precious beyond expression; important as the interests of the soul; the source of all his strength, comfort, and joy; indispensable to his salvation. It is one of his most fearful responsibilities, that he can, by his inconsistent life, produce scepticism on this important doctrine, lead others to doubt the promise of those succours which are necessary to their salvation, to do even more. But, if the world see professors of religion animated by the same spirit, governed by the same motives, and even guilty of the same open sins with themselves, will they not naturally say, not only that their professions are hypocritical, but also that their pretensions are groundless and enthusiastic; that they do not accomplish or even attempt any thing beyond the ordinary powers of man. To authorize such remarks, is a sin, to which all others seem small. That God works in the heart of the Christian, is clearly a doctrine of Scripture, and philosophy has never had any thing solid to object against it; that he works in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure, a cordial obedience to the spiritual,

but just and reasonable precepts of his word, is taught in the same sentence; and philosophy is guilty at once of presumption and impiety, in casting reproach on this doctrine. The Bible assigns the fall of man as the reason which makes this agency necessary. But what are we to say of a system which teaches the existence of Divine influences, at the same time that it denies their necessity; which teaches that man has only a bad habit of volition, which he might be supposed about as able to correct, as to acquire. What shall we say of one, who teaches that the Christian, notwithstanding this influence, "will not obey God unless he is greatly excited;" that he goes back from the path of duty, and does nothing to promote the glory of God, except in times of a revival, which is very seldom? What shall we say of a system, where the sacred doctrine of which we have been speaking, is thus united with a bold Antinomianism? Mr. Finney, like the original inventor of Pelagianism, lays vast stress on some particular and often minor points of morality; he denounces the use of tobacco, coffee, and tea; indeed, imposes on the church of Christ almost as many shackles as the abrogation of the ceremonial law removed; but still he tells us, that the Christian may and does habitually disobey God; that a revival is a renewal of obedience, even to the believer. What are *revivals*, as they have heretofore been understood? They take place in churches, where neither members nor ministers allow themselves habitually to slumber, but always use the means of grace; where they live near to God; where they realize the things of another world by faith; their warnings and instructions, sanctioned by a holy life, give evidence, force, and influence, to the truths of revelation; they eagerly and perseveringly seek spiritual riches, both for themselves and others, and yet have witnessed but occasional conversions. Here God shows at once the influence of prayer, while he demonstrates the inefficiency of means and instruments, in increasing the numbers of his church; he displays his sovereign power, suddenly converts numbers, and receives the glory which he claims.

But what is an excitement, which Mr. Finney calls a revival? "It supposes that the church are sunk down in a backslidden state;" "that their hearts are as hard as marble;" "that the truths of religion appear only like a dream;" "a revival is nothing else than a new beginning of obedience towards God, with regard to the church;" "unless they

are greatly excited, they will not obey God." Now what does he say they do, when they are aroused? Why, they wake up, rub their eyes, bluster about, and vociferate a little while, and go to sleep again. The Christian, *out of a revival*, that is, the greater part of his life, is *asleep, and does not obey God; in a revival*, he **VOCIFERATES A LITTLE**.

But what will be the influence of Mr. F.'s system of instruction, and his new measures, on our religious institutions? This influence has plainly shown itself, where these measures have been long employed. Mr. Finney and his adherents should know, by this time, that they owe their influence wholly to the remaining respect in the minds of the community, for the institutions, doctrines, and ministers of the gospel. He is stupidly undermining himself and his new measures, and success would be their immediate ruin. New measures owe their influence wholly to remaining respect for the means of grace. It is folly, if nothing worse, for Mr. F. to endeavour to destroy the influence of that vast majority of the clergy, who hesitate to receive his discoveries; nothing but their firm and persevering opposition will prevent new measures from falling into hands which will destroy his influence as easily as he has that of a large number of devoted ministers; that will at once sink new men, new measures, and new divinity, into utter neglect.

The church, too little disposed to be instructed by the history of the past, is compelled to learn wisdom by her own sufferings. Ecclesiastical history, as well as the Bible, had pointed out the danger of mingling bold, subtil, and barren philosophy, with the truths of revelation. A sound and scriptural theology, had in vain pointed out the true consequences of some of the common speculations on moral agency. Providence has permitted a bold and reckless hand, to reduce one theory to practice, and show the legitimate, but frightful results of licentious speculations on the doctrines and institutions of Christianity, in such a manner as to silence and shame all cavils and objections.

Every thing seems to indicate the importance of returning to that scriptural, practical, and spiritual exhibition of the truths of Christianity, which characterized that constellation of able divines who shone forth in England when the Reformation and the revival of letters had well united their influence. This country has produced many powerful works on doctrinal theology; but can it boast of producing

many popular works of practical divinity since the days of Edwards? Numerous facts make it evident that the science of holy living, worth all the rest, needs to be more diligently and systematically cultivated. It is a fact, that the literary taste of the Unitarians has put a value on many of these old divines which is hardly felt by the evangelical. It does seem that preaching would be far more successful if, instead of vainly attempting to prove man an accountable being, we could be persuaded to believe conscience, and the Bible, and insist on the justice and perpetual obligation of the law, in its strictest and most extensive demands. The sinner would be convinced at once of his corruption and his guilt, see the need of grace to cleanse, and mercy to pardon. He would see the adaptation of the offices of a Saviour to his own infinite wants,—embracing him, would see him to be infinitely precious and lovely.

We cannot but think that the interests of religion would be greatly advanced, if divines, from the pulpit, dwelt far more on the evil of sin, the corruption and guilt of the sinner, the character and offices of Christ, the duties of the closet, the care of the heart, the necessity of possessing a spiritual mind, and being detached from the world. Were the duties of the closet insisted on, and performed as they were once, we are persuaded the influence would instantly be felt. It would have an influence on the temper, the spirit, and conduct of Christians, which would instantly attract the attention and respect of the world; it would add, not only to the comfort of professors themselves, but would give tenfold vigour to all the benevolent operations of the day.

With respect to Mr. F.'s arguments against depravity and regeneration, which he is pleased to call physical, we confess it is an ingenious way to disprove the existence of the disease, by denying the existence of the heart in which it is seated. His arguments owe their force to this denial, and it is somewhat too late for an individual to come forward and say that there is no such thing as a will, of which envy, pride, hatred, ambition, and revenge are the affections.

We have been surprised at the numerous contradictions contained in his lectures; we had considered them as oversights, and concluded that his denial was as good as his assertion; and this might be true were the memories of his hearers perfect. But we find a thing asserted to prove one thing, and denied to prove another. The props must be re-

moved from under one part that other parts of his beautiful fabric might be supported.

With regard to Mr. Finney's charges against a very great portion of the clergy as unfriendly to revivals ; his strange defence of new measures ; his sweeping censures on the characters, attainments, and designs of a great majority of the clergy ; his adducing the authority of Edwards, in support of a measure which that great divine had pointedly condemned ; we think that Mr. F. has consulted his circumstances, and the extremity of his system of new measures, rather than his own feelings, or the *naked* truth. We do not feel disposed to apply the rules of a rigorous morality to some of the artifices of his book : and it is only as he stands connected with new measures, and takes the lead in the prevalent system of disorganization, that we have felt permitted to allude to his character at all. We say we do not know how much guilt may attach to these artifices, though we can see much mischief as the result. The truth is, Mr. F. is now aware that he has pushed on too far ; advance and retreat are both alike difficult. He is conscious that the public confidence is now fast ebbing away from him ; and both charity and humanity forbid that we attach a responsibility to his convulsive flouncing which could belong only to deliberate motion.

ART. VIII. ON RADICALISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

No. II.

An exposition of the effects of Radicalism.

IT was attempted, in a previous number, to trace Radicalism back to the principles from which it springs. It now remains to follow it down to the effects which it produces. This is the more important, as it is, after all, rather by their effects, than their principles, that different systems and measures are commonly judged of. Men are slow to condemn any thing, whatever may be said of its abstract nature, which is seen to be productive of the public good. And, on the contrary, if its tendencies are plainly hurtful, nothing which can be alleged in its favour, will save it from general reprobation.

It is our design to show, *that the good results which are claimed as the effects of the Radical mode of reform, are falsely ascribed to it, and that, on the contrary, its proper influence is injurious.*

The argument most frequently used by those who abet that system of Radical Reform, which has been already described, is, that, let moralists say what they please of its nature, it is still the means of accomplishing great and good ends, not otherwise attainable. To confirm this, they refer to the example of some successful Reformers, who have adopted this mode of proceeding; and ask, with triumph, what great Reformation was ever effected without its aid.

The fallacy of this argument consists in claiming results as the appropriate effects of the Radical style of proceeding, which are owing, either directly to different causes, or to the providential counteraction of the natural tendencies of the system to which they are ascribed.

Good results are sometimes claimed as the effects of Radical efforts, which are really owing to different, and

even opposite causes. The course of things is often very much as follows:—Through the operation of those silent, but deep-working powers, which are ordained by God for the renovation and elevation of man, the state of society is gradually changed. A sound public sentiment is formed,—a public conscience is created. The whole moral atmosphere acquires a tone which is strengthening to whatever is pure and good, but in which nothing which is evil can long subsist. But now, in this state of things, where every good result is on the point of being realized, a new agency, which had no share in bringing on so favourable a crisis, is thrust violently in between the proper causes and their near effects, and from its immediate proximity to the latter, receives the credit of their accomplishment. It is here, as it often happens in scientific investigations, where, after the way had been prepared by ages of patient experiment, some lucky and unpremeditated hit brings to light the long-sought principle, and eclipses the fame of those labours, by which stores of knowledge had been accumulated, and by which the grand discovery would have been ere long attained. In like manner, when some great reform is witnessed, the credit of its accomplishment, which is due only to the long-continued operation of the stated means of human improvement, is often usurped by some extraordinary and violent agency, which has not a particle of salutary efficacy, except what it derives from its intrusive interposition, as a kind of conductor, between the remote causes and their final results. The formation of a purified and invigorating moral atmosphere, is the great work. Where this exists, and there only, philanthropy has an element in which it can live and act. It is this all-pervading, high-toned moral sentiment, which sustains, and accelerates every good enterprise, while it smites every evil work with languor, or the stroke of death. And this moral sentiment, which is the grand condition of success in every project of reform, is produced, not by special agencies of benevolence, but by more deep and stated causes.

In other cases, *the good ascribed to Radicalism is owing to the providential counteraction of the proper tendencies of this system.* Through the violence and recklessness which characterize this mode of Reform, the elements of society are often thrown into confusion; parties are formed, and arrayed in bitter hostility against each other; prejudices are excited, which prevent the farther progress of the im-

provement begun ; and a storm of passion is raised which is ready to vent itself upon whatever obstructs its course, and to spread promiscuous ruin through the moral and social kingdom. In this state of most deplorable turmoil and uproar, when those by whom the tempest has been raised, unable longer to controul it, stand aghast in view of its unsparing rage, and expecting sudden destruction,—in this state of things, Providence sometimes interposes, in a way the most unlooked for, to prevent the dreaded evils. That same power which shifts the gale, and bids it drive the shattered barque, ready to dash upon the rocks, into a place of safety, and then chains its fury and lulls it to rest ;—even so turns the hearts of men, when most vehemently set upon evil,—marks out a safe direction for their stormy passions, and then, after accomplishing by them his own good purposes, makes them to cease,—causes the wrath of man to praise Him, and the remainder of it restrains. The excitement, the confusion, the danger, the terror, were the proper effects of the Radical spirit ;—to this, too, would the ruin just escaped have been justly charged. The unforeseen deliverance is from God. 'Tis He, in these moments of our self-wrought terror and peril,

" 'Tis He, our fears to cease,
Sends down the meek-eyed PEACE.
She, crown'd with olive-green, comes softly gliding,
Down through the turning sphere,
—His ready harbinger,—
With turtle wing the stormy cloud dividing,
And waving wide her myrtle wand,
She strikes a universal peace through sea and land."*

But how often is the pure, serene, and blissful state, thus brought out of darkness and tempest by the Divine interposition, regarded as the proper effect of the angry elements from which it is educed ! and how contrary is this to truth ! It is as if the day, instead of being derived from the rising sun, should be ascribed to the night out of which it is brought. It is as if the beauteous edifice which rises upon the ashes of a dreadful conflagration, should be ascribed to the destroying fire, rather than to the skill and industry by which the ruins of the fire are repaired.

If now it is considered, how much of the good which is claimed as the effect of the Radical style of effort, may be

* Milton's Christmas Hymn.

accounted for in one or the other of the ways just mentioned; there will be but little left to warrant the plea of utility, so often urged in its behalf. It would indeed be contrary to many of the plainest moral principles, if any good at all should *naturally* flow from a system of such unmingled evil, as Radicalism has been shown to be. As there is no virtue in this system, it would seem to follow, that none could go out of it. From a root so bitter, a stock so crabbed, and branches so prickly, how can pleasant fruits be expected? Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?

But we proceed further to show, that *the direct tendency and natural effects of the Radical spirit are evil.*

Such they are, first of all, upon the *personal character* of those who are infected by it. If the Radical spirit grows out of flaws and faults in personal character, as has been before shown, it reacts upon them, and makes them tenfold more glaring. Under the influence of this spirit, the whole man rapidly deteriorates.

As it is to some intellectual deficiency that Radicalism may be first traced, so it is in the *understanding* that its deleterious influence first appears. It kindles passions which, like a fever, produce a debility proportioned to the violence with which they have raged.—It is characteristic of the Radical humour, to fix upon some particular object, selected at random, from the wide field of benevolence, to the neglect or exclusion of every other. To this object it confines the thoughts and feelings, and thus blinds the judgement, and distorts the intellectual frame. Through the laws of our mental constitution, we are liable to err, not only by thinking too little, but also by thinking too much, upon any one object. The mind's eye, like the eye of the body, dilates as the field of vision widens, and contracts as it diminishes, until the most comprehensive sight, by poring too long and too intently upon one thing, is rendered, at last, microscopic. The perpetual working of one idea is too much for the brain to bear, and often produces *monomania*, if not the entire derangement of the mental faculties.

It is said that after the Rantian philosophy had been broached, and had seized and absorbed the attention of the German scholars, one could scarcely enter a mad-house, without meeting some raving philosopher. And it is to be presumed, that our Retreats for the Insane would bear simi-

lar testimony to the melancholy effect upon the human mind of those undue excitements on some matters of a practical nature, to which our community is so prone. This effect has, indeed, to a certain extent, been sadly conspicuous in the case of many good men, whose only error, at first, was too exclusive a devotion to some favourite object which they had espoused, but who, in process of time, have run into such wildness and extravagance of opinion, as to excite the suspicion, that they had lost the balance of their minds, and that, as to one point, at least, they were really *insane*.

While it is painful to allude to such instances, it is proper they should be held forth for the warning of those who are accustomed to work themselves up to excessive zeal in behalf of the objects, which, one after another, engage the attention of the benevolent public, without once thinking of the injury they are thus doing their own minds. If they allow themselves to be perpetually revolving some single thing, especially if it be of an exciting nature, they will almost inevitably acquire a mental bias, by which, even if reason be not unsettled, their judgement will be warped, so that the confidence reposed in them must be shaken, and their whole influence greatly impaired.

The effect of the Radical spirit upon the *temper and disposition* of those by whom it is indulged, is still worse than upon their understanding. Overlaying, as they do, the faults of others with every colour of exaggeration, they come to regard them as monsters of iniquity, quite beyond the pale of charity, towards whom, accordingly, they allow themselves to exercise the most unmingled detestation. There is some truth in the remark, that by hating *vices* too much, we may come to love *men* too little. Nothing tends more to quench every philanthropic sentiment in the human breast, than an habitual indulgence of those angry feelings, those severe and uncandid judgements, and that reproachful language, by which the Radical temper gives itself vent. Where this indulgence has been long continued, there has been invariably induced over the character a cast of bitter misanthropy.

It cannot be denied, that persons of the best dispositions are often seduced from the right path, by the high pretensions and apparent utility of the Radical mode of reform. But the dispositions by which they were drawn into this dangerous alliance, are soon supplanted by those more conge-

nial with the impetuous career on which they have entered. In the first glow of that chivalrous enthusiasm, with which they rush upon the high towers and strong holds of wickedness, there is something of generosity, which awakens our interest, if it cannot gain our approbation. But, behold them in the next scene of this melo-drama of reformatory enterprise! Disappointed of the immediate success which they anticipated, and dismayed by the unexpected vigour of the resistance made to them, they give way to a momentary discouragement. From this state, however, they soon recover themselves, and renew the assault;—but with less of good will, less of cheerfulness and hope, and more of impatience and vexation. Their onset is again unsuccessful. And here a new set of feelings arises. Their just abhorrence of the evil assailed, gives place to rage against those by whom it is so pertinaciously defended. Their love to the cause in which they are embarked, is abated; while to conquer its enemies, and to triumph over them, becomes the reigning passion of their souls. Irritated by the obstinacy with which they have been resisted,—thirsting for revenge the wounds they have received, they mingle once more in the conflict. In that disgraceful war of passion which now ensues, there is no longer any difference apparent between the infuriated assailants, and the enraged adherents of evil. The same passions are indulged, the same weapons wielded, on both sides. Where now is that serenity which springs from the consciousness of right, and of the Divine favour? Where now is that charity, which doth not behave itself unseemly,—unvaunting, long-suffering, unprovoked? attributes by which the true Reformer,—the Christian philanthropist,—is ever distinguished. “Behold, I send you forth,” said our Saviour to his disciples, “as sheep among wolves.” But here the sheep are changed to wolves; and wolves meet wolves, and bite and devour one another with rabid ferocity. When it comes to this, there is no longer any hope for our valiant heroes of Reform. In such fighting they are sure to be beaten; and at length retire from the field, exhausted with fruitless labour, stung with shame, and covered with disgrace, and sink down at last into a state of fretful petulance, sullen dejection, and malignant misanthropy.

There is another effect of the Radical spirit upon personal character, more deplorable still. *It tends*, by an insidious process, which is hardly discerned even by those in

whom it takes place, *to undermine their moral integrity*. That moral delinquency, both in lower and higher instances, does follow hard upon every species of ultraism and zealotry, is an observation so common, as almost to be proverbial. The history of fanaticism always leads us, by rapid transitions, from the heights of a boasted purity almost superhuman, to the lowest depths of moral pollution. Nor is it difficult to give some account of a phenomenon at once so frequent and so remarkable. Those who in some things go beyond the commandment, will be very apt to feel, that, in other things, they may stop as far short of it. They will naturally hope to be indulged in certain occasional *short comings*, out of respect to the great excess of their virtue, in other particulars, above the ordinary standard. They will readily flatter themselves, that persons of such uncommon merit will not forfeit the character of goodness, even should they deviate now and then from the line of strict rectitude. It is not the deluded Romanist alone, who believes, that sinful indulgences may be balanced by works of supererogation,—that sins of omission may be atoned for by the performance of certain *consilia evangelica*, which go beyond the common standard of duty,—that the debts to Divine justice which the righteous contract, may be cancelled by drafts upon their treasury of good works. These are principles which have their origin in the deceitfulness of the heart, and are universally operative, until eradicated by a deeper reformation, than that from Popery. But while all who make any pretensions to goodness, are liable to their influence, the zealous Reformer is peculiarly exposed to their power, and in many sad instances has unconsciously become their victim.

There is another way in which this demoralizing influence of Radicalism is exerted. Men of that vicious humour of reform which we are now describing, not unfrequently select for its exercise, some remote evil, the lawful removal of which is to them impracticable, and the continued existence of which is therefore a wrong for which they are not personally responsible. They soon succeed, however, in persuading themselves, by means of a logic of their own, that it lies within the sphere of their duty, and thus they are bound to accomplish its immediate subversion. This sense of personal obligation is greatly enhanced, where the evil in question is heinous in its character, or when the end they

have in view has any thing of sacredness in it, any thing which appeals to moral or religious principle. Under this high-raised, though groundless sense of obligation, they band themselves together, and engage, as it were, that they will neither eat nor sleep until they have removed the evil of which they complain. But in prosecuting their endeavour, they soon come upon the impassable barriers which mark the sphere of their duty, and begin to find, to their surprise, that, in this case, *ability* is not exactly commensurate with *responsibility*,—certainly, that they are not *honestly* able to do all which they had *supposed* themselves responsible for. But instead of arguing, in this dilemma, the nullity of the supposed obligation, from the want of honest ability, they hold fast to the idea of responsibility, and reason from it inversely, that what *ought* to be done, *can* be done. And what *can* be done, they manfully resolve, *shall* be done.—“This evil, which curses earth and affronts heaven, *must* and *shall* be removed.” This is resolved upon ;—the die is cast ;—they themselves are publicly and solemnly pledged ; and it is no time now to be scrupulous about the *means*. Their righteous object must be gained, if not in one way, then in another ;—if not by fair means, then by foul ;—if not on the highway of honest endeavour, then through the by-way of duplicity and stratagem. Thus does that mistaken zeal, which *reaches over* the limits of what is lawfully practicable, as to the objects at which it aims, incline insensibly to *overreach*, in the means which it employs.

This point may be well illustrated by a passage from the history of Charles I. “After the resolution had once been formed by the commons,” says an acute historian of that monarch, “of invading the established government of Church and State, it could not be expected that their proceedings, in such a violent attempt, would thenceforth be altogether regular and equitable. But it must be confessed, that in their attack on the hierarchy, they still more openly passed all bounds of moderation ; as supposing, no doubt, that the sacredness of the cause would sufficiently atone for employing means the most irregular and unprecedented. This principle, which prevails so much among zealots, never displayed itself so openly as during the transactions of this whole period.”

But this deteriorating process does not stop here. These unlawful means which were at first adopted from their sup-

posed necessity in order to a good end, are afterwards often retained from choice. The conscience, being blunted by their first admission, loses its sense of their criminality, while the heart, being depraved by their use, acquires a real appetite for their spirit and pungency. So that what has been said of some Reformers, incredible though it seem, may not be wholly untrue, that *a guiltless reformation would appear to them flat and insipid.*

By steps so gradual, has this false zeal in doing good led many thoughtlessly down to this deep corruption of moral principle! And thus may we account for the afflictive spectacle, too often witnessed, of *immoral* means, openly and stately employed in different departments of *moral* reform! the spectacle of men, while engaged in opposing fraud and oppression, adopting measures fraudulent and coercive!—using misrepresentation and falsehood, petty management and deep stratagem, whispered calumny and open proscription, as occasion may require, in the service of humanity and virtue!—doing for conscience' sake what their own conscience must condemn, and seeming ready, (so entire the derangement of their moral nature,) to break every precept of the moral law, through their zeal to keep it in a single point!

The principles which lead to such practices, require to be most carefully examined. Men of the stamp just described, when admonished respecting the obliquity of their course, will sometimes admit, "that the measures to which they resort are wrong;—but yet the end for which they are employed is good, and they seem to be necessary for its attainment,—and the advantages to be gained will, it is to be hoped, overbalance the evil attending their use,—which, moreover, is sanctioned by the authority and example of great names." By such specious arguments do these men justify themselves in doing evil that good may come! But let them well consider, that no secondary or assumed responsibility can annul their primary obligation to keep the plain commandments of God;—that true benevolence can never lead men aside from the path of rectitude;—that no one can be properly responsible for any results which may not be lawfully attained;—that to plead the goodness of an end in justification of doubtful or improper means, is to adopt one of the most profligate doctrines of Jesuitical casuistry, under cover of which the most horrid enormities of crime

have been, and may again be perpetrated ;—that to console one's self in the use of forbidden methods, under the idea of their being necessary to the attainment of good ends, is to forget the wo pronounced upon those by whom the offence cometh, though it must needs be that offences come ;—that to weigh off actual crime against contingent advantages is a business which, supposing the scales of their wisdom ever so well adjusted, they are never called to perform ;—and finally, that what is manifestly wrong can never be made right by any authority of names, by any ingenuity of reason, or by any eloquence of praise.

“ Not all that heralds rake from coffin'd clay,
Nor flord prose, nor honied lies of rhyme,
Can blazon evil deeds, or consecrate a crime.”

We have dwelt the longer on these various effects of the Radical system upon personal character, because, though they are real and deplorable, yet, from being more covert and confined, they have been often overlooked. And it is to these personal effects more particularly, that we have been desirous of directing the attention of those of our readers, who are looking forward to public life, or are about to enter upon its duties. There is much in the spirit and carriage of Radicalism which appeals to the youthful ardour and enterprise of persons in this position. But if it has a bright side, it has also a dark side, which it behooves them to look at. And, before they commit themselves to it, let them consider that, however mighty may be its energies, or however radiant its glories, its embraces, like Jove's, must prove fatal to those who allow them. An alliance with this system will be attended, on their part, with an almost certain sacrifice of all that is just and enlarged in view, of all that is lovely and excellent in disposition, of all that is strict and ingenuous in principle. Would they then be delivered from mental bias and error,—from malice and all uncharitableness,—from deceitfulness, and blindness, and hardness of heart,—let them shun the infection of that spirit which will inevitably involve them in these evils ! Like the fabled Kelpie of the Scottish mythology, which, by cheering lights lures the benighted traveller from his path into bogs and fens, and then seizes upon him, drags him through tangled brakes, puts out his eyes, and maims his limbs, and at last drowns him in turbid waters ;—even so does the Demon of Radical-

ism seize hold of those whom, by its specious pretensions, it has decoyed from the right path, worry and harass, rend and tear, blind and disfigure them, and at last plunge them into the gloomy gulf of delusion, scorn, bigotry, and guilt.

Ab ! gentle youths, your eager steps ne'er lose !
 Nor let this Sprite mislead you to the heath !
 Dancing in murky night o'er fen and lake,
 He glows to draw you downward to your death,
 In his bewitch'd, low, marshy willow braka.
 What though far off, from some dark dell espied,
 His glimmering mazes cheer the excursive sight,
 Yet turn, ye wanderers, turn your steps aside,
 Nor trust the guidance of that faithless light !
 For watchful, lurking 'mid th' unrustling reed,
 At those mirk hours the wily monster lies,
 And listens oft to hear the passing steed,
 And frequent round him rolls his sullen eyes,
 If chance his savage wrath may some weak wretch surprise !

On him, enraged, the Fiend, in angry mood,
 Shall never look with pity's kind concern,
 But instant, furious, raise the whelming flood
 O'er its drown'd banks, forbidding all return.
 Or if he meditate his wish'd escape
 To some dim hill, that seems uprising near
 To his faint eye, the grim and grisly shape
 In all his terrors clad, shall wild appear.
 Meantime the watery surge shall round him rise,
 Pour'd sudden forth from every swelling source.
 What now remain but tears and hopeless sighs ?
 His fear-shook limbs have lost their youthful force,
 And down the waves he floats, a pale and breathless corse.*"

We proceed now to show the ill effects of Radicalism upon *the particular cause* which it aims to promote.

It is here presumed, that in the whole business of moral reform, physical force is out of the question. The proper labour of the Reformer is, to gain the will of those who are in the wrong, and lead them to the voluntary abandonment of the evil complained of. And the way to accomplish this object is determined by the very laws of our minds. If the will is to be gained in behalf of any object, it must be through the judgement, the conscience, and the affections. Reason must be addressed by sober arguments ; the moral sense must be aroused by solemn appeals ; the passions in which the evil is rooted, must be corrected ; the prejudices by which it is sustained, must be removed ; and by all the methods of affectionate persuasion, the heart must be brought to favour the desired reformation. This is the course almost instinctively

* Collins's Superstitions in Scotland.

adopted by every sensible man, when truly interested to gain his point—a course so plain, that even a wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err in it. But the Radical adopts a very different course. In opposition to the known laws of the human mind, he begins by abusing the adverse party, and pursues a course calculated at every step, not to conciliate, but to offend them; not to convince their judgement, but to blind it; not to rouse their conscience, but to stop its action and drown its voice; not to remove their prejudices and depraved dispositions, but to confirm and inflame them. So contrary is the course pursued by him to all that experience teaches, or that wisdom dictates, as to the manner of moral influence, that one is sometimes compelled to suspect, that he is less concerned to secure the proposed good, than to render himself conspicuous in promoting it. However this may be, his method of promoting reform is such as to ensure his failure. It bars the door against him, and prevents his getting even a hearing. So far from removing the evil against which it was directed, it tends only to establish it, and to put off to a great remove the time of its overthrow.

How often, under the genial and all-pervading influence of Christianity, has some mighty form of evil been gradually melting away—its foundations being undermined, and its bands relaxed, until it has seemed ready to fall; when, suddenly, it has been frozen, yes, petrified into changeless rigidity, by the rising against it of the Medusa-head of ultra-opposition. And there it must stand, immoveable and beyond the hope of mitigation, until the horror of this scowling phantom is effaced and forgotten.

Recent occurrences among us furnish a melancholy comment on the truth of these remarks. So obvious have been the ruinous consequences resulting to some of the noblest moral enterprises of the day, from their being urged too far or too violently, by this ultra and radical spirit, that they will occur of themselves to the mind of the reader, and relieve us of the painful necessity of specifying them. No direct opposition from the enemies of these enterprises, could have done them half the injury they have sustained from the indiscreet and mistaken zeal of their friends. It would seem as if the adversary, looking with a malignant eye upon the good effected by means of these enterprises, and seeking to destroy them, but despairing of the accomplishment of his purpose in the way of direct hostility, had devised this as his great expe-

dient—to join with them, under the semblance of pious zeal, and drive them on to such extremes, as must repel their best friends, create a strong reaction against them, deprive them of the public confidence, and thus in the end secure their overthrow. But whatever may be his agency, he doubtless looks with complacency upon the arrest of these useful enterprises; and owns, as peculiarly congenial, that spirit which is so efficient in hindering their progress.

The blighting effects of Radicalism upon its immediate subjects and objects, having been thus exhibited, we are now to show its influence upon *other persons* and *other causes*. It is, however, to two points only, in that wide circle of mischief which here opens before us, that we can direct the attention of our readers.

The Radical style of procedure alienates and repels a large class of persons, who might be gained to the cause of reformation were it wisely conducted. We allude to that class of men, who, either from principle or temperament, adhere to whatever has been long established, are averse to change, and suspicious of improvement. This class has always comprised some of the wisest and best men. Their opposition must always be formidable, while their concurrence would bring to any cause in which they might enlist, a great accession of strength. Such men are sure to be repelled by witnessing the folly and extravagance, the vulgarity and violence, which characterize the radical way of reforming, and the evil consequences which follow in its train. In view of these evils, they cling more tenaciously than before to every ancient institution and usage, however unimportant. Their fear of change, excessive before, becomes now their ruling passion; and they start at the very name of Reform, and tremble at the shadow of turning. Suspecting every reformatory effort of covering over some revolutionizing project, they decline or oppose it. Taking their stand on the existing state of things, with all its abuses, they thus fortify themselves as in a citadel; and can be neither drawn thence by the most alluring prospects of advantage, nor driven thence by the most terrible threatenings of overthrow. To every call for improvement, they turn a deaf ear. Composing themselves in supine and imperturbable quiet, they parry every appeal to reason and conscience, by arguments drawn from the evils of innovation; and answer every reproach from the zealous philanthropist, by the great maxim

of conservation—“*Better to be despised for too anxious apprehension, than ruined by a too confident security.*” The inflexibility, the immoveableness, the resolved unaddictedness to change, which these men exhibit, though bitterly complained of by Reformers, is an obstacle to their success, for which, in many cases, they may thank their own folly and rashness.

There remains one other general effect of Radicalism to be described. It is more deserving of notice, as more comprehensive of evil than all the rest. It is that in which, according to our view, consists the chief hurtfulness of this system—the head and front of its offending—in comparison with which, its injuring the character of a few individuals, or arresting the progress of a few particular enterprises, are hardly worth naming. *It is the tendency of Radicalism to suspend, or cut off, the good influences emanating from our fundamental institutions, literary, civil, and religious, even where it does not wholly subvert these institutions themselves.*

It will hardly be denied, that it is from civil government, with its laws and officers, its councils and courts, its rewards and penalties; from the church, with its ministry, its Sabbaths and sanctuaries, its Scriptures and sacraments; and also from literary institutions, as subordinate to the others, with the liberal studies, the arts and sciences, cherished in their bosom—that the influences are derived which constitute the well-being of society. It is the existence of these institutions, which distinguishes the civilized from the savage state. It is by their excellence that the true glory of a nation is to be estimated. Through their influence it is, that the grand traits of national character are formed, and the grand particulars of national destiny determined. Of all of them it may be justly said, that they are *ordained of God*; since in willing the happiness of human society, he must also be supposed to have willed the means necessary to this end. Of the institutions of government and religion, this is eminently true. In the highest sense, are these *of God*; and it is especially through the corrective and formative power which they exert, that He exercises his nurturing care over his human family, and would train us for the heavenly state. So intimately is the welfare of human society connected with the stability and prosperity of these institutions, that he who careth for us, has made them peculiarly sacred

and inviolable—has guarded them like the apple of his eye—has armed them, for their defence, with the power of the sword and of the keys—has required obedience to them on his own authority—has forbidden resistance, every manner of contempt, and even an evil word spoken against them, and annexed his own sanctions to their ordinances. Hence it is, that the crimes of treason and rebellion—of heresy, schism, and apostacy—and whatever else tends, not only to subvert these institutions, but in any way to impair their powers, are, by the common consent of civilized and Christian nations, regarded as capital offences—first against God, by whom they were ordained; and then against man, for whose benefit they were designed—and as justly liable to the highest civil penalties and ecclesiastical censures.

Now the Radical spirit, fraught as it is with contempt for these institutions, and opposition to them, envelopes the germ of all these crimes; and, when fully unfolded, produces them, and all their dreadful consequences. Viewed in this light, the great question of Conservation and Radicalism, which is now dividing the world, is of no trifling import. It is not, as often considered, one of those party questions, either side of which may be indifferently taken. It is not a question to be decided by taste, by birth, by class, or order. So far from this, it is a question of a highly moral nature—in the decision of which are involved the most solemn obligations of duty, on the one hand, and on the other, the deepest grades of criminality.

To say nothing here of the tendency of the Radical spirit utterly to subvert and overthrow these fundamental institutions, it is our design to show, that even while they continue, the good influences emanating from them are suspended, just so far as Radicalism prevails.

The good influence of these institutions depends on a few simple conditions on the part of those for whose benefit they are designed. The principal of these conditions are perhaps the following, viz. *that the public mind should be tranquil and undisturbed under the action of these institutions, that it should be penetrated with reverence and affection for them, and repose on their truth and divinity with unwavering confidence.*

The composure of the public mind is an essential condition of the efficacy of public institutions. The influences emanating from them are not sudden or striking, enabling

them to arrest and hold an averted or diverted attention. On the contrary, they are uniform, gentle, unobtrusive ; and accordingly require, in order that their powers may be experienced, a high degree of interested attentiveness and open susceptibility.

But this state of the public mind is wholly incompatible with the movements which the Radical spirit originates. These movements are bold, startling, and disturbing ; and are designed to be so, for the very sake of diverting the public interest from its proper and wonted objects to themselves. While they are bursting in rapid succession, and brilliant display, and captivating novelty, upon the astonished public, it can hardly be otherwise, than that the general interest felt for the old, established institutions, should be abated, and the diligence with which they are administered, be intermitted.

The effect of these rare measures upon what may be regarded as the regular daily business appointed by God for the advancement of society, is, to use a humble comparison, like that of a company of strolling players upon an industrious village. The worthless tricks and empty shows of jugglers and stage-actors are eagerly run after, and admiringly gazed at, and extravagantly paid for, by the simple villagers ; while those useful callings among them, by which their happiness might be greatly increased, are left to languish for want of encouragement and support. And not only so, but the active citizens,—the shop-keeper, the mechanic, the ploughman,—suspend meanwhile their respective employments ; and thus all useful business comes to a dead stand.—Not unlike this is the position into which our community is often thrown by the eccentric performances,—the grand *coups d'eclat*,—the antic feats of benevolence, played off before them by some of the vagrant actors on our public stage. These men, who despise the old-fashioned way of doing good, and have invented an improved method,—who can leap at results without the use of the necessary means,—these men who can conquer enemies by waving enchanted wands, open fast-closed doors by uttering mystic words, and break down impregnable walls by sounding magic horns,—these reforming Magicians of our times,—how often do they run away with the hearts and the money of the people ; while those upon whom the public prosperity really depends are left comparatively uncared for and unrewarded ! And

what is worse, the public functionaries themselves, the teacher, the magistrate, the pastor, are turned aside from the exercise of their appropriate callings, and join in the general amazement at the grand exploits of the wonder-workers in the business of reform !

But it is not merely by its strange and eccentric performances, addressed to an idle curiosity, that Radicalism diverts the public attention from its proper objects ; but by agitations of a far more serious nature, appealing to deeper and more absorbing principles. Wherever it prevails, it breaks the harmony of the constituent elements of society, interrupts the settled course of affairs, produces endless change and wide commotion, and brings about such a state of things as cannot be witnessed without solicitude, a sense of insecurity, and apprehension of coming danger. In such circumstances, whatever is even a little removed from the first care of self-preservation, is likely to be disregarded. When every thing around is shaking,—when the most momentous interests are in jeopardy,—when the question of life and death is brought home to every bosom,—in this vast confusion, of which the Radical spirit is the author, and in which it riots, as its congenial element,—it is not to be expected that much interest should be felt in any of those useful vocations, which depend for their successful prosecution upon present quiet, and for their reward, upon the perpetuity of the existing state of things. The price of public stocks rises and falls according to the variations in public confidence, with scarcely more precision, than the esteem in which those liberal pursuits are held, which flourish only in peace. Both means and motives are wanting to all the learned professions, in the midst of general disturbance, and in the prospect of general revolution. The higher exercises of genius, the more expanded aims of patriotism and Christian benevolence,—whatever tends to adorn and ennoble society, and has a prospective bearing upon its interests,—are, at such times, immeasurably depreciated ; while the demand proportionably rises for the lower political and military virtues, for the calculations of selfish policy, for soldier-courage, and brutal force,—and for all those sterner powers, which are necessary, indeed, for the preservation of society in perilous crises, but which, at the same time, drive it back towards barbarism, more rapidly than it ever advances thence, under better influences, towards civilization.

The unfavourable influence of public agitations upon learned pursuits, and all the departments of public instruction, is well described by Damiron in his *History of Philosophy in France in the nineteenth century*.* After portraying the French Revolution in vivid colours, he asks, "What place could there be in such circumstance, for the thoughts of science? How could peaceful speculations, such as are requisite in abstract studies, be permitted to minds preoccupied by concern with matters so grave? Where could minds be found either strong enough, or cold enough, not to trouble themselves with affairs which excited so much dread? Where could be found the Archimedes, who in the midst of this political ruin, could pursue his scientific investigations in cold blood? * * How many learned men, and men of letters, were thrown by this movement, beyond the sphere in which their taste and talent had placed them, and compelled to take part in the assemblies, in the armies, or in the government, until better days should permit them to return to their studies or their art! * * From 1789, and even earlier, there was a general remission of purely intellectual labours. In place of chairs and academies, they had tribunes and clubs. The peace of the closet no longer remained, but was sacrificed to other necessities. Public instruction, being either neglected or destroyed, in the prospect of being reformed, ceased to produce any results. And as for philosophy, which, more than any thing else, has need of order and calmness, it is easy to see that in such a state of men's minds, it could not receive a very assiduous cultivation. One does not live for philosophy in the midst of such agitations. It is not born, and does not flourish, except under the peaceful influence of deep security, outward peace, and a kind of intellectual leisure, which leave it without distraction, without trouble, and without alarm. It is a little with the psychologist as it is with the naturalist;—he observes ill during a storm;—he too has his atmosphere, and all the chances of the tempest which agitate and toss it. If he does not perceive around him that stability of institutions, that accord of minds, those pacific dispositions, which are essential conditions of successful study, he becomes apprehensive, active in self-defence, and absorbed in the dangers by which he is surrounded."

What is true of institutions for public instruction, that

* Damiron, *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France au dix-neuvième siècle*. Tom. I. p. 36, etc.

they require the repose of the public mind,—its freedom from agitating excitements, in order to the production of their appropriate effects, is pre-eminently true of our *religious institutions*. Their influence upon a mind harassed and disquieted, is compared in the Scriptures, to the sowing of seed among thorns. The cares of this life, the conflict of high-raised passions, solicitude and insecurity relating to our earthly lot, are indeed thorns, which choke the springing blade of that tender exotic, planted from above in the soul of man. If the powers of the world to come are to seize and mould the human heart, the claims of the present world upon our attention must not be urgent or imperious; but all around should be still and peaceful. In accordance with this truth, the Temple of Janus was closed when the Saviour appeared to set up his kingdom of peace in the world.

“ Nor war, nor battle’s sound
Was heard the world around,
The idle spear and shield were high up hung;
The hooked chariot stood,
Unstain’d with hostile blood,
The trumpet spake not to the armed throng.

“ And peaceful was the night;
Wherein the Prince of light,
His reign of peace upon the earth began.
The winds with wonder whist
Smoothly the waters kiss’d,
Whispering new joys to the mild Ocean,
Who now hath quite forgot to rave,
While birds of calm sit brooding on the charmed wave.”

“ It is according to the nature of things,” says the great Schleiermacher, in his eloquent *Work on Religion*, “ that in times of general confusion and revolution, the slumbering spark of religion should rarely be rekindled in the soul. However affectionately and patiently we may labour and wait, it will not in such times be kindled to life, even in those in whom, under more auspicious circumstances, it would have sprung into existence, in despite of hinderances, when no human institutions remain unshaken;—when we see those very things which determine our place in the world, and which link us in the earthly order, ready every moment not only to leave us, and be seized by others, but to be swept down in an all-absorbing vortex;—while some are straining every nerve, and calling aloud for aid from every quarter, to uphold what they regard as the very pillars of

art, of science, and of the social world, which seem now, through a mysterious destiny, to be spontaneously heaving themselves from their deepest foundations, and tearing off what has for ages twined around them; and while others are hurrying with the same restless zeal to clear away the rubbish of centuries, that they may be the first to settle on the fearful soil formed beneath them by the lava of the terrible volcano, yet scarcely cooled;—when every one, even without leaving his own place, is so violently shaken with the convulsions of the great whole, that he must be rejoiced, if, amidst the general whirl, he can fix his eye on a single object long enough to hold himself by it, and convince himself that any thing is yet standing;—in such a state of things, it were vain to expect that many could be found disposed to cultivate and cherish religious feelings, which flourish best in a state of calm. It is indeed true, that the aspect of the moral world is never more sublime and majestic than in the midst of such confusion, and that the light then condensed in momentary gleams is more intense than that of ages beside. But who can then save himself from the general agitation and solicitude? Who then can escape the power of selfish interest, at such times tenfold more urgent than at others? Who is able to behold all this, and maintain a settled and undisturbed composure?*

We have dwelt longer on the unfriendly bearing of public commotions and excitement, upon the best interests of society, because in this country we are peculiarly prone to them, and have, generally speaking, a very inadequate sense of their evils. In further illustration of these evils, we cannot forbear citing Lord Bacon's beautiful Fable on the mischiefs of tumult. "In Orpheus' theatre, all beasts and birds assembled; and forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably together, listening to the airs and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, than every beast returned to his own nature. Wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which so long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence, and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is

* Schleiermacher's Reden ueber die Religion, R. III. p. 143.

society and peace maintained. But if these instruments be silent, or sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion."

Now the Radical spirit is the great and universal AGITATOR. It is its proper work to disturb the repose so essential to the experience of the liberalizing and elevating powers of our literary, civil, and religious institutions. It is seditious and tumultuous Radicalism which makes that louder noise which drowns the airs and accords of Orpheus' harmonizing harp,—which makes inaudible the instruments by which men are sweetly touched, reclaimed from their savageness, and bound together in a well-ordered, virtuous, and happy society. So far, then, as Radicalism prevails, it does, by disturbing the public tranquillity, suspend or cut off the good influences emanating from our fundamental institutions.

It is a well known fact, in the natural world, that dews never fall on windy nights. And it is equally true, in the moral world, that the gentle and salubrious influences descending upon us from learning, law, and religion,—the silent and refreshing dews distilling from these higher spheres of light, order, and love,—are all swept away while the surface of society is traversed, to and fro, by the hurricanes of revolutionary Reform.

Another of the conditions above specified as indispensable to the efficacy of our public institutions, is, *that they should be regarded with veneration and love.* To enable them to command the respect and engage the affections of men, they have been wisely surrounded with certain appendages of form and ceremony, which may indeed be regarded as unessential to their existence, but which are useful, as conferring upon them, dignity and attractiveness. Viewed in this light, however unimportant they may be in themselves, they are not less approved by an enlightened reason, than owned and loved by a feeling heart.

But to the Radical spirit nothing is so intolerably offensive as these ceremonial appendages, wherever, and in whatever degree of simplicity it may find them. In connexion with secular institutions, it regards them as foolish and absurd; in connexion with religious institutions, as superstitious and abominable. It would strip from Government and Religion every vestige of that graceful drapery with which the hand of God, and the wisdom and piety of ages have conspired to array them, and leave them in the cold nakedness

of their earliest origin,—in the unadorned and sordid condition in which they emerged from the midst of barbarism.

Radicalism is thus to the outward institutions of Government and Religion, what *Rationalism* is to the principles and doctrines which lie at their basis ; since it is the office of both to divest their respective objects of every thing which is mysterious,—of every thing which appeals to the fancy or the feelings,—of every thing which cannot endure the unsparing and heartless scrutiny of a superficial understanding. To speak more accurately of the relation subsisting between these two regent powers of the modern world,—Radicalism is the practical execution of the speculative scheme of Rationalism. It is the arm which accomplishes, what the narrow wisdom of the Rationalist devises, and seeks to conform every thing to his pitiful standard. Radicalism has been the constant attendant, and ready executor, of this new sprung Illuminism,—the destroying heat inseparable from this false light,—kindling in fury upon every object which proved impervious to those intrusive rays which would leave nothing unilluminated,—and burning away at least those comely and obscuring veils which have covered our institutions with a venerable and impressive mystery, even where it has not insinuated itself into the very frame of the institutions themselves, and dissolved their very substance, leaving them in frightful ruins,—fit monuments to mark the progress of these joint conquering powers of Rationalism and Radicalism !

The last condition above named as essential to the efficacy of our fundamental institutions, is, that *the public mind should repose on their truth and divinity with unwavering confidence*. Settled faith is the great subjective condition on which depends the efficacy of every moral cause. What influence can such a cause exert over one who has no faith in it ? And since it is of the moral, and not of the physical or coercive powers of our institutions that we are speaking, it is obvious, that their influence must be just so far suspended, as men are of a doubting mind with regard to them.

But the Radical spirit is one of scepticism, with regard to all established institutions. Not content with tearing away their ceremonial appendages, it would bring their most essential parts into constant revision. To one into whose mind this spirit has breathed itself, nothing is settled,—nothing is

sacred. Great antiquity, the consent of ages, the authority of the wise and good, so far from constraining his belief for any institution, usage or opinion, are the highest incentives to his doubts ; and strange to say, he demands stricter proof for whatever has been long established and generally received, than for the most unfounded innovations. He will not only patiently hear first principles and foundation truths called in question, but is unwilling to have them settled ; he loves to be drifted away from those rocks to which others cling. He is always waiting for *new light* on things about which others wish for none, and hails, as the signs of coming day, what others dread as omens of gathering night. He is ever learning, but never comes to the *knowledge* of the truth,—never reposes on it with peaceful and unwavering confidence. And the doubts which he originates, he communicates to others ; and not to select persons, by whom they might be resolved, but to all with whom he meets,—to those who otherwise would never have dreamed of them,—who are more unable than himself to come to a satisfactory decision about them, and who will be thrown by them either into painful and irretrievable perplexity, or more probably, into downright unbelief.

Now what good influence can any institutions be expected to have when persons are thus disposed evermore to hold them in suspicion, and to subject them to discussion ? As well may a tree bear fruit, when its boughs are tossed with a daily tempest, and its roots heaved from the earth by a mighty frost, as any public institutions produce their appropriate effects, when swayed about by every wind of doctrine, and unsettled by idle questions and disputations.

This free and popular discussion is peculiarly adverse to the influence of *Religious Institutions*. While it is proceeding, that pious reverence entertained for them by the sound-hearted believer, is gradually worn away. His faith in them is first shaken, then destroyed. And the scepticism thus engendered, soon extends its influence beyond its first object to the whole circle of divine things, and becomes the settled, often the unalterable habit of the mind. A man's religious faith, like his personal honour, is a delicate thing, which is sullied even by the breath of suspicion. Like honour, too, while it is easily destroyed, it is hard to be recovered.

The nature and relations of the objects of religion, im-

pose upon religious discussion certain restrictions, which cannot be safely or innocently disregarded. The sacredness of these objects should exclude every degree of levity from their discussion. Their essential incomprehensibility should check the presumption which would solve their mysteries, and make them perfectly intelligible. The momentous interests staked on their belief, should overawe the voluntary prurience of doubts, and make them unwelcome to the mind. The deep hold they take of the feelings of men, should forbid the utterance of any dissentient views, which are not judged of sufficient importance to overbalance the harm of the strifes and parties which they will certainly engender, and should lead those who are constrained to publish their doubts, to study to do it in such a way, as not to shock the sensibilities of Christian people, or diminish their respect for the authority of Revelation.

These just restrictions are, however, intolerable to the Radical spirit. Under its influence many seem to have lost all sense of the danger of disturbing the public faith, and even to be ambitious of the honour of quitting the beaten track, and striking out new paths of religion. No matter how mysterious the objects of their doubts may be, or how intimately connected with the most sacred associations of mankind,—no matter how trifling may be their objections, or how recently they may have occurred, even if they have not yet taken shape in their own minds; they still proclaim them, and often in a way the most wounding to pious sensibilities; and, with a zeal proportioned to the insignificance of its objects, endeavour to proselyte the world to their wavering creed.

As to the abstract right of discussing the doctrines, institutions, and usages of religion, there can be no question: and none, certainly, as to the extreme impropriety of throwing out immature suspicions, and especially scornful cavilings, respecting objects on which the public faith has been accustomed to repose, and around which its most sacred associations have long been entwined. Of those who allow themselves in this free and irreverent discussion, the least that can be said, is, that they know not what they do. *New light* may be increased by their discussions, but faith and reverence proportionately decline. While they amuse themselves with this solemn trifling with divine things, Infidelity makes rapid inroads. Who that has witnessed the course of these discussions among us, and traced their effects, is not

ready to agree with Burke, that "it is the misfortune (not as these gentlemen think it, the glory) of this age, that every thing is to be *discussed* ; as if our institutions were always to be a subject rather of altercation, than of enjoyment." And in comparison with those who expect so much advantage from this discussion, who will not think Burke nearer right, when he says, "there is no improvement to be expected in the great truths and institutions of morality and religion. They were understood as well before we were born, as they will be when the grave has heaped its mound on our presumption, and the tomb imposed its law on our pert loquacity."

Never can we experience the fulness of the renovating power which belongs to Christianity until we shall cease from those free discussions of its principles and constitution, for which a disputative humour will always find occasion ;—until, wearied and wasted by controversies, we shall come, in unity of spirit, to receive this divine religion, with that submissive and cordial faith which it requires. Then, the conditions on our part being answered, might we expect to see, in the fruits of peace and righteousness which would every where abound, how rich are its resources for blessing the world. It is to be feared, however, from present appearances, that we have first to learn, in a still lower religious declension, and in the wider prevalence of irreligion, how far these resources may be rendered unavailing, through continued controversy. To us belong the admonitions and warnings addressed by John Howe to his contemporaries : "If we love divine truth, why do we not feed and live upon it, and enjoy its pleasant relishes ; but relish gravel more, or chaff, or bran ; for thither the agitation of continued controversy about it, doth soon sift it, the grain of flour,—the kidney of wheat,—being passed away, and gone from us. Can none remember when the disputative humour had eaten out the power and spirit of practical godliness ? Thither things are again tending, if God, by severity or mercy, do not repress that tendency."

It will be perceived, that we have forborne to enlarge on the tendency of Radicalism *utterly to subvert and overthrow* our fundamental institutions. That this is its tendency, there can be no doubt. Were its principles to be carried out to their legitimate results in practice, all government would be prostrated, every institution demolished, and society resolved into a chaos far more horrid than that which

furnished the original necessity for its formation. But, through the interposition of that Being, who is the author of peace, and the lover of concord, these effects are rarely permitted, and when they do occur, are too obvious to require, and too awful to admit of any delineation. We have chosen, therefore, to confine our remarks upon our last general topic, to the effects of Radicalism in suspending the influences of our various institutions, even while they exist; effects which, from being ordinary, ought to be noticed, while they are less likely to be observed, from being negative in their character. Still, if what has been said be true, even these effects cannot be made light of. Let any one consider to what an extent the public mind is diverted from our fundamental institutions, either by the worse than worthless expedients which Radicalism would substitute for them, or by the all-absorbing apprehension and solicitude which Radicalism induces;—how the public heart is alienated from them by the unveiled nakedness and almost squalid poverty in which Radicalism has left them;—how the public faith in them is shaken by the endless questions which Radicalism engenders and protrudes,—let any one candidly consider these things, and he will be driven to the conclusion, that, as for all the high ends for which they are designed, these institutions might almost as well be overthrown, as to have the conditions of their utility thus for ever frustrated. How can a people be expected to advance in intelligence, in social refinements and virtues, in religious duties and joys, when the grand means of this advancement are cut off? If the influences emanating from these institutions are the life of public virtue and happiness, what can be expected from the withholding of the one, but the decline of the other? Surely as plants die in winter, must knowledge, social order, and piety perish, during a long-continued suspension of the genial and vital powers of our literary, civil, and religious institutions. Surely as a cold and dark shadow falls from the cloud which intercepts the light and heat of the sun, will ignorance, lawlessness, and irreligion, in triple folds of shade, rest on that spot of earth, between which, and those lights planted in the moral heavens to rule and bless us, the Evil Angel of Radicalism spreads abroad his dusky pinions. And where that blighting shadow long abides, there must every thing which renders Christian civilization desirable, gradually disappear, and all which renders Pagan barbarism dreadful, soon succeed. To predict famine, war, and pesti-

lence, when the sun and moon are eclipsed, is indeed superstitious ; but there is no superstition in foretelling a dearth of knowledge, the conflict of the social elements, and the plague of vice, when the lights of the moral world are prevented from shining. To ascribe these natural eclipses to the Principle of Evil contending with the Principle of Good, is indeed superstitious ; but there is no superstition in ascribing these moral obscurations to the Prince of Darkness, and the Ruler of the powers of the air. Mischief on so large a scale is worthy of him, and can hardly have an inferior author. And the Radical spirit, instrumental as it is in producing these moral eclipses, must therefore be regarded as, at least, one of his impersonations, if not as absolutely identical with him, and as entitled, by way of eminence, to the name of **THE ENEMY**, and the **DESTROYER**. Implacably hostile to our institutions, obscuring these luminaries of the moral system, and threatening to destroy them, the Radical spirit cannot be better designated than as the Great Dragon of eastern mythology, supposed, when eclipses are seen, to be devouring the heavenly bodies.

Thus have we attempted to portray some of the pernicious effects resulting from Radicalism. Our picture has not been drawn from fancy, (though touched, it may be, with some of her colours,) but from the living page of history. When we look around on the individuals who have been actuated by the Radical spirit,—upon the particular objects to which it has been directed,—upon the whole sphere in which it has moved, we see confirmation strong of all which has been said. Nor are the evils now described, its accidental effects, merely, but on the contrary, its natural and almost necessary fruits.—The ruin of personal character,—the ruin of every benevolent enterprise,—the ruin of every public interest, are the foot-prints, by which you may surely trace the progress of this Destroyer. The particular evils now witnessed and deplored may pass away, but only to reappear, so long as this spirit is not cast out from those it has possessed, and driven from the abodes of men. The labours of patient philanthropy will scarcely have repaired the desolation of the last eruption, before the rising villa and flowering vintage will be again laid waste by a new lavatide, disgorged from the same volcanic centre, whose dying fires are ever kept alive and fanned to fury by the whirlwind passions prisoned in its bosom.

LITERARY NOTICE.

The Ministry we Need. Three Inaugural Discourses, delivered at Auburn, June 18th, 1835. "—*ἀνθρ λόγιος, δυνατός ἐν ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς.*"—Acts xviii. 24. New-York, Taylor & Gould.

THIS neat little volume comprises the inaugural sermon, charge, and address, which were delivered on occasion of inducting the PROFESSOR OF SACRED RHETORIC AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY, in the Auburn Theological Seminary. The sermon, by the Rev. J. W. Adams, of Syracuse, is a finished, eloquent, and deeply interesting production. After an introductory allusion to the burning ardour, the invincible energy, and the unparalleled self-devotion, which Paul brought to the work of the ministry, the author proposes to illustrate and establish the proposition, *That emotion in the preacher is necessary to an effective and successful proclamation of the Word of God.* Nor has he failed in his object. Having explained the term *emotion*, and limited its meaning to "that deep and holy movement of the affections, which has been produced by the energy of truth understood and believed," he proceeds to show that the themes on which the preacher is called to dwell demand emotion; that the want of emotion amounts to a demonstrative denial of the truth and importance of his message; that the advantages which truth has in the hands of a living preacher, over the same truth on the pages of inspiration, consist mainly in the power which he possesses of giving expression to the various emotions which truth is adapted to inspire; that those preachers who have been anointed with the unction of holy emotion have been far more successful than others; that the condition of our hearers is such as to call for emotion; that the Spirit of God exerts his sanctifying power chiefly upon the affections, which are the great sources of emotion; and, in conclusion, answers the enquiry, *How may this important attribute be secured to the ministry?* by the following positions:—that faith is the main-spring of all true emotion; that the preacher cannot feel an adequate and uniform interest in his work, without possessing profound and practical views of the truth; that great advantage may be derived from a familiar acquaintance with the works of such men as Leighton, Baxter, Howe, Edwards, and Payson; that parochial labours, faithfully performed, will strongly tend to sustain and deepen the interest which is felt in the ministerial work; that a previous self-application of the truths of the gospel, is indispensable, before the preacher can be duly qualified to speak to others, in a spirit that shall commend his message and honour his master; and lastly,—after remarking that, in his judgement, habits of extemporaneous delivery will contribute an important advantage for securing to preaching the attribute of emotion,—that to give an efficient and sacred unction to the ministry, it will be necessary to accompany it continually with prayer.

Had we room, it would afford us pleasure to adorn our notice of this sermon with some of its glowing passages and burning thoughts; but we commend it to the perusal—if not of some clergymen in particular—of all theological students;—convinced, with its author, that as, on the one hand, "the great interests of the church are never so jeopardized as when committed to the care of men, who feel strongly, but know nothing;" so on the other, "that not all the endowments which the most profound and varied learning can give, will render a frigid preacher of the truth, a successful one."

The charge, which was delivered on the same occasion, by the Rev. Eliakim Phelps, of Geneva, has the rare merit of *brevity*, though it happily sketches the leading traits which are demanded in the ministry at the present day. Indeed, there is a remarkable coincidence between the topics which were successively introduced on the inaugural occasion; and as we are given to understand that it was undesigned, it renders these respective performances more interesting, and imparts to the title of the volume redoubled emphasis—*the ministry we need.*

The attention of most readers of this volume, will be particularly directed to the *Inaugural Address*—not, however, to the disparagement of the other reverend gentlemen who officiated on the occasion, but because every thing which comes from the pen of Dr. Cox is *sui generis*. We do not pretend to judge this distinguished individual by other men, but *by himself*; and the only question, in view of his performances, which ever occurs to us as exactly appropriate, is—*Does he fall below himself?* If he does not, we are very far from being dissatisfied, much less disposed to captiousness.

We never expect that Dr. Cox will confine himself to *Walkerian* words, or that he will observe Blair's rules of composition, or that he will not occasionally digress from the logical heads of his discourse. His is not a mind for ordinary trains of thought or modes of speech. We look for occasional words, which, though uncommon or never used, convey his exact idea to all who are acquainted with the structure of language; for views which spring from a deep acquaintance with the Scriptures; for sentiments which bespeak a soul smitten with the love of truth, while we expect to be gratified by the corruscations of his genius, animated by his ardour, and emboldened by his faithfulness.

The friends of Dr. Cox will not be disappointed in his inaugural address. It bears the impress of his talents and piety—his enlarged views and catholic spirit. To analyze it, would convey no adequate idea of its merits.

We prefer to *hear*, than to *read* the doctor's thoughts; yet he writes very much as he speaks; and it is our custom, in order to read his composition to advantage, to place this "excellent nobleman of nature and grace," in the sacred desk, and in imagination to listen to his tones of earnestness and energy, to mark his appropriate gestures, and watch the varying expressions of his spirit-speaking face.

His theme is the ministry of reconciliation—"the chosen medium by which God conciliates men—the mighty moral enginery that accomplishes his brightest wonders—the authentic diplomacy of the King of kings, *working salvation in the midst of the earth*." The manner in which he treats his subject, in relation to the importance of the Christian ministry, and *the kind of ministry needed in this age and nation*, we need hardly remark, will amply repay the perusal of his brethren, if not be interesting and instructive to the church at large.

"Error-accusing notoriety" may not altogether like the odour of this little book; and the "lynx-eyed detectors of heresy" will not be forward to approve a work in which they are handled with such unsparing severity; but by "all the favourers, on principle, of a pious, sound, educated, scriptural, and accomplished ministry, in the church of God and throughout the whole world, as the MINISTRY WE NEED, to whom this little volume is most respectfully inscribed," it will be read, and, we trust, circulated.

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